CN108983165B - Substation selection-based anti-deception jamming method for multi-station radar system - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention provides a substation selection-based anti-deception jamming method for a multi-station radar system, which comprises the following implementation steps: a multi-station radar system transmits signals; receiving an echo signal by a multi-station radar system; calculating a deception distance estimation value; identifying the deceptive jamming and the target; calculating the minimum mean square error of the deception distance estimation value; and optimizing the number of radar stations. The invention can use part of radar stations in the multi-station radar system to effectively resist the deception jamming and can be used for saving the resource loss of the multi-station radar system.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of radars, and further relates to a substation selection-based method for resisting deception jamming of a multi-station radar system in the technical field of multi-station radars.
Background
In today's complex electromagnetic environment, in order to ensure the concealment of a real target, an interference machine is usually deployed around the real target, interference modulation is performed on a received radar detection signal, and the radar detection signal is forwarded back to the radar after parameters of the radar detection signal are changed so as to disturb the detection and tracking of the radar on the real target. In order to obtain target information more quickly and accurately and ensure the stability of information sources, radars are connected into a network through a communication means and are matched for use to form a multi-station radar system, and meanwhile, a method for resisting deceptive interference is added. After independent detection of each radar station in the multi-station radar system, joint processing is carried out in a fusion center, and true and false targets are identified. Compared with a single-station radar for detecting the target independently, the combined detection method becomes a higher-performance processing mode. Therefore, it is another effective method to discriminate the detected target by the way of estimating the parameters of the target for the spoofing distance. The method is based on echo processing of all radar stations in a multi-station radar system. Through analyzing the past simulation experiments, the number of the radar stations and the station arrangement position are particularly important in anti-interference performance, so that the increase of the number of the radar stations is an effective mode for improving the anti-interference performance. However, too many radar stations can severely increase system resource waste, resulting in unnecessary energy consumption.
S. Zhao et al, in its published article "Signal fusion-based algorithms to discrete double radio targets and deletion jam in distributed multiple-radio architecture" (IEEE Sensors J., vol.15, No.11, pp.6697-6706, Nov.2015), propose a method for anti-spoofing interference based on multi-station joint detection. The method comprises the following steps: firstly, each radar transmitting station detects a target, and each receiving station receives an echo signal; secondly, obtaining an estimated value of the time delay tau by using a maximum likelihood estimation method; thirdly, calculating a cheating distance delta d according to the estimated value of the time delay tau; and fourthly, designing an optimal discriminator by using the cheating distance delta d and the CRLB thereof to discriminate the true and false targets. The method has the disadvantages that in the process of detecting the target and resisting the deceptive jamming, the transmitting stations and the receiving stations of all node radars are required to be used, so that the resource waste is caused in the implementation process.
The west ampere electronic technology university discloses a deception jamming resisting method of a networked radar system in a patent technology 'networked radar system deception jamming resisting method' (application number: 201410200662.3 application date: 2014.05.13 publication number: 103954943B). The method mainly solves the problem of deception jamming resistance of the networked radar system. The method comprises the following implementation steps: firstly, for n node radars, obtaining a distance unit corresponding to p point targets according to detection, and obtaining a slow-time random complex envelope sequence of each point target; second step of radar detection of ith nodeiSlow-time random complex envelope sequence of point targets and pth node radar detectionjEstimating the correlation coefficient between slow time random complex envelope sequences of the targets; thirdly, setting a real part of the correlation coefficient as a correlation measurement; fourth step estimating point targetThe slow time random complex envelope sequence and the corresponding target noise ratio are used for solving the correlation measurement and selecting a detection threshold according to the expected value; fifthly, performing active false target correlation inspection on any two point targets according to an inspection threshold; and step six, traversing and checking each target in the i-th node radar and the j-th node radar, and eliminating active false targets of the targets, thereby achieving the purpose of anti-deceptive interference. The method has the defects that the method excessively depends on slow time random complex envelope of the target, all node radars are required to continuously detect the echo envelope of the target, and the method cannot be used for the situation that a certain node radar is out of service when the method is used in actual engineering.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a substation selection-based anti-cheating false target method for a multi-station radar system, aiming at solving the problems in the prior art, so as to reduce the transmission requirement, the calculation complexity and the equipment requirement among radar stations and optimize the whole resources.
Aiming at the anti-deception interference of the multi-station radar system, the multi-station radar system receives a transmitting signal, calculates a deception distance estimation value to identify the deception interference and a true target, calculates the minimum mean square error of the deception distance estimation value, optimizes the number of radar stations, and uses part of the radar stations to realize the effective countermeasure to the deception interference.
The method comprises the following specific steps:
(1) the multi-station radar system transmits signals:
a transmitting station in a multi-station radar system transmits a group of transmitting signals with orthogonal waveforms to an airspace where a target to be tracked is located, wherein the transmitting signals are narrow-band signals,
wherein, betakRepresenting the bandwidth of the transmitted signal, fcRepresents the carrier frequency of the transmitted signal;
(2) each receiving station in the multi-station radar system receives an echo signal at each moment;
(3) calculating a deception distance estimation value;
(3a) extracting a time delay parameter in an echo signal by using a maximum likelihood detection formula;
(3b) calculating a deception distance between the deception jamming and a true target by using an Euclidean distance formula;
(4) determining a deceptive jamming and true target:
judging the target with the deception distance between the deception interference and the true target larger than the discrimination threshold as the deception interference; judging the target with the deception distance between the deception jamming and the true target smaller than the discrimination threshold as the true target;
(5) and (3) calculating the minimum mean square error of the deception distance estimation value:
(5a) calculating each element value in the minimum mean square error transition matrix by using a Claimello boundary calculation formula;
(5b) and (3) calculating the minimum mean square error of the deception distance estimation value by utilizing a third-order matrix determinant calculation formula:
(6) optimizing the number of radar stations:
(6a) setting a receiving station selection vector and a transmitting station selection vector as zero vectors;
(6b) calculating the Euclidean distance between the target and each transmitting station and each receiving station;
(6c) setting a selection vector corresponding to a transmitting station and a receiving station with the minimum Euclidean distance to a target as 1;
(6d) utilizing a Claimello range calculation formula to calculate the minimum mean square error of the selected radar subarray on the deception distance estimation value,
(6e) selecting any transmitting station and any receiving station from the radar stations with the selection vector of 0 to form a temporary transition radar group;
(6f) calculating the minimum mean square error of the temporary transition radar group to the deception distance estimation value;
(6g) judging whether the mean square error of the deception distance estimation value of the temporary transition radar group is lower than a threshold value, if so, executing the step (6e), otherwise, setting a selection vector corresponding to a radar station in the temporary transition radar group to be 1 and then executing the step (7);
(7) and closing the radar station corresponding to the selection vector 0, and tracking the target by using the radar station corresponding to the selection vector 1.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages:
firstly, the target with the deception distance between the deception jamming and the true target larger than the discrimination threshold is judged as the deception jamming; the target with the deception distance between the deception jamming and the true target being smaller than the discrimination threshold is judged as the true target, the defect of high calculation complexity in the prior art when the slow-time random complex envelope processing is carried out on the target is overcome, and the efficiency of the radar for processing the echo signal is improved.
Secondly, because the radar station corresponding to the selection vector 0 is closed, and the radar station corresponding to the selection vector 1 is used for tracking the target, the using number of the radar stations is reduced, the defect of resource waste in the prior art is overcome, and the using resources of the equipment are saved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of an implementation of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a simulation of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention is described in further detail below with reference to the attached drawings.
The specific implementation steps of the present invention are described in further detail with reference to fig. 1.
Step 1, a transmitting station in a multi-station radar system transmits a group of transmitting signals with orthogonal waveforms to an airspace where a target to be tracked is located, wherein the transmitting signals are narrow-band signals,
wherein, betakRepresenting the bandwidth of the signal, fcRepresenting the carrier frequency of the signal.
And 2, each receiving station in the multi-station radar system receives the echo signal at each moment.
Step 3, extracting the time delay parameter in the echo signal according to the following formula:
wherein τ represents a time delay parameter, α represents the amplitude of an echo signal, ≧ dt represents an integration operation, T represents the duration of a set of signals with orthogonal waveforms transmitted by a transmitting station in the multi-station radar system, r (T) represents an echo signal received by a receiving station in the multi-station radar system at time T, and s (T) represents a set of signals with orthogonal waveforms transmitted by the transmitting station in the multi-station radar system at time T; the spoof distance between the spoof interference and the true target is calculated according to the following formula:
where deltad represents the spoof distance between the spoof interference and the true target,
indicates an operation of opening root, xt，ytAn abscissa and an ordinate, x, representing the tth transmitting station in a multi-station radar systemr，yrAnd x and y represent the abscissa and ordinate values of the target.
Step 4, calculating the discrimination threshold of the deceptive jamming and the true target according to the following formula:
wherein eta represents the discrimination threshold of the deceptive jamming and the true target,
indicating a square distribution of the tower
Inverse cumulative distribution function of PPTIndicating expected pair truth set by anti-disturber personnelAnd (3) determining the probability of identifying the real target, namely determining the deceptive jamming and the real target: judging the target with the deception distance between the deception interference and the true target larger than the discrimination threshold as the deception interference; and judging the target with the deception distance between the deception jamming and the true target being smaller than the discrimination threshold as the true target.
A21＝A12
wherein, | | denotes an absolute value taking operation, A11，。A22，A12，A21And respectively representing the element values corresponding to a first row, a first column, a second row, a second column, a first row, a second column and a second row, a first column and a second column in the minimum mean square error transition matrix.
The minimum mean square error of the spoofed range estimate is calculated as follows:
wherein σΔdRepresenting the minimum mean square error of the spoofed range estimates, M representing the total number of transmitting stations in the multi-station radar system, M representing the serial number of transmitting stations in the multi-station radar system, N representing the total number of receiving stations in the multi-station radar system, N representing the serial number of receiving stations in the multi-station radar system, c representing the speed of light,
representing the variance of complex white Gaussian noise, A11,A12,A21,A22The values of the elements corresponding to the first row, the first column, the second row, the second column, the first row, the first column and the second row, respectively, in the minimum mean square error transition matrix, | · | represents determinant operation, and a represents the minimum mean square error transition matrix.
And 6, optimizing the number of the radar stations.
Setting the receiving station selection vector and the transmitting station selection vector as zero vectors, calculating Euclidean distances between a target and each transmitting station and each receiving station, and setting the selection vector corresponding to the transmitting station and the receiving station with the minimum Euclidean distance to be 1.
And calculating the minimum mean square error of the selected radar subarrays on the spoofed distance estimation value according to the following formula:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
represents the estimated minimum mean square error of the selected radar subarrays over the spoofed range,
and
representing the case where the transmitting station and the receiving station are selected: when the l-th transmitting station or the k-th receiving station is selected, it will
And
setting the sequence number as 1, otherwise, setting the sequence numbers as 0, m 'and n' to respectively represent the sequence numbers of a transmitting station and a receiving station in the multi-station radar system in the second round of traversal, and respectively setting the sequence numbers as m 'and n' to respectively represent the sequence numbers of a transmitting station and a receiving station in the third round of traversalThe serial numbers of the transmitting and receiving stations in the system are 2 x 2 for two rows and two columns and 3 x 3 for three rows and three columns.
And selecting any transmitting station and any receiving station from the radar stations with the selection vector of 0 to form a temporary transition radar group, calculating the minimum mean square error of the temporary transition radar group to the deception distance estimation value, judging whether the mean square error of the deception distance estimation value of the temporary transition radar group is lower than the minimum mean square error of the deception distance estimation value set by an anti-interference party according to the expected interference discrimination probability, if so, continuously selecting any transmitting station and any receiving station from the radar stations with the selection vector of 0 to form the temporary transition radar group, calculating the minimum mean square error of the deception distance estimation value of the temporary transition radar group, and if not, setting the selection vector corresponding to the radar stations in the temporary transition radar group to be 1 and then executing the step 7.
And 7, closing the radar station corresponding to the selection vector 0, and tracking the target by using the radar station corresponding to the selection vector 1.
The effects of the present invention can be further demonstrated by the following simulation experiments.
1. Simulation conditions are as follows:
the simulation experiment of the invention is realized by Matlab simulation software, a multi-station radar system is set, wherein, five transmitting stations and seven receiving stations are arranged, the positions of the transmitting stations and the receiving stations are shown in table 1, the set cheating distance of the cheating interference is 2km, and the bandwidth of the transmitting signal is 500 MHz.
TABLE 1 transmitting station and receiving station location information Table
2. Simulation content and result analysis:
the simulation experiment of the invention adopts the substation selection-based multi-station radar system anti-deception jamming method, and uses a transmitting station for transmitting signals and a receiving station for receiving signals to identify the deception jamming, so as to obtain the substation selection result schematic diagram of fig. 2. The abscissa in fig. 2 represents the x-axis coordinate, and the ordinate represents the y-axis coordinate. The positions indicated by solid triangles in fig. 2 represent the positions of the transmitting stations in the selected multi-station radar system, the positions indicated by open triangles represent the positions of the transmitting stations in the switched-off multi-station radar system, the positions indicated by solid circles represent the positions of the receiving stations in the selected multi-station radar system, and the positions indicated by open circles represent the positions of the receiving stations in the switched-off multi-station radar system.
As can be seen from fig. 2, when the method of the present invention is used for deception interference discrimination, 3 transmitting stations and 2 receiving stations are selected, and 2 transmitting stations and 5 receiving stations are closed.
Claims (7)
1. A substation selection-based anti-deception jamming method of a multi-station radar system is characterized in that the multi-station radar system receives a transmitting signal echo, deception jamming and targets are determined through deception distance estimated values, the number of radar stations is optimized, and effective countermeasures to the deception jamming are achieved through partial radar stations; the method comprises the following specific steps:
(1) the multi-station radar system transmits signals:
a transmitting station in a multi-station radar system transmits a group of transmitting signals with orthogonal waveforms to an airspace where a target to be tracked is located, wherein the transmitting signals are narrow-band signals,
wherein, betakRepresenting the bandwidth of the transmitted signal, fcRepresents the carrier frequency of the transmitted signal;
(2) each receiving station in the multi-station radar system receives an echo signal at each moment;
(3) calculating a deception distance estimation value;
(3a) extracting a time delay parameter in an echo signal by using a maximum likelihood detection formula;
(3b) calculating a deception distance between the deception jamming and a true target by using an Euclidean distance formula;
(4) determining a deceptive jamming and true target:
judging the target with the deception distance between the deception interference and the true target larger than the discrimination threshold as the deception interference; judging the target with the deception distance between the deception jamming and the true target smaller than the discrimination threshold as the true target;
(5) and (3) calculating the minimum mean square error of the deception distance estimation value:
(5a) calculating each element value in the minimum mean square error transition matrix by using a Claimello boundary calculation formula;
(5b) and calculating the minimum mean square error of the deception distance estimation value by using the following third-order matrix determinant calculation formula:
wherein σΔdRepresenting the minimum mean square error of the spoofed range estimates, M representing the total number of transmitting stations in the multi-station radar system, M representing the serial number of transmitting stations in the multi-station radar system, N representing the total number of receiving stations in the multi-station radar system, N representing the serial number of receiving stations in the multi-station radar system, c representing the speed of light,
representing the variance of complex white Gaussian noise, A11,A12,A21,A22Respectively representing values of elements corresponding to a first row and a first column, a first row and a second column, a second row and a first column, and a second row and a second column in the minimum mean square error transition matrix, | · | represents determinant operation, and A represents the minimum mean square error transition matrix;
(6) optimizing the number of radar stations:
(6a) setting a receiving station selection vector and a transmitting station selection vector as zero vectors;
(6b) calculating the Euclidean distance between the target and each transmitting station and each receiving station;
(6c) setting a selection vector corresponding to a transmitting station and a receiving station with the minimum Euclidean distance to a target as 1;
(6d) utilizing a Claimello range calculation formula to calculate the minimum mean square error of the selected radar subarray on the deception distance estimation value,
(6e) selecting any transmitting station and any receiving station from the radar stations with the selection vector of 0 to form a temporary transition radar group;
(6f) calculating the minimum mean square error of the temporary transition radar group to the deception distance estimation value;
(6g) judging whether the mean square error of the deception distance estimation value of the temporary transition radar group is lower than a threshold value, if so, executing the step (6e), otherwise, setting a selection vector corresponding to a radar station in the temporary transition radar group to be 1 and then executing the step (7);
(7) and closing the radar station corresponding to the selection vector 0, and tracking the target by using the radar station corresponding to the selection vector 1.
2. The substation selection-based multi-station radar system anti-spoofing interference method of claim 1, wherein the maximum likelihood detection formula in step (3a) is as follows:
where τ denotes a time delay parameter, α denotes an amplitude of an echo signal, - [ mu ] T denotes an integration operation, T denotes a duration of a set of signals with orthogonal waveforms transmitted by a transmitting station in the multi-station radar system, r (T) denotes an echo signal received by a receiving station in the multi-station radar system at time T, and s (T) denotes a set of signals with orthogonal waveforms transmitted by the transmitting station in the multi-station radar system at time T.
3. The substation selection-based multi-station radar system anti-spoofing interference method according to claim 2, wherein the euclidean distance formula in step (3b) is as follows:
where deltad represents the spoof distance between the spoof interference and the true target,
indicates an operation of opening root, xt，ytAn abscissa and an ordinate, x, representing the tth transmitting station in a multi-station radar systemr，yrAnd x and y represent the abscissa and ordinate values of the target.
4. The substation selection-based multi-station radar system anti-spoofing interference method of claim 1, wherein the discrimination threshold in step (4) is obtained by the following formula:
wherein eta represents the discrimination threshold of the deceptive jamming and the true target,
indicating a square distribution of the tower
Inverse cumulative distribution function of PPTRepresenting the probability of identifying the true target set by the anti-disturber person in anticipation.
5. The substation selection-based multi-station radar system anti-spoofing interference method according to claim 3, wherein the Clarameltem calculation formula in step (5a) is as follows:
A21＝A12
wherein, | | denotes an absolute value taking operation, A11，A22，A12，A21And respectively representing the element values corresponding to a first row, a first column, a second row, a second column, a first row, a second column and a second row, a first column and a second column in the minimum mean square error transition matrix.
6. The substation selection-based multi-station radar system anti-spoofing interference method according to claim 1, wherein the Clarameltem calculation formula in step (6d) is as follows:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
represents the estimated minimum mean square error of the selected radar subarrays over the spoofed range,
and
representing the case where the transmitting station and the receiving station are selected: when the l-th transmitting station or the k-th receiving station is selected, it will
And
and otherwise, setting to be 1, setting to be 0, wherein m 'and n' respectively represent the serial numbers of the transmitting station and the receiving station in the multi-station radar system in the second round of traversal, m 'and n' respectively represent the serial numbers of the transmitting station and the receiving station in the multi-station radar system in the third round of traversal, 2 × 2 represents that the matrix dimension is two rows and two columns, and 3 × 3 represents that the matrix dimension is three rows and three columns.
7. The substation selection-based multi-station radar system cheat-interference resisting method according to claim 1, wherein the threshold value in step (6g) is the minimum mean square error of a cheat distance estimation value set by an anti-interference party according to an expected interference discrimination probability.
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