CN108810901A - A kind of malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain - Google Patents
A kind of malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain Download PDFInfo
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- CN108810901A CN108810901A CN201810345311.XA CN201810345311A CN108810901A CN 108810901 A CN108810901 A CN 108810901A CN 201810345311 A CN201810345311 A CN 201810345311A CN 108810901 A CN108810901 A CN 108810901A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/02—Details
- H04L12/14—Charging, metering or billing arrangements for data wireline or wireless communications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
- H04L67/1095—Replication or mirroring of data, e.g. scheduling or transport for data synchronisation between network nodes
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
- H04M15/00—Arrangements for metering, time-control or time indication ; Metering, charging or billing arrangements for voice wireline or wireless communications, e.g. VoIP
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
- H04M15/00—Arrangements for metering, time-control or time indication ; Metering, charging or billing arrangements for voice wireline or wireless communications, e.g. VoIP
- H04M15/47—Fraud detection or prevention means
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/24—Accounting or billing
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Power Engineering (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention relates to the malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain,Public fraud number block chain including multiple interrelated formation of alliance's chain node,User connects after a phone,Judge whether the phone that current phone is answered is fraud phone according to dialog context,When the phone answered is fraud phone,User generates label information to malice number and is sent to associated alliance's chain node,Alliance's chain node to label information count and block is written in the set of the label information of acquisition by timing,Obtain the block data of alliance's chain node,It forms block head and is added on public fraud number block chain,Public fraud number block chain is the database at center,It can not distort,It can only add,It can trace,It can be proved with time series,The propagation of each number mark information uses distributed frame in alliance's chain,Renewal speed is fast and greatly improves the safety of data.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to mobile Internet security fields more particularly to block chain applied technical fields, and in particular to one
Malice number mark recognition methods of the kind based on block chain.
Background technology
The case where telecommunication fraud mode emerges one after another at present, and various distribution harassing calls and personal information are usurped by people
It happens occasionally, we can generally install the software of a certain manufacturer on mobile phone now, and then be carried out when having phone to come in
Prompt, these security softwares for putting harassing and wrecking are required to database to support at present, but the data between producer are without timely
It synchronizes, and be constantly needed to the maintenance of software vendor and data service could constantly improve its function, the cost run in this way is just
The case where meeting is very high, and there are number limited amounts, it is difficult to take precautions against comprehensively, and data validity can not ensure that data are deposited
In the possibility being tampered.
Invention content
In view of this, a kind of malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain of disclosure of the invention, more comprehensively
Quickly malice number is marked and decentralization.
A kind of malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain of offer of the present invention, including several alliance's chain nodes,
Block data is preserved in each alliance's chain node, at least two alliance's chain nodes are connected with each other, and make phase
The block data of the alliance's chain node to connect realizes data sharing, builds a public fraud number block chain, and user connects
After one phone, judge whether the phone that current phone is answered is fraud phone according to dialog context, when the electricity answered
When words is cheat phone, user is marked by user terminal to be generated label information for malice number and is sent to associated
The label information that associated all user terminals are sent is carried out statistics and forms statistics by alliance's chain node, alliance's chain node
As a result, when the statistical result reaches certain threshold value, which the set of the label information of acquisition is written
Block obtains the block data of alliance's chain node, forms complete block head, and the block head is added into described public take advantage of
It cheats on number block chain, any user terminal associated by multiple alliance's chain nodes can add the public fraud number
Block data in block chain is preserved, when user terminal is connected to incoming call again, if number be malice number, directly into
Row identification shows the label information.
Further, the label information includes total statistics number of malice number and the number, unit interval internal standard
Remember number and label proportion.
Further, the method for the set write-in block of the label information is to calculate the hash value of a block,
The filled write-in block of label information is formed into block head, the block data structures for obtaining alliance's chain node are：<
PreviousBlockHash, P1, P2 ..., Pn, Nonce, Requirement>；Institute is then calculated according to Requirement
It states in alliance's chain node and meets the Nonce required as follows, form complete block head, be included in the public fraud number block
Chain so that
Zero(Hash(PreviousBlockHash||P1||P2||...||Pn||Nonce))>Requirement；
Wherein, PreviousBlockHash is the hash value of a upper block, and P1, P2 ..., Pn are respectively to be disliked in block
Anticipate number label information, Requirement be Hash function return values since first 0 number；
Further, the input of the Zero () function is the return value of Hash functions, and the output of Zero () function is meter
Leftmost continuous 0 number for calculating the Hash function return values is calculated since first position of Hash function return values.
Further, the Hash functions are arbitrary cryptography Hash functions, and the Hash functions include SHA1 and SHA2.
Further, the result of calculation of the Hash functions is a Bit String.
Further, the Bit String includes 64 bits, 128 bits or 256 bits.
Further, the block data of alliance's chain node includes Timestamp, can to fraud number it is effective into
Line trace.
Further, the number of alliance's chain node statistics each malice number on public fraud number block chain,
And statistical data is sent in the APP databases of each user mobile phone and is preserved.
Further, the method for the set write-in block of the label information is POW, POS or digital signature.
The advantageous effect that technical solution provided by the invention is brought is：The propagation of each number mark information in alliance's chain
All use distributed frame, can directly by the alliance, chain node is sent directly to other alliance's chain link points and is shared, alliance's chain
In need not be that each the malice number that intercept of needs reserves a specific position, but voluntarily participates in marking by user
And shared between all alliance's chain nodes, renewal speed is fast and greatly improves the safety of data.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is a kind of flow chart of the malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is block data structures schematic diagram in the present invention.
Specific implementation mode
To make the object, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention clearer, below in conjunction with attached drawing to embodiment party of the present invention
Formula is further described.
It please refers to Fig.1 and Fig. 2, embodiment of the invention discloses that a kind of malice number mark identification side based on block chain
Method, including several alliance's chain nodes preserve block data, at least two alliance's chains in each alliance's chain node
Node is connected with each other, and the block data for the alliance's chain node being connected with each other is made to realize data sharing, and structure one is public to take advantage of
Cheat number block chain.
User connects after a phone, judges whether the phone that current phone is answered is fraud electricity according to dialog context
Words, when the phone answered is fraud phone, user is marked to be generated label information by malice number and be sent to and close
The label information is carried out Statistic analysis by alliance's chain node of connection, alliance's chain node, it is determined whether is needed corresponding information
Block is added and then forms statistical result, when the statistical result reaches certain threshold value, which will obtain
Label information set be written block, obtain the block data of alliance's chain node, form complete block head；
In the present embodiment, when each user is after being connected to a phone, the doubtful fraud number P that oneself is thought gives birth to
At the alliance's chain node being sent to after label information associated by oneself, subsequent alliance's chain node by current 10 minutes (including
10 minutes) label information of doubtful fraud number that receives carries out judging whether to need that block is added in corresponding information, simultaneously will
Be judged as doubtful fraud telephone number P1, P2 of number, P3 ..., the label information of Pn is counted and is gathered is packed into
The statistical result for gathering packed label information is spliced into Bit String by Hash functions and is used as Hash functions by statistical result
The input of algorithm generates the Bit String of regular length after the calculating of Hash functions, and Hash functions can be arbitrary cryptography Hash letters
Number, including SHA1 and SHA2, and the result of calculation of Hash functions are a Bit Strings, and the length of Bit String is by the Hash letters chosen
Number decision, including：64 bits, 128 bits, 256 than top grade, will be described then when statistical result reaches certain threshold value
Block is written in statistical result, and wiring method is：
The filled write-in block of label information is formed block head, obtained by the hash value for calculating a block
The block data structures of alliance's chain node are：<PreviousBlockHash, P1, P2 ..., Pn, Nonce,
Requirement>；It is then calculated in alliance's chain node according to Requirement and meets the Nonce required as follows, shape
At complete block head, it is included in the public fraud number block chain so that
Zero(Hash(PreviousBlockHash||P1||P2||...||Pn||Nonce))>Requirement；
Wherein, PreviousBlockHash is the hash value of a upper block, and P1, P2 ..., Pn are respectively to be disliked in block
Anticipate number label information, Requirement be Hash function return values since first 0 number；Zero () function
Input is the return value of Hash functions, and the output of Zero () function is calculate the Hash function return values leftmost continuous 0
Number, calculated since first position of Hash function return values.Requirement is an integer, is less than Hash letters
The length of several return values, including：4,10, this value define Hash function return values first starts, it is necessary to how many
A 0.
After the nonce for the condition that meets is calculated, write into block, alliance's chain node of generation
Block data structures：<PreviousBlockHash, P1, P2 ..., Pn, Nonce, Requirement>；It is then formed complete
Block head, and be added into the public fraud number block chain, the block of alliance's chain node all between alliance's chain altogether
It is added on the public fraud number block chain enjoyed, and is about scheduled on a longest chain and adds.
When there is propagation delay time, the blocks of alliance's chain node or other alliance's chain nodes is being added to described public take advantage of
It cheats on number block chain it is possible that bifurcated, once there is bifurcated situation, subsequent described alliance's chain node or other connection
The block addition of alliance's chain node selects longest bifurcated.
The doubtful fraud number each of on public fraud number block chain of each alliance's chain node statistic record simultaneously
Number, statistical data is sent in the APP databases of each user node (be typically mobile phone) preserves (or exhaled in the number
Number is informed to each user when being some user), i.e., the cell phone application of user shows the number while showing number
The number being recorded on public fraud number block chain.
Simultaneously in order to which to the effective into line trace of fraud number, (including 10 minutes) are interior in current 10 minutes receives
Doubtful fraud number P1, P2, P3 ..., Pn generates label information and timestamp is added in gather packing when
Timestamp, and binding marker information carries out Hash functions and block data structures is calculated：
<PreviousBlockHash, Timestamp, P1, P2 ..., Pn, Nonce, Requirement>；
It is possible thereby to record the timing node of every a label information, and shared on each alliance's chain node,
Form the data that can not be distorted, can not forge.
Particularly, the method for the set write-in block of the label information can also be POW, POS or digital signature.Herein
No longer repeat one by one.
It is described in the present invention that specific embodiments are merely illustrative of the spirit of the present invention.Technology belonging to the present invention
The technical staff in field can make various modifications or additions to the described embodiments or by a similar method
It substitutes, however, it does not deviate from the spirit of the invention or beyond the scope of the appended claims.
In the absence of conflict, the feature in embodiment and embodiment herein-above set forth can be combined with each other.The above institute
Only presently preferred embodiments of the present invention is stated, is not intended to limit the invention, all within the spirits and principles of the present invention, made by
Any modification, equivalent substitution, improvement and etc. should all be included in the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain, it is characterised in that：It is each including several alliance's chain nodes
Block data is preserved in alliance's chain node, at least two alliance's chain nodes are connected with each other, and mutually to interconnect
The block data of the alliance's chain node connect realizes data sharing, builds a public fraud number block chain, and user connects one
After phone, judge whether the phone that current phone is answered is fraud phone according to dialog context, when the phone answered is
When cheating phone, user is marked by user terminal to be generated label information for malice number and is sent to associated alliance's chain
The label information that associated all user terminals are sent is carried out statistics and forms statistics knot by node, alliance's chain node
Fruit, when the statistical result reaches certain threshold value, alliance's chain node is periodically by the set write area of the label information of acquisition
Block obtains the block data of alliance's chain node, forms complete block head, and the block head is added into the public fraud
On number block chain, any user terminal associated by multiple alliance's chain nodes can add the public fraud number area
Block data in block chain is preserved, and when user terminal is connected to incoming call again, if number is malice number, is directly carried out
Identification shows the label information.
2. the malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that：The label information
Total statistics number, unit interval internal labeling number including malice number and the number and label proportion.
3. the malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain as claimed in claim 1 or 2, it is characterised in that：The label
The method of the set write-in block of information is to calculate the hash value of a block, and the filled of label information is written
Block forms block head, and the block data structures for obtaining alliance's chain node are：<PreviousBlockHash, P1,
P2 ..., Pn, Nonce, Requirement>；It is then calculated in alliance's chain node and is met such as according to Requirement
The Nonce of lower requirement forms complete block head, is included in the public fraud number block chain so that
Zero(Hash(PreviousBlockHash||P1||P2||...||Pn||Nonce))>Requirement；
Wherein, PreviousBlockHash is the hash value of a upper block, and P1, P2 ..., Pn are respectively malice number in block
Code label information, Requirement be Hash function return values since first 0 number.
4. the malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain as claimed in claim 3, it is characterised in that：The Zero () letter
Several inputs is the return value of Hash functions, and the output of Zero () function is calculate the Hash function return values leftmost
Continuous 0 number is calculated since first position of Hash function return values.
5. the malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain as claimed in claim 3, it is characterised in that：The Hash functions
For arbitrary cryptography Hash functions, the Hash functions include SHA1 and SHA2.
6. the malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain as described in claim 3 or 5, it is characterised in that：The Hash
The result of calculation of function is a Bit String.
7. the malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain as claimed in claim 6, it is characterised in that：The Bit String packet
Include 64 bits, 128 bits or 256 bits.
8. the malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain as claimed in claim 3, it is characterised in that：Alliance's chain link
The block data of point includes Timestamp, can be to the effective into line trace of fraud number.
9. the malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that：Alliance's chain link
The number of point statistics each malice number on public fraud number block chain, and statistical data is sent to each user mobile phone
APP databases in preserve.
10. the malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that：The label letter
The method of the set write-in block of breath is POW, POS or digital signature.
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| CN201810345311.XA CN108810901A (en) | 2018-04-17 | 2018-04-17 | A kind of malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain |
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| CN201810345311.XA CN108810901A (en) | 2018-04-17 | 2018-04-17 | A kind of malice number mark recognition methods based on block chain |
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Cited By (17)
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| CN109327627A (en) * | 2018-11-27 | 2019-02-12 | 深圳声笑科技有限公司 | Telephone number recognition methods, device and storage medium based on block chain |
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| CN110636037A (en) * | 2019-07-02 | 2019-12-31 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | One-number multi-card service application method, user node, operator system and block chain |
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| CN109327627A (en) * | 2018-11-27 | 2019-02-12 | 深圳声笑科技有限公司 | Telephone number recognition methods, device and storage medium based on block chain |
| CN111327771A (en) * | 2018-12-17 | 2020-06-23 | ***通信集团青海有限公司 | Method and device for identifying crank call number |
| CN111355852A (en) * | 2018-12-21 | 2020-06-30 | 西安佰才邦网络技术有限公司 | Method and equipment for acquiring contact number based on block chain |
| CN111355852B (en) * | 2018-12-21 | 2024-04-05 | 西安佰才邦网络技术有限公司 | Method and equipment for acquiring contact number based on blockchain |
| CN111371941A (en) * | 2018-12-26 | 2020-07-03 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method and device for preventing harassing call, terminal and storage medium |
| WO2020135393A1 (en) * | 2018-12-26 | 2020-07-02 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Nuisance call prevention method and device, terminal, and storage medium |
| CN111385322A (en) * | 2018-12-28 | 2020-07-07 | ***通信集团山西有限公司 | Blacklist number sharing system, method, device, equipment and storage medium |
| CN111385322B (en) * | 2018-12-28 | 2023-11-21 | ***通信集团山西有限公司 | System, method, device, equipment and storage medium for sharing blacklist number |
| US11831660B2 (en) | 2019-01-31 | 2023-11-28 | China Internet Network Information Center | Blockchain-based method and system for handling domain name abuse |
| CN111510415B (en) * | 2019-01-31 | 2022-09-16 | ***通信集团终端有限公司 | Method, device, equipment and storage medium for sharing and identifying blacklist number |
| WO2020155205A1 (en) * | 2019-01-31 | 2020-08-06 | 中国互联网络信息中心 | Domain name abuse processing method and system based on blockchain |
| CN111510415A (en) * | 2019-01-31 | 2020-08-07 | ***通信集团终端有限公司 | Method, device, equipment and storage medium for sharing and identifying blacklist number |
| CN110636037A (en) * | 2019-07-02 | 2019-12-31 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | One-number multi-card service application method, user node, operator system and block chain |
| CN110636037B (en) * | 2019-07-02 | 2021-11-26 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | One-number multi-card service application method, user node, operator system and block chain |
| CN110505623A (en) * | 2019-08-23 | 2019-11-26 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | A kind of method, system and server handling labeled number complaint |
| CN110505623B (en) * | 2019-08-23 | 2022-09-02 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Method, system and server for processing marked number complaint |
| CN112532780A (en) * | 2019-09-19 | 2021-03-19 | 中国电信股份有限公司 | Anti-harassment information processing method and system |
| CN111567012A (en) * | 2019-10-11 | 2020-08-21 | 支付宝(杭州)信息技术有限公司 | Decentralized automated phone fraud risk management |
| US10958780B1 (en) | 2019-10-11 | 2021-03-23 | Alipay (Hangzhou) Information Technology Co., Ltd. | Decentralized automatic phone fraud risk management |
| JP2021532427A (en) * | 2019-10-11 | 2021-11-25 | アリペイ (ハンジョウ) インフォメーション テクノロジー カンパニー リミテッドAlipay (Hangzhou) Information Technology Co., Ltd. | Decentralized automatic phone fraud risk management |
| WO2020011286A3 (en) * | 2019-10-11 | 2020-06-25 | Alipay (Hangzhou) Information Technology Co., Ltd. | Decentralized automatic phone fraud risk management |
| WO2020011286A2 (en) | 2019-10-11 | 2020-01-16 | Alipay (Hangzhou) Information Technology Co., Ltd. | Decentralized automatic phone fraud risk management |
| CN110955729A (en) * | 2019-12-02 | 2020-04-03 | 中国银行股份有限公司 | Block chain based cheating client information sharing method, equipment and system |
| CN111132172A (en) * | 2019-12-30 | 2020-05-08 | 山东爱城市网信息技术有限公司 | Method, device and medium for preventing telecommunication fraud based on block chain |
| CN111770500A (en) * | 2020-06-24 | 2020-10-13 | 江苏荣泽信息科技股份有限公司 | Method for preventing telecommunication fraud based on block chain |
| CN111787159A (en) * | 2020-07-02 | 2020-10-16 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Block chain-based crank call identification method and system |
| CN111787159B (en) * | 2020-07-02 | 2022-03-18 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Block chain-based crank call identification method and system |
| CN112862505A (en) * | 2021-03-03 | 2021-05-28 | 中国工商银行股份有限公司 | Anti-fraud information sharing method and device based on block chain |
| CN113542504A (en) * | 2021-07-15 | 2021-10-22 | 中国银行股份有限公司 | Block chain-based harassing call marking method and device |
| CN113542504B (en) * | 2021-07-15 | 2022-12-23 | 中国银行股份有限公司 | Block chain-based harassing call marking method and device |
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Application publication date: 20181113 |