CN107342900A - A kind of allocation of computer device of signal communication bag - Google Patents
A kind of allocation of computer device of signal communication bag Download PDFInfo
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- CN107342900A CN107342900A CN201710562999.2A CN201710562999A CN107342900A CN 107342900 A CN107342900 A CN 107342900A CN 201710562999 A CN201710562999 A CN 201710562999A CN 107342900 A CN107342900 A CN 107342900A
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- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 28
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 6
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims description 14
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims description 7
- 238000000205 computational method Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000010276 construction Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000013507 mapping Methods 0.000 abstract description 3
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 abstract description 2
- 229910006119 NiIn Inorganic materials 0.000 description 2
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000000686 essence Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008054 signal transmission Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
- H04L41/08—Configuration management of networks or network elements
- H04L41/0803—Configuration setting
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3006—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters
- H04L9/302—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters involving the integer factorization problem, e.g. RSA or quadratic sieve [QS] schemes
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W40/00—Communication routing or communication path finding
- H04W40/24—Connectivity information management, e.g. connectivity discovery or connectivity update
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims (2)
- A kind of 1. allocation of computer device of signal communication bag, it is characterised in that the allocation of computer device bag of the signal communication bag Include:Transmitting terminal, computer, router, receiving terminal;Transmitting terminal is connected by wireless network with computer, and computer is connected by netting twine with router, and router passes through wireless Network and the connection received;The wireless network user attribute private key generation:Attribute authority (aa) mechanism unit is using system public key PK and main private key MK as input, the attribute for the user terminal decrypted as needed List L=(L1, L2..., Ln), wherein, n is the number of attribute in system, generates attribute private key SKLAnd it is sent to user terminal; Specifically include:The first step, attribute authority (aa) mechanism unit is in ZpIn randomly select r, r '1, r '2..., r 'nWith r "1, r "2..., r "n, calculateSecond step, ifAttribute authority (aa) mechanism unit calculatesOtherwiseAttribute Weight Prestige mechanism unit calculatesWhereinIth attribute w in expression systemiNiKth in individual valueiIndividual value,Represent attribute wiNegative value;3rd step, attribute authority (aa) mechanism unit calculateMake Di=(DI, 1, DI, 2);4th step, attribute authority (aa) mechanism unit calculateMake Fi=(FI, 1, FI, 2);5th step, attribute authority (aa) mechanism unit make SKL=(L, D0, { Di, Fi}1≤i≤n);The computer includes communication domain path control deivce, encryption chip;The router includes:Wireless sending module;The router is for the specific method of the verification operation of encryption data:Step 1: the existence of search key:When data user only receives the A of Cloud Server return, data are used first The public key of owner is verified to A;IfThen pass through checking;C is decrypted operation acquisition pair Claim key sk1, decryption A obtains Bloom filter BF, if BFverify (w)=0, it is meant that user institute is not present on Cloud Server The keyword of search, conversely, rejecting returning result;Step 2: the correctness of search key:When data user receives { W, F, A, B, C }, W/f is calculated1WithIfIllustrate correctly, conversely, explanation is error result;Step 3: the integrality of the data file address comprising keyword w:When data user demonstrates the correctness of keyword Afterwards, then B is verified, ifThen sk is obtained by decrypting C1, and then obtain target data File;The encryption method of the router includes:Trusted authority center operation RSA Algorithm is that Cloud Server and data owner generate public private key pair:{(n1,e1),d1And {(n2,e2),d2};Data owner ensures the integrality of data file by digital signature;With the public key of Cloud Server to close Literary keyword is re-encrypted to prevent the offline guessing attack of external attacker, when data owner uses SYMEnc() encryption is calculated Method returns to the address of encryption file, is designated as ID { F to being contracted out to Cloud Server, server after data file encryptioni, so include Keyword w data file is represented by IDw=ID { F1}||ID{F2}…||ID{Fi};Specifically include:Step 1: initialization (1l):Trusted authority center selects Bilinear map:e:G×G→GT, G and GTIt is the circulation that rank is p Group, p are the primitive element of l bit longs, select the hash function under random oracleH1:{0,1}*→G;H2:{0,1}*→ZpIt is one-way Hash function, selects a, b, c ← Zp, g ← G,Pm=(H1,H2,e,g,p,ga,gb,gc,G,GT),Mk=(a, b, c)Then k independent hash function H ' are chosen1,…,H'k, for the Bloom filter BF transmissions of the construction m bits of m bits It is that data owner and Cloud Server generate public private key pair { (n to data owner1,e1),d1And { (n2,e2),d2};Step 2: key generation (mk, T):Trusted authority center performs Share (T, ac) algorithm, accesses tree T each leaf Node can all obtain the part about secret ac and share qv(0), to each leaf node v ∈ lvs (T), t ← Z is chosenp, calculateAnd Bv=gt, note private key sk=(T, Av,Bv)|v∈lvs(T));Step 3: the encryption to keyword and file address:(w, atts, ID (w)) data owner passes through trusted authority center The hash function generation Bloom filter of transmission, BF ← BFGen ({ H '1,…,H'k},{w1,…,wl), to containing keyword w Data file address IDwAnd Bloom filter, SYMEnc() AES is encrypted, symmetric key sk1:BFEnc=SYM (BF), (IDw)Enc=SYM (IDw);User data owner is to BFEnc(IDw)EncSigned:To sk1It is encrypted with ABE () AES:C=ABE (sk1);After search terminates, attribute meets that the validated user can decryption C of access strategy obtains sk1, and then decrypt and obtain target File;Select r1,r2←Zp, calculateF=(f1,f2) wherein To each atj∈ Atts, calculateW is encrypted to obtain with the public key of serverIt can so remember that ciphertext keyword is:Cph=(Atts, W', WE,W0,Wj,F,A,B,C);Step 4: generation search password (sk, w):Select s ← Zp, each leaf node v ∈ lvs (T) are calculated Searching for password istok2=gcs, with the public key of server to tok2It is encrypted: Remember tk=(tok1,(tok2)Enc,T,(A′v,B′v)|v∈lvs(T));Step 5: search (tk, cph):Server chooses property set S to meet to search in password the access tree specified from cph, If such set S is not present, 0 is returned;Conversely, to each atj∈ S, calculateWith reference to (T, Ev| att (v) ∈ S), meter CalculateAnd thenServer decrypts W with the private key of oneselfE, (tok2)EncObtain W and tok2If e (W', tok1)Eroot=e (W, tok2), return to { W, F, A, B, C } and give user;Otherwise, only Return to A;Step 6: checking { W, F, A, B, C }:After data user receives the search result of Cloud Server return, checking behaviour is carried out Make;The receiving terminal includes:Wireless receiving module, deciphering chip, processing module.
- 2. the allocation of computer device of signal communication bag as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that the wireless receiving module Optimal transmission power computational methods include:CSU node is are in its transmission time slot tiIt is interior that idle letter can be accessed by the way of TDMA Road, and can be with speed in downlinkTransmit data, speedExpression formula be:<mrow> <mtable> <mtr> <mtd> <mrow> <msubsup> <mi>v</mi> <mi>i</mi> <mi>C</mi> </msubsup> <mo>=</mo> <munder> <mi>&Sigma;</mi> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> <mo>&Element;</mo> <msub> <mi>L</mi> <mi>C</mi> </msub> </mrow> </munder> <msub> <mi>t</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <msub> <mi>log</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mrow> <msubsup> <mi>H</mi> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> <mo>,</mo> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> <mi>j</mi> </msubsup> <mo>&CenterDot;</mo> <msup> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mrow> <munderover> <mi>&Sigma;</mi> <mrow> <mi>b</mi> <mo>=</mo> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> <mi>m</mi> </munderover> <msubsup> <mi>X</mi> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> <mo>,</mo> <mi>b</mi> </mrow> <mi>j</mi> </msubsup> </mrow> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> <mrow> <mo>-</mo> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </msup> </mrow> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </mtd> </mtr> <mtr> <mtd> <mrow> <mo>&times;</mo> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mrow> <msub> <mi>&omega;</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mi>I</mi> <mo>+</mo> <msub> <mi>&lambda;</mi> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> <mo>,</mo> <mi>m</mi> </mrow> </msub> <munder> <mi>&Sigma;</mi> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> <mo>&Element;</mo> <msub> <mi>L</mi> <mi>C</mi> </msub> </mrow> </munder> <munderover> <mi>&Sigma;</mi> <mrow> <mi>b</mi> <mo>=</mo> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> <mi>m</mi> </munderover> <msubsup> <mi>X</mi> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> <mo>,</mo> <mi>b</mi> </mrow> <mi>j</mi> </msubsup> </mrow> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </mtd> </mtr> </mtable> <mo>;</mo> </mrow>Wherein ωiRepresent the Lagrange multiplier associated with CSU power;Optimal transmission power assignment problem is formulated as equation group:<mrow> <mtable> <mtr> <mtd> <munder> <mi>max</mi> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> <mo>&Element;</mo> <msub> <mi>N</mi> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> <mi>S</mi> <mi>U</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </munder> </mtd> <mtd> <msubsup> <mi>v</mi> <mi>i</mi> <mi>C</mi> </msubsup> </mtd> </mtr> <mtr> <mtd> <mrow> <mi>s</mi> <mo>.</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mrow> <mi>F</mi> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> <mo>:</mo> </mrow> </mtd> <mtd> <mrow> <munder> <mi>&Sigma;</mi> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> <mo>&Element;</mo> <msub> <mi>L</mi> <mi>C</mi> </msub> </mrow> </munder> <mo>|</mo> <msubsup> <mi>H</mi> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> <mo>,</mo> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> <mi>j</mi> </msubsup> <mo>|</mo> <mo>&le;</mo> <msubsup> <mi>P</mi> <mi>max</mi> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> <mo>,</mo> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </msubsup> </mrow> </mtd> </mtr> <mtr> <mtd> <mrow> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mrow> <mi>F</mi> <mn>2</mn> </mrow> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> <mo>:</mo> </mrow> </mtd> <mtd> <mrow> <msubsup> <mi>I</mi> <mi>m</mi> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> <mi>S</mi> <mi>U</mi> </mrow> </msubsup> <mo>&le;</mo> <munder> <mi>&Sigma;</mi> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> <mo>&Element;</mo> <msub> <mi>L</mi> <mi>C</mi> </msub> </mrow> </munder> <mo>|</mo> <msubsup> <mi>H</mi> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> <mo>,</mo> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> <mi>j</mi> </msubsup> <mo>|</mo> <mo>&CenterDot;</mo> <munderover> <mi>&Sigma;</mi> <mrow> <mi>b</mi> <mo>=</mo> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> <mi>m</mi> </munderover> <mo>|</mo> <msubsup> <mi>X</mi> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> <mo>,</mo> <mi>b</mi> </mrow> <mi>j</mi> </msubsup> <mo>|</mo> </mrow> </mtd> </mtr> </mtable> <mo>;</mo> </mrow>Wherein NCSURepresent the set of CSU nodes.
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Citations (4)
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US20110320809A1 (en) * | 2010-06-23 | 2011-12-29 | Motorola, Inc. | Method and apparatus for key revocation in an attribute-based encryption scheme |
CN104636292A (en) * | 2013-11-10 | 2015-05-20 | 西安汉威数控设备有限公司 | Computer configuration device for signal communication package |
CN104993929A (en) * | 2015-05-15 | 2015-10-21 | 西安邮电大学 | Attribute-based encryption system and method supporting system attribute expansion |
CN104038349B (en) * | 2014-07-03 | 2017-05-03 | 西安电子科技大学 | Effective and verifiable public key searching encryption method based on KP-ABE |
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Patent Citations (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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US20110320809A1 (en) * | 2010-06-23 | 2011-12-29 | Motorola, Inc. | Method and apparatus for key revocation in an attribute-based encryption scheme |
CN104636292A (en) * | 2013-11-10 | 2015-05-20 | 西安汉威数控设备有限公司 | Computer configuration device for signal communication package |
CN104038349B (en) * | 2014-07-03 | 2017-05-03 | 西安电子科技大学 | Effective and verifiable public key searching encryption method based on KP-ABE |
CN104993929A (en) * | 2015-05-15 | 2015-10-21 | 西安邮电大学 | Attribute-based encryption system and method supporting system attribute expansion |
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Inventor after: Xue Geli Inventor after: Wang Wanping Inventor after: Wang Honglei Inventor after: Wang Jing Inventor after: Huang Zhaoji Inventor before: Chen Huanying Inventor before: Wang Wanping Inventor before: Cui Dong Inventor before: Sun Peishuo Inventor before: Wang Honglei Inventor before: Wang Jing |
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Effective date of registration: 20171219 Address after: No. 5, courtyard No. 1, courtyard 23, Shuguang street, Xinhua District, Xinhua District, Henan Province Applicant after: Xue Geli Address before: No. 5, courtyard No. 1, courtyard 23, Shuguang street, Xinhua District, Xinhua District, Henan Province Applicant before: Chen Huanying |
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Application publication date: 20171110 |