CN107181732B - Physical layer secret communication method based on modulation symbol phase rotation - Google Patents
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Abstract
A physical layer encryption communication method based on modulation symbol phase rotation, a symbol of a rectangular MQAM is formed by superposing P mutually independent 4QAM symbols, and the safe transmission of data between legal users is realized by randomly rotating the phases of the P4 QAM symbols; both sides of a legal user determine the seed number of the chaotic sequence generator used for generating random numbers according to the channel reciprocal theorem and the negotiation mechanism by utilizing the channel state information, periodically update the seed number, reset the chaotic sequence generator to generate a new chaotic sequence, and obtain an approximately independent P group of uniformly distributed random sequences through an interleaver. The reciprocity and negotiation mechanism of the channel ensure the consistency of phase rotation of the two parties, and the randomness of the channel ensures that an eavesdropper cannot obtain a random rotation phase consistent with a transmitting end. The invention enables a legal user to realize safe data transmission in a static channel or quasi-static channel environment, and has higher safety.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of wireless communication and information security, in particular to a physical layer secret communication method based on modulation symbol phase rotation.
Background
Physical layer security has recently received wide attention from researchers as a scheme for secure communication that can be theoretically proven, and the mainstream physical layer security technologies can be classified into two categories according to the presence or absence of a secret key.
In the keyless physical layer security technique, the secret capacity is defined as a difference between a channel capacity of a legitimate channel (a channel between legitimate users) and a channel capacity of an eavesdropping channel (a channel between a sender and an illegitimate user). When the secret capacity is larger than 0, absolute safe transmission can be realized among legal users; when the secret capacity is less than 0, the secure transmission of information can no longer be guaranteed. Due to channel fading, it may happen that the channel capacity of the legitimate channel is smaller than that of the eavesdropping channel, so that it cannot be guaranteed that the secret capacity is always larger than 0. The secret technology of the physical layer without the secret key proposed at present mainly makes the secret capacity greater than 0 by methods of artificial noise, wave velocity forming, diversity and the like, thereby realizing the absolute safety of information transmission. At present, channel coding for realizing secret key-free secure communication is in a theoretical exploration stage, a secret key-free physical layer security technology only stays in a theoretical research stage, and the secret key-free physical layer security technology is not applied to civil communication or military communication.
The other type of technology corresponds to the physical layer security technology without keys, and the other type of technology is the physical layer security technology with keys, and the technology mainly utilizes the random characteristic and reciprocity of a channel to generate keys and encrypts information to be transmitted at a data link layer. However, this kind of method is not suitable for all communication situations, for example, when the channel of the legitimate user is a static channel or a quasi-static channel, the key entropy for generating the key is too low, and the security of information transmission is greatly reduced accordingly.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a physical layer secret communication method based on modulation symbol phase rotation, which has higher security and aims to overcome the defect of lower security of the existing physical layer communication method and enable a legal user to realize the safe transmission of data in a static channel or quasi-static channel environment.
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention provides the following technical scheme:
a physical layer secret communication method based on modulation symbol phase rotation is characterized in that: comprises an encryption processing procedure and a decryption processing procedure of a physical layer;
the encryption processing process of the physical layer comprises the following steps:
1-1: a set of chaos sequences which are evenly distributed is generated by a Tent mapping equation, and the seed number of the chaos sequences is determined by a channel coefficient and a negotiation mechanism. And a group of chaotic sequences are interleaved by the interleaver to generate P groups of chaotic sequences.
1-2: and (3) generating P groups of rotating phases by using the P groups of chaotic sequences obtained in the step (1-1) and changing the phases of 4QAM symbols, wherein each 4QAM symbol corresponds to one rotating phase.
1-3: and modulating the bit information to be transmitted by using 4QAM (Quadrature amplitude modulation), and generating P groups of 4QAM symbols. And (3) changing the phase of the self according to the generated rotation phase in the step (1-2), generating a rectangular MQAM symbol after vector superposition, and sending the symbol to a legal receiver to finish encryption on a physical layer.
The decryption processing procedure of the physical layer comprises the following steps:
2-1: a set of chaos sequences which are uniformly distributed is generated by a Tent mapping equation, and the seed number of the chaos sequences is also determined by a channel coefficient and a negotiation mechanism. The channel coefficient can be considered to be constant and invariable in the channel coherence time, the channel coefficient obtained according to the channel reciprocity theorem is effective at this time, and then the consistency of the seed number is ensured through a negotiation mechanism.
2-2: and a legal receiver receives the modulation symbols which are sent by the sender and are subjected to encryption processing.
2-3: and (3) generating P groups of rotation phases after the chaos sequence generated in the step 2-1 passes through an interleaver.
2-4: and (3) restoring the phase of the modulation symbol received in the step (2-2), and performing iterative digital demodulation on the modulation symbol to obtain bit information so as to finish decryption on a physical layer.
In the steps 1-1 and 2-1, the initial value of the chaotic sequence is determined by the channel state information, and P groups of uniformly distributed chaotic sequences are generated by a Tent mapping equation, and the process is as follows:
the sender or receiver obtains a group of channel coefficients and takes the envelope thereof, which are respectively recorded as { | ht,l-1, 2, … }, quantizing the envelope of the channel coefficients according to a threshold value Λ to obtain a set of binary sequences { q }lThe specific quantization scheme is as follows:
wherein the adaptive threshold
Where μ is the mean and σ is the mean square error. After quantization, the characteristic value of wireless channel is convertedBit stream changed to 01; after negotiation of the negotiation mechanism, both communication parties have completely consistent random seed sequence qlE {0,1}, l 1,2, …, Q, a random seed sequence of length Q
Seed number a converted into chaotic sequence1，a1The mathematical expression of (a) is:
a1then substitute into Tent mapping equation:
ak+1＝2β(1-|ak|)-1,β＝1
iteration is carried out to obtain a group of chaos sequences { a) which are uniformly distributed in a (-1,1) intervalkK is 1,2, … }; periodically generating random seeds a1And resetting the chaotic sequence generator to generate a new chaotic sequence.
In the steps 1-2 and 2-3, P groups of rotating phases are generated by using the P groups of chaotic sequences obtained in the steps 1-1 and 2-1 respectively, and the process is as follows:
before the chaos sequence is used for generating a rotation phase, the chaos sequence is sent into an interleaver, and the sequences after interleaving are approximately independent; setting the row number C > P of the interleaver, and selecting P of the C sequence numbers read out according to the columns as P groups of random variables for phase rotation;
the chaotic number after interleaving is a random variable uniformly distributed in a (-1,1) obeying interval, is a floating point number, has infinite precision requirement, and cannot be met in an actual system; for the chaotic sequence number aiTaking the m, n and p digit values of the fractional part to form an integer, then modulo K to obtain the angle of phase rotation, the mathematical expression is
Da,i＝mod(Extract(ai,m,n,p),K)
Thus, Da,iIs a random variable theta uniformly distributed within 360 degrees with a set resolution precisionkFor 1-2 and 2-3 stepsThe phase in step is rotated.
In step 1-3, the bit information to be transmitted is modulated by 4QAM, and the generated modulation symbol changes its phase according to the generated rotation phase in step 1-2, as follows:
bit to be transmitted b2p-1,b2pA symbol generated by 4QAM modulation of | P ═ 1,2, … P } information is denoted as { spThe mathematical expression of the symbol s of MQAM after the symbol superposition of the P-path 4QAM is as follows:
wherein
Changing the phase of the 4QAM symbol by using the rotational phase generated in step 1-2, where μ represents a modulation symbol to be transmitted after the phase change, and may also be referred to as an encrypted modulation symbol, and its mathematical expression is:
in said step 2-4, the phase of the received modulation symbols is recovered as follows:
for the first iteration, input r1And (r), performing phase contrarotation to obtain:
after demodulation by 4QAM, bits are obtainedObtaining corresponding modulation symbols after 4QAM modulation
At the same time, output r2Is composed of
Assuming that the iterative demodulation is correct, i.e.
Then output r2The method is simplified as follows:
sending the data to the next iterative demodulation, and repeating the above steps to recover all bit information
The technical conception of the invention is as follows: as known in the communication principle, high-order rectangular MQAM constellation symbols (such as 16QAM, 64QAM and the like) can be regarded as being composed of
The 4QAM symbol vectors with mutually independent paths are superposed. I.e., log2M bits are divided into P groups, each group comprises 2 bits, each 2 bits are modulated by 4QAM with different amplitudes, then the MQAM is formed by vector superposition, and the mathematical expression is that
The invention makes the discrete phase
Generalizing to continuous phase interval [ -pi, pi [ -pi]In the transmitting end, P independent ones are generated]And random variables which are uniformly distributed are used for respectively carrying out random phase rotation on the P-path 4QAM modulation symbols, and then vector superposition is carried out to form encrypted MQAM symbols. At the receiving end, the P-path 4QAM modulation symbols must be subjected to phase reversal rotation, so that correct demodulation can be realized.
Random phase thetakGenerated by a chaotic sequence generator, transmitting and receivingThe parties must have the same seed number to produce a consistent chaotic sequence (random phase). According to the channel reciprocity and the chaos sequence seed number negotiation mechanism, the randomness of the seed number and the consistency of the chaos sequences of the receiving and transmitting parties are ensured. Assuming that the eavesdropper and the receiver have different spatial positions, i.e. there is no correlation between the sender-receiver and the sender-eavesdropper, it is impossible for the eavesdropper to generate the same number of seeds as the legitimate receiver. Therefore, it is impossible for an eavesdropper to generate a random phase that coincides with the sender and to demodulate correctly, i.e., to eavesdrop on any information of both parties of a legitimate communication. After one group of chaotic sequences are interleaved by the interleaver, P groups of chaotic sequences which are approximately independent mutually are generated. Therefore, the receiving party can accurately recover the phase of the received symbol and obtain effective information after digital demodulation.
The chaos mapping equation is used to generate a chaos sequence with uniform distribution, the seed number of the chaos sequence is generated by Channel State Information (CSI) between legal communication users and a negotiation mechanism, and the seed number is periodically reset according to the channel state information of the legal communication users. In order to simplify the problem of chaotic synchronization between legal users, a sender only uses one chaotic sequence generator, and the same is true for a receiver. And generating approximately independent P groups of random numbers by one group of random numbers by adopting an interleaving method of an interleaver. The invention has the beneficial effects that: the legal user can realize the safe transmission of data under the static channel or quasi-static channel environment; the safety is high.
Drawings
Fig. 1 shows that 16QAM may consist of 2 4 QAMs.
Fig. 2 is a packet interleaver.
Fig. 3 is a block diagram of a transmitting end.
Fig. 4 is a received symbol constellation without phase recovery processing.
Fig. 5 is a block diagram of a receiving end.
Fig. 6 shows the bit error rates of the legitimate receiver and the illegitimate receiver under different snr conditions.
Detailed Description
The present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.
Referring to fig. 1 to 6, a physical layer secure communication method based on modulation symbol phase rotation includes an encryption process and a decryption process of a physical layer;
the encryption processing process of the physical layer comprises the following steps:
1-1: a set of chaos sequences which are evenly distributed is generated by a Tent mapping equation, and the seed number of the chaos sequences is determined by a channel coefficient and a negotiation mechanism. And a group of chaotic sequences are interleaved by the interleaver to generate P groups of chaotic sequences.
1-2: and (3) generating P groups of rotating phases by using the P groups of chaotic sequences obtained in the step (1-1) and changing the phases of 4QAM symbols, wherein each 4QAM symbol corresponds to one rotating phase.
1-3: and modulating the bit information to be transmitted by using 4QAM (Quadrature amplitude modulation), and generating P groups of 4QAM symbols. And (3) changing the phase of the self according to the generated rotation phase in the step (1-2), generating a rectangular MQAM symbol after vector superposition, and sending the symbol to a legal receiver to finish encryption on a physical layer.
The decryption processing procedure of the physical layer comprises the following steps:
2-1: a set of chaos sequences which are uniformly distributed is generated by a Tent mapping equation, and the seed number of the chaos sequences is also determined by a channel coefficient and a negotiation mechanism. The channel coefficient can be considered to be constant and invariable in the channel coherence time, the channel coefficient obtained according to the channel reciprocity theorem is effective at this time, and then the consistency of the seed number is ensured through a negotiation mechanism.
2-2: and a legal receiver receives the modulation symbols which are sent by the sender and are subjected to encryption processing.
2-3: and (3) generating P groups of rotation phases after the chaos sequence generated in the step 2-1 passes through an interleaver.
2-4: and (3) restoring the phase of the modulation symbol received in the step (2-2), and performing iterative digital demodulation on the modulation symbol to obtain bit information so as to finish decryption on a physical layer.
Taking a rectangular 16QAM as an example, the symbol on the 16QAM constellation diagram is denoted by 'x' in FIG. 1, each quadrant comprises 4 symbols, and the 4 symbols form a symbolA radius of "o" as the coordinate center
The 4QAM constellation of (1). At the same time, the 4 "o" s also form a radius of
The 4QAM constellation of (1). Figure 1 pictorially shows that a 16QAM constellation may consist of 2 4QAM constellations.
In steps 1-1 and 2-1, the sender (receiver) obtains a set of channel coefficients and takes the envelope thereof as { | ht,l| 1,2, … }. The envelope of the channel coefficient is compared and quantized with a self-adaptive threshold value to obtain a group of binary sequences qlThe quantization scheme is as follows:
wherein the adaptive threshold
Where μ is the mean and σ is the mean square error. After the quantization stage, the wireless channel characteristic values are converted into a bit stream of 01. Due to the interference and noise in the wireless channel, and the mismatch of the hardware of the device, the 01 bit streams of the transmitter and the receiver are not completely matched. Considering that a chaotic sequence is very sensitive to an initial value (seed number), even if 10 exist for two chaotic sequence initial values-10The errors in (2) can cause the chaos numbers generated subsequently to be completely different. Therefore, the invention adopts Caseade protocol proposed by BrassardG in 1994 to carry out 01 bit stream information reconciliation, so that two communication parties have completely consistent random seed sequence qlE {0,1}, l ═ 1,2, …, Q. Random seed sequence with length of Q
Seed number a converted into chaotic sequence1，a1Mathematics of (2)The expression is as follows:
obviously a1∈(-1,1)。a1Substitution into Tent mapping equation:
ak+1＝2β(1-|ak|)-1,β＝1
iteration is carried out to obtain a group of chaos sequences { a) which are uniformly distributed in a (-1,1) intervalkAnd k is 1,2, … }. In order to further enhance the communication security of the legal two parties, a random seed a is periodically generated1And resetting the chaotic sequence generator to generate a new chaotic sequence.
In order to obtain P sets of uniformly distributed random variables, the chaotic sequence generator is passed through an interleaver as shown in fig. 2. Fig. 2 is a block interleaver with data written in rows and read out in columns. The sequence generated by the chaotic sequence generator has a certain correlation with a plurality of random numbers before and after the sequence, but after the sequence passes through the interleaver shown in FIG. 2, the interval between the sequence before and after the sequence is at least 8, so the sequence is approximately independent. And setting the row number C > P of the interleaver, and selecting P of the C sequence numbers read out by columns as P groups of random variables for phase rotation. How to select P of the C numbers, the two parties of the transceiver agree in advance, but for the eavesdropper with unknown selection rules, the difficulty of intercepting the communication information of the two legal parties is further increased.
The P groups of random variables after passing through the interleaver are all random variables uniformly distributed in a (-1,1) obeying interval and are floating point numbers. Floating point numbers with infinite precision requirements are not met in practical systems, for example, the number of bits of a DA conversion chip is limited. For the chaos sequence number ai(expressed in a 10-system), the M, n and p-th bit values of the fractional part are taken to form an integer, and then modulo M is carried out to obtain the angle of phase rotation. The mathematical expression is
Da,i＝mod(Extract(ai,m,n,p),M)
In the actual system, the chaos value is taken at any position several bits behindMay be, for example, bits 10, 11 and 12. Due to the chaotic characteristic, the distribution uniformity can be guaranteed. Thus, Da,iIs a random variable theta which is uniformly distributed within 360 degrees with certain resolution precision (depending on the values of M, n, p and M)kFor phase rotation in steps 1-2 and 2-3. Likewise, an eavesdropper does not know how to get from aiObtaining Da,iAny information of the sender still cannot be correctly demodulated.
In said step 1-3, the bit to be transmitted b1,b2,b3,b4Divide into 2 groups, i.e. { b }1,b2And { b }and3,b4}. As shown in FIG. 3, each group of 2 bits is modulated by 4QAM and is denoted as s1And s2. The two paths of 4QAM symbols can be regarded as a 16QAM symbol s after being superposed, and the mathematical expression is as follows:
wherein
Using two sets of independent rotation phases theta distributed in the same way generated in the step 1-21And theta2By varying s separately1And s2S represents a modulation symbol after phase change, that is, an encrypted modulation symbol, and the mathematical expression of s is:
from this mathematical expression and FIG. 1, it can be seen that the bits b1,b2The power of is b3,b 44 times of
Has lower bit error rate, so that important data can be put into b in practical application1,b2In this group, and put the less important data into { b }3,b4In (c) }.
Assuming that the channel is an additive white gaussian noise channel (AWGN), in step 2-2, an encrypted modulation symbol r sent by the sender is received, and its mathematical expression is
Where w is a complex gaussian noise,
FIG. 4 shows symbol SNR
And the receiving side obtains the symbol constellation diagram.
In step 2-4, the phase generated in step 2-3 is used
To iteratively recover P randomly selected groups of 4QAM as shown in figure 5. For the first iteration, input r1R, making phase reversal rotation to obtain
After demodulation by 4QAM, bits are obtainedObtaining corresponding modulation symbols after 4QAM modulation
At the same time, output r2Is composed of
Suppose this iterationDemodulation is correct, i.e.
Then output r2Simplified to
And sending to the next iterative demodulation. By parity of reasoning, all bit information is restored by iteration
Fig. 6 shows the bit error rate of the bit information obtained by the illegal user and the bit error rate of the bit information obtained by the legal user. No matter the communication condition is good or bad (the signal-to-noise ratio is used as a measurement index), the bit error rate of the illegal user is always maintained to be about 0.5, which indicates that the illegal user guesses the communication content between the legal users and cannot extract effective information from the content.
Claims (5)
1. A physical layer secret communication method based on modulation symbol phase rotation is characterized in that: comprises an encryption processing procedure and a decryption processing procedure of a physical layer;
the encryption processing process of the physical layer comprises the following steps:
1-1: generating a group of chaos sequences which are uniformly distributed by using a Tent mapping equation, wherein the seed number of the chaos sequences is determined by a channel coefficient and a negotiation mechanism; a group of chaotic sequences is interleaved by an interleaver to generate P groups of chaotic sequences;
1-2: generating P groups of rotating phases by using the P groups of chaotic sequences obtained in the step 1-1, wherein the P groups of rotating phases are used for changing the phases of 4QAM symbols, and each 4QAM symbol corresponds to one rotating phase;
1-3: modulating bit information to be transmitted by using 4QAM (quadrature amplitude modulation), and generating P groups of 4QAM symbols; changing the phase of the rotation phase according to the generated rotation phase in the step 1-2, and generating a rectangular MQAM symbol after vector superposition, wherein M and P satisfy the relation:then sending to a legal receiver to finish the encryption in the physical layer;
the decryption processing procedure of the physical layer comprises the following steps:
2-1: generating a group of chaos sequences which are uniformly distributed by using a Tent mapping equation, wherein the seed number of the chaos sequences is also determined by a channel coefficient and a negotiation mechanism; considering the channel coefficient to be constant and invariable in the channel coherence time, at this time, obtaining the channel coefficient according to the channel reciprocity theorem to be effective, and then ensuring the consistency of the seed number through a negotiation mechanism;
2-2: a legal receiver receives the modulation symbol which is sent by a sender and is encrypted;
2-3: generating P groups of rotation phases after the chaos sequence generated in the step 2-1 passes through an interleaver;
2-4: and (3) restoring the phase of the modulation symbol received in the step (2-2), and performing iterative digital demodulation on the modulation symbol to obtain bit information so as to finish decryption on a physical layer.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the physical layer secure communication method based on modulation symbol phase rotation comprises: in the steps 1-1 and 2-1, the initial value of the chaotic sequence is determined by the channel state information, and P groups of uniformly distributed chaotic sequences are generated by a Tent mapping equation, and the process is as follows:
a sender or a receiver obtains a group of channel coefficients and an envelope thereof, which are respectively recorded as { | ht，l1,2, quantizing the envelope of the channel coefficients according to a threshold value Λ to obtain a set of binary sequences { q ═ q }lThe specific quantization scheme is as follows:
wherein the adaptive threshold
In the formula, mu is a mean value, and sigma is a mean square error; after the quantization stage, the wireless channel characteristic value is converted into a bit stream of 01; after negotiation of the negotiation mechanism, both communication parties have completely consistent random seed sequence qlE {0,1}, l 1,2, Q, a random seed sequence of length Q
Seed number a converted into chaotic sequence1，a1The mathematical expression of (a) is:
a1then substitute into Tent mapping equation:
ak+1＝2β(1-|ak|)-1，β＝1
iteration is carried out to obtain a group of chaos sequences { a) which are uniformly distributed in a (-1,1) intervalkK is 1,2, … }; periodically generating random seeds a1And resetting the chaotic sequence generator to generate a new chaotic sequence.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the physical layer secure communication method based on the modulation symbol phase rotation comprises: in the steps 1-2 and 2-3, P groups of chaotic sequences obtained in the steps 1-1 and 2-1 are respectively used for generating P groups of rotating phases, and the process is as follows:
before the chaos sequence is used for generating a rotation phase, the chaos sequence is sent into an interleaver, and the sequences after interleaving are approximately independent; setting the row number C of the interleaver to be more than P, and selecting P sequence numbers read out according to the columns as P groups of random variables for phase rotation;
the chaotic number after interleaving is a random variable uniformly distributed in a (-1,1) obeying interval, is a floating point number, has infinite precision requirement, and cannot be met in an actual system; for the chaotic sequence number aiTaking the m, n, p position of the decimal partForming an integer, then modulo K to obtain the angle of phase rotation, the mathematical expression of which is
Da，i＝mod(Extract(ai，m，n，p)，K)
Thus, Da，iIs a random variable theta uniformly distributed within 360 degrees with a set resolution precisionkFor phase rotation in steps 1-2 and 2-3.
4. A physical layer secure communication method based on modulation symbol phase rotation according to claim 3, characterized in that: in step 1-3, the bit information to be transmitted is modulated by 4QAM, and the generated modulation symbol changes its phase according to the generated rotation phase in step 1-2, as follows:
bit to be transmitted b2p-1，b2pA symbol generated by 4QAM modulation of | P ═ 1,2, … P } information is denoted as { spThe mathematical expression of the symbol s of MQAM after the symbol superposition of the P-path 4QAM is as follows:
wherein
Changing the phase of the 4QAM symbol by using the rotational phase generated in step 1-2, where μ represents a modulation symbol to be transmitted after the phase change, and may also be referred to as an encrypted modulation symbol, and its mathematical expression is:
5. the method of claim 4, wherein the modulation symbol phase rotation based physical layer secure communication method comprises: in said step 2-4, the phase of the received modulation symbols is recovered as follows:
for the first iteration, input r1And (r), performing phase contrarotation to obtain:
after demodulation by 4QAM, bits are obtained
Obtaining corresponding modulation symbols after 4QAM modulation
At the same time, output r2Is composed of
Assuming that the iterative demodulation is correct, i.e.
Then output r2The method is simplified as follows:
sending the data to the next iterative demodulation, and repeating the above steps to recover all bit information
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| CN110417817A (en) * | 2019-08-30 | 2019-11-05 | 哈尔滨工业大学 | A kind of encryption in physical layer based on interleaved multi-user, decryption method and system |
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| CN112929318B (en) * | 2021-02-09 | 2022-05-03 | 电子科技大学 | Constellation shaping safety access method for optical access network |
| CN113645245B (en) * | 2021-08-16 | 2022-09-20 | 华朴无限(成都)科技有限公司 | DM-OFDM system physical layer security realization method and device for enhancing robustness |
| WO2023240566A1 (en) * | 2022-06-16 | 2023-12-21 | Oppo广东移动通信有限公司 | Sequence generation method and device |
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| CN1574703A (en) * | 2003-06-18 | 2005-02-02 | 三星电子株式会社 | Method and apparatus for generating preamble using chaotic sequence |
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