CN106226055A - The monitoring reliability method that a kind of nuclear power plant based on fault tree valve body lost efficacy - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention belongs to nuclear power plant's Risk Monitoring (Risk Monitor) field, be specifically related to the monitoring reliability method that a kind of nuclear power plant based on fault tree based on fault tree modeling technique, that valve arrangement body lost efficacy be applicable to the online Risk Monitoring of nuclear power plant valve body lost efficacy.The present invention includes: the status monitoring information of (1) online acquisition nuclear power plant valve；(2) original state of ONLINE RECOGNITION valve set up original state transfer figure；(3) modularity fault tree reliability model online updating that valve arrangement body lost efficacy are set up；(4) reliability lost efficacy at line computation valve arrangement based on fault tree body.The present invention, based on fault tree analysis method and Condition Monitoring Technology, gives framework and the step of a kind of monitoring reliability method for nuclear power plant's valve arrangement body inefficacy, can overcome conventional failure tree method deficiency in terms of modelling valve arrangement state and online updating.

Description

The monitoring reliability method that a kind of nuclear power plant based on fault tree valve body lost efficacy

Technical field

The invention belongs to nuclear power plant's Risk Monitoring (Risk Monitor) field, be specifically related to a kind of based on fault tree modeling Technology, be applicable to the online Risk Monitoring of nuclear power plant valve arrangement body lost efficacy nuclear power plant based on fault tree valve body The monitoring reliability method lost efficacy.

Background technology

Nuclear power plant's Risk Monitoring technology is the concrete application in nuclear power plant's running of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) technology And development.Use Risk Monitoring technology can realize the understanding of nuclear power plant's risk, controlled in nuclear power plant, thus guarantee safety On the premise of, improve the economy that nuclear power plant runs.When carrying out nuclear power plant's Risk Monitoring, need to consider power plant's configuration, the most various The combined situation of the usability status of equipment, system etc..Nuclear power plant have employed substantial amounts of valve arrangement.Nuclear power plant's running In, valve is likely to be at different states, and as opened or closed, and the state of valve changes the most over time, and this can lead Cause its risk analysis situation and become complicated.

At present, in nuclear power plant's Risk Monitoring, the reliability of system, equipment is carried out by commonly used Fault Tree Analysis Analyze.In traditional core power plant Risk Monitoring, it is important that the risk of the expection planning activitys such as maintenance, test is evaluated, generally For power plant's configuration that some are special, carry out the fault tree configuration method of exhaustion by room shape event and model, thus meet specific configuration Under system, equipment dependability modeling demand.For valve arrangement, it is common that specify that under certain determines configuration it is initial State also combines its need state and analyzes relevant failure mode and set up fault tree models.Chilled water system is set with certain nuclear power plant Electrodynamic valve RRI040VN/041VN as a example by, tradition being analyzed as follows shown in table 1 of Risk Monitoring.The letter of nuclear power station VN motor-operated isolation valve Figure is such as Fig. 1.

Table 1 nuclear power plant sets the electrodynamic valve RRI040/041 information table of chilled water system

For configuration 1 situation in table 1, fault tree reliability model such as Fig. 2 of RRI040VN, RRI041VN of foundation, Shown in Fig. 3.

Equally, corresponding fault tree reliability model can also be set up for configuration 2 situation in table a, and room can be passed through The configuration situation that shape EventSelect is corresponding.

Along with the progressively application in nuclear power plant of computer technology and digitizer Ore-controlling Role, nuclear power plant's Risk Monitoring skill Art develops the most further, it is proposed that the concept of online Risk Monitoring.So-called online Risk Monitoring, i.e. by Condition Monitoring Technology, is adopted The service data of collection nuclear power plant, as system running pressure, flow, valve switch etc. can metrical information, automatically systems of identification nuclear power plant System, equipment state in which, and utilize online risk model, evaluate the current risk of nuclear power plant in time.Online risk model is wanted Ask can the configuration of modelling power plant flexibly, possess upgrade in time, the quick feature such as calculating.But, traditional based on fault tree and The Reliability Modeling that the valve arrangement body of room shape event lost efficacy has the disadvantage that

(1) motility is not enough.In nuclear power actual motion, it is frequently present of the switching of valve switch state or other moves with valve Make relevant dynamic process.The valve event of traditional usual modelling typical condition of method by room shape event control configuration Before and action after power plant's configuration, the typically no modelling of impact of valve event process.This is unsatisfactory for the need of online Risk Monitoring Ask.

(2) valve state renewal is the most convenient.In traditional analysis, the general provision specific configuration of valve arrangement and phase Valve original state/the need state answered, analyzes typical valve state by state enumeration.This cannot be in existing nuclear power plant Effectively utilize under era of information gather information realization model more easily, continuous print updates.

Therefore, in the online Risk Monitoring of nuclear power plant, need to set up a set of monitoring reliability flexible, effective for valve arrangement Method, substitutes traditional based on fault tree and the valve arrangement reliability model of room shape event.Build about valve arrangement reliability , there is many different methods in mould technique study.But at present in nuclear power Practical Project field, it is still with fault tree analysis side Method is main, and main flow software for calculation is also based on what fault tree calculated.Based on this, the present invention is at nuclear power plant's related valve status monitoring On the basis of technology, it is proposed that a set of valve arrangement body inefficacy monitoring reliability method based on fault tree, enhance valve The updating ability of apparatus body inefficacy reliability model, provides one for the modeling of valve arrangement in the online Risk Monitoring of nuclear power plant Plant new method.

Summary of the invention

It is an object of the invention to provide the monitoring reliability side that a kind of nuclear power plant based on fault tree valve body lost efficacy Method.

The object of the present invention is achieved like this:

The monitoring reliability method that a kind of nuclear power plant based on fault tree valve body lost efficacy, comprises the steps:

(1) status monitoring information of online acquisition nuclear power plant valve:

From the information monitoring and management system of nuclear power plant, gather the monitoring signal of valve arrangement, specifically include from prison in real time Ore-controlling Role gathers the switching signal of valve, calculates system acquisition valves test/maintenance isolation record information from auxiliary isolation, from number Word networked control systems gathers the startup control signal of valve；According to above-mentioned signal and information, build the state of a valve arrangement The unit that monitoring sign space Ω, Ω comprise have: the normally opened signal of valve (1), the normally off signal of valve (0), maintenance of valve/fault note Record (r), valve reaches close step control signal (-1), and valve closes out step control signal (+1)；Wherein, the normally opened signal of valve It is referred to as valve constant signal with the normally off signal；Valve reaches pass and pass and is referred to as valve step letter to opening step control signal Number；Valve arrangement status monitoring sign space Ω is expressed as:

Ω=(1,0, r ,-1 ,+1)；

(2) original state of ONLINE RECOGNITION valve set up original state transfer figure；

(2.1): set up initial state space S of valve arrangement_o；S_oThe state comprised has: open (s₁), close (s₂), fault (s₃), preventive maintenance (s₄), correct maintenance (s₅)；Valve arrangement initial state space S_oIt is expressed as:

S_O=(s₁,s₂,s₃,s₄,s₅)

By the status monitoring sign space Ω of valve arrangement, detect valve in actual motion, be in state space S_o In which kind of original state, determine valve monitoring sign space Ω to valve arrangement initial state space S_oCriterion function f_C, side Method is as follows:

(2.1.1) when valve constant signal is 1, state is for opening；

(2.1.2) when valve constant signal is 0, state is for closing；

(2.1.3) record information r determines that state is to correct maintenance, preventive maintenance or fault；

(2.1.4) valve step signal+1 or-1 represents the automatic startup that valve state opens or closes；

Set up following mapping relations:

(2.2) valve original state transfer figure is set up according to actual motion；Original state transfer figure method for building up is as follows:

(2.2.1) based on valve arrangement initial state space S set up_ODetermine the original state of valve, use oval frame table Show；

(2.2.2) transfer path between original state is determined based on power plant's actual motion, by band arrow and the reality of numeral Line represents, numeral represents transfer path sequence number between original state；

The complete transfer path determined includes: in normal course of operation, open (s₁) and close (s₂) mutual conversion；Safeguarded Cheng Zhong, opens (s₁) and preventive maintenance (s₃) mutually conversion and close (s₂) and preventive maintenance (s₃) mutual conversion；Failure procedure In, open (s₁) arrive fault (s₃) conversion and close (s₂) arrive fault (s₃) conversion；In repair process, fault (s₃) to correcting maintenance (s₅) conversion, correct maintenance (s₅) to opening (s₁) conversion and correct maintenance (s₅) to closing (s₁) conversion；Valve arrangement state Monitoring sign space Ω and criterion function f_CMonitoring original state or change, supplement in state transition diagram and add relevant monitoring Signal inputs；

(3) set up valve arrangement body lost efficacy modularity fault tree reliability model and online updating:

(3.1) original state-transferring demand situations figure of valve arrangement is set up:

Set up the need state space S of valve arrangement_d, S_dThe state comprised has: open (S_d1), close (S_d2), it is not necessary to ask (O)；

S_d=(s_d1,s_d2,o)；

Set up the valve arrangement original state mapping relations to need state, set up rule f_sAs follows:

(3.1.1) " original state " chooses defined initial state space S₀In element；

(3.1.2) " need state " chooses defined need state space S_dIn element；

(3.1.3) when valve arrangement " original state " is defined as unavailable, " need state " is sky；

(3.1.4) valve arrangement " original state " determines mapping object by actual motion when being defined as available；

Rule-based f_s, the mapping relations of valve arrangement original state to need state are: valve arrangement is initially out (S₁) During state, power plant is defined as can use, and whole demands include out (S_d1) and close (S_d2) state；Valve is initially pass (S₁) state time, Power plant is defined as can use, and whole demands include out (S_d1) and close (S_d2) state；Valve arrangement is initially fault (S₃), preventive maintenance (S₄), correct maintenance (S₅) state time, power plant is defined as unavailable, and now need state is empty, corresponds to " without asking (O) to set up Mapping relations as follows:

On the basis of original state transfer figure, set up the complete original state of valve arrangement-transferring demand situations figure, set up Rule is:

(3.1.1.1) based on the valve arrangement need state space S set up_dDetermine the need state of valve, use square frame table Show；

(3.1.1.2) determine that original state arrives the transfer path of need state based on power plant's actual motion, with band arrow and The solid line of letter represents, the transfer path sequence number of letter representation original state to need state；

By the mapping relations of above-mentioned valve arrangement original state to need state, according to setting up rule, at nuclear power plant's valve Original state-transferring demand situations the figure of complete valve arrangement is set up out in the monitoring of door original state and transfer figure；

(3.2) set up valve arrangement body lost efficacy modularity fault tree reliability model:

Valve arrangement modularity fault tree modeling method is as follows:

(3.2.1) modularity fault tree does not define equipment original state；

(3.2.2) failure mode of all analysis states in modularity fault tree envelope equipment state transfer figure；

After setting up out the modularity fault tree models of equipment, solved the minimal cut set collection of fault tree by Boolean calculation Close；If comprising N number of minimal cut set, then jth minimal cut set is expressed as:

K_j=(X^j ₁,X^j ₂,…,X^j _i,····,X^j _n)

X^j _iRepresenting failure mode, the minimal cut set set expression of modularity fault tree is:

Θ={ K₁,K₂,…,K_N}

In Θ, if any one minimal cut set K_j(j=1,2 ..., N) whole bottom event X^j _iOccur, the top of fault tree Event must occur, and minimal cut set set is used for representing the structure function of fault tree；Each fault tree synthesis function is to pass through The result simplify after the set operation of fault tree, absorbed, i.e. modularity fault tree synthesis function Θ₀(X) it is expressed as:

${\mathrm{\Θ}}_0\left(X\right)=\underset{j=1}{\overset{N}{\∪}}{K}_j=\underset{j=1}{\overset{N}{\∪}}\underset{i\∈K_j}{\∩}{X}_i$

The failure mode that all kinds of valves comprise is as follows:

(3.2.1.1) electrodynamic valve: rupture, leaks outside, and internal hemorrhage due to trauma is refused out, and refuses to close, opens by mistake, closes by mistake；

(3.2.1.2) check-valves: rupture, leaks outside, and internal hemorrhage due to trauma is refused out；

(3.2.1.3) hand-operated valve: rupture, leaks outside, internal hemorrhage due to trauma, forgets to open, and forgets to close；

(3.2.1.4) pneumatic operated valve: rupture, leaks outside, internal hemorrhage due to trauma, closes by mistake, closes, manually opened inefficacy by mistake；

When valve arrangement is in " preventive maintenance ", " correcting maintenance ", " fault " original state, represent its generation unavailable, The most only comprising fault/keep in repair unavailable failure mode, the unavailable logical renewal carrying out fault tree processes；

(3.3) set up out the more new regulation of valve arrangement modularity fault tree, obtain modularity fault tree to the event of each state The mapping relations of barrier tree:

If (3.3.1) by X in modularity fault tree^j _iEvent attribute is set to False, represents this event to determine not and occurs； So at fault tree synthesis function Θ₀(X) remove in and comprise X^j _iAll minimal cut sets, re-start set operation absorb, letter New structure function Θ is generated after change_i(X)；

If (3.3.2) by X in modularity fault tree^j _iEvent attribute is set to True, represents that this event occurs；In fault Tree construction function Θ₀(X) X comprised in minimal cut set is removed in^j _iElement, generates after re-starting set operation absorption, simplification New structure function Θ_i(X)；

If (3.3.3) by X in modularity fault tree^j _iEvent attribute is set to Normal, represents that this event is with certain probability Occur, then substitute into elementary event reliability model and calculate；I.e. fault tree synthesis function Θ₀(X) do not change；

On the basis of valve module fault tree models, obtain the fault tree models of each state；I.e. pass through modularity Fault tree synthesis function Θ₀(X), actual mapping relationship f is set up_x, obtain the structure function of equipment each status fault tree-model；Reflect Firing table is shown as:

Valve arrangement state is determined, all to there being a status fault tree construction function Θ for each_i(X):

Θ_i(X)=f_x ⁱ[Θ₀(X)]

The characteristic secondary updated for the change of valve need state updates as follows:

(3.3.3.1) once update: monitor the change of valve original state, if need state is identical with original state, enter The renewal of row valve state；Monitoring valve original state constant, power plant's configuration change causes valve need state to update, directly Carry out the renewal of valve state；

(3.3.3.2) secondary updates: for monitoring valve original state change situation in once updating, it is judged that valve is real Border need state is the most identical with original state, and identical then Exactly-once updates, and difference is then it needs to be determined that become after original state Change need state secondary to update；Set up modularity fault tree secondary more new regulation:

When each valve state updates, define a F_iState is to F_jThe transfer process of state:

F_i→j=F_j-F_i

F_i→jCorrespond to the transfer path in state transition diagram；In Θ (X), there is a F_iThe fault tree synthesis letter of state Number Θ_i(X) to F_jThe fault tree synthesis function Θ of state_j(X) change procedure:

Θ_i→j(X)=Θ_j(X)-Θ_i(X)

The Φ generated_i→j(X) it is exactly more new regulation, and has following corresponding relation:

F_i→j——→Φ_i→j(X)

In valve body failed module bottom event of fault tree, rupture, leaking outside to be summarized as ON/OFF operational failure；Internal hemorrhage due to trauma For demand for closing operational failure；Refuse out, refuse to close, open by mistake, by mistake pass can be summarized as demand expiration；Wherein refusing out and opening by mistake is to close to opening Process, claim demand expiration 1；Refuse to close and close the process being to reach close by mistake, claim demand expiration 2；

The most more new route: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11, a, d path；

Secondary more new route: 1-d, 2-a, 6-a, 7-d, 9-a, 11-d path；

(3.4) judge the state of valve and its modularity fault tree is performed more new regulation；First determine whether valve " initial shape State ", if constant judgement valve need state, if change judges that valve needs after performing to update for the first time to its modularity fault tree again Seek state；Then in the case of original state is constant, judge valve need state, if constant, needn't be to its modularity fault tree Perform renewal, if same execution of change updates for the first time；Finally in the case of original state changes, judge valve need state, if Constant then needn't to its modularity fault tree perform second time update, if change also need perform second time update；

(4) reliability lost efficacy at line computation valve arrangement based on fault tree body；

Set up the modularity fault tree that valve body lost efficacy, by the more new regulation of call establishment, to modularity fault tree Carry out logical assignment；By obtaining the minimal cut set of reliability model after the Boolean set operations simplification of fault tree models, absorption Set；It is finally translated into the fault tree synthesis function of correspondence, after carrying out non cross link process, substitutes into corresponding elementary event reliability Model, calculates the failure probability that valve body lost efficacy；The structure function Φ (X) converted by minimal cut set set is:

$\mathrm{\Φ}\left(X\right)=\underset{j=1}{\overset{N}{\∪}}\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\∩}}{X^j}_i\≈\underset{j=1}{\overset{N}{\Σ}}\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\Π}}{X^j}_i$

Substitute into t elementary event X^j _iThe elementary event failure probability P that reliability model is tried to achieve⁶ _iT (), obtains valve Apparatus body lost efficacy unreliable degree R (X, t), it may be assumed that

$R(X,t)\≈\underset{j=1}{\overset{N}{\Σ}}\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\Π}}{P^j}_i\left(t\right).$

The beneficial effects of the present invention is:

(1) present invention is based on fault tree analysis method and Condition Monitoring Technology, gives one for nuclear power plant's valve arrangement originally The framework of monitoring reliability method that body lost efficacy and step, can overcome conventional failure tree method modelling valve arrangement state and Deficiency in terms of line renewal.

(2) the valve arrangement body during the present invention is the online risk model of nuclear power plant lost efficacy and provided a kind of basis modeling think of Road, it is considered to multiple state status, effectively reduces the scale of valve logic fault tree and simplifies modeling process, reducing model Development cost.

(3) present invention is compatible with existing wide variety of business software (such as RiskSpectrum) good, can be fully sharp With existing modeling software based on fault tree, it is simple to accepted by nuclear power engineering and application personnel, it is simple to Project Realization.

Accompanying drawing explanation

The original state monitoring of Fig. 1 nuclear power plant valve arrangement and state transition diagram；

The fault tree reliability model that RRI040VN is set up by Fig. 2 configuration 1；

The fault tree reliability model that RRI041 is set up by Fig. 3 configuration 2；

The original state monitoring of Fig. 4 nuclear power plant valve arrangement and state transition diagram；

" original state-need state " transfer figure of Fig. 5 nuclear power plant valve arrangement；

The monitoring reliability flow process that in the online Risk Monitoring of Fig. 6 nuclear power plant, valve arrangement body based on fault tree lost efficacy；

The modularity fault tree logical model that Fig. 7 nuclear power plant RRI040VN electrodynamic valve lost efficacy.

Detailed description of the invention

Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings the present invention is described further.

The present invention provides a kind of monitoring reliability method lost efficacy for nuclear power plant's valve arrangement body, exists for nuclear power plant Line Risk Monitoring is set up valve arrangement body inefficacy reliability model, improves the reliability model that valve arrangement body lost efficacy Dynamically updating ability, overcomes tradition Risk Monitoring model deficiency in terms of flexible modelling valve state change, it is achieved that right The continuous monitoring that nuclear power plant's valve arrangement body lost efficacy.

In order to achieve the above object, the technical scheme is that and be achieved in that:

The first step: the status monitoring information of online acquisition nuclear power plant valve.

The present invention gathers the monitoring signal of valve arrangement from the information monitoring and management system of nuclear power plant, specifically include from Real-time monitoring system (KNS) gathers the switching signal of valve, gathers valves test/maintenance from auxiliary isolation calculating system (CBA) Isolation record information, gathers the startup control signal of valve from Digitizing And Control Unit (DCS).According to these signals and information, Can build the status monitoring sign space Ω of a valve arrangement, the unit that Ω comprises have: the normally opened signal of valve (1), valve The normally off signal (0), maintenance of valve/failure logging (r), valve reaches close step control signal (-1), and valve closes out step control Signal (+1) processed.Wherein, the normally opened signal of valve and the normally off signal are referred to as valve constant signal；Valve reaches close and close to opening rank The control signal that jumps is referred to as valve step signal.Therefore, valve arrangement status monitoring sign space Ω is represented by:

Ω=(1,0, r ,-1 ,+1)

The present invention build valve state monitoring sign space Ω, it is therefore an objective to filter out in nuclear power plant's magnanimity monitoring information with Valve body inefficacy reliability model updates the relevant monitoring signal of reality and information.

Second step: the original state of ONLINE RECOGNITION valve also sets up original state transfer figure.

1st step: the present invention is based on valve body inefficacy fail-safe analysis in nuclear power plant's actual motion and online risk model Demand, establish initial state space S of valve arrangement_o.In the present invention, S_oThe state comprised has: open (s₁), close (s₂), therefore Barrier (s₃), preventive maintenance (s₄), correct maintenance (s₅).Valve arrangement initial state space S_oIt is represented by:

S_O=(s₁,s₂,s₃,s₄,s₅)

By the above-mentioned status monitoring sign space Ω setting up valve arrangement, application claims detects valve and transports in reality Row is in state space S_oIn which kind of original state, it is thus necessary to determine that valve monitoring sign space Ω to the initial shape of valve arrangement State space S_oCriterion function f_C.Provide as follows:

(1) valve constant signal is "ON" for state time " 1 "；

(2) valve constant signal is "Off" for state time " 0 "；

(3) record information r determines that state is " correcting maintenance ", " preventive maintenance " or " fault "；

(4) valve step signal "+1 " or "-1 " represent the automatic startup of valve state "ON" or "Off".

Therefore, following mapping relations are set up:

2nd step: the present invention needs to set up valve original state transfer figure according to actual motion.Original state transfer figure is valve The original state of door equipment body inefficacy reliability model updates and provides the foundation.The original state transfer figure that present invention provide that is built Legislate is as follows:

(1) based on valve arrangement initial state space S set up_ODetermine the original state of valve, represent with oval frame；

(2) transfer path between original state is determined based on power plant's actual motion, with band arrow and the solid line table of numeral Showing, numeral represents transfer path sequence number between original state.

The present invention is at state space S_ODefined in 5 kinds of original states of valve arrangement, including: open (s₁), close (s₂), therefore Barrier (s₃), preventive maintenance (s₄), correct maintenance (s₅).Based on nuclear power plant's actual moving process, the complete transfer path bag determined Include: in normal course of operation, open (s₁) and close (s₂) mutual conversion；In maintenance process, open (s₁) and preventive maintenance (s₃) phase Conversion and pass (s mutually₂) and preventive maintenance (s₃) mutual conversion；In failure procedure, open (s₁) arrive fault (s₃) conversion and pass (s₂) arrive fault (s₃) conversion；In repair process, fault (s₃) to correcting maintenance (s₅) conversion, correct maintenance (s₅) to opening (s₁) conversion and correct maintenance (s₅) to closing (s₁) conversion.Additionally, the present invention is by above-mentioned valve arrangement status monitoring sign Space Ω and criterion function f_CIts original state or change can be monitored, also can supplement in state transition diagram and add relevant monitoring Signal input (circle that can monitor sign band shade represents, input path band arrow dotted line represents).

Therefore, monitoring and the transfer of nuclear power plant's valve original state that the present invention sets up are schemed as shown in Figure 4, core as seen from the figure At most there are 11 bar state transfer paths in power plant valve original state.

Original state transfer figure is that the original state renewal of valve arrangement reliability model provides the foundation.

3rd step: set up modularity fault tree reliability model online updating that valve arrangement body lost efficacy.

1st step: set up " original state-need state " transfer figure of valve arrangement.In Fault Tree Analysis, valve sets Standby state is determined by " original state " and " need state ".In the present invention, establish the original state of valve arrangement Space S₀Monitoring with original state and transfer figure (Fig. 4), " original state " of valve arrangement can monitor.

But, " need state " in the fault tree analysis that valve arrangement body lost efficacy only "ON" and two kinds of shapes of "Off" State, it is relevant with power plant actual configuration, it is difficult to automatically monitor.It is only normal " RUN " or " standby " at valve " original state " Time (may be "Off" or "On" state) just exist " need state ", if valve because of " maintenance ", " fault " and the most in-service time usual There is not " need state ".Therefore the present invention has also set up the need state space S of valve arrangement_d, S_dThe state comprised has: open (S_d1), close (S_d2), it is not necessary to ask (O).

S_d=(s_d1,s_d2,o)

For the change model of clear and definite valve arrangement state, the actual motion of syncaryon power plant valve equipment, the present invention builds Found the valve arrangement original state mapping relations to need state, set up rule f_sAs follows:

(1) " original state " chooses defined initial state space S₀In element；

(2) " need state " chooses defined need state space S_dIn element；

(3) when valve arrangement " original state " is defined as unavailable, " need state " is sky.

(4) valve arrangement " original state " determines mapping object by actual motion when being defined as available.

Rule-based f_s, the mapping relations of valve arrangement original state to need state are: valve arrangement is initially " to be opened (S₁) " state time, power plant is defined as can use, and whole demands include " opening (S_d1) " and " close (S_d2) " state (such as motor-operated isolation valve)； Valve is initially and " closes (S₁) " state time, power plant is defined as can use, and whole demands include " opening (S_d1) " and " close (S_d2) " state (as Manual isolation valve)；Valve arrangement is initially " fault (S₃) ", " preventive maintenance (S₄) ", " correct maintenance (S₅) " state time, power plant Being defined as unavailable, now need state is empty, corresponds to " without asking (O) ".Therefore, the mapping relations of foundation can represent such as Under:

After determining above-mentioned mapping, the present invention establishes complete " initial of valve arrangement on the basis of original state transfer figure State-need state " transfer figure, add set-up below regular:

(1) based on the valve arrangement need state space S set up_dDetermine the need state of valve, use box indicating；

(2) determine that original state arrives the transfer path of need state based on power plant's actual motion, with band arrow and letter Solid line represents, the transfer path sequence number of letter representation original state to need state.

By the mapping relations of above-mentioned valve arrangement original state to need state, according to the foundation rule added, this Bright " original state-the demand that can set up out complete valve arrangement in the monitoring of nuclear power plant's valve original state and transfer figure State " transfer figure, as shown in Figure 5.

2nd step: set up the modularity fault tree reliability model that valve arrangement body lost efficacy.Fault tree models is a kind of figure Shape logical model, the reliability that valve arrangement body lost efficacy can combine elementary event reliability by fault tree logical model Model obtains.The present invention proposes a kind of modularity fault tree analysis method in order to solve fault tree under valve arrangement multimode combined situation The problem of model modification difficulty.Valve arrangement modularity fault tree idea about modeling is as follows:

(1) modularity fault tree does not define equipment original state；

(2) failure mode of all analysis states in modularity fault tree envelope equipment state transfer figure.

After setting up out the modularity fault tree models of equipment, the minimal cut set of fault tree can be solved by Boolean calculation Set.If comprising N number of minimal cut set, then jth minimal cut set is expressed as:

K_j=(X^j ₁,X^j ₂,…,X^j _i,····,X^j _n)

X^j _iRepresent failure mode (elementary event or bottom event).So, the minimal cut set set expression of modularity fault tree For:

Θ={ K₁,K₂,…,K_N}

In θ, if any one minimal cut set K_j(j=1,2 ..., N) whole bottom event X^j _iOccur, the top of fault tree Event must occur.Therefore, minimal cut set set can be used to represent the structure function of fault tree.And each fault tree synthesis function It it is all the result by simplifying after the set operation of fault tree, absorbing.I.e. modularity fault tree synthesis function Θ₀(X) can represent For (mathematical form of modularity fault tree):

${\mathrm{\Θ}}_0\left(X\right)=\underset{j=1}{\overset{N}{\∪}}{K}_j=\underset{j=1}{\overset{N}{\∪}}\underset{i\∈K_j}{\∩}{X}_i$

The present invention, based on above-mentioned valve arrangement modularity fault tree idea about modeling, sets up valve based on modularity fault tree Apparatus body inefficacy reliability model is as follows:

The modularity fault tree of valve arrangement is not specified by valve state, but needs under the envelope nuclear power plant all states of valve The failure mode that body lost efficacy.Generally, nuclear power plant's valve includes electrodynamic valve, check-valves, hand-operated valve and pneumatic operated valve.Only considering valve Under door body failure conditions, the failure mode that all kinds of valves comprise is as follows:

(1) electrodynamic valve: rupture, leaks outside, and internal hemorrhage due to trauma is refused out, and refuses to close, opens by mistake, closes by mistake；

(2) check-valves: rupture, leaks outside, and internal hemorrhage due to trauma is refused out；

(3) hand-operated valve: rupture, leaks outside, internal hemorrhage due to trauma, forgets to open, and forgets to close；

(4) pneumatic operated valve: rupture, leaks outside, internal hemorrhage due to trauma, closes by mistake, closes, manually opened inefficacy by mistake.

When valve arrangement is in " preventive maintenance ", " correcting maintenance ", " fault " original state in the present invention, represents it and occur Unavailable, the most only comprise " fault/keep in repair unavailable " failure mode, only need to carry out at the unavailable logical renewal of fault tree Reason.

Therefore, the above-mentioned four nucleoid power plant valve present invention can be set up respectively according to fault tree analysis thinking the mould of correspondence Massing fault tree (by or door connect).

3rd step: the present invention sets up out the more new regulation of valve arrangement modularity fault tree.Go back after setting up modularity fault tree Need the mapping relations setting up modularity fault tree models to each status fault tree-model, namely more new regulation.The mould of equipment It is as follows that massing fault tree updates thought:

Owing to device level modularity fault tree models is a kind of underlying graphics logical model, and bottom envelope equipment is complete Portion analyzes the failure mode (bottom event) of state, therefore each status fault tree of the same envelope of modularity fault tree.Due to figure Shape model is convenient, can directly obtain the modularity fault tree mapping relations to each status fault tree by following mapping ruler:

(1) if by X in modularity fault tree^j _iEvent attribute is set to " False ", represents this event to determine not and occurs；That At fault tree synthesis function Θ₀(X) remove in and comprise X^j _iAll minimal cut sets, re-start set operation absorb, simplify The structure function Θ that rear generation is new_i(X)。

(2) if by X in modularity fault tree^j _iEvent attribute is set to " True ", represents that this event occurs；So in event Barrier tree construction function Θ₀(X) X comprised in minimal cut set is removed in^j _iElement, raw after re-starting set operation absorption, simplification The structure function Θ of Cheng Xin_i(X)。

(3) if by X in modularity fault tree^j _iEvent attribute is set to " Normal ", represents that this event is sent out with certain probability Raw, then can substitute into elementary event reliability model and calculate；Namely fault tree synthesis function Θ₀(X) do not change.

By above-mentioned mapping ruler, on the basis of valve module fault tree models (without original state), can obtain The fault tree models of its each state.I.e. by modularity fault tree synthesis function Θ₀(X), actual mapping relationship f is set up_x(press Set up according to mapping ruler), the structure function of available equipment each status fault tree-model.Mapping table is shown as:

Valve arrangement state is determined, all to there being a status fault tree construction function Θ for each_i(X), and all deposit :

Θ_i(X)=f_x ⁱ[Θ₀(X)]

In fault tree analysis, valve arrangement state is determined by " original state " and " need state ".Not only " initial shape State " valve state can be caused to update (such as Fig. 4), and also " need state " change also results in valve state renewal.It is different from it The equipment (if the need state of pump is startup optimization) of its unitary demand state, same valve is in difference in functionality fault tree " need state " can be different.As certain nuclear power plant set chilled water system public row B row isolating valve RRI040VN (original state as "Off") " RRIA arranges to supply water to common return and lost efficacy ", need state is "Off" in fault tree, " RRIB arrange to common return confession Water lost efficacy " need state is but "ON" in fault tree.Therefore, although same valve " original state " is identical, but due to not In congenerous fault tree, " need state " can be different, and the status fault tree-model hence set up also can change.

The characteristic that the present invention is directed to valve " need state " change renewal proposes a kind of secondary update scheme.Scheme is such as Under:

(1) once update: 1. monitor valve " original state " change.It is assumed that " need state " and " original state " Identical, carry out the renewal of valve state.2. monitoring valve " original state " constant, power plant's configuration change causes valve " demand State " update.The most directly carry out the renewal of valve state.Above-mentioned needs sets up modularity fault tree the most more new regulation.

(2) secondary updates: for situation in once updating 1., now judges that whether valve actual " need state " is with " just Beginning state " identical, identical then Exactly-once updates, and difference is then it needs to be determined that " original state " changes " need state " secondary afterwards Update.Above-mentioned needs sets up modularity fault tree secondary more new regulation.

When each valve state (" original state " or " need state ") updates, both define a F_iState is to F_jShape The transfer process of state:

F_i→j=F_j-F_i

F_i→jCorrespond to " transfer path " in " state transition diagram ".Accordingly, in Θ (X), there is a F_iThe event of state Barrier tree construction function Θ_i(X) to F_jThe fault tree synthesis function Θ of state_j(X) change procedure:

Θ_i→j(X)=Θ_j(X)-Θ_i(X)

So, the Φ of generation_i→j(X) be exactly the present invention set up more new regulation.And there is a following corresponding relation:

F_i→j——→Φ_i→j(X)

In the valve body failed module bottom event of fault tree of the present invention, rupture, leak outside can be summarized as ON/OFF run Lost efficacy (valve body lost efficacy, and was called for short RF)；Internal hemorrhage due to trauma be demand be to close operational failure (be called for short IL).Refuse out, refuse to close, open by mistake, close by mistake Demand expiration can be summarized as；Wherein " refuse out " and " opening by mistake " is to close to the process opened, claim demand expiration 1 (being called for short NF1)；" refuse to close " " close " process being to reach close by mistake, claim demand expiration 2 (being called for short NF2).

The present invention for bar state more new route every in Fig. 5, be required for according to prior module fault tree update thought and Three class failure modes (RF, NF1 and NF2) of above-mentioned regulation are set up out for the first time and second time more new regulation.It is specifically related to 17 More new regulation, including:

(1) the most more new route: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11, a, d path；

(2) secondary more new route: 1-d, 2-a, 6-a, 7-d, 9-a, 11-d path；

4th step: judge the state of valve and its modularity fault tree is performed more new regulation.The present invention passes through status monitoring Technology can identify " original state " of valve automatically, however it is necessary that and directly judges valve " need state ".Determine according to above-mentioned Secondary update scheme: first determine whether valve " original state ", if constant judgement valve " need state ", if change to its module Change after fault tree performs to update for the first time and judge valve " need state " again；Then in the case of " original state " is constant, valve is judged Door " need state ", if constant, needn't perform renewal to its modularity fault tree, if same execution of change updates for the first time；? After under " original state " situation of change, judge valve " need state ", if constant, its modularity fault tree needn't be performed the Secondary updates, and updates if change also needs to perform second time.

4th step: the reliability lost efficacy at line computation valve arrangement based on fault tree body.

The present invention can set up the modularity fault tree that valve body lost efficacy, by the more new regulation of call establishment, to mould Massing fault tree carries out logical assignment；Then by obtaining reliability after the Boolean set operations simplification of fault tree models, absorption The minimal cut set set of model；Being finally translated into the fault tree synthesis function of correspondence, the non cross link carrying out approximating can generation after processing Enter corresponding elementary event reliability model, calculate the failure probability that valve body lost efficacy.Converted by minimal cut set set Structure function Φ (X) be:

$\mathrm{\Φ}\left(X\right)=\underset{j=1}{\overset{N}{\∪}}\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\∩}}{X^j}_i\≈\underset{j=1}{\overset{N}{\Σ}}\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\Π}}{X^j}_i$

Therefore, t elementary event X is substituted into^j _iThe elementary event failure probability P that reliability model is tried to achieve^j _iT (), can obtain To valve arrangement body lost efficacy unreliable degree R (X, t), it may be assumed that

$R(X,t)\≈\underset{j=1}{\overset{N}{\Σ}}\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\Π}}{P^j}_i\left(t\right)$

In the present invention, valve arrangement body inefficacy reliability model have employed wide variety of finger during npp safety is analyzed Number distribution basic reliability model.Obtain valve arrangement body lost efficacy unreliable degree R (X t), eventually serves as nuclear power plant online The input of Risk Monitoring model bottom.

Fig. 6 show the monitoring reliability flow process that in online Risk Monitoring, valve arrangement body based on fault tree lost efficacy. And syncaryon power plant sets as a example by the electrodynamic valve RRI040VN of chilled water system, and the present invention will be described.

The original state monitoring of nuclear power plant's valve arrangement as shown in Figure 1 and state transition diagram, the daily reality of syncaryon power plant Border production management, power plant's original state that nuclear power plant's valve arrangement exists is as shown in table 2 below:

The original state of table 2 nuclear power plant valve arrangement

Status monitoring sign based on valve arrangement and criterion, supervise " original state " of nuclear power plant's RRI040VN electrodynamic valve Cls analysis is as shown in table 3 below.

The sign monitoring of table 3 nuclear power plant RRI040VN electrodynamic valve original state is analyzed

Based on table 2 and the analysis of table 3, " the initial shape of the RRI040VN electrodynamic valve that the method proposed by the present invention is set up State " to monitor and transfer figure reference Fig. 4, " original state-need state " transfer figure of the RRI040VN electrodynamic valve of foundation is with reference to figure 5。

Failure mode analysis (FMA) based on valve arrangement, to the inefficacy mould under whole states of nuclear power plant's RRI040VN electrodynamic valve Formula is analyzed as follows shown in table 4.

The once change failure mode classification of table 4 nuclear power plant RRI040VN electrodynamic valve

Analysis based on table 4, summarizes the failure mode of valve arrangement, sets up out what RRI040VN electrodynamic valve body lost efficacy Modularity fault tree logical model, as shown in Figure 7.

" original state-need state " transfer figure according to the nuclear power plant's valve arrangement shown in Fig. 5, has according to actual motion Article 17, alternative routing, its Status Change process and relevant alternative routing be described as follows shown in table 5, including in change process in table Number the inside is need state.

The actual change process of table 5 nuclear power plant RRI040VN

The secondary update scheme proposed in conjunction with the present invention, more new regulation Φ of the secondary update scheme of foundation_i→j(X) as follows Shown in table 6.

Table 6 nuclear power plant RRI040VN electrodynamic valve modularity fault tree secondary more new regulation

The failure mode (bottom event) of whole state and initial assignment is comprised all in valve arrangement modularity fault tree It is defaulted as " Normal ".But, valve, under different conditions, comprises different failure modes.

Therefore, the present invention, based on the mapping ruler set up, gives corresponding failure mode assignment in modularity fault tree (" False ", " True ", " Normal "), carrys out accurate modelling and goes out equipment logical model under different conditions.Valve is in certain shape Under state, the failure mode assignment " False " being not included in modularity fault tree, the inefficacy mould being included in modularity fault tree Formula keeps " Normal " constant.Further, " unavailable " failure mode is only just present in fault tree when down state, and table Bright event occurs, assignment " True "；And when other state, " unavailable " failure mode is not present in fault tree, therefore Assignment " False ".

Valve arrangement body inefficacy monitoring reliability model set forth above is applicable to that nuclear power plant is all comprises valve arrangement Function system, can be correlation function system provide valve arrangement body lost efficacy reliability basic model.Based on fault tree Valve arrangement body inefficacy monitoring reliability model actual operating in online Risk Monitoring is: first, Risk Monitoring The valve arrangement analyzed in device acquisition tables 3 can monitor sign, the state of the sign each valve of criterion ONLINE RECOGNITION by arranging； Then, by the secondary update scheme of definition, the original state of valve arrangement is carried out on-line automatic renewal, to valve arrangement Need state is configured or manually updates；Finally, by Status Change process F_i→jWith secondary update scheme more new regulation Φ_i→j(X) corresponding relation (as shown in table 5 and table 6), the modularity fault tree reliability model of the correspondence that upgrades in time.Finally, Updating or Risk Calculation needs when, the fault tree models that each valve arrangement of nuclear power plant is corresponding all can be by collection every time Conjunction is calculated corresponding construction function, each elementary event is substituted into the basic reliability model that nuclear power plant is used, calculates (X t), provides input for nuclear power plant's risk model to the unreliable degree R that valve body lost efficacy.

Claims (1)

1. the monitoring reliability method that nuclear power plant based on a fault tree valve body lost efficacy, it is characterised in that include as follows Step:

(1) status monitoring information of online acquisition nuclear power plant valve:

From the information monitoring and management system of nuclear power plant, gather the monitoring signal of valve arrangement, specifically include and monitor system from real time System gathers the switching signal of valve, calculates system acquisition valves test/maintenance isolation record information from auxiliary isolation, from digitized Control system gathers the startup control signal of valve；According to above-mentioned signal and information, build the status monitoring of a valve arrangement The unit that sign space Ω, Ω comprise have: the normally opened signal of valve (1), the normally off signal of valve (0), maintenance of valve/failure logging R (), valve reaches close step control signal (-1), and valve closes out step control signal (+1)；Wherein, the normally opened signal of valve and The normally off signal is referred to as valve constant signal；Valve reaches close and close to opening step control signal be referred to as valve step signal； Valve arrangement status monitoring sign space Ω is expressed as:

Ω=(1,0, r ,-1 ,+1)；

(2) original state of ONLINE RECOGNITION valve set up original state transfer figure；

(2.1): set up initial state space S of valve arrangement_o；S_oThe state comprised has: open (s₁), close (s₂), fault (s₃), in advance Anti-maintenance (s₄), correct maintenance (s₅)；Valve arrangement initial state space S_oIt is expressed as:

S_O=(s₁,s₂,s₃,s₄,s₅)

By the status monitoring sign space Ω of valve arrangement, detect valve in actual motion, be in state space S_oIn Which kind of original state, determines that valve monitoring sign space Ω is to valve arrangement initial state space S_oCriterion function f_C, method is such as Under:

(2.1.1) when valve constant signal is 1, state is for opening；

(2.1.2) when valve constant signal is 0, state is for closing；

(2.1.3) record information r determines that state is to correct maintenance, preventive maintenance or fault；

(2.1.4) valve step signal+1 or-1 represents the automatic startup that valve state opens or closes；

Set up following mapping relations:

(2.2) valve original state transfer figure is set up according to actual motion；Original state transfer figure method for building up is as follows:

(2.2.1) based on valve arrangement initial state space S set up_ODetermine the original state of valve, represent with oval frame；

(2.2.2) transfer path between original state is determined based on power plant's actual motion, with band arrow and the solid line table of numeral Showing, numeral represents transfer path sequence number between original state；

The complete transfer path determined includes: in normal course of operation, open (s₁) and close (s₂) mutual conversion；In maintenance process, Open (s₁) and preventive maintenance (s₃) mutually conversion and close (s₂) and preventive maintenance (s₃) mutual conversion；In failure procedure, open (s₁) arrive fault (s₃) conversion and close (s₂) arrive fault (s₃) conversion；In repair process, fault (s₃) to correcting maintenance (s₅) Conversion, correct maintenance (s₅) to opening (s₁) conversion and correct maintenance (s₅) to closing (s₁) conversion；Valve arrangement status monitoring Sign space Ω and criterion function f_CMonitoring original state or change, supplement in state transition diagram and add relevant monitoring signal Input；

(3) set up valve arrangement body lost efficacy modularity fault tree reliability model and online updating:

(3.1) original state-transferring demand situations figure of valve arrangement is set up:

Set up the need state space S of valve arrangement_d, S_dThe state comprised has: open (S_d1), close (S_d2), it is not necessary to ask (O)；

S_d=(s_d1,s_d2,o)；

Set up the valve arrangement original state mapping relations to need state, set up rule f_sAs follows:

(3.1.1) " original state " chooses defined initial state space S₀In element；

(3.1.2) " need state " chooses defined need state space S_dIn element；

(3.1.3) when valve arrangement " original state " is defined as unavailable, " need state " is sky；

(3.1.4) valve arrangement " original state " determines mapping object by actual motion when being defined as available；

Rule-based f_s, the mapping relations of valve arrangement original state to need state are: valve arrangement is initially out (S₁) state Time, power plant is defined as can use, and whole demands include out (S_d1) and close (S_d2) state；Valve is initially pass (S₁) state time, power plant Being defined as can use, whole demands include out (S_d1) and close (S_d2) state；Valve arrangement is initially fault (S₃), preventive maintenance (S₄), correct maintenance (S₅) state time, power plant is defined as unavailable, and now need state is empty, corresponds to " without asking (O) to set up Mapping relations as follows:

On the basis of original state transfer figure, set up the complete original state of valve arrangement-transferring demand situations figure, set up rule For:

(3.1.1.1) based on the valve arrangement need state space S set up_dDetermine the need state of valve, use box indicating；

(3.1.1.2) determine that original state arrives the transfer path of need state based on power plant's actual motion, with band arrow and letter Solid line represent, the transfer path sequence number of letter representation original state to need state；

By the mapping relations of above-mentioned valve arrangement original state to need state, according to setting up rule, at the beginning of nuclear power plant's valve Original state-transferring demand situations the figure of complete valve arrangement is set up out in the monitoring of beginning state and transfer figure；

(3.2) set up valve arrangement body lost efficacy modularity fault tree reliability model:

Valve arrangement modularity fault tree modeling method is as follows:

(3.2.1) modularity fault tree does not define equipment original state；

(3.2.2) failure mode of all analysis states in modularity fault tree envelope equipment state transfer figure；

After setting up out the modularity fault tree models of equipment, solved the minimal cut set set of fault tree by Boolean calculation；As Fruit comprises N number of minimal cut set, then jth minimal cut set is expressed as:

K_j=(X^j ₁,X^j ₂,…,X^j _i,…·,X^j _n)

X^j _iRepresenting failure mode, the minimal cut set set expression of modularity fault tree is:

Θ={ K₁,K₂,…,K_N}

In Θ, if any one minimal cut set K_j(j=1,2 ..., N) whole bottom event X^j _iOccur, top event Must occur, minimal cut set set is used for representing the structure function of fault tree；Each fault tree synthesis function is to pass through fault The result simplifying, absorbing after the set operation of tree, i.e. modularity fault tree synthesis function Θ₀(X) it is expressed as:

${\mathrm{\Θ}}_0\left(X\right)=\underset{j=1}{\overset{N}{\∪}}{K}_j=\underset{j=1}{\overset{N}{\∪}}\underset{i\∈K_j}{\∩}{X}_i$

The failure mode that all kinds of valves comprise is as follows:

(3.2.1.1) electrodynamic valve: rupture, leaks outside, and internal hemorrhage due to trauma is refused out, and refuses to close, opens by mistake, closes by mistake；

(3.2.1.2) check-valves: rupture, leaks outside, and internal hemorrhage due to trauma is refused out；

(3.2.1.3) hand-operated valve: rupture, leaks outside, internal hemorrhage due to trauma, forgets to open, and forgets to close；

(3.2.1.4) pneumatic operated valve: rupture, leaks outside, internal hemorrhage due to trauma, closes by mistake, closes, manually opened inefficacy by mistake；

When valve arrangement is in " preventive maintenance ", " correcting maintenance ", " fault " original state, represent its generation unavailable, now Only comprising fault/keep in repair unavailable failure mode, the unavailable logical renewal carrying out fault tree processes；

(3.3) set up out the more new regulation of valve arrangement modularity fault tree, obtain modularity fault tree to each status fault tree Mapping relations:

If (3.3.1) by X in modularity fault tree^j _iEvent attribute is set to False, represents this event to determine not and occurs；So At fault tree synthesis function Θ₀(X) remove in and comprise X^j _iAll minimal cut sets, re-start set operation absorb, simplify after Generate new structure function Θ_i(X)；

If (3.3.2) by X in modularity fault tree^j _iEvent attribute is set to True, represents that this event occurs；Tie fault tree Structure function Θ₀(X) X comprised in minimal cut set is removed in^j _iElement, generates new after re-starting set operation absorption, simplification Structure function Θ_i(X)；

If (3.3.3) by X in modularity fault tree^j _iEvent attribute is set to Normal, represents that this event occurs with certain probability, Then substitute into elementary event reliability model to calculate；I.e. fault tree synthesis function Θ₀(X) do not change；

On the basis of valve module fault tree models, obtain the fault tree models of each state；I.e. by modularity fault Tree construction function Θ₀(X), actual mapping relationship f is set up_x, obtain the structure function of equipment each status fault tree-model；Mapping table It is shown as:

Valve arrangement state is determined, all to there being a status fault tree construction function Θ for each_i(X):

Θ_i(X)=f_x ⁱ[Θ₀(X)]

The characteristic secondary updated for the change of valve need state updates as follows:

(3.3.3.1) once update: monitor the change of valve original state, if need state is identical with original state, carry out valve The renewal of door state；Monitoring valve original state constant, power plant's configuration change causes valve need state to update, and directly carries out The renewal of valve state；

(3.3.3.2) secondary updates: for monitoring valve original state change situation in once updating, it is judged that valve is actual to be needed Asking state the most identical with original state, identical then Exactly-once updates, and difference is then it needs to be determined that change need to after original state State secondary is asked to update；Set up modularity fault tree secondary more new regulation:

When each valve state updates, define a F_iState is to F_jThe transfer process of state:

F_i→j=F_j-F_i

F_i→jCorrespond to the transfer path in state transition diagram；In Θ (X), there is a F_iThe fault tree synthesis function Θ of state_i (X) to F_jThe fault tree synthesis function Θ of state_j(X) change procedure:

Θ_i→j(X)=Θ_j(X)-Θ_i(X)

The Φ generated_i→j(X) it is exactly more new regulation, and has following corresponding relation:

F_i→j→Φ_i→j(X)

In valve body failed module bottom event of fault tree, rupture, leaking outside to be summarized as ON/OFF operational failure；Internal hemorrhage due to trauma is for needing Ask as closing operational failure；Refuse out, refuse to close, open by mistake, by mistake pass can be summarized as demand expiration；Wherein refusing out and opening by mistake is to close to the mistake opened Journey, claims demand expiration 1；Refuse to close and close the process being to reach close by mistake, claim demand expiration 2；

The most more new route: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11, a, d path；

Secondary more new route: 1-d, 2-a, 6-a, 7-d, 9-a, 11-d path；

(3.4) judge the state of valve and its modularity fault tree is performed more new regulation；First determine whether valve " original state ", If constant judgement valve need state, if change judges valve demand shape after performing to update for the first time to its modularity fault tree again State；Then in the case of original state is constant, judges valve need state, if constant, its modularity fault tree needn't be performed Update, if same execution of change updates for the first time；Finally in the case of original state changes, judge valve need state, if constant Then its modularity fault tree needn't be performed second time to update, update if change also needs to perform second time；

(4) reliability lost efficacy at line computation valve arrangement based on fault tree body；

Set up the modularity fault tree that valve body lost efficacy, by the more new regulation of call establishment, modularity fault tree is carried out Logical assignment；By obtaining the minimal cut set set of reliability model after the Boolean set operations simplification of fault tree models, absorption； It is finally translated into the fault tree synthesis function of correspondence, after carrying out non cross link process, substitutes into corresponding elementary event reliability model, Calculate the failure probability that valve body lost efficacy；The structure function Φ (X) converted by minimal cut set set is:

$\mathrm{\Φ}\left(X\right)=\underset{j=1}{\overset{N}{\∪}}\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\∩}}{X^j}_i\≈\underset{j=1}{\overset{N}{\Σ}}\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\Π}}{X^j}_i$

Substitute into t elementary event X^j _iThe elementary event failure probability P that reliability model is tried to achieve^j _iT (), obtains valve arrangement originally Body lost efficacy unreliable degree R (X, t), it may be assumed that

$R(X,t)\≈\underset{j=1}{\overset{N}{\Σ}}\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\Π}}{P^j}_i\left(t\right).$