CN105956456B - A kind of pair of android system carries out the implementation method of quadruple combinations signature verification - Google Patents
A kind of pair of android system carries out the implementation method of quadruple combinations signature verification Download PDFInfo
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- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
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Abstract
The invention discloses the implementation methods that a kind of pair of android system carries out quadruple combinations signature verification, this method comprises: the first weight: obtaining the signing messages of current application program using Android API, signing messages is extracted into abstract using a kind of hashing algorithm, then it is passed to and carries out adding salt and encryption in dynamic link library, then compared with the signing messages on network site；Second weight: reading the signature of the internal hiding APK of application using reflection function, carries out signature check with the signing messages for using Android API to obtain；Third weight: the signing messages that getPackageInfo method obtains is compared with the signing messages being stored in dynamic link library using reflection mechanism in Jni, it will try again repeated authentication to the summary info of dynamic link library, if be changed in dynamic link library, prompt user that regular channel is gone to re-download application；Quadruple: compiling a binary executable file using NDK, is wherein being compared using the apk reserved in system with the hash being stored in bianry.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the implementation methods that a kind of pair of android system carries out quadruple combinations signature verification, belong to information peace
Full technical field.
Background technique
With universal and development of Mobile Internet technology the development of smart phone, mobile phone is at indispensable in people's daily life
Few a part.Inside numerous operation system of smart phone, android system with its open source, freely, it is free the features such as account for
There is very big occupation rate of market.With android system prevalence and individual developer it is increasing, for Android
The security attack means of platform also emerge one after another, and increase the risk for causing economic loss and privacy leakage.Therefore, how
The application that safety is write out in Android platform has become the direction that current Android developer needs to study.
Android system is an open platform, it means that user can voluntarily install the installation file in various sources.
Dis-assembling and compilation can be carried out to Android application using tools such as baksmali, smali.But attacker often can be with
Using disassemblers by App dis-assembling, it is added after the malicious code of dis-assembling and carries out integration packing using tools such as smali.
Approach is installed in face of numerous and complicated Android, how to prevent from being tampered key business logic sum beating again being bundled into a key
Problem.And the present invention can well solve problem above.
Summary of the invention
Present invention aims in view of the above shortcomings of the prior art, provide a kind of pair of android system to carry out quadruple
The implementation method of coalition signature verifying, the method achieve the application programs to Android platform to carry out multi-signature verifying, energy
It is enough that application program is prevented to be tampered and beat again packet well, to ensure that the safety of application program.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention to solve the technical problem is that: a kind of pair of android system carries out quadruple combinations
The implementation method of signature verification, comprising:
First weight: obtaining the signing messages of current application program using Android API, will be signed using a kind of hashing algorithm
Name information extraction goes out to make a summary, and is then passed in dynamic link library and carries out plus salt and encryption, then with the signing messages on network site
It compares.
Second weight: the signature of the internal hiding APK of application is read using reflection function, is obtained with Android API is used
Signing messages carries out signature check.
Third weight: the signing messages that getPackageInfo method is obtained using reflection mechanism in Jni be stored in
Signing messages in dynamic link library compares.On this basis, we by the summary info to dynamic link library again
A repeated authentication is done, if be changed in dynamic link library, prompts user that regular channel is gone to re-download application.
Quadruple: compiling a binary executable file using NDK, is wherein utilizing the apk and guarantor reserved in system
There are the hash in bianry to compare.
Wherein, first signature verification again, uses android.content.pm.PackageManager class
GetPackageInfo () function obtains PackageInfo, then therefrom extracts signature object.
Wherein, described first again in signature verification, and the hashing algorithm used is the custom algorithm of similar MD5 a kind of,
Signature object extraction can be gone out to the abstract of 32 16 systems.
Wherein, described plus salt and cryptographic operation are that 32 for obtaining previous step make a summary it in incoming dynamic link libraries
The operation carried out afterwards, add salt refer to by original 32 be abstract it is associated with one section of random n position random number, encrypt using
Improved MD5 algorithm.
Wherein, it by adding the abstract of salt and encryption to need to pass back Java layers, is compared with the value of server-side.
More specifically, user may be installed in the case where equipment does not connect network；So the present invention uses extensively
Receiver is broadcast to monitor network connection situation, if the failed cluster verifying in network connection and SharedPreferences
Value is true, then carries out signature verification when being connected to the network next time.
Wherein, described second again in signature verification, and Java level getPackageInfo method is used to obtain
The signing messages of signing messages and the empty apk File locally saved obtained using getPackageArchiveInfo method into
Row comparison.
Wherein, local empty apk File be stored in application program installation file /resets/raw/ in.
Wherein, local empty apk File is that the empty apk without any content for only passing through developer's signature is literary
Part, it is therefore intended that compared with local signature.
Wherein, the reflection mechanism, reflection is PackageParser class, and PackageParser class is in Android
It has been marked as hide attribute in SDK, but the title of this class can be obtained by reflection mechanism.
Wherein, it in the system higher than Android 5.0, is read using getPackageArchiveInfo () method
The signing messages of above-mentioned hiding apk File.
Wherein, the present invention takes the mode for judging Android API LEVEL, judges automatically the system version of equipment
Number, to determine to obtain the signing messages of this air-ground APK FILE using any mode.
Wherein, the third is again in signature verification, and the reflection mechanism of use is realized in Jni, and reflection is
Java layers of the getPackageInfo signature comparison algorithm similar with the first weight, but completely with native C in dynamic link
It is realized in library.
Wherein, the third is again in signature verification, after obtaining signature digest, directly with there are dynamic link libraries
The signature digest of middle preservation compares.
Wherein, the third after generating dynamic link library, can mention dynamic link library again in signature verification
It takes, then obscured and is encrypted, is finally replaced again with original dynamic link library.
Wherein, described that dynamic link library is obscured, it is the e_shoff, e_ for modifying the link view of ELF header
The fields such as shensize, modification mode are nop, by such operation, can not open dynamic link library using softwares such as IDA.
Wherein, the encryption to dynamic link library is to be put into function to be protected in specific section to add
Apk is packaged into after close again, decrypts so at runtime.Here with gcc _ attribute_ attribute mechanism, use
Secction subitem.
Further, using section subitem, function or data are put into the input section of specified name, jstring
encrypt(JNIEnv*)_attribute_((section(".test")))；, encrypt () function is put into jni
.test inside section.
More specifically, the step of encrypting to dynamic link library is: firstly, after dynamic base is compiled, in external poll
Shstrtab (String Header String Table), the position of this shstrtab is opened at the shoff of so header
Begin, length is shnum.Then, use e_shnum to count as count, compare shname with .test with strcmp, it is consistent it
Afterwards, the content of this part section is saved.Finally, the content got up using Encryption Algorithm encrypting storing, is then write back
so。
More specifically, shoff, shnum, shstrtab etc. are read from Elf32_Ehdr (so header) first
Then offset reads the character string shstrtab in String table, store into str, read section header, deposit
Put shdr into.According to position of the shdr- > sh_name in str, recycles and compare with .test.According to shdr- > sh_offset with
Content in .test is saved in tmpSection by the index of shdr- > sh_size field.TempSection is moved to right 4
After negate, encrypted tmpSection is finally saved in so by that is, * tmpSection=~(* tmpSection > > 4)
In.According to the analysis of earlier paragraphs, section field can be modified, and have no effect on operation of so, then directly handle
E_shoff is written in shdr- > addr, and e_entry is written in shdr- > sh_size, addr.
Further, after being encrypted to dynamic link library, dynamic link library is carried out in application program operation
Real time decrypting.The process of decryption is to read addr and offset that e_shoff/e_entry obtains encryption Section, is used
Mprotect () increases access limit to .CODE sections of content, then by Encryption Algorithm before the section use of this part
Decryption method is decrypted, and finally defines void decrypt () _ attribute_ (constructor)；Guarantee decrypt
() is called first.
Further, if verification failure, the method by reflecting Toast prompts user.
Wherein, in the quadruple signature verification, using carrying out signature check in ELF executable file.
More specifically, this ELF executable file makes to show a C language, compiled using NDK.
More specifically, this executable file, is read under application program installation directory/data/app/ using file operation
Apk installation file CERT.SF, to obtain signing messages；Then by signing messages and the word string being previously positioned in ELF
It compares.
More specifically, can be automatic after application program is determined to acquisition root authority in this ELF executable file
Be installed to by script/system/xbin/ in.
Further, since the application installation file save location of different editions is different, this programme can be directed to Android editions
Originally the path of base.apk was judged, correctly to read signing messages.
Further, for the starting of ELF executable file, wake operation is written in debuggerd, so as to energy
Enough AutoBackgrounds when starting up debuggerd run ELF executable file.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is flow chart of the method for the present invention.
Fig. 2 is signature check in dynamic link library and to checking algorithm/HASH algorithm encryption schematic diagram.
Fig. 3 is the encryption flow figure of dynamic link library.
Fig. 4 is the flow chart that signature verification is carried out using ELF executable file.
Specific embodiment
As shown in Figure 1, the present invention provides the realization sides that a kind of pair of android system carries out quadruple combinations signature verification
Method, this method comprises the following steps:
Step 1；Signature is extracted using getPackageInfo at Java layers, is then obtained reserved on server
Information compares.The hashing algorithm used is the custom algorithm of similar MD5 a kind of, can go out signature object extraction
The abstract of 32 16 systems.Wherein, described plus salt and cryptographic operation are the incoming dynamics of 32 abstracts for obtaining previous step
The operation carried out after in chained library, adding salt to refer to original 32 is that abstract is associated with one section of random n position random number, is added
It is close using improved MD5 algorithm.By adding the abstract of salt and encryption to need to pass back Java layers, carried out pair with the value of server-side
Than.
Step 2: the signing messages obtained using Java level getPackageInfo method and use
The signing messages for the empty apkFile locally saved that getPackageArchiveInfo method obtains compares.Third,
The signing messages that getPackageInfo method is obtained using reflection mechanism in Jni and the signature being stored in dynamic link library
Information compares.Java layers of signature function is put into dynamic link library by third using reflection mechanism.
Step 3: dynamic link library is encrypted.As Fig. 2 can put function or data using section subitem
Enter the input section of specified name.Concrete operations are as follows.
jstring encrypt(JNIEnv*)_attribute_((section(".test")))；, it will be able in jni
It is middle that encrypt () function is put into inside .test section.The present invention is after dynamic base is compiled, according to the following steps
Operation:
(1) poll shstrtab (String Header String Table), the position of this shstrtab is in so
Start at the shoff of header, length is shnum.
(2) it uses e_shnum to count as count, compares shname with .test, after consistent, by this portion with strcmp
The content of section is divided to save.
(3) content got up using Encryption Algorithm encrypting storing, then writes back so.
Specifically, shoff, shnum, shstrtab etc. are read from Elf32_Ehdr (so header) first
Then offset reads the character string shstrtab in String table, store into str, read section header, deposit
Put shdr into.According to position of the shdr- > sh_name in str, recycles and compare with .mytext.According to shdr- > sh_offset
With the index of shdr- > sh_size field, the content in .mytext is saved in tmpSection.TempSection is moved to right
It is negated after 4, that is, * tmpSection=~(* tmpSection > > 4), finally encrypted tmpSection is saved
Into so.According to the analysis of earlier paragraphs, section field can be modified, and have no effect on operation of so, then directly handle
E_shoff is written in shdr- > addr, and e_entry is written in shdr- > sh_size, addr.The operation carried out in JNI is that building adds
Close section, and constructor is constructed dynamically to decrypt；And the operation that external Shell adding module carries out is, to warp
It crosses so file being packaged to extract and then obscured and encrypted, detailed process such as Fig. 3.
Further, dynamic link library is decrypted.When decryption is the load dynamic base in application program operation
It carries out, step is to read addr and offset that e_shoff/e_entry obtains encryption Section, right with mprotect ()
.CODE the content of section increases access limit, then solves the decryption method of Encryption Algorithm before the section use of this part
It is close, finally define void decrypt () _ _ attribute__ (constructor)；Guarantee that decrypt () is called first.
Step 4: writing ELF executable file；This executable file reads application program using file operation and installs mesh
The CERT.SF of apk installation file under record/data/app/, to obtain signing messages；Then by signing messages with put in advance
The word string set in ELF compares.This ELF executable file makes to show a C language, and is compiled using NDK.This ELF can
/ system/xbin/ can be installed to automatically by script after application program is determined to acquisition root authority by executing in file
In.Since the application installation file save location of different editions is different, this programme can for Android version come pair
The path of base.apk is judged, correctly to read signing messages.Specific workflow such as Fig. 4.
Starting for ELF executable file, wake operation is written in debuggerd, and debuggerd is
ELF file is given it to start and can guarantee starting up by a startup item in init.rc.It can so be switched on
AutoBackground runs ELF executable file when starting debuggerd.
Particularly, it is all shell script on all devices that inventor, which notices that debuggerd is not, in some machines
On be executable file, so, by the way of switching, the debuggerd of script is saved into debuggerd_ without exception
Origin, and new debuggerd file is created, the inside executes two operations, and first is to start the ELF mentioned in this programme
Executable file, second is to execute debuggerd_origin.
The present invention has the advantage that multi-signature is taken to verify, it is added in local and network verification to dynamic link library
Obscure and cryptographic operation, and joined in dynamic link library verifying and ELF executable file in verifying so that attack
Person beats again that package operation is extremely difficult to application program, greatly improves the safety of application program.
Although those familiar with the art should manage described above is a specific embodiment of the invention
Solution, we are merely exemplary described specific embodiment, rather than for the restriction to the scope of the present invention, it is familiar with ability
The technical staff in domain should be covered according to modification and variation equivalent made by spirit of the invention in power of the invention
Benefit requires in the range of protecting.
Claims (9)
1. the implementation method that a kind of pair of android system carries out quadruple combinations signature verification characterized by comprising
First weight: obtaining the signing messages of current application program using Android API, using a kind of hashing algorithm by A.L.S.
Breath extracts abstract, is then passed in dynamic link library and is encrypted, then compares with the signing messages on network site；
Second weight: the signature of the internal hiding APK of application is read using reflection function, with the signature for using Android API to obtain
Information carries out signature check；
Third weight: the signing messages that obtains using reflection mechanism to getPackageInfo method in Jni and it is stored in dynamic
Signing messages in chained library compares, and will try again repeated authentication to the summary info of dynamic link library, if dynamic
Chained library is changed, then prompt user goes regular channel to re-download application；
Quadruple: using NDK compile a binary executable file, wherein using in system reserve apk be stored in
Hash in binary is compared.
2. a kind of pair of android system according to claim 1 carries out the implementation method of quadruple combinations signature verification, special
Sign is: in the first signature verification again, using android.content.pm.PackageManager class
GetPackageInfo () function obtains PackageInfo, then therefrom extracts signature object；Described first is signed again
In name verifying, the hashing algorithm used is the 16 systems abstract that signature object extraction is gone out to 32；The encryption behaviour
Make, is the operation carried out later in the incoming dynamic link library of 32 abstracts for obtaining previous step, encrypts using improved
MD5 algorithm；Abstract by encryption should pass Java layers back, compare with the value of server-side.
3. a kind of pair of android system according to claim 1 carries out the implementation method of quadruple combinations signature verification, special
Sign is: the method monitors network connection situation using radio receiver, if network connection and
The value of failed cluster verifying in SharedPreferences is true, then carries out signature when being connected to the network next time and test
Card.
4. a kind of pair of android system according to claim 1 carries out the implementation method of quadruple combinations signature verification, special
Sign is: in second again signature verification, the signing messages that uses Java level getPackageInfo method to obtain with
The signing messages of the empty apk File locally saved obtained using getPackageArchiveInfo method is compared；This
The empty apk File on ground be stored in application program installation file /resets/raw/ in；Local empty apk File be one only
Merely through the empty apk file without any content of developer's signature, then compared with local signature.
5. a kind of pair of android system according to claim 1 carries out the implementation method of quadruple combinations signature verification, special
Sign is: in third again signature verification, the reflection mechanism, reflection is PackageParser class；The reflection machine of use
System is realized in Jni, reflection be Android provide getPackageInfo function；After obtaining signature digest
Directly compared with the signature digest saved in dynamic link library.
6. a kind of pair of android system according to claim 1 carries out the implementation method of quadruple combinations signature verification, special
Sign is: obscuring dynamic link library, is the e_shoff for modifying the link view of ELF header, e_shensize field, modification
Mode is nop, by such operation, can not open dynamic link library using IDA software；Encryption to dynamic link library is
By function to be protected be put into specific section encrypt after be packaged into Apk again, using gcc _ _ attribute__ belong to
Property mechanism and section subitem, the decryption when input section that function or data are put into specified name is realized encryption and operation.
7. a kind of pair of android system according to claim 1 carries out the implementation method of quadruple combinations signature verification, special
Sign is: the step of encrypting to dynamic link library is: firstly, after dynamic base is compiled, in external poll shstrtab
(String Header String Table), the position of this shstrtab is opened at the shoff of dynamic link library header
Begin, length is shnum, then, uses e_shnum to count as count, the content of this part section is saved, most
Afterwards, this partial content is encrypted using Encryption Algorithm, be written in dynamic link library.
8. a kind of pair of android system according to claim 1 carries out the implementation method of quadruple combinations signature verification, special
Sign is: the described method includes: read first from the Elf32_Ehdr (dynamic link library header) shoff, shnum,
Shstrtab is stored into str, is read section header, is stored into shdr, according to position of the shdr- > sh_name in str
It sets, recycles and compare with .test, according to the index of shdr- > sh_offset and shdr- > sh_size field, in .test
Appearance is saved in tmpSection, negates after tempSection is moved to right 4, finally encrypted tmpSection is saved in
In dynamic link library, after encrypting to dynamic link library, real time decrypting is carried out to dynamic link library in application program operation；
The process of decryption is: addr and offset that e_shoff/e_entry obtains encryption Section are read, it is right with mprotect ()
.CODE the content of section increases access limit, and then this part section is decrypted using corresponding decryption method.
9. a kind of pair of android system according to claim 1 carries out the implementation method of quadruple combinations signature verification, special
Sign is: in quadruple signature verification, using carrying out signature check in ELF executable file；The ELF is executable
File makes to show a C language, and is compiled using NDK；The ELF executable file reads application program using file operation and installs
The CERT.SF of apk installation file under catalogue/data/app/, to obtain signing messages；Then by signing messages and in advance
The word string being placed in ELF compares；It can be determined to obtain root authority in application program in the ELF executable file
Be installed to later automatically by script/system/xbin/ in；Be for Android version come the path to base.apk into
Row judgement；Starting for ELF executable file, wake operation is written in debuggerd.
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| CN106971098B (en) * | 2016-10-11 | 2020-06-02 | 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 | Method and device for preventing repacking |
| CN106502668B (en) * | 2016-10-20 | 2019-08-23 | 武汉斗鱼网络科技有限公司 | A kind of interface package method and system for realizing Android JNI reflection |
| CN106788973A (en) * | 2016-12-19 | 2017-05-31 | 四川九洲电器集团有限责任公司 | A kind of endorsement method and transmission equipment |
| CN107729746B (en) * | 2017-11-28 | 2020-06-12 | 苏州浪潮智能科技有限公司 | Installed application program tamper-proofing method and system based on digital signature |
| CN109960666B (en) * | 2017-12-22 | 2021-05-11 | 北京安天网络安全技术有限公司 | Method and system for obtaining reflection and aidl and clearing cache |
| CN108259182B (en) * | 2018-01-08 | 2021-01-05 | 中国人民大学 | Android application repacking detection method and device |
| CN108629184A (en) * | 2018-05-18 | 2018-10-09 | 北京智游网安科技有限公司 | A kind of SDK safety detection methods of IOS |
| CN109472148B (en) * | 2018-11-15 | 2021-04-02 | 百度在线网络技术（北京）有限公司 | Method, device and storage medium for loading hot patch |
| CN111353148B (en) * | 2020-02-07 | 2022-10-14 | 贝壳技术有限公司 | Method and equipment for determining whether application program is repackaged |
| CN112134905B (en) * | 2020-11-20 | 2021-02-09 | 深圳市房多多网络科技有限公司 | Android system based signature method, device and equipment |
| CN112529423A (en) * | 2020-12-15 | 2021-03-19 | 青岛海尔科技有限公司 | Target resource acquisition method and device, storage medium and electronic device |
| CN114662062A (en) * | 2020-12-23 | 2022-06-24 | 北京奇虎科技有限公司 | Application program tampering detection method, device, equipment and storage medium |
| CN112613037A (en) * | 2020-12-29 | 2021-04-06 | 北京永新视博数字电视技术有限公司 | Code checking method and device |
| CN112699398A (en) * | 2021-01-28 | 2021-04-23 | 厦门立林科技有限公司 | Device, method and equipment for protecting key data of android application and storable medium |
| CN112861191B (en) * | 2021-04-23 | 2023-01-10 | 腾讯科技（深圳）有限公司 | Application program monitoring method and device |
| CN114301655B (en) * | 2021-12-20 | 2023-03-24 | 天翼爱音乐文化科技有限公司 | Android-based data secure transmission method, system, device and medium |
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