CN105684482A - Method of establishing a trusted identity for an agent device - Google Patents
Method of establishing a trusted identity for an agent device Download PDFInfo
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- CN105684482A CN105684482A CN201480056749.6A CN201480056749A CN105684482A CN 105684482 A CN105684482 A CN 105684482A CN 201480056749 A CN201480056749 A CN 201480056749A CN 105684482 A CN105684482 A CN 105684482A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
- H04L67/125—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks involving control of end-device applications over a network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
- H04L63/101—Access control lists [ACL]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
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- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
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- H04W12/068—Authentication using credential vaults, e.g. password manager applications or one time password [OTP] applications
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- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
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Abstract
A trusted identity may be established for an agent device (4) for performing trusted communication with one or more application providing apparatuses (6). The method of establishing the trusted identity includes determining which of a number of authentication models is a selected authentication model to be used for uniquely authenticating the agent device (4)(100). First and second authentication information is generated according to the selected model (102). The first authentication information is for uniquely authenticating the identity of the device and the second authentication information is for verifying that the agent device has the first authentication information. The first authentication information is embedded in the agent device (4)(104) while the second authentication information is transmitted to a registry apparatus (8)(106) for maintaining a device of agent devices. Authentication model information identifying which is the selected authentication model is also sent to the registry (8)(106).
Description
The present invention relates to the field that data process. More particularly, the present invention relates to a kind of method setting up trusted identities for agent equipment.
Having in family, other buildings or outdoor environment processes and communication capacity is thus the number of the equipment allowing itself and other process equipment to interact is on the increase. Everyday objects and relatively small-scale process equipment can be connected to each other as the part of " Internet of Things " and be connected to central platform. For example, the sprinkler system in family from different moisture levels sensor collection information, and can control the activation of sprinkler based on humidity information. Additionally, health care provider can use wireless senser (such as heart rate monitor or taking the sensor of its prescription drug for monitoring patient) to follow the tracks of the health of the patient being in family.
Therefore, in numerous applications, it is understood that there may be the center applications interacted with one or more agent equipments provides device, described agent equipment provides data and/or by application provider control to application provider. Agent equipment can be dramatically different in complexity, process resource, hardware and purpose. Being likely to it is important to provide between agent equipment and application provider to trust, so that application provider can trust the effectiveness of the data being received from agent equipment, and agent equipment can trust any order being received from application provider. But owing to the many agent equipments in Internet of Things are likely to only have very low disposal ability, therefore provide in agent equipment and be likely to relatively difficult and that agent equipment may be dramatically increased cost for the resource setting up trusted relationship with application provider. The rapid widespread deployment of such agent equipment means to also want to so that installing as much as possible quickly and efficiently. The technology of the present invention attempts solving these problems.
From the viewpoint of one, the present invention provides a kind of method setting up trusted identities for the agent equipment for implementing the trust communication with one or more application providers, said method comprising the steps of:
A () determines which in the middle of multiple authentication model is the selected authentication model by being used to authentication proxy's equipment uniquely;
B () generates the first authentication information and the second authentication information according to selected authentication model, the first authentication information is for the identity of authentication proxy's equipment uniquely, and the second authentication information is used for verifying that agent equipment has the first authentication information;
C () is embedded in the first authentication information in agent equipment; And
(d) to be used for keeping the registration table device of device registry of agent equipment transmit the second authentication information and identify in the middle of the plurality of authentication model which be the authentication model information of the selected authentication model used by agent equipment.
Registration table device can keep the device registry for the agent equipment can being trusted with one or more application provider communications. Registration table can keep the authentication information for authentication proxy's equipment. But the technology of the present invention is recognized, authentication model possibly cannot adapt to the agent equipment of all kinds. Some agent equipments are likely to be of high security requirement, thus the authentication model of safety is suitable possibly for such equipment, even if its implementation cost is of a relatively high. On the other hand, for other agent equipments, the temperature monitoring in such as weather forecast application, safety is likely to less important, and authentication model is likely to require nothing more than, and sensor can be identified and can trust its data is effective. For such equipment, it may be preferred to more unsafe authentication model is to save cost. Therefore, the technology of the present invention is recognized, it might be useful to provide extendible security capabilities for different agent equipments.
Therefore, when setting up trusted identities for agent equipment, it is possible to select one of them of multiple authentication model for authenticating device uniquely. The first and second authentication informations can be generated subsequently according to selected authentication model. First authentication information is the information that will be held by agent equipment for its identity of certification uniquely, and the second authentication information is for verifying that agent equipment has the information of the first authentication information. Second authentication information can be sent to registration table device for being registered in device registry. Which in the middle of the multiple authentication model authentication model information that used by agent equipment registration table device may be provided for identifying.
In this way, it is possible to set up extendible authentication profiles for agent equipment, it can balance implementation cost and for the safety required by this particular device. Additionally, identify, by maintenance in registration table, the information employing which model, registration table can be inquired about to set up the degree of belief of particular agent equipment by other equipment, thereby determines how to use this agent equipment. For example, some safety applications can select not use its authentication model to fall specific minimum safe and require following agent equipment. The identity for agent equipment and corresponding application thereof and the more high confidence level of safety is allowed by the overall platform of registration table and the agent equipment offer setting up its trust in this way.
In general, different authentication models can provide different safety levels. These different safety levels are generally along with different implementation costs. For example, implement higher safety and offer specific resources in agent equipment is provided, consequently, it is possible to increase the cost of manufacture equipment.
Once it is determined that selected authentication model, described method can include the step providing the certification resource for implementing selected authentication model in agent equipment. For example, it is possible to during the manufacturing process of agent equipment, set up trusted identities, and subsequently once have selected model, it is possible to specific resources is set up in agent equipment. For example, described resource can include the protected storage for authentication storage information, or for generating the circuit of authentication information, and it can according to have selected which model and different.
Or, once manufacture the agent equipment with specific authentication resource (such as protected storage or key generative capacity), it is possible to set up trusted identities. In this case, it is available for being likely to a certain extent be limited to which certification resource for the selection of authentication model. But still may be made that selection, and which model can be the instruction of selected authentication model subsequently about to registration table offer.
In some instances, the external equipment separated with agent equipment can generate the first and second authentication informations, and by external equipment, the first authentication information can be embedded in agent equipment subsequently. For example, described external equipment can be the manufacturer by agent equipment or retail trader operates computer or other support systems. For safety reasons, it may be useful to be deleted by external equipment after the first authentication information is already embedded in agent equipment, and the first authentication information be not sent to any other equipment. In this way, the first authentication information can be limited only to agent equipment, and it cannot be conducted interviews by other equipment. This reduces another equipment can utilize the first authentication information himself will disguise oneself as into the probability of agent equipment.
Or, it is possible to it is being internally generated the first and second authentication informations by the circuit in agent equipment. For example, described equipment can have key generator, and it can generate the key corresponding to the first and second authentication informations. This method is probably safer, because which ensure that the first authentication information will not be present in the outside of agent equipment, so there is no other equipment and can usurp the identity of agent equipment. But this method may increase manufacturing cost, because will need to provide key to generate resource in agent equipment. For example, key generates the generating random number being likely to need offer good, and its implementation cost is likely to higher.
By different modes, the first authentication information can be embedded in agent equipment. If implementing described method during manufacture equipment, then described embedding can include providing storage circuit plus storage the first authentication information in agent equipment. For example, it is possible to flash memory or read only memory (ROM) are set up in equipment to store the first authentication information. Or, if having manufactured the equipment with storage circuit, then described embedding can include the first authentication information to be stored in the storage circuit provided.
For additional safety, it is possible to the first authentication information is embedded in the protected storage zone section of agent equipment. For example, only the software of trust can read the first authentication information from protected section, and also the first authentication information in protected section can be protected to avoid being written.
Different authentication models can be different from each other in several ways. Description below discusses the various modes that authentication model can be different, but it would be recognized that can provide the model being combined with several features discussed hereafter if desired.
Identical authentication information can be included for some authentication model, the first authentication information and the second authentication information. It is to say, registration table can store shared key or also proxied device itself make for himself other authentication informations of certification. For example, it is possible to use the such as symmetric key of AES (advanced ciphering system) key etc. This method implements possible comparatively inexpensive, but utilize the safety level that this model realizes to be lowered, this is because registration table is able to access that the information uniquely identifying agent equipment, and this information is transferred to registration table it may be easily affected by security violations.
In other models, by providing different authentication information so that greater security level can be realized as the first and second authentication informations. For example, agent equipment can have private key using as the first authentication information, and registration table can have the PKI that is different from private key using as the second authentication information. For example, described private key and PKI can be ECC (elliptic curve cipher) keys. This method is safer, this is because only have agent equipment to be able to access that its private key, it will not be exposed to registration table. Described transfer step can include the digital certificate including PKI to registration table transmission. For example, described digital certificate can be X.509 certificate.
Wherein different authentication model can different another way be the first and second authentication informations be can change or unmodifiable. In some models, authentication information can be unmodifiable, so that once after establishing trusted identities for agent equipment, then this authentication information is just fixed and cannot be changed. For example, the first authentication information can be written in the memory area that cannot be written, and agent equipment be likely to not have at it once regenerate any circuit of authentication information after leaving manufacturer or retail trader. This method implements more cheap, but if the key information of agent equipment suffers damage, then can not generate new key. If but key information is unique for an equipment, then the cracking of key for this equipment need not have influence on any other agent equipment. In other instances, several agent equipments can share identical authentication information.
On the other hand, for other authentication models, authentication information can be changeable. Agent equipment can have the authentication information generative circuit for regenerating the first and second authentication informations, and agent equipment can transmit the second new authentication information registry entries with more new equipment with backward registration table device. Achieve higher safety by this method, this is because can periodically regenerating key to reduce the probability that key is cracked.
Therefore, these different attributes can be combined, to set up a series of different authentication model providing the expansible safety for implementation cost compromise. For example, it is possible to set up three kinds of authentication models. In the first authentication model, the first and second authentication informations can include identical information and be unmodifiable. In the second authentication model, the first and second authentication informations can include different authentication informations and be unmodifiable. In the 3rd authentication model, the first and second authentication informations can include changeable different authentication information. These authentication models provide different options and properly select for the developer of agent equipment and be suitably used by application provider.
Authentication model can different another way be that whether it allows to be reassigned into different registration tablies once agent equipment is after the first registration table for registering. For example, private organization or government may want to run the privately owned registration table of the agent equipment of himself, so that it can more directly control the certification of equipment, to avoid its agent equipment to be used by its hetero-organization certification. But the safe transfer supporting another registration table is likely to need specific resource be available, and the such as ability of regenerating key information, so that registration table in the early time is no longer able to authenticating device. Therefore, same, supporting that being reassigned between different registration tablies and its implementation cost exists compromise. Therefore, it can provide as desired for different models or do not provide the ability of appointment equipment.
When setting up equipment identities, described method can also include setting up the device identifier uniquely identifying agent equipment and being embedded in a device. Device identifier can be sent to registration table device, to allow registration table device by relevant for its any other metadata to authentication information and about equipment.
Furthermore, it is possible to registration table authentication information is embedded in agent equipment for certification registration table device. Agent equipment is thus allowed to check that registration table is effective and is trusted.
Additionally, described method can include embedding registration table address, URL or the IP address of such as registration table device. Thus allow agent equipment contact registration table device to be authenticated. For example, agent equipment (when such as first time is energized when agent equipment is deployed) can contact the registration table device gone out by registration table address designation automatically when its first time is activated.
On the other hand, the present invention provides a kind of for keeping for implementing the registration table device of the device registry of agent equipment communicated with the trust of one or more application providers, including:
It is configured to store the storage circuit of device registry, described device registry includes at least one registry entries for corresponding agent equipment, described registry entries include identifying in the middle of multiple authentication model which be used to the authentication model information of selected authentication model of the corresponding agent equipment of certification uniquely; And
It is configured in response to transmit to external equipment the telecommunication circuit of the authentication model information of the registry entries for authorized agency's equipment from the authentication model inquiry asking the authentication model information for authorized agency's equipment of external equipment.
Including identifying the registration table of authentication model information particular agent equipment being employed to which authentication model by maintenance, registration table can be inquired about to identify capacity of equipment by other equipment. Thus allow application provider according to agent equipment place can safety carry out himself operation adaptive. For example, application provider can avoid the agent equipment that the safety with its authentication model is not enough to the purpose for application provider to interact.
Registration table device can authentication proxy's equipment, if and agent equipment is certified, then registration table device can transmit application key information to agent equipment and application provider, enables to the trust communication carrying out between agent equipment and application provider. Therefore, registration table can serve as the intermediary for providing application key, so that agent equipment itself does not need do so. So can helping to simplify the configuration of agent equipment, this is useful for the equipment in Internet of Things, in Internet of Things, for instance the agent equipment of sensor etc is likely to do not have very strong disposal ability.
On the other hand, the present invention provides a kind of for keeping for implementing the registration table device of the device registry of agent equipment communicated with the trust of one or more application providers, including:
Memory unit for storage device registration table, described device registry includes at least one registry entries for corresponding agent equipment, described registry entries include identifying in the middle of multiple authentication model which be used to the authentication model information of selected authentication model of the corresponding agent equipment of certification uniquely; And
For transmitting the communication component of the authentication model information of the registry entries for authorized agency's equipment to external equipment for the authentication model inquiry of the authentication model information of authorized agency's equipment in response to the request from external equipment.
On the other hand, the present invention provides a kind of method of device registry keeping agent equipment for registration table device, and described agent equipment implements the trust communication with one or more application providers, said method comprising the steps of:
Keep the device registry including at least one registry entries for corresponding agent equipment, described registry entries include identifying in the middle of multiple authentication model which be used to the authentication model information of selected authentication model of the corresponding agent equipment of certification uniquely;
The request authentication model inquiry for the authentication model information of authorized agency's equipment is received from external equipment; And
Inquire about in response to authentication model, transmit the authentication model information of the registry entries for authorized agency's equipment to external equipment.
On the other hand, the present invention provides a kind of to for implementing the method for the device registry trade mark agency equipment of agent equipment communicated with the trust of one or more application providers, said method comprising the steps of:
A () determines which in the middle of multiple authentication model is the selected authentication model that proxied device makes for this agent equipment of certification uniquely; And
B () the registration table device transmission of device registry identifies in the middle of the plurality of authentication model which is used to the authentication model information of selected authentication model of agent equipment to being used for keeping.
The a certain stage later after the trusted identities having been set up agent equipment can also transmit authentication model information to registration table device. In this case, described method can include determining which authentication model agent equipment employs, and transmits authentication model information to registration table device. If not yet transmitting authentication information to registration table, then can also transmit authentication information when to registration table for registering equipment.
Accompanying drawing will be respectively referred to below and be described more fully other aspects of the present invention, feature and advantage.
Fig. 1 schematically shows the example including the system for setting up at least one registration table device that trust communicates between agent equipment with application provider;
Fig. 2 illustrates an example of the relation between agent equipment, application provider, device registry and consumer;
Fig. 3 illustrates and shows that agent equipment is through its exemplary time line from the life cycle of the use being fabricated onto for application;
Fig. 4 schematically shows an example of agent equipment;
Fig. 5 schematically shows the example for authentication storage information with the storage compartments for setting up other information communicated with registration table device provided in agent equipment;
Fig. 6 illustrates an example of application provider;
Fig. 7 illustrates an example of the registration table device for keeping trusted device registration table;
Fig. 8 A illustrates an example of the registry entries for agent equipment;
Fig. 8 B illustrates an example of the logout for agent equipment;
Fig. 9 shows the chart of the compromise between safety and the cost implementing safety;
Figure 10,11 and 12 three examples of authentication model illustrating identity for authentication proxy's equipment;
Figure 13 compares the Figure 10 table to the different attribute of the authentication model shown in 12;
Figure 14 illustrates the first illustrative methods setting up the trusted identities for agent equipment;
Figure 15 illustrates the second illustrative methods setting up the trusted identities for agent equipment;
Figure 16 illustrates and implements certification and the method setting up coded communication between agent equipment and application provider between agent equipment and registration table device;
Figure 17 illustrates an example of method agent equipment being associated with user and agent equipment being associated with application-specific;
Figure 18 illustrates an example of the method agent equipment currently for the first registration table for registering being assigned to the second registration table;
Figure 19 illustrates an example of the method for the proprietary rights of agent equipment being reset back to the first registration table; And
Figure 20 to 23 illustrates four examples of the service condition for agent equipment, registration table device and application provider.
Fig. 1 illustrates an example of the system 2 being made up of some agent equipments 4, application provider 6 and registration table device 8. The data that application provider 6 can include providing cloud service or utilization to be collected from one or more agent equipment 4 perform application program and/or send any equipment of order for controlling one or more agent equipment 4. Agent equipment 4 can be collect data for being sent to application provider 6 or any equipment controlled by application provider 6. For example, agent equipment 4 can be the connection equipment in Physical Network (IOT), such as wireless senser and actuator. Although the larger-scale that agent equipment 4 can include such as tablet PC or mobile phone etc processes equipment, but agent equipment 4 usually can include the relatively small-scale equipment only implementing limited set of tasks, such as collect sensing data and be fed back to the sensor of application, or controlling the relatively simple control unit of the object being associated of such as sprinkler, pump in swimming pool or air-conditioning unit etc. Agent equipment 4 can utilize wired or wireless communication and other equipment (such as application provider 6 and registration table device 8) to communicate, and this can be through what Internet connection carried out. In this application, term " sensor " will be used as an example of agent equipment sometimes, but it would be recognized that agent equipment can also include the equipment that can implement other tasks except sensing.
Agent equipment 4 and application provider 6 are communicated by coded communication. In order to help to set up such coded communication, it is provided that one or more registration table devices 8 are for keeping the storage trust agent equipment registration table about the information of trust agent equipment 4. Registration table 8 promotes that the automatization of agent equipment 4 and application provider 6 matches safely, so that application can the verity of trust agent equipment 4 and data integrity, and make agent equipment 4 can trust verity and the order integrity of application 6, even if being also such when application and agent equipment are and are provided by different manufacturers, supplier or retail trader. Registration table 8 also simplifies the configuration that the trust between agent equipment 4 with application 6 communicates, so that agent equipment 4 requires no knowledge about the detail of the application just communicated, and make the user of agent equipment 4 need not implement configuration operation to communicate with application foundation. On the contrary, when activated, agent equipment 4 can contact registration table 8 simply, and it can communicate with one another with application 6 by Configuration Agent equipment 4 subsequently.
As shown in fig. 1, it is provided that multiple registration table devices 8, each registration table device contacts with the different sets of agent equipment 4 and application provider 6. As shown in fig. 1, agent equipment A8 is possibly for more than one registration table for registering. Similarly, application provider 6 can contact with multiple registration tablies. Although additionally, most of agent equipment 4 will communicate with single application provider 6, but it is also possible that so that registration table Configuration Agent equipment 4 communicates (for example, see the agent equipment A2 in Fig. 1) with multiple application providers.
For different application, the function of agent equipment 4 and application provider 6 can have significant difference. For example, agent equipment 4 can collect meteorological data for being sent to application provider 6, and the latter runs the weather application implementing prediction based on the data collected by agent equipment 4. Additionally, some agent equipments 4 can collect the body building about user information (such as heart rate, complete distance etc.), and this information can be fed back to kept by application provider 6 body-building monitoring application. In another example, home air conditioning systems can include central monitoring application 6 and some agent equipments 4, such as temperature sensor, humidity sensor, user's configured board and conditioning control unit, wherein by central authorities apply sensor-based sensing and in user's configured board set user preference to control the operation of conditioning control unit. There are many other application can use application provider 6 and one or more agent equipment 4 in a comparable manner. For example, it is possible to the application of the aspects such as household safe, family or street lighting, public utilities offer, building automation, inspection, asset tracking and logistics is provided. Registration table 8 provides the common architecture of the certification for managing between internet of things equipment and application 6 and trust.
Fig. 2 schematically shows an example of the relation between agent equipment 4, application provider 6, registration table 8 and consumer 10. Agent equipment 4 is had CAS Institute of Physics and has the right by consumer 10. Consumer 10 also has business relations with application provider 6. For example, application provider is likely to the user profiles that utilizes ID and password to establish consumer 10. Consumer in this situation can be such as individual, family or company.
Agent equipment 4 (such as sensor) merges for himself authentication information of registration table 8 certification. For example, agent equipment 4 can have key, and described key can be used to prove its identity. Therefore, registration table 8 can check the identity of agent equipment 4, and verifies that it is trust agent equipment. Similarly, registration table 8 and application provider 6 can exchange key, in order to verify identity each other and set up trusted relationship. When registration table 8 all establishes trust with agent equipment 4 and application provider 6, registration table 8 can provide application key to agent equipment 4 and application provider 6 subsequently. The application key provided by registration table 8 is subsequently used to communicating without by any communication of registration table 8 between encryption agents equipment 4 with application provider 6. Therefore, registration table 8 promotes the foundation that the trust between agent equipment 4 with application provider 6 communicates, and directly sets up trust in-between without agent equipment 4 and application provider 6. This is useful, because generally agent equipment 4 is probably less ultra low power equipment (such as temperature sensor or heart rate monitor), it has little disposal ability and implements agreement and the cryptographic algorithm of identity for verifying application provider 6. Additionally, the people being commonly installed agent equipment 4 is likely to not have for implementing knowledge for setting up the complex configurations application that trust communicates with application provider 6 or information. Registration table makes to be no longer necessary to the user of agent equipment 4 or setter knows how configuration trust communication.
It should be mentioned that, the relation being absent from fig. 2 between consumer 10 and registration table 8. Registration table 8 does not have any details about consumer, such as ID or password, so there is no individual's details and is transmitted and stored by registration table. Only there is relation 10 in consumer with application provider 6. Registration table 8 only communicates with agent equipment 4 and application provider 6, and does not communicate with consumer 10. Therefore, registration table 8 is the neutral platform for setting up trust between agent equipment and application. Once establish trust communication between agent equipment 4 and application 6, then communication directly carries out between agent equipment and application, without regard to registration table.
In other instances, it is possible to be absent from consumer 10 as shown in Figure 2, contrary agent equipment 4 can belong to the homologue of running application provider 6. For example, intelligent link city can have be arranged in city everywhere such as monitoring the internet of things equipment of street lighting, traffic flow or waste collection, and city management can have the agent equipment 4 providing sensing data and for monitoring the data obtained by agent equipment 4 and processing one or more application providers 6 (such as described application can provide high in the clouds platform, and the resident in city can access this high in the clouds platform to check state and to Report a Problem) of these data simultaneously. In this case, it is possible to there is no the consumer 10 being associated as shown in Figure 2 with particular agent equipment 4. But the use of registration table 8 still can simplify the installation of agent equipment 4. Agent equipment 4 is arranged on the contractor in street lamp or wastebin and such as will require no knowledge about how Configuration Agent equipment 4 and the application communication receiving the data from agent equipment 4. On the contrary, when agent equipment 4 activates while disposing (such as in agent equipment energising or), agent equipment automatically can also communicate to registration table 8 and apply 6 and set up trusted relationship.
Fig. 3 illustrates that showing that agent equipment (sensor) 4 manufactures from it passes through its registration for registration table 8 with certification until setting up the exemplary time line of the process communicated with application provider 6. In step A place, manufacture the system on chip (SOC) for agent equipment with silicon. In step B place, original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and/or original equipment manufacturer (ODM) utilize described system on chip to manufacture agent equipment 4. Certain point place during manufacture, unique device identifier and the key information of the identity for authentication proxy's equipment and be embedded in agent equipment 4 together with other metadata of agent equipment. In step C place, agent equipment is distributed. For example, user 10 can buy agent equipment 4 from shop, or agent equipment can be supplied to the tissue of such as weather forecast center or municipal government etc. During manufacture in step B place or the distribution at step C place, provide register information to registration table 8 agent equipment 4 is registered in registration table 8 as trust agent equipment. Can provide for verifying that agent equipment 4 is the key information of trust and about other metadata of agent equipment 4 for registration table 8.
Now, registration table 8 knows that the agent equipment 4 with described unique ID is trust agent equipment, but is have no knowledge about which cloud service application and will use the data from agent equipment 4. Therefore, in step D place, implement bindings user 10, agent equipment 4 and high in the clouds are applied 6 and is associated. For example, agent equipment can have certain device identifier thereon, such as reference number, bar code or QR code (quick response code). Application provider 6 can provide web interface or smart phone or tablet device application, for input equipment identifier or scan stripes shape code or QR code, and together with the identifier of user, device identifier is uploaded to application provider 6. Or this can implement by application provider's subsequent allocations at consumer's registration for application provider and agent equipment to user with when sending with charge free. Now, cloud service knows which user has agent equipment 4, and then can notify, to registration table 8, the device identifier that will register for the use of this application 6 so that registration table it is now know which application provider 6 should communicate with agent equipment 4. In this way, registration table 8 can be known the user without agent equipment 4 to deposit in registration table 8, set up associating between agent equipment 4 with application provider 6 in case, and store, also without agent equipment 4, specific cloud service or the information of application provider 6 that agent equipment 4 is associated with.
In step E place, for instance by it can be used as a part for Internet of Things to install in original place, or dispose agent equipment by first time unlatching agent equipment. When agent equipment 4 activates, agent equipment 4 utilizes the registration table address being stored in agent equipment 4 automatically to contact registration table 8. Certification is to set up trust each other now for agent equipment 4 and registration table 8, and this is to utilize be embedded in agent equipment 4 in step B place and realize for the key information of registration table 8 registration during the registration of step B or C. If mutual authentication success, then registration table 8 provides application key to agent equipment 4 and application provider 6, and then can by utilizing the application key being received from registration table 8 encryption and deciphering message to communicate safely in step F place agent equipment 4 and application provider 6. Therefore, registration table 8 allows to set up trust between agent equipment 4 and application 6, implements the configuration of any complexity without agent equipment.
Sum it up, registration table 8 provides the framework of the certification for the trust between managing I/O T equipment (such as sensor) 4 and application provider (high in the clouds provider) 6. Registration table 8 includes high in the clouds platform, its management is about the metadata of each application provider 6 and agent equipment 4, relation between administration agent equipment 4 and application provider 6, authenticating device identifier, and automatically provide key to allow safe communicating for agent equipment with application. Agent equipment 4 can manufacture according to particular design guide and design, its guarantee agent equipment 4 have uniquely can authenticating identity, safety key storage, for keep safely trust cryptographic abilities and predictable platform robustness. Agent equipment manufacture supports platform key in agent equipment 4 can be supported to generate and insert, the management of double secret key and the interface with registration table.
This framework contributes to solving the Railway Project in existing system. By providing by the unique identifier of registration table cloud service certification for each agent equipment, agent equipment can be uniquely identified to guarantee to trust. Preferably, device identifier can be globally unique, so that the whole world is all without there being the identifier that two collaborative share are identical. This means that the appointment manufactured with device identifier may be completely independent of the registration table of any follow-up use. But it is also possible to make device identifier is that local is unique in given registration table or registration table colony, wherein for independent, do not have the distinct device in mutual registration table to use identical identifier. By matching the automatic registration process of agent equipment for application safety, it is achieved being mutually authenticated between agent equipment 4 and application 6, so that application trust agent equipment verity and make agent equipment trust application verity. Even if owing to agent equipment 4 and application 6 are not manufactured by identical provider or distribute can also trust each other now, thus open market for agent equipment and application, so that there is no need to use the agent equipment 4 of the particular brand provided by application-specific provider 6 to realize trusting. Application can trust the agent equipment of the wide variety from Duo Jia manufacturer, and agent equipment can trust the application of the wide variety from Duo Jia provider. This will assist in the cost reducing agent equipment and application, and also contributes to increasing the use of Physical Network agent equipment and application. Additionally, registration table 8 is favorably improved the confidentiality in the source of application provider's sensing data to applying for " big data ", described " big data " application processes the mass data being received from many sources. The value of the collected information of " big data " service is depended on to the effectiveness of all " small data " collected by each independent agent equipment 4. If cloud service cannot trust on its each independent agent equipment 4, then the conclusion obtained by " big data " application also cannot be trusted, so that whole application is nonsensical. The technology of the present invention helps to maintain for the trust by the overall information collected by such application. Additionally, registration table 8 can other information of use history etc of storage agent device characteristics and such as agent equipment 4. This can be used to allow the particular kind of agent equipment of application provider 64 as target. For example, application 6 is likely to be intended merely to collect data from having the agent equipment 4 that specific minimum safe requires.
Fig. 4 schematically shows agent equipment 4. Agent equipment includes the sensing circuit 11 for collecting sensing data. For example, sensing circuit 11 can include temperature sensor, camera, heart rate monitor or for collecting any other detector of the data needed for application provider 6. Agent equipment 4 also includes, for controlling the various process circuit 12 processing operation implemented by agent equipment 4, being such as mutually authenticated, generating for the encryption and key being sent to the data of application provider 6. Agent equipment 4 also has for the telecommunication circuit 14 with the such as external device communication of registration table device 8 and application provider 6 etc. Telecommunication circuit 14 can use radio communication, such as utilize the communication of WLAN (WiFi), the short haul connection of such as radio communication (RFID) or near-field communication (NFC) etc, or it is used in the communication in the wireless sensor network of such as ZigBee or Bluetooth or 6LoWPAN etc. Additionally, telecommunication circuit 14 can use the cellular network of such as 3G or 4G etc. Telecommunication circuit 14 can also use wire communication, such as uses optical fiber or metallic cable. Telecommunication circuit 14 can also use the communication that two or more are multi-form, and such as combination uses wherein several examples given above. Agent equipment also includes storage circuit 16, and it is for the device identifier of storage agent equipment 4, for the authentication information of authentication proxy's equipment and other information of being used by agent equipment 4. Agent equipment can also include key generator 18 alternatively, and it is for generating key information or other authentication informations for agent equipment 4.
Although Fig. 4 is shown in which that agent equipment is an example of the sensor including sensing circuit 11, in other instances, sensing circuit 11 is not likely to be vital. On the contrary, for instance agent equipment can include for controlling physical object, such as the control circuit of sprinkler, anti-theft alarm, heating or air-conditioning unit or traffic light systems.
Fig. 5 schematically shows an example of the information in the storage circuit 16 being stored in agent equipment 4. Storage circuit 16 has One Time Programmable (OTP) section 20 for storing the device identifier 22 uniquely identifying agent equipment 4. Device identifier 22 is embedded in OTP section 20 during the manufacture of agent equipment 4. In this embodiment, once be fixed in OTP section 20, device identifier 22 just cannot be changed. For example, after device identifier being written to OTP section 20, it is possible to burn fuse in storage circuit, so that OTP section 20 cannot be rewritten. Or, in some equipment, it is possible to generate new identifier for equipment after the fabrication. For example, when equipment is transferred to different registration tablies, it is possible to for the identifier that device assignment is new, the identifier of the equipment to avoid and to have been managed by new registration table clashes.
Storage circuit 16 also includes both can being read and can also be written of non-volatile memory section 24, but it is applied read-write protection, so that section 24 can only be accessed by the privileged software processed performed by circuit 12. Read/write protection section 24 stores registration table address 26, and it includes URL, IP address or allows agent equipment 4 to contact other identifiers of registration table 8. Protected section 24 also stores the registration table PKI 27 for deciphering the message being received from registration table 6, in order to verify that described registration table is authorized (registration table PKI 27 corresponds to the registration table private key that registration table is held).
Protected section 24 goes back storage sensor key 28 or private key 29, and it is the unique key for uniquely identifying its identity that agent equipment 4 keeps. Sensor key 28 is the symmetric key shared with registration table 8. Message can be encrypted at least partially by sensor key 28 first, and if registration table 8 identical key can be utilized successfully to decipher described message, then this message is considered to be received from trust agent equipment, and therefore described equipment obtains certification. Or, it is possible to provide the private key 29 corresponding to the held different PKIs of registration table 8 for agent equipment. Such asymmetric double secret key allows the safer certification for agent equipment, this is because do not have other equipment to hold the private key 29 of agent equipment 4. PKI 32 corresponding to private key 29 is placed on the write-protect of storage circuit 16 but in the read-protected section 34 of right and wrong. Therefore, PKI 32 can by any equipment or operate in any software on agent equipment 4 and read. Additionally, the digital certificate 36 being associated with agent equipment 4 is also stored in the open section 34 of storage circuit 16. Described digital certificate comprises the mark various data of agent equipment 4, metadata and PKI 32. Described certificate is sent to registration table 8 during certification, and registration table is signed by described certificate so that authentication proxy's equipment identities. Other equipment can read certificate from registration table 8 subsequently, and the signature verification agent equipment of registration table is that trust and the PKI 32 that is associated with certificate 36 are actually from this agent equipment. Therefore, registration table 8 can serve as the Notified Body for issuing PKI 32, and its mode is similar to other Notified Bodies in PKIX (PKI).
Read/write protection section 24 also stores one or more application key 30, and it is for implementing, with application provider 6, the symmetric key that trust communicates. These keys are provided by registration table 8, and are used to data that agent equipment 4 and application provider 6 are exchanged or order is encrypted/deciphers. Different application key can be provided for every a pair agent equipment 4 and application provider 6, in order to the safety of the communication between maintenance equipment by registration table 8. In other embodiments, asymmetric key is used as the application key 30 of the equipment that is supplied to 4 and application provider 6. The application key that registration table device 8 provides can be generated by registration table device 8 itself, or can by registration table from another equipment, and such as hardware keys maker or cipher key storage device obtain.
Fig. 6 illustrates an example of application provider 6. Telecommunication circuit 40 is provided to communicate for registration table 8 and agent equipment 4. Likewise it is possible to provide multi-form wired or wireless communication, as discussed previously for agent equipment 4. Application provider also includes storage circuit 42, and it stores the various data and application that are used by application provider 6. For example, storage circuit 42 can store application program, and described application program uses and is received from the data of agent equipment 4 by telecommunication circuit 40 and in a manner it processed, or sends control command to agent equipment 4. Offer processes circuit 44 for performing application and controlling other operations, such as the encryption/deciphering of the certification of registration table 8 and the data for exchanging with agent equipment 4. Cipher feature portion can be provided, such as store the safe storage in circuit 42 and process the cryptographic algorithm in circuit 44 or safe handling function.
Fig. 7 illustrates an example of the registration table device 8 for keeping device registry. Registration table 8 has the telecommunication circuit 50 for communicating with agent equipment 4 and application provider 6. Similarly, telecommunication circuit 50 can use various wired or wireless communication, as previously discussed. Registration table also has storage circuit 52, and it stores the program performed by registration table 8, and storage device registration table is for the information followed the tracks of about various agent equipments 4 and corresponding application 6. Offer processes circuit 54 for performing be stored in the application program stored in circuit 52 and control various operation, such as authentication proxy's equipment 4 and application provider 6, implement the agent equipment 4 transfer between different registration tablies, and management is about the metadata of agent equipment. Likewise it is possible to provide cipher feature portion, such as store the safe storage in circuit 42 and process the cryptographic algorithm in circuit 44 or safe handling function. The inquiry for the information about particular agent equipment 4 from external equipment can also be responded by registration table 8, such as uses the information of which authentication model about agent equipment. For safety reasons, and not all registration table 8 can allow such inquiry. For example, some registration table operators are not it may be preferred that provide the information about the authentication model used by particular agent equipment 4. Additionally, query facility can be implemented certification by registration table 8 before utilizing the information about agent equipment 4 to respond, in order to guarantee that the query facility of only trust is allowed to obtain this information.
Fig. 8 A illustrates an example of the registry entries 60 stored by the storage circuit 52 of registration table device 8. The registry entries of the device identifier 22 (it is corresponding to being stored in the identifier 22 in the OTP section 20 of agent equipment 4) including this agent equipment 4 can be had to each agent equipment 4 of registration table for registering. Registry entries also includes device certificate 36 and the PKI 32 of agent equipment 4, and is made for verifying that agent equipment 4 is any other authentication information of trust by registration table 8. Although Fig. 8 A is shown in which that certificate 36 and PKI 32 are in an example in identical field, but certificate 36 and PKI 32 can also be provided in different fields. Additionally, registry entries 60 can also have the field for the other kinds of authentication information being used in other authentication models.
Registry entries 60 also includes one or more application identifier 62, its mark agent equipment 4 will set up with it one or more application providers 6 of trust communication and the one or more application keys 30 for communicating with the application provider 6 identified. Similarly, application identifier 62 can be in identical field or the field separately of registry entries 60 with corresponding application key 30. Can in response to its request being associated with this agent equipment be stored in application identifier in registry entries from application provider. Therefore, agent equipment itself need not know its with which application communication, and registration table 8 can provide associating between agent equipment with application provider. For example, once agent equipment receives the application key 30 from registration table 8, then it can export the data utilizing application key 30 encryption simply without being concerned about that these data will go to where.
Registry entries 60 also includes mark agent equipment 4 and uses which authentication model to carry out himself authentication model information of certification safely, as will be described later. It should be appreciated that registry entries 60 can include the many other types of information about agent equipment and metadata, it can be inquired about by the external equipment of such as application provider etc. It should also be appreciated that agent equipment 4, application provider 6 and registration table 8 can include except Fig. 4, shown in 6 and 7 except other unit many.
Additionally, registry entries 60 includes signature/hash field 68, it trust included based on the information in other fields more at least within of registry entries 60 generates is signed or hashed value. This allows to make tampering detection when revising one of them other field after a certain equipment or individual are attempted creating registry entries 60 first in registration table. Registration table device 8 can utilize other fields to recalculate signature or hash, and checks whether it mates stored signature/hash field 68.
As seen in fig. 8b, registration table device 8 can also store the event entries 69 for corresponding agent equipment 4. Event entries 69 can be the sub-entry of the registry entries 60 shown in Fig. 8 A, or may be provided in the record separated being associated with registry entries 60 by device id 22 in other embodiments. Event entries 69 provides the historical information relevant with the event occurred for corresponding agent equipment 4. Specific agent equipment 4 can have zero associated therewith, one or more event entries 69. Therefore, can there is many-one relationship between the registry entries 60 for particular device and the event entries 69 being associated with identical device. Event entries 69 includes the date and time information on date, the logout showing the type of institute's event and the field of any other information being associated with event that occur for the device id 22 of agent equipment, expression event, and the signature/hash field for tampering detection, it is similarly to the signature/hash field 68 of registry entries 60. New event entries 69 can be created when the event being associated with agent equipment 4 occurs. For example, it is possible to the event being recorded includes agent equipment 4 and sends with charge free from what manufacture, ship (position), the activating or disable of equipment, consumer to the registration of equipment and many other business. Event entries 69 allows registration table to follow the tracks of the history of equipment.
As shown in Figure 9, different types of agent equipment 4 is likely to be of different requirements for safety and certification. In general, the level of required safety more high (this be such as because data be valuable, belong to individual, commercial sensitivity or because there is the health or public safety problem that are associated with the use of data), the manufacturing cost of agent equipment 4 is more high, this is because be likely to need the more complicated resource for administrative authentication. For some equipment, this additional cost possibly cannot be rationalized (justify). For example, for such as data being fed to the agent equipment of the thermometer etc of weather monitoring application, required all conditions is that data can be trusted is real, therefore can use the authentication model of relatively low cost and low-security. On the other hand, the other kinds of equipment for using in health care or intelligent city or teleprocessing, it is possible to it is highly important that agent equipment integrity and verity are without prejudice. For these application, the way causing the cost of increase in order to obtain the safety of higher degree can be rationalized. Therefore, as shown in Figure 9, it is possible to set up multiple different trust level, in order to a kind of extensible technique for keeping real equipment identity for IOT equipment is provided. Each agent equipment 4 can have the specific authentication model selected for it, and authentication model information 64 as shown in Figure 8 can be utilized to show selected model in registry entries 60. In addition it is likely present so that the equipment with similar functions has the business demand of the authentication model operated under different safety levels. This is probably useful for catering to different use fields.
After establishing the different agent equipments 4 with different authentication model during the manufacture or distribution of equipment, registration table 8 can divide based on 64 agent equipments of authentication model information or be separated in different classifications subsequently. For example, some application 6 may show that it can only communicate with the agent equipment with specific authentication model. Additionally, equipment can inquire about registration table 8 to determine the authentication model for authorized agency's equipment 4. For example, banking application provider may want to determine that the ready-made agent equipment 4 of user met specific minimum safe requirement before communicating with agent equipment 4 foundation trust. Different authentication models be likely to many different in different. For example, some authentication models can use fixing, unmodifiable authentication information, and other authentication models then can allow the key generator circuitry 18 utilizing agent equipment 4 to update authentication information. For fixing model, key generator circuitry 18 provides perhaps without together with agent equipment 4, such that it is able to implement agent equipment more cheaply, agent equipment for having key generative capacity then can provide safer certification, this is because can regenerating key when needed. Similarly, some authentication models can use the symmetric key shared by agent equipment 4 and registration table 8, and other equipment then can use asymmetric key, and wherein agent equipment 4 and registration table 8 have different complementary key. Some models can allow an agent equipment to transfer to another from a registration table, and other models then can be restricted to agent equipment for specific registration table handling. Therefore, there are many different modes to implement authentication model, and can be properly carried out selecting during the manufacture of agent equipment or exploitation.
Figure 10 to 12 illustrates three examples of authentication model. Figure 10 illustrates the first authentication model, and wherein fixing sensor key 28 is injected in the protected section 24 of agent equipment 4 during manufacture. Sensor key 28 is generated by the external equipment 70 belonging to manufacturer. Subsequently sensor key 28 is shared as the shared secret uniquely identifying equipment and registration table 8. For example, sensor key can be 128 bits generated during manufacture or 256 bit A ES (Advanced Encryption Standard) key. For authentication proxy's equipment 4, agent equipment 4 can transmit message to registration table 8, and a part for wherein said message utilizes sensor key 28 to encrypt. If registration table 8 can successfully be deciphered this part of message 28 and utilize the copying of sensor key 28 of himself to verify that it is correct, then the certification for agent equipment 4 is successful. For example, it is possible to generated hash by agent equipment 4 from described message, and use sensor key 28 to encrypt described hash. The registration table receiving message can utilize the algorithm identical with agent equipment 4 to generate the hash of himself of received message, and also can decipher received hash and check whether received hash mates its hash generated. If two hash couplings, then agent equipment is certified. The advantage of the first authentication model is in that its enforcement is less costly. There is no need to provide PKIX or key generator 18 in agent equipment 4. Have only to AES or another kind of shared secret scheme. But the cost of low cost is safety to be reduced, if this is because shared secret is cracked (compromise), then provides the control completely for equipment or agent equipment for assailant, changes or data access including proprietary rights. Owing to the sensor key 28 shared providing registration table 8 is identical with the sensor key 28 being used to authenticating device, therefore the probability of sensor key 28 is cracked bigger compared with the situation using asymmetric key, particularly that sensor key is distributed to the process of registration table 8 from manufacture system 70 is especially such. But owing to sensor key 28 is unique for each agent equipment 4, even if therefore sensor key is cracked, this also only will affect an agent equipment 4, and will not affect that any other agent equipment. Therefore, this model can be used to the low-security applications of such as weather forecast etc.
In certain embodiments, replace there is single sensor key 28, it is possible to the list of a sensor key is embedded in agent equipment 4, and can by agent equipment 4 select from described list a key for certification himself. Show which key is that the index entering in list of selected key is to define the active mark of equipment in such a case, it is possible to utilize. The corresponding agent equipment key for selected key can be provided subsequently for registration table 8. In this way, if a sensor key is cracked, then agent equipment 4 can be switched to another sensor key used in list to profit.
Figure 11 illustrates an example of the second authentication model, wherein remains fixing (immutable) for the authentication information of agent equipment 4, but this time described authentication information includes asymmetric double secret key, including private key 29 and PKI 32. This is safer, because private key 29 can only be held by agent equipment 4 not with any other collaborative share, corresponding PKI 32 then can be broadcasted generally to other equipment without damaging private key 29. Asymmetric double secret key makes to decipher only with corresponding PKI 32 according to being similar to the message that mode previously discussed utilizes private key 29 partly to encrypt. Therefore, if registration table 8 can utilize PKI 32 successfully to decipher the message being received from agent equipment, then may determine that described message originates from the agent equipment through authorizing with private key 29. Described double secret key is also associated with the digital certificate 36 of the common sides representing agent equipment 4. Certificate 36 can be used to transmit PKI 32 to registration table 8, and once by registry signature, verification public key 32 is the correct key for this agent equipment 4. Described double secret key and certificate can include any type of signing certificate and double secret key. For example, elliptic curve cipher (ECC) key is used as double secret key 29,32, and X.509 certificate is used as digital certificate 36. In the model, manufacture equipment 70 and generate double secret key and certificate 36 during manufacture, and embed it in the protected section 24,34 of memorizer, just as shown in Figure 11 like that. Although there is potential weakness, namely manufacture processes 70 private keys 29 that will be appreciated by agent equipment 4, but manufacturer 70 just can be deleted after private key 29 is injected in agent equipment 4, and hereafter agent equipment 4 will be able to access only equipment of described private key. Any other part except agent equipment 4 itself does not all need private key. Authentication information is safer to the transfer of registration table 8 from manufacturer 70, this is because it only needs transfer PKI 32 and certificate 36, without transfer private key 29. But in the model, the cost compared with the first authentication model increases, this is because agent equipment needs PKI ability and for storing more Guared memories of private key 29, PKI 32 and certificate 36. But safety is higher, this is because be absent from the permanent shared key known to other equipment except agent equipment 4. Similarly, replacing single double secret key, agent equipment 4 can have once list with regard to alternative double secret key after can operating at agent equipment. While it is true, described list does not still have great protection requirement in this case, this is because the list of the agent equipment key kept by registration table 8 is only made up of PKI and certificate. Any of PKI scheme can be used for the second model.
Figure 12 illustrates the 3rd authentication model, and it is safer than the first and second models, but implementation cost is also higher. Similarly, provide private key 29 and PKI 32 together with digital certificate 36 in the storage circuit 16 of agent equipment 4. But the 3rd model and the second model are different in that, in agent equipment 4, provide on chip key generator circuitry 18 for generating double secret key 29,32. Which provide higher safety, because the private key 29 of agent equipment 4 is never known by manufacturer 70. Additionally, due to provide on chip key to generate facility, therefore if it is necessary to then agent equipment can regenerating key to change authentication information. Only PKI 32 and certificate 36 are provided to the external equipment of such as registration table 8 etc. Therefore, during identity and proprietary rights are set up, the chipset 18 in agent equipment 4 creates the asymmetric double secret key of such as ECC double secret key etc. Private key 29 is stored in the read/write protection section 24 of memorizer. Only authorization code is able to access that private key 29. On chip, key generator circuitry 18 will additionally generate certificate 36, and comprises device id 22 and the Certificate Signature Request of PKI 32 to registration table 8 transmission. PKI 32 and certificate 36 are also written in the write-protect section 34 of memorizer, and it is fully readable without protection. Certificate 36 is signed by registration table 8, to verify that agent equipment is through authorizing. This method does not have the exposure weakness in model 1 or 2, and in model 1 or 2, sensor key 28 or private key 29 can be extracted from registration table 8 or manufacturing platform 70. The private key 29 of agent equipment will not be exposed to any other equipment except agent equipment 4. In this case, the intensity of safety depends on the quality that the double secret key undertaken by key generator on chip 18 generates, so that this one side safe enough, additional cost is there is, this is because additional silicon must be had to support that safe key generates (such as needing good generating random number) in the equipment of manufacture.
In the example of Figure 12, the 3rd authentication model also allows for the trusted relationship between registration table 8 and agent equipment 4 to transfer to the second registration table 80. This process be will be described in further detail below. Owing to agent equipment 4 has key generator circuitry 18 on chip, it is therefore intended that when agent equipment transfers to the second registration table 80 trust from the first registration table 8, it is possible to generate new key, so that the first registration table 8 is no longer able to authentication proxy's equipment 4. This is useful for providing additional safety to be probably, this is to be in that such as to be used in the operator of the privately owned registration table 8 in government or defence application some agent equipment may be required to transfer to its registration table, and removes and being related of public registry 8. Or, the first registration table can be instructed to delete relevant entry, so that it is no longer able to authentication proxy's equipment. In this way, agent equipment need not generate new key. In another kind of modification, agent equipment can have the more than one key prestored. When changing registration table, the key being previously not used by then can be used subsequently.
It should be appreciated that other models being possible Figure 10 and 11 provide the ability of transfer trust between registration table. But in this case, owing to agent equipment cannot regenerate its key information, therefore agent equipment 4 will utilize identical key information to be registered in the second registration table 80. In this case, two registration tablies 8,80 can share identical agent equipment 4, so that identical agent equipment 4 is registered to two registration tablies. Therefore, replace and agent equipment data are transferred directly to another registration table, agent equipment can be assigned to two registration tablies on the contrary, so that the application provider that agent equipment can and homogeneously associate with two registration tablies communicates.
It is, therefore, possible to provide some different types of authentication models, in order to allow the ability of the safety of the agent equipment design balance enough degree of maintenance and the cost implementing safety. Depend on that the meaning of agent equipment determines purpose, particular model can being selected during manufacture, and can be kept about the information employing which model by registration table 8 subsequently, requiring to use suitable agent equipment for it thus allowing to apply. Figure 13 illustrates and compares the Figure 10 table to the different attribute of the model shown in 12. Will be appreciated that, it is possible to use other kinds of model. For example, it is possible to use different types of key generates to provide safety in various degree.
Figure 14 illustrates the first example of the method for the trusted identities setting up agent equipment 4. Described trusted identities can during the manufacture of agent equipment, its distribution during or later when for registration table registering apparatus set up. In step 100 place, it is determined that the authentication model that will use for agent equipment 4. If agent equipment 4 is manufactured, then the determination of selected authentication model be will depend upon which in agent equipment 4, have been provided for which resource (if such as agent equipment does not have key generator circuitry 18 on chip, then possibly cannot select authentication model 3 previously discussed). On the other hand; if agent equipment manufacture before or period implement described method; then can select any authentication model, and can in enforcement later for implementing the required process resource (such as protected storage, PKI infrastructure or key generative capacity being set up in equipment) of described model.
In step 102 place, generate the key information for authentication proxy's equipment 4 according to selected authentication model. Depending on selected model, this can be implemented by outside manufacture equipment 70 or be implemented by agent equipment 4 itself. In step 104 place, device id 22, shared sensor key 28 or private key 29, registration table address 26 and also have device certificate 36 to be embedded in the storage circuit 16 of agent equipment 4 alternatively. Described embedding step by a storage circuit is set up in equipment and implemented, or can be implemented by being provided in the storage circuit in agent equipment during described information is stored in fabrication stage previously. If using authentication model 1, then sensor key 28 is embedded into, if using authentication model 2 or 3, then private key 29 and certificate 36 are stored in storage circuit 16. Now, it is also possible to provide registration table authentication information for the identity of checking registration table 8 for agent equipment 4.
In step 106 place, the various metadata of the trusted identities for defining agent equipment 4 are uploaded to registration table device 8. For example, device id 22, sensor key 28 (for model 1) or PKI 32 (for model 2 or 3), digital certificate 36 (for model 2 or 3) and show that the authentication model information 64 of selected model can be uploaded to registration table 8. In step 108 place, certificate is signed by registration table when necessary, and device metadata is registered in registration table can authentic trusted device described equipment is established as its identity.
Figure 15 illustrates the second example setting up the trust for equipment and identity. In this embodiment, the device identifier 22 in having utilized key generator circuitry 18 and having utilized the OTP section 20 being stored in storage circuit 16 has manufactured agent equipment (sensor) 4. Therefore, this sensor 4 uses authentication model 3 or allows the close copy that on chip, key generates. In step 120 place, sensor 4 sends registration (registration) request of the device identifier 22 showing sensor 4 to registration table 8. In step 122 place, whether Registry Checking sensor 4 is had by registration table, and if words then described method terminate.
If agent equipment is not yet had, then in step 124 place, trigger sensor 4 is to utilize key generator 18 to create new double secret key 29,32, and the private key 29 in the middle of described double secret key is placed in protected storage zone section 24. Generate Certificate signature request in step 126 place, and it is sent to registration table 8. The digital certificate 32 of sensor 4 is signed by Certificate Signature Request request registration table 8. Described certificate at least includes the device identifier 22 of sensor 4 as subject name, the safety level (authentication model information) of sensor 4, and the PKI 32 generated by key generator 18. In step 128 place, described certificate is signed to confirm that described certificate and PKI are effective by registration table 8. Registration table the information registering about sensor 4 in device registry, in order to sensor 4 is established as trust agent equipment.
Figure 16 illustrates and agent equipment 4 is implemented certification to check that it is registered as trusted device and sets up the method that trust communicates subsequently between agent equipment 4 with application provider 6. Assuming such as to use the method shown in Figure 14 or 15 to have registered agent equipment 4 for registration table 8, therefore registration table 8 includes for verifying that agent equipment 4 includes uniquely identifying the information of the authentication information of this agent equipment 4. Employing authentication model 3 in this embodiment, therefore agent equipment 4 includes sensor private key Ks.pr, and registration table 8 includes the sensor PKI Ks.pu corresponding to private key Ks.pr. Similarly, agent equipment 4 can utilize the registration table PKI Kr.pu of the registration table private key Kr.pr held corresponding to registration table 8 to carry out certification registration table 8.
In step 150 place, registration table 8 and application provider 6 are to implementing each other to be mutually authenticated to set up trust. As a rule, this will be implemented once for each application provider 6 by registration table 8. Not each agent equipment 4 for communicating with application provider 6 150 is generally repeated by being mutually authenticated between registration table 8 with application provider 6. Being mutually authenticated 150 can utilize any of authentication techniques to occur.
In step 152 place, agent equipment is activated, and in response to activation, agent equipment 4 transmits certification request 154 to the registration table URL26 passing through to be embedded in the protected storage 24 of the agent equipment registration table identified. Described certification request includes the device id 22 of mark agent equipment 4. The activation of agent equipment such as can include agent equipment first time energising after mounting, or the activator button on agent equipment is pressed. Certification request 154 can be automatically transferred in response to the activation of agent equipment, so that user interface or certain other kinds of user interface triggering authentication need not be carried out. This means that the people of installation or use agent equipment need not know agent equipment just certified. Asking 154 in response to certification, agent equipment 4 and registration table 8 utilize to be proceeded by by agent equipment 4 and registration table 8 exchanged key during registration or registration and are mutually authenticated 156. In being mutually authenticated, agent equipment 4 utilizes sensor private key Ks.pr to encrypt the hash of message, and the message 158 of Partial encryption is sent to registration table 8. According to corresponding mode, registration table 8 utilizes registration table private key Kr.pr to encrypt the hash of message, and the message 159 of Partial encryption is sent to agent equipment 4. Agent equipment 4 obtains the hash of the message 159 of himself, and by its with compare by utilizing registration table PKI Kr.pu that keyed hash is decrypted the hash obtained. If two hash couplings, then assert that registration table 8 is real. Similarly, registration table 8 obtains hash from message 158, and by its with compare by utilizing sensor PKI Ks.pu that the keyed hash received along with message 158 is decrypted the hash obtained. Similarly, if two hash couplings, then agent equipment 4 obtains certification.
Although Figure 16 illustrates the request of certification separately 154 and certification message 158 that are transmitted by agent equipment 4, but in other embodiments, certification request 154 and certification message 158 can be identical message, so that agent equipment 4 when activating 152 to the certification message 158 (together with device id 22) of registration table 8 translator unit encryption, and the certification message 158 of this Partial encryption is served as and is triggered registration table 8 by being mutually authenticated the 156 certifications requests responded.
If registration table 8 successfully have authenticated the message 158 being received from agent equipment 4, then in step 160 place, registration table 8 generates application key 30 and application key is sent to agent equipment 4. Additionally, registration table 8 is also sent to application key 30 application provider 6 identified by the application identifier 62 in the registry entries 60 of the agent equipment 4 for having the device id 22 specified in certification request 154. Registration table 8 is also sent to application provider 6 the agent equipment ID of agent equipment 4, so that application provider 6 knows which agent equipment 4 will utilize received application key 30 to communicate.
If agent equipment 4 successfully have authenticated registration table 8, then in step 170 place, agent equipment 4 and application provider 6 utilize the application key 30 being received from registration table 8 to start coded communication. If registration table 8 is proxied device 4 success identity not yet, then agent equipment 4 is not involved in utilizing any coded communication of application key 30. In coded communication 180, usual agent equipment 4 will transmit data to application provider 6, and application provider will transmit order to agent equipment 4, but it is also possible that and send data or order in the opposite direction. In step 190 place, operate in the application on application provider 6 and process the data being received from agent equipment. For example, application can use data to determine other information, or the high in the clouds that data can be used for passing through access to the Internet calculates platform. Coded communication 180 is made directly between agent equipment 4 and application provider 6, and without registration table 8.
Therefore, registration table 8 allows agent equipment 4 and application provider 6 to be encrypted the complex configurations without agent equipment 4 place to communicating or user is mutual. This means that agent equipment 4 can be very simple, and need not have the process resource of complexity, still can keep safety simultaneously.
Figure 17 illustrates the method for agent equipment 4 being associated with particular consumer (user) 10 in registration table 8 and agent equipment 4 being associated with application provider 6. In step 200 place, consumer 10 obtains the device id 22 of agent equipment. This can carry out in several ways. For example, agent equipment 4 or the box for equipment 4 can have the device id being printed thereon, and consumer can read device id from agent equipment shell. Additionally, device id can be represented by bar code or QR code or similar figure, and user can use code reader to carry out scan code to obtain device id 22. Consumer 10 transmits equipment association request 210 with backward application provider 6, its identifier (ID) comprising consumer and device identifier 22. This step can in response to such as using smart phone or tablet device application or web interface to read bar code or QR code and automatically occur. Application provider 6 now can for device id record ID so that the communication later from agent equipment 4 can be associated with particular consumer. After receiving equipment association request 210, application provider 6 can also send association request 220 to registration table 8, thus the application identifier of application provider 6 is associated with the device id 22 from agent equipment association request 210. Asking in response to association, 8 application identifier of registration table are registered in the registry entries 60 for having the agent equipment being asked 220 device identifiers 22 specified by association.
In other instances, consumer 10 is likely to directly obtain agent equipment 4 from application provider, and therefore when consumer obtains agent equipment, application provider 6 may already know that associating between device id with ID. In this case, it is possible to do not need equipment association request 210, and application provider 6 can alternatively use its internal record to generate the association request 220 that will be sent to registration table 8. It should be mentioned that, registration table 8 does not receive user identifier. Registry entries 60 only identifies agent equipment 4 by device id, and does not comprise any user data.
In a comparable manner, association request 220 can also be made for asking currently transferring to different providers 6 from the agent equipment 4 that an application provider 6 is associated by application provider 6. In this case, association request 220 can come from multiple source, including agent equipment itself (if such as user selects switching application provider), the application provider 6 in the early time being previously associated with agent equipment 4, utilizes association request 220 to assign new application provider 6 or another third party device of equipment for it. Before agent equipment 4 being reassigned into new application provider 6, registration table 4 can check whether the equipment sending association request 220 is trusted device. If or agent equipment 4 is allowed to be associated with multiple application providers 6, then can register new application provider 6 together with previous application provider 6 for agent equipment 4, rather than as example given above is replaced previous application provider 6.
Figure 18 illustrates the method that the agent equipment 4 registered to the first registration table 8 is assigned to the second registration table 80. In step 250 place, requester device request is the ownership transfer of registered agent equipment 4 to the second registration table 80. Requester device can be agent equipment the 4, second registration table 80 or can be another third party device of such as application provider (the cloud service owner) etc. In step 260 place, the first registration table 8 checks whether the agent equipment 4 mentioned in device assignment is asked currently is registered in registration table. If it is not, then described method terminates. Therefore, in order to assign the proprietary rights of agent equipment, it is necessary to from the first registration table 8 request license of the registration currently with this agent equipment. So guarantee that only have the registration table having established trust with agent equipment to authorize transfers to another registration table 80 by its trust state.
In step 270 place, the first registration table determines if to trust the requester device that have issued agent equipment assignment request. If it is not, then described method terminates. First registration table is likely to be previously authenticated requestor, can be defined as trust requestor in this case. Or in step 270 place, if requestor is but without certified, then requestor can be carried out new certification by registration table. Certification between first registration table 8 and requestor can utilize any of technology to carry out. Additionally, for some authentication model, agent equipment 4 is likely to be not allowed to the appointment of different registration tablies, therefore registration table can check whether the authentication model information for agent equipment makes the appointment of agent equipment be licensed.
After the inspection at step 270 place, if registration table credential request person and agent equipment are allowed to transfer to different registration tablies, then described method proceeds to step 280, and wherein agent equipment 4 utilizes key generator 18 to generate new double secret key. New double secret key can be generated by different mode trigger agents equipment 4. In an example, the first registration table 8 may indicate that agent equipment 4, and it will be assigned to another registration table, and in response to this instruction, agent equipment can generate new double secret key. Or, to requester device or the second registration table 80, the first registration table 8 can notify that equipment can be assigned, and this equipment can generate new double secret key by trigger agents equipment subsequently. In step 290 place, agent equipment 4 Generates Certificate signature request, and it comprises newly-generated PKI and the device id of agent equipment 4. Private key corresponding to PKI is stored in safe storage. Certificate Signature Request is sent to the second registration table 80, and certificate is signed by it in step 300 place, and agent equipment 4 is registered in its device registry. In step 310 place, agent equipment cancels its original licensed table proprietary rights, and this is by deleting private key 29 from primary key centering and its registration table URL26 updates the URL corresponding to the second registration table 80 realizing. In step 320 place, the first registration table 8 checks that agent equipment correctly displaced its registration table proprietary rights, and is now arranged under its proprietary rights with backward second registration table 80 notification agent equipment 4. Now, the first registration table 8 can delete the registry entries 60 for agent equipment 4 alternatively, so that it is no longer registered in the first registration table. Or, the entry for agent equipment may remain in registration table, this is because therefore delete from the PKI 32 of primary key pair due to its corresponding private key proxied device 4 is no longer relevant.
Example shown in Figure 18 is for authentication model 3, or wherein agent equipment has the ability to generate the similar authentication model of new double secret key. If agent equipment have authentication model 2 or wherein authentication information be fixing close copy, then replace and generate new double secret key, step 280,290 and 300 places, can use from the first registration table primary key to and certificate so that provide the identical authentication information being to be registered in the first registration table 8 at first for the second registration table 80. After assigning, agent equipment 4 can be registered in both registration tablies 8,80, such that it is able to by two registration table certifications, and the application provider that can and be associated with two registration tablies 8,80 communicates.
Agent equipment 4 or the first registration table 8 can take steps to ensure that step 280 to 320 is occurred by atomic way, so that described step can not be interrupted in midway and be in unfinished state. This means if broken down in the midway that renewal processes, then only possible result or agent equipment 4 retain its primary key to certificate and be not transferred to the second registration table (being similar to situation when registration table after the step 270 determines that requestor is not trusted), or agent equipment will be fully updated under the proprietary rights being in the second registration table. This guarantees that agent equipment 4 will always be able to one registration table 8 or 80 of contact, and will not finally cannot by any one registration table 8,80 certification.
In some cases, as shown in Figure 18, when agent equipment 4 is assigned to new registration table, the application provider 6 being associated with agent equipment 4 can also change. Which (which) application second registration table 80 such as can select to be assigned to agent equipment 4, or the second registration table 80 can wait that the association from external source asks 220, and it shows the application identifier of the application provider 6 being associated with agent equipment 4. Or when switching registration table, the application being associated with agent equipment 4 can keep identical, and the second registration table 80 can register identical (multiple) application identifier (such as the first registration table 8 can provide the second registration table 80 (multiple) application identifier) being registered in the first registration table 8 for agent equipment 4 simply.
Figure 19 illustrates the proprietorial method for resetting the agent equipment 4 being previously transferred to the second registration table 80, thus being returned to be looked after by the first registration table 8 of first registers agent equipment 4. In step 350 place, the second registration table 80 (requester device) asks the first registration table 8 to regain the proprietary rights of agent equipment 4. In step 360 place, the first registration table 8 determines whether the second registration table 80 is trusted. Similarly, this can include implementing certification, checks that requestor is previously certified, or determines whether agent equipment 4 is supported to be reset to the first registration table 8. If agent equipment 4 is not allowed to be reset to registration table, then described method terminates. Otherwise, described method proceeds to step 370, and wherein whether Registry Checking agent equipment 4 is currently had by the second registration table 80. If it is not, then described method terminates. Thus guarantee that the current owner of only registration can trigger and the registration of equipment 4 is reset to the first registration table 8.
If agent equipment is had by the second registration table 80, then in step 380 place, agent equipment 4 generate new double secret key. In step 390 place, new PKI and device id is utilized to prepare Certificate Signature Request and send it to the first registration table 8. The private key in the middle of double secret key generated is stored in the safety storage 16 of agent equipment 4. In step 400 place, new certificate is signed by the first registration table 8, in order to again agent equipment is authorized. In step 410 place, agent equipment is by deleting previous double secret key and certificate and being updated by its registration table URL26 and cancel its registration for the second registration table 80 corresponding to the first registration table 8. In step 420 place, more new equipment title of ownership state in the first registration table 8, and the second registration table 80 can delete its entry for agent equipment 4. Described method terminates subsequently. Similarly, the operation at step 380-420 place can be implemented by atomic way, in order to guarantees that agent equipment is always for one of them registration table for registering, and will not finally in any one registration table all without effective registration.
The method of Figure 18 and 19 allows transfer agent equipment between registration table, or allow agent equipment to be assigned to multiple registration table simultaneously, this provides the privately owned registration table of agent equipment of himself to be probably useful for allowing some operator, in order to separated with other agent equipments using public registry certification by its agent equipment. For example, defence tissue, government or city management can run the registration table of the safe trust agent equipment of himself for use in its tissue. General public registry can be provided to use for general purpose. When manufacturing agent equipment, it can be registered initially for public registry, but when being asked proprietary rights to change by privately owned registration table, then can be transferred into privately owned registration table. When privately owned registration table is no longer necessary to agent equipment, then proprietary rights can be reset to original licensed table. Preferably, it is possible to generate new authentication information when transferring to different registration tablies, in order to guarantee that agent equipment no longer can by registration table certification in the early time.
Figure 20 to 23 illustrates four examples of the timeline of the different application example explaining the technology for the present invention. Figure 20 illustrates the first example in personal health nursing field, and wherein agent equipment (sensor) is applied to specific high in the clouds by limit bundle (tether), so that it is directly provided by application provider and cannot be used to other application. Agent equipment 4 can be such as the sensor of the weared on wrist comprising heart rate monitor, and it can feed back to heart rate information the application provider 6 operated by health care provider for the health monitoring patient. In step 1 place, the design of chip I P company is used for the hardware and software of sensor 4 and is used for the safety Design guide of sensor. System on chip (SOC) manufacturer produces the SOC being associated with security hardware and unique device identifier. Original equipment manufacturer (ODM) manufactures sensor device. Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) develops final products. Certain point place (this can be in SOC, ODM or OEM stage) during manufacture processes, is installed in agent equipment 4 in step 2 place, device identifier and private key. In step 3 place, sensor metadata is uploaded to registration table 8 by manufacturing support system 70. Described metadata such as can include device identifier, PKI and authentication model information. Registration table device 8 by this information registering in its device registry.
In step 4 place, health care provider 6 is sold to by sensor. In step 5 place, 6 sensors of health care provider are supplied to user as a part for its service. The sensor ID of 6 equipment of health care provider is associated with the ID of user. In step 4 place or in step 5 place, OEM or application provider 6 provide association to ask to registration table 8, in order to applied in the high in the clouds being used to health care provider to its notice sensor 4. Therefore, although registration table does not have Customer Information, but it knows that it will communicate with the application provider 6 corresponding to health care company when agent equipment 4 is activated.
In step 6 place, user receives sensor 4 from health care provider 6. User is worn on cuff in his/her wrist, turn on sensor 4 and beginning to use. Unlatching equipment trigger sensor 4 utilizes certification ROL request-online registration table 8, and is mutually authenticated subsequently, as previously discussed. User is to this and is unaware of, and is automatically triggered by the activation of equipment not used for the user interface certification triggering this certification. Registration table 8 determines that sensor 4 has been registered in its registration table, and has the application identifier corresponding to health care provider 6 in its registry entries. Therefore, in step 7 place, registration table 8 notifies device id to health care provider, and utilizes authentic effective device id to enliven now to health care provider 6 notification agent equipment. In step 8 place, health care provider 6 request application key is for the secure communication with sensor 4. In step 9 place, registration table provides application key to both sensor 4 and health care provider 6. In step 10 place, between sensor 4 and health care provider 6, start to be not related to the coded communication of the directly safety of registration table.
Figure 21 illustrates another example of service condition, is wherein substituted in limit bundle before agent equipment is supplied to user and applies to high in the clouds, and user can alternatively buy " ready-made " equipment and later, equipment is associated with the application of specific high in the clouds. User is thus allowed to use dissimilar or brand sensor for identical high in the clouds application. Similarly, this example belongs to personal health nursing field, and wherein application provider belongs to health care company. In step 1-3 and Figure 20 identical. But in this example, in step 4 place, OEM is by production marketing to retailer, and sensor 4 is sold to terminal temperature difference by retailer subsequently. Now, sensor 4 is not tied to application provider 6.
In step 5 place, user runs the smart phone application provided by health care provider 6, and scanning sensor 4 itself or sensor are packaged in the code on box therein. Application on smart phone transmits sensors association request to health care provider, thus the device id of sensor is associated with particular user account. In step 6 place, the platform 6 of smart phone application or health care provider sends association request to registration table 8, thus application ID is associated with device id. Therefore, being now registered with table can be associated agent equipment with application-specific, and application provider can be associated agent equipment ID with specific user. The step 7-11 of Figure 21 carries out according to the same way of the step 6-10 of Figure 20 subsequently respectively.
Figure 22 illustrates the 3rd service condition, is wherein bought " buying equipment by oneself " (BYOD) sensor 4 by user, and wherein user can in the middle of the several different application provider of unrestricted choice one so that used along with sensor 4. Internet of Things (IOT) is applied shop 400 and is used to make this selection. In step 1-4 and Figure 21 in Figure 22 identical. Similarly, retailer is sold to by sensor 4, and retailer continues to be sold to terminal temperature difference. In step 5 place, user runs application shop 400 on smart phone, tablet device or computer, and similarly uses QR code or similar technology to carry out the device id of collecting sensor 4. In step 6 place, application shop 400 is for the device id of registration table 8 verificating sensor. For example, registration table 8 can be inquired about in application shop 400, in order to determines other abilities of the authentication model used by agent equipment or agent equipment, and can prepare the menu of the compliant applications worked together with agent equipment 4 subsequently. Providing the user application menu, user selects desired application, runs described application and log in. In step 7 place, application shop utilizes the selection more new registry of user, so that registration table is associated the application identifier of the device id of sensor with selected application. Application shop is also sent to selected application provider 6 the device id of sensor and ID, so that it can be associated together ID and sensor ID. Now, registration table 8 knows particular sensor 4 will with which application communication, and application provider knows which client is associated with this sensor 4. Then the step 8-12 of Figure 22 is identical with the step 7-11 of Figure 21 respectively, being mutually authenticated between sensor 4 and registration table 22 wherein occurs, and sets up the communication of safety subsequently between sensor 4 and application provider 6.
Figure 23 illustrates the 4th service condition, and wherein agent equipment 4 is used in large-scale industry or government's deployment rather than is used in personal health nursing. In this embodiment, agent equipment is mounted in the sensor 4 on street lamp, and it to high in the clouds platform, safeguards that provider can such as use described data to determine which street lamp needs repairing subsequently about the data feedback of the operation of street lamp. Similarly, identical in step 1-3 and Figure 20-22. In step 4 place, manufacture the product comprising sensor and provide it to contractor. For example, it is possible to manufacture the street lamp with integrated sensor, or can be installed on street lamp in a certain stage later by the product comprising sensor separately manufactured with street lamp. Now can more new registry, to reflect the scale of sensor 4 to special services provider 6, or this carries out when can install sensor and street lamp at step 5 place later, now contractor can use smart phone application or similar equipment to scan product IDs or to provide the GPS location data for sensor 4. In step 6 place, the equipment of contractor can the device id of sensor 4 together with by use come sensor 4 sensing data application 6 application identifier be sent collectively to registration table. Smart phone application can allow for contractor and send a kind of simple mode of the association request that sensor 4 is associated with application-specific 6, understands occurent thing without contractor.
In step 7 place, when agent equipment 4 activates (such as when energising), the agent equipment in street lamp directly contacts registration table and is mutually authenticated to set up, as previously discussed. Once set up certification, in step 8 place, to the described service provider 6 based on the system of Internet of Things (IoT) of exploitation or deployment, registration table notifies that new street lamp and agent equipment are mounted, and reached the standard grade by the example identity of effective certification. In step 9 place, service provider 6 request application key is for secure communication. In step 10 place, registration table 8 provides symmetry application key to service provider 6 and agent equipment itself. Directly secure communication starts subsequently, and the IoT platform of service provider 6 utilizes the sensing data provided by sensor 4 to perform application. Client's (such as city management office or safeguard company of contractor) such as can also utilize web platform to access IoT system (step 11). Therefore, in the example of Figure 23, the use of registration table 8 simplifies contractor and installs the work of equipment, this is because contractor can assemble agent equipment, scan code simply and/or utilize simple measure (such as insert power supply or press single button) to activate agent equipment, registration table 8 is responsible for authentication proxy's equipment and the connection of foundation and application provider 6 subsequently. Contractor need not interact with the user interface for Configuration Agent equipment by spended time.
Although being described herein specific embodiment, but it would be recognized that the invention is not restricted to this, and may be made that many amendments and interpolation within the scope of the invention. For example, when the feature of independent claims is without departing substantially from the scope of the present invention, it is possible to make the various combinations of the feature of dependent claims below.
Claims (29)
1. the method setting up trusted identities for agent equipment, described agent equipment, for implementing the trust communication with one or more application providers, said method comprising the steps of:
A () determines which in the middle of multiple authentication model is the selected authentication model by being used to authentication proxy's equipment uniquely;
B () generates the first authentication information and the second authentication information according to selected authentication model, the first authentication information is for the identity of authentication proxy's equipment uniquely, and the second authentication information is used for verifying that agent equipment has the first authentication information;
C () is embedded in the first authentication information in agent equipment; And
(d) to be used for keeping the registration table device of device registry of agent equipment transmit the second authentication information and identify in the middle of the plurality of authentication model which be the authentication model information of the selected authentication model used by agent equipment.
2. method according to claim 1, wherein, the plurality of authentication model provides different safety levels.
3. according to arbitrary in the method described in front claim, wherein, described method includes the step that provides the certification resource for implementing selected authentication model in agent equipment.
4. method according to claim 1, wherein, described determines that step determines selected authentication model according to having been provided for which certification resource in agent equipment for implementing selected authentication model.
5. according to arbitrary in the method described in front claim, wherein, the first authentication information and the second authentication information are generated by the external equipment separated with agent equipment.
6. method according to claim 5, wherein, after the first authentication information is embedded in agent equipment, described external equipment deletes described first authentication information.
7., according to described method arbitrary in claim 1 to 4, wherein, the first authentication information and the second authentication information are internally generated by the circuit in agent equipment.
8. according to arbitrary in the method described in front claim, wherein, described embedding includes the storage circuit that provides a store for the first authentication information in agent equipment.
9. according to described method arbitrary in claim 1 to 7, wherein, described embedding includes storing the first authentication information in providing the storage circuit in agent equipment.
10. according to arbitrary in the method described in front claim, wherein, the first authentication information is embedded in the protected storage zone section of agent equipment.
11. according to arbitrary in the method described in front claim, wherein, the plurality of authentication model includes wherein the first authentication information and the second authentication information and includes at least one authentication model of identical authentication information.
12. according to described method arbitrary in claim 1 to 10, wherein, the plurality of authentication model includes at least one authentication model that wherein the first authentication information includes being different from the authentication information of the second authentication information.
13. method according to claim 12, wherein, at least one authentication model described, the first authentication information includes private key and the second authentication information includes being different from the PKI of private key.
14. method according to claim 13, wherein, at least one authentication model described, described transfer step includes transmitting the digital certificate including PKI.
15. according to arbitrary in the method described in front claim, wherein, the plurality of authentication model includes wherein the first authentication information and the second authentication information at least one authentication model unmodifiable.
16. according to described method arbitrary in claim 1 to 14, wherein, the plurality of authentication model includes wherein the first authentication information and the second authentication information at least one authentication model changeable.
17. method according to claim 16, wherein, described agent equipment includes the authentication information generative circuit for regenerating the first authentication information and the second authentication information.
18. method according to claim 1, wherein, the plurality of authentication model includes:
(i) first authentication model, wherein the first and second authentication informations include identical authentication information and are unmodifiable;
(ii) the second authentication model, wherein the first and second authentication informations include different authentication informations and are unmodifiable; And
(iii) the 3rd authentication model, wherein the first and second authentication informations include different authentication informations and are changeable.
19. method according to claim 1, wherein, the plurality of authentication model includes at least one authentication model that for it agent equipment can be reassigned into different device registries.
20. according to arbitrary in the method described in front claim, wherein, described agent equipment includes the device identifier uniquely identifying this agent equipment, and described transfer step also includes transmitting device identifier to registration table device.
21. according to arbitrary in the method described in front claim, also include registration table authentication information to be embedded in agent equipment for the step of certification registration table device.
22. a registration table device for the device registry for keeping agent equipment, described agent equipment is for implementing the trust communication with one or more application providers, and described registration table device includes:
It is configured to store the storage circuit of device registry, described device registry includes at least one registry entries for corresponding agent equipment, described registry entries include identifying in the middle of multiple authentication model which be used to the authentication model information of selected authentication model of the corresponding agent equipment of certification uniquely; And
It is configured in response to transmit to external equipment the telecommunication circuit of the authentication model information of the registry entries for authorized agency's equipment from the authentication model inquiry asking the authentication model information for authorized agency's equipment of external equipment.
23. registration table device according to claim 22, wherein, each registry entries includes the authentication information for the corresponding agent equipment of certification uniquely, and described registration table device includes the process circuit that is configured to utilize authentication information to implement the certification to corresponding agent equipment.
24. registration table device according to claim 23, wherein, described telecommunication circuit is configured in the successful situation of certification to transmit application key information to agent equipment and the application provider through certification, and described application key is for allowing the trust communication between agent equipment and application provider.
25. a registration table device for the device registry for keeping agent equipment, described agent equipment is for implementing the trust communication with one or more application providers, and described registration table device includes:
Memory unit for storage device registration table, described device registry includes at least one registry entries for corresponding agent equipment, described registry entries include identifying in the middle of multiple authentication model which be used to the authentication model information of selected authentication model of the corresponding agent equipment of certification uniquely; And
For transmitting the communication component of the authentication model information of the registry entries for authorized agency's equipment to external equipment for the authentication model inquiry of the authentication model information of authorized agency's equipment in response to the request from external equipment.
26. the method keeping the device registry of agent equipment for registration table device, described agent equipment, for implementing the trust communication with one or more application providers, said method comprising the steps of:
Keep the device registry including at least one registry entries for corresponding agent equipment, described registry entries include identifying in the middle of multiple authentication model which be used to the authentication model information of selected authentication model of the corresponding agent equipment of certification uniquely;
The request authentication model inquiry for the authentication model information of authorized agency's equipment is received from external equipment; And
Inquire about in response to authentication model, transmit the authentication model information of the registry entries for authorized agency's equipment to external equipment.
27. to a method for the device registry trade mark agency equipment of agent equipment, described agent equipment, for implementing the trust communication with one or more application providers, said method comprising the steps of:
A () determines which in the middle of multiple authentication model is the selected authentication model that proxied device makes for this agent equipment of certification uniquely; And
B () the registration table device transmission of device registry identifies in the middle of the plurality of authentication model which is the authentication model information of the selected authentication model for agent equipment to being used for keeping.
28. method according to claim 27, also include transmitting the authentication information for authentication proxy's equipment uniquely to registration table device.
29. referring particularly to accompanying drawing device or method substantially as described herein.
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US14/056,423 US10069811B2 (en) | 2013-10-17 | 2013-10-17 | Registry apparatus, agent device, application providing apparatus and corresponding methods |
PCT/GB2014/053097 WO2015056009A1 (en) | 2013-10-17 | 2014-10-15 | Method of establishing a trusted identity for an agent device |
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CN201480056752.8A Expired - Fee Related CN105684483B (en) | 2013-10-17 | 2014-10-15 | Register meter apparatus, agent equipment, application provider and corresponding method |
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CN105684483A (en) | 2016-06-15 |
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