CN105635125A - Physical layer combined authentication method based on RF fingerprint and channel information - Google Patents
Physical layer combined authentication method based on RF fingerprint and channel information Download PDFInfo
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- CN105635125A CN105635125A CN201510990799.8A CN201510990799A CN105635125A CN 105635125 A CN105635125 A CN 105635125A CN 201510990799 A CN201510990799 A CN 201510990799A CN 105635125 A CN105635125 A CN 105635125A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
- H04W12/79—Radio fingerprint
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L25/00—Baseband systems
- H04L25/02—Details ; arrangements for supplying electrical power along data transmission lines
- H04L25/0202—Channel estimation
- H04L25/0224—Channel estimation using sounding signals
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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Abstract
The present invention discloses a physical layer combined authentication method based on an RF fingerprint and channel information. The method comprises the steps that: (S1) in a first time slot, a legitimate sender A sends a first data packet to a legitimate recipient B, and the physical layer authentication of the first data packet based on the RF fingerprint is carried out, (S2) the wireless channel information from the legitimate sender A to B is extracted and is stored into the memory of the legitimate recipient B, (S3) a wireless channel information sample is set, (S4) in a next time slot, a sender X sends a second data packet to the legitimate recipient B, and the wireless channel information from the legitimate sender X to B is extracted, (S5) the similarity between the wireless channel information from the sender X to B and the wireless channel information sample is judged, if the similarity is larger than or equal to a set threshold, the physical layer authentication based on the channel information is successful, the wireless channel information from the sender X to B is stored, and the method jumps to the step (S3), otherwise the physical layer authentication based on the channel information is failed, the second data packet is discarded, and the method jumps to the step (S1). The method has the characteristics of non-counterfeiting, low complexity and high accuracy.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to field of information security technology, particularly relate to a kind of physical layer joint qualification method based on radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information.
Background technology
In recent years, along with the rise of the universal of intelligent terminal and BYOD (BringYourOwnDevice, the office equipment oneself carried), the demand of cordless communication network is continuously increased. But, the opening of wireless network and the mobility of intelligent terminal, provide hotbed for network attack, the safety of mobile e-business and individual privacy become the focus of concern. Therefore, Wireless Communication Equipment is badly in need of the certification guarantee communications security of low complex degree and low cost. The certification adopting cipher mechanism is a kind of effective scheme that the great majority that antagonism is likely to occur are attacked, but there is the risk of Key Exposure in cipher mechanism, the more important thing is that cipher mechanism relate to intensive calculations, resource consumption is serious, and this is that the very limited amount of mobile equipment of resource brings serious burden.
Recently, some research worker have turned to use physical layer information to strengthen the safety of radio communication, attempt using the new method of non-cipher authentication, it is intended to realize lightweight quickly certification. The non-cipher authentication of these physically based deformation layers has multiple method, mainly includes the non-cipher authentication based on channel or position, based on the non-cipher authentication of software and hardware based non-cipher authentication. Radio channel information and location of wireless devices are wireless device the most direct features in a communications system, and wherein, radio channel information easily obtains, and the research about channel information estimation is also comparatively deep. But once wireless device is in mobile status, the information of wireless channel also changes therewith, and Verification System must adjust in time, Verification System is required higher. In the research of hardware based non-cipher authentication, based on radio-frequency fingerprint (RadioFrequencyFingerprint, RFF) non-cipher authentication method is very representative, because the essence of radio-frequency fingerprint is the hardware information of transmitter, and the hardware of any two transmitting set certainly exists difference, and it is difficult to forge. But, the time variation of wireless multi-path channels causes radio-frequency fingerprint deficient in stability, and the identification etc. that radio-frequency fingerprint is in multi-antenna wireless device is all the problem that radio-frequency fingerprint assistant officer is to be solved.
Obviously, the non-cipher authentication method of physically based deformation layer has the application prospect of light. But, various different non-cipher authentication methods suffer from the shortcoming can not ignore, and can only apply under specific scene. The present invention attempts combining different non-cipher authentication methods, it is intended to realize lightweight rapid authentication in larger scope. Now, the first frame is only authenticated by a lot of radio communication systems when accessing network, and packet below does not all give certification, and this may result in a lot of safety problem, such as ID tracking, man-in-the-middle attack and malicious node attack etc. The mobility of mobile terminal determines the authentication method to the first frame must have versatility, namely just can be authenticated without adjusting, and the present invention adopts the physical layer joint qualification method based on radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information. First, recipient is by extracting the radio-frequency fingerprint of sender's the first frame, and compares certification with the radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse stored, if certification success, then packet below is adopted the non-cipher authentication method based on channel information. The completing of this authentication method relies on the radio-frequency fingerprint of sender and channel information, have unique and can not counterfeit property, therefore there is significantly high security feature.
Summary of the invention
It is an object of the invention to overcome the deficiencies in the prior art, it is provided that a kind of physical layer joint qualification method based on radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information, have the advantages that complexity is low, time delay is little and degree of accuracy is high, be particularly suited for resource-constrained certification environment.
It is an object of the invention to be achieved through the following technical solutions: based on the physical layer joint qualification method of radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information, comprise the following steps:
S1. in the first time slot, legitimate sender A sends the first packet to legitimate receiver B, and the first packet is carried out the physical layer certification based on radio-frequency fingerprint by legitimate receiver B:
(1) if certification success, then the Trusted channel between legitimate sender A and legitimate receiver B, jump procedure S2 are set up;
(2) if authentification failure, then step S1 is repeated;
S2. legitimate receiver B extracts the radio channel information between legitimate sender A and legitimate receiver B, and described radio channel information is stored in the memorizer of legitimate receiver B;
S3., radio channel information sample is set;
S4. in next time slot, sender X sends the second packet to legitimate receiver B, and legitimate receiver B extracts the radio channel information between sender X and legitimate receiver B;
S5. the radio channel information of sender X in step S4 is carried out the physical layer certification based on channel information according to the radio channel information in memorizer by legitimate receiver B, namely judges the radio channel information of sender X and the similarity of radio channel information sample:
(1) if described similarity is more than or equal to the threshold value set, then based on the physical layer certification success of channel information, think that sender X is legitimate sender A, the radio channel information of sender X is stored in the memorizer of legitimate receiver B, jump procedure S3 simultaneously;
(2) if described similarity is less than the threshold value set, then based on the physical layer authentification failure of channel information, sender X is assailant E, and legitimate receiver B abandons the second packet, jump procedure S1;
The method of the similarity of the radio channel information judging sender X described in step S5 and radio channel information sample is likelihood ratio test method or Sequential Probability Ratio Test: if set recipient B to the k-1 moment according to its channel information of pilot extraction of legitimate sender A asAt subsequent time and k moment according to its channel information of pilot extraction of unknown sender X it isThe following two kinds verification method is adopted when then judging the similarity of the radio channel information of sender X and radio channel information sample:
(1) likelihood ratio test method: the comparative result of k-1 moment and k moment channel information is ��1, k is positive integer:
Wherein, Kco1It is normalization coefficient,It is the phase contrast in k-1 moment and two information bags of k reception, | | | |2It is two norm computings;
By ��1With threshold value ��1Compare, wherein ��1�� [0,1]: if ��1< ��1, then the k-1 moment is sufficiently close together with k moment channel information, then what two moment sent information is same entity, it is determined that sender X is legitimate sender A, based on the physical-layer identity certification success of channel information; If ��1�ݦ�1What then k-1 moment and k moment sent information is not same entity, it is determined that sender X is illegal sender E, based on the physical-layer identity authentification failure of channel information;
(2) Sequential Probability Ratio Test: the comparative result �� of the channel information of adjacent moment between two in k-S to the k momentxSum is ��2, the information bag certification success of k-S to k-1 reception, the information bag of k reception is information bag to be certified; K, S are positive integer and k >=S >=1:
Wherein,For the channel information that recipient extracts from the pilot tone of the information bag of k-i reception,For the channel information that recipient extracts from the pilot tone of the information bag of k-i+1 reception, i, x are temporary variable, i=1 ..., S; X=k ..., k-S;It is the phase contrast in k-i+1 moment and two information bags of k-i reception, | | | |2It is two norm computings;
Compare �� equally2With threshold value ��2�� [0,1], if ��2< ��2, then the k moment is based on the physical-layer identity certification success of channel information; If ��2�ݦ�2, then the k moment is based on the physical-layer identity authentification failure of channel information.
The described physical layer certification based on radio-frequency fingerprint adopts the radio-frequency fingerprint certification based on transient signal or the radio-frequency fingerprint certification based on steady-state signal.
Based on the physical layer certification of radio-frequency fingerprint, namely described step S1 includes following sub-step:
S11. legitimate receiver B receives the sender A signal sent;
S12. legitimate receiver B is according to the transient signal of sender A or steady-state signal, extracts the radio-frequency fingerprint based on transient signal or the radio-frequency fingerprint based on steady-state signal;
S13. legitimate receiver B adopts matched curve to obtain the fitting coefficient of radio-frequency fingerprint envelope curve, namely extracts the radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector of sender A;
S14. the radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse of the radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector of extraction with self storage is compared by legitimate receiver B:
(1) if a certain vector Sample Similarity is more than or equal to the threshold value set in this radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector and radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse, physical layer certification success based on radio-frequency fingerprint, the radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector of this sender A is stored in the radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse of legitimate receiver B, jump procedure S2;
(2) if arbitrary vector Sample Similarity is less than the threshold value set with radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse for this radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector, then based on the physical layer authentification failure of radio-frequency fingerprint, jump procedure S1.
Described based in the physical layer certification of channel information, the extraction of radio channel information can adopt the semi-blind channel estimation algorithm of pilot-symbol aided channel estimation algorithm, Blind channel estimation algorithm and the two combination.
When the radio channel information of radio channel information and legitimate receiver B extraction sender X that described legitimate receiver B extracts legitimate sender A adopts data pilot assisted channel estimation algorithm, comprise the following steps:
S21. the known pilot tone of legitimate receiver B is sent at transmitting terminal;
S22. legitimate receiver B receives the signal comprising pilot tone, and extracts the pilot tone in signal;
S23. legitimate receiver B application LS channel estimation algorithm, least mean-square error channel estimation method or its innovatory algorithm estimating channel information;
S24. legitimate receiver B adopts interpolation algorithm to obtain complete channel information matrix, i.e. radio channel information.
The step that threshold value is set also is included before described step S5.
It is one or more that radio channel information sample in described step S3 includes in the memorizer of legitimate receiver B in the radio channel information of storage.
The invention has the beneficial effects as follows:
(1) present invention completes to rely on the radio-frequency fingerprint of sender and channel information, have unique and can not counterfeit property, the legitimate sender A packet sent cannot be distorted, forward or forge by assailant, therefore has significantly high security feature;
(2) present invention adopts the physical layer certification combined based on radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information, belongs to non-cipher authentication, is not related to the cryptographic calculations of complexity, has the advantages that computation complexity is low and time delay is little;
(3) present invention adopts the physical layer certification combined based on radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information, overcomes the certification based on radio-frequency fingerprint and the application shortcoming of the certification based on channel information to a certain extent, it is achieved that lightweight rapid authentication in larger scope.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is the present invention flow chart based on the physical layer authentication method of radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information;
Fig. 2 is one embodiment of the present of invention.
Detailed description of the invention
Verification process and accompanying drawing thereof below in conjunction with cell mobile communication systems describe in further detail technical scheme, but protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the following stated.
As in figure 2 it is shown, cell mobile communication systems includes legitimate correspondence both sides (sender A, recipient B) and one as the illegal wiretapping person E distorting forwarding side. Illegal wiretapping person intercepts legitimate sender A after the recipient B legal information bag sent on channel, and information bag is distorted, and information of distorting sends to recipient B. Recipient B adopts the physical layer certification device based on radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information that sender is carried out authentication.
As it is shown in figure 1, based on the physical layer joint qualification method of radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information, comprise the following steps:
S1. in the first time slot, legitimate sender A sends the first packet to legitimate receiver B, and the first packet is carried out the physical layer certification based on radio-frequency fingerprint by legitimate receiver B:
(1) if certification success, then the Trusted channel between legitimate sender A and legitimate receiver B, jump procedure S2 are set up;
(2) if authentification failure, then step S1 is repeated;
The described physical layer certification based on radio-frequency fingerprint adopts the radio-frequency fingerprint certification based on transient signal or the radio-frequency fingerprint certification based on steady-state signal.
Based on the physical layer certification of radio-frequency fingerprint, namely described step S1 includes following sub-step:
S11. legitimate receiver B receives the sender A signal sent;
S12. legitimate receiver B is according to the transient signal of sender A or steady-state signal, extracts the radio-frequency fingerprint based on transient signal or the radio-frequency fingerprint based on steady-state signal;
S13. legitimate receiver B adopts matched curve to obtain the fitting coefficient of radio-frequency fingerprint envelope curve, namely extracts the radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector of sender A;
S14. the radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse of the radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector of extraction with self storage is compared by legitimate receiver B:
(1) if a certain vector Sample Similarity is more than or equal to the threshold value set in this radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector and radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse, physical layer certification success based on radio-frequency fingerprint, the radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector of this sender A is stored in the radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse of legitimate receiver B, jump procedure S2;
(2) if arbitrary vector Sample Similarity is less than the threshold value set with radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse for this radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector, then based on the physical layer authentification failure of radio-frequency fingerprint, jump procedure S1.
In described step S14, radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse is dynamically to update. If sender A communicates with legitimate receiver B first, sender A will send the upper strata key of original allocation and communicate with recipient B, after B recognizes this key, carries out upper strata key authentication. If certification success, it is determined that sender A is legitimate sender, extract its radio-frequency fingerprint vector, be stored in radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse; If authentification failure, it is determined that sender A is illegal sender, terminate communication, do not extract radio-frequency fingerprint vector. Afterwards, sender A communicates with legitimate receiver B again, directly transmits information, and recipient B can directly judge the identity of A according to the radio-frequency fingerprint sample in radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse. When judging sender A as legitimate sender every time, all extract its radio-frequency fingerprint vector, be stored in radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse.
Described step S14 needs first set threshold value, then adopt likelihood ratio test method or Sequential Probability Ratio Test to compare the radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector of extraction and the radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse of self storage.
S2. legitimate receiver B extracts the radio channel information between legitimate sender A and legitimate receiver B, and described radio channel information is stored in the memorizer of legitimate receiver B.
Described based in the physical layer certification of channel information, the extraction of radio channel information can adopt the semi-blind channel estimation algorithm of pilot-symbol aided channel estimation algorithm, Blind channel estimation algorithm and the two combination.
When the radio channel information of radio channel information and legitimate receiver B extraction sender X that described legitimate receiver B extracts legitimate sender A adopts pilot-symbol aided channel estimation algorithm, comprise the following steps:
S21. the known pilot tone of legitimate receiver B is sent at transmitting terminal;
S22. legitimate receiver B receives the signal comprising pilot tone, and extracts the pilot tone in signal;
S23. legitimate receiver B application LS channel estimation algorithm, least mean-square error channel estimation method or its innovatory algorithm estimating channel information;
S24. legitimate receiver B adopts interpolation algorithm to obtain complete channel information matrix, i.e. radio channel information.
S3., radio channel information sample is set;
It is one or more that radio channel information sample in described step S3 includes in the memorizer of legitimate receiver B in the radio channel information of storage.
S4. in next time slot, sender X sends the second packet to legitimate receiver B, and legitimate receiver B extracts the radio channel information between sender X and legitimate receiver B;
S5. the radio channel information of sender X in step S4 is carried out the physical layer certification based on channel information according to the radio channel information in memorizer by legitimate receiver B, namely judges the radio channel information of sender X and the similarity of radio channel information sample:
(1) if described similarity is more than or equal to the threshold value set, then based on the physical layer certification success of channel information, think that sender X is legitimate sender A, the radio channel information of sender X is stored in the memorizer of legitimate receiver B, jump procedure S3 simultaneously;
(2) if described similarity is less than the threshold value set, then based on the physical layer authentification failure of channel information, sender X is assailant E, and legitimate receiver B abandons the second packet, jump procedure S1;
The method of the similarity of the radio channel information judging sender X described in step S5 and radio channel information sample is likelihood ratio test method or Sequential Probability Ratio Test: if set recipient B to the k-1 moment according to its channel information of pilot extraction of legitimate sender A asAt subsequent time and k moment according to its channel information of pilot extraction of unknown sender X it isThe following two kinds verification method is adopted when then judging the similarity of the radio channel information of sender X and radio channel information sample:
(1) likelihood ratio test method: the comparative result of k-1 moment and k moment channel information is ��1, k is positive integer:
Wherein, Kco1It is normalization coefficient,It is the phase contrast in k-1 moment and two information bags of k reception, | | | |2It is two norm computings;
By ��1With threshold value ��1Compare, wherein ��1�� [0,1]: if ��1< ��1, then the k-1 moment is sufficiently close together with k moment channel information, then what two moment sent information is same entity, it is determined that sender X is legitimate sender A, based on the physical-layer identity certification success of channel information; If ��1�ݦ�1What then k-1 moment and k moment sent information is not same entity, it is determined that sender X is illegal sender E, based on the physical-layer identity authentification failure of channel information;
(2) Sequential Probability Ratio Test: the comparative result �� of the channel information of adjacent moment between two in k-S to the k momentxSum is ��2, the information bag certification success of k-S to k-1 reception, the information bag of k reception is information bag to be certified; K, S are positive integer and k >=S >=1:
Wherein,For the channel information that recipient extracts from the pilot tone of the information bag of k-i reception,For the channel information that recipient extracts from the pilot tone of the information bag of k-i+1 reception, i, x are temporary variable, i=1 ..., S; X=k ..., k-S;It is the phase contrast in k-i+1 moment and two information bags of k-i reception, | | | |2It is two norm computings;
Compare �� equally2With threshold value ��2�� [0,1], if ��2< ��2, then the k moment is based on the physical-layer identity certification success of channel information; If ��2�ݦ�2, then the k moment is based on the physical-layer identity authentification failure of channel information.
Threshold value ��1����2Choose can by obtain for the experiment of different applied environments and demand for security or emulation.
The present invention completes to rely on the radio-frequency fingerprint of sender and channel information, have unique and can not counterfeit property, the legitimate sender A packet sent cannot be distorted, forward or forge by assailant, therefore has significantly high security feature;
The present invention adopts the physical layer certification combined based on radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information, belongs to non-cipher authentication, is not related to the cryptographic calculations of complexity, has the advantages that computation complexity is low and time delay is little;
The present invention adopts the physical layer certification combined based on radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information, overcomes the certification based on radio-frequency fingerprint and the application shortcoming of the certification based on channel information to a certain extent, it is achieved that lightweight rapid authentication in larger scope.
Claims (7)
1. based on the physical layer joint qualification method of radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information, it is characterised in that: comprise the following steps:
S1. in the first time slot, legitimate sender A sends the first packet to legitimate receiver B, and the first packet is carried out the physical layer certification based on radio-frequency fingerprint by legitimate receiver B:
(1) if certification success, then the Trusted channel between legitimate sender A and legitimate receiver B, jump procedure S2 are set up;
(2) if authentification failure, then step S1 is repeated;
S2. legitimate receiver B extracts the radio channel information between legitimate sender A and legitimate receiver B, and described radio channel information is stored in the memorizer of legitimate receiver B;
S3., radio channel information sample is set;
S4. in next time slot, sender X sends the second packet to legitimate receiver B, and legitimate receiver B extracts the radio channel information between sender X and legitimate receiver B;
S5. the radio channel information of sender X in step S4 is carried out the physical layer certification based on channel information according to the radio channel information in memorizer by legitimate receiver B, namely judges the radio channel information of sender X and the similarity of radio channel information sample:
(1) if described similarity is more than or equal to the threshold value set, then based on the physical layer certification success of channel information, think that sender X is legitimate sender A, the radio channel information of sender X is stored in the memorizer of legitimate receiver B, jump procedure S3 simultaneously;
(2) if described similarity is less than the threshold value set, then based on the physical layer authentification failure of channel information, sender X is assailant E, and legitimate receiver B abandons the second packet, jump procedure S1;
The method of the similarity of the radio channel information judging sender X described in step S5 and radio channel information sample is likelihood ratio test method or Sequential Probability Ratio Test: if set recipient B to the k-1 moment according to its channel information of pilot extraction of legitimate sender A asAt subsequent time and k moment according to its channel information of pilot extraction of unknown sender X it isThe following two kinds verification method is adopted when then judging the similarity of the radio channel information of sender X and radio channel information sample:
(1) likelihood ratio test method: the comparative result of k-1 moment and k moment channel information is ��1, k is positive integer:
Wherein, Kco1It is normalization coefficient,It is the phase contrast in k-1 moment and two information bags of k reception, | | | |2It is two norm computings;
By ��1With threshold value ��1Compare, wherein ��1�� [0,1]: if ��1< ��1, then the k-1 moment is sufficiently close together with k moment channel information, then what two moment sent information is same entity, it is determined that sender X is legitimate sender A, based on the physical-layer identity certification success of channel information; If ��1�ݦ�1What then k-1 moment and k moment sent information is not same entity, it is determined that sender X is illegal sender E, based on the physical-layer identity authentification failure of channel information;
(2) Sequential Probability Ratio Test: the comparative result �� of the channel information of adjacent moment between two in k-S to the k momentxSum is ��2, the information bag certification success of k-S to k-1 reception, the information bag of k reception is information bag to be certified; K, S are positive integer and k >=S >=1:
Wherein,For the channel information that recipient extracts from the pilot tone of the information bag of k-i reception,For the channel information that recipient extracts from the pilot tone of the information bag of k-i+1 reception, i, x are temporary variable, i=1 ..., S; X=k ..., k-S;It is the phase contrast in k-i+1 moment and two information bags of k-i reception, | | | |2It is two norm computings;
Compare �� equally2With threshold value ��2�� [0,1], if ��2< ��2, then the k moment is based on the physical-layer identity certification success of channel information; If ��2�ݦ�2, then the k moment is based on the physical-layer identity authentification failure of channel information.
2. the physical layer joint qualification method based on radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information according to claim 1, it is characterised in that: the described physical layer certification based on radio-frequency fingerprint adopts the radio-frequency fingerprint certification based on transient signal or the radio-frequency fingerprint certification based on steady-state signal.
3. the physical layer joint qualification method based on radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information according to claim 1, it is characterised in that: based on the physical layer certification of radio-frequency fingerprint, namely described step S1 includes following sub-step:
S11. legitimate receiver B receives the sender A signal sent;
S12. legitimate receiver B is according to the transient signal of sender A or steady-state signal, extracts the radio-frequency fingerprint based on transient signal or the radio-frequency fingerprint based on steady-state signal;
S13. legitimate receiver B adopts matched curve to obtain the fitting coefficient of radio-frequency fingerprint envelope curve, namely extracts the radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector of sender A;
S14. the radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse of the radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector of extraction with self storage is compared by legitimate receiver B:
(1) if a certain vector Sample Similarity is more than or equal to the threshold value set in this radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector and radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse, physical layer certification success based on radio-frequency fingerprint, the radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector of this sender A is stored in the radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse of legitimate receiver B, jump procedure S2;
(2) if arbitrary vector Sample Similarity is less than the threshold value set with radio-frequency fingerprint storehouse for this radio-frequency fingerprint characteristic vector, then based on the physical layer authentification failure of radio-frequency fingerprint, jump procedure S1.
4. the physical layer joint qualification method based on radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information according to claim 1, it is characterized in that: described based in the physical layer certification of channel information, the extraction of radio channel information can adopt the semi-blind channel estimation algorithm of data pilot assisted channel estimation algorithm, Blind channel estimation algorithm and the two combination.
5. the physical layer joint qualification method based on radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information according to claim 4, it is characterized in that: when the radio channel information of radio channel information and legitimate receiver B extraction sender X that described legitimate receiver B extracts legitimate sender A adopts data pilot assisted channel estimation algorithm, comprise the following steps:
S21. the known pilot tone of legitimate receiver B is sent at transmitting terminal;
S22. legitimate receiver B receives the signal comprising pilot tone, and extracts the pilot tone in signal;
S23. legitimate receiver B application LS channel estimation algorithm or, least mean-square error channel estimation method estimating channel information;
S24. legitimate receiver B adopts interpolation algorithm to obtain complete channel information matrix, i.e. radio channel information.
6. the physical layer joint qualification method based on radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information according to claim 1, it is characterised in that: also include the step that threshold value is set before described step S5.
7. the physical layer joint qualification method based on radio-frequency fingerprint and channel information according to claim 1, it is characterised in that: it is one or more that the radio channel information sample in described step S3 includes in the memorizer of legitimate receiver B in the radio channel information of storage.
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| CN107046468A (en) * | 2017-06-14 | 2017-08-15 | 电子科技大学 | A kind of physical layer certification thresholding determines method and system |
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