CN105048461A - Attack and defense exercise method for direct-current optimal power flow calculation data integrity of power system - Google Patents
Attack and defense exercise method for direct-current optimal power flow calculation data integrity of power system Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses an attack and defense exercise method for direct-current optimal power flow calculation data integrity of a power system. The attack and defense exercise method comprises the following steps: (1) acquiring state parameters of branch circuits in the power system when the power system stably runs, and calculating a difference value [delta]P<l> between the actual active power and the maximal transmission power of each branch circuit; (2) selecting N branch circuits with the minimal difference values [delta]P<l> between the actual active power and the maximal transmission power from the branch circuits; (3) acquiring attack increments of the selected branch circuits; (4) attacking the branch circuit corresponding to the minimal attack increment with the minimal attack increment, and finishing the attack to the direct-current optimal power flow calculation data integrity of the power system; and (5) increasing the maximal active power which is permitted to pass through on the attacked branch circuits, and overcoming the attack to the direct-current optimal power flow calculation data integrity of the power system. According to the attack and defense exercise method, the attack and defense to the direct-current optimal power flow calculation data integrity of the power system can be effectively finished.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of data security and control of an electric power system, and relates to an attack and defense drilling method for data integrity of direct current optimal power flow calculation of the electric power system.
Background
The electric power system is an electric energy production and consumption system which consists of links such as a power plant, a power transmission branch, a power supply and distribution station, power utilization and the like. The function of the system is to safely and efficiently supply the electric energy produced by a power plant to each user through modes of power transmission, transformation, power distribution and the like. In order to realize the function, the power system is also provided with corresponding information and control systems at each link and different levels, and the production process of the electric energy is measured, regulated, controlled, protected, communicated and scheduled so as to ensure that users obtain safe and high-quality electric energy.
An Optimal Power Flow (OPF) is one of core modules of an Energy Management System (EMS) in an electric power system, and refers to a way of reasonably arranging an electric power system to operate under the condition of satisfying various safety constraints, so that the total power generation cost is minimized or other targets are optimized.
The optimal power flow is an optimization link which is established on the basis that the EMS receives various parameters transmitted to a power grid from the SCADA system and calculates a quadratic programming problem containing a plurality of equality and inequality constraint conditions according to a certain calculation method, so that the power generation operating cost of all generators in the power system is minimum.
At present, most of researches on the field of data security of the power system are concentrated in the field of state estimation, and few people consider the malicious influence of the data integrity attack on the optimal power flow link after the state estimation, and how power system security protection personnel can adapt to the data integrity attack aiming at the direct-current optimal power flow calculation of the power system and overcome the data integrity attack of the direct-current optimal power flow calculation of the power system become the biggest challenges of the power system security, so that an attack and defense exercise method for researching the data integrity of the direct-current optimal power flow calculation of the power system is urgently needed, and the power system security protection personnel can adapt to the requirements of the current power system security protection as soon as possible.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects of the prior art and provides an attack and defense drilling method for the data integrity of the DC optimal power flow calculation of the power system, which can effectively complete the attack and defense drilling for the data integrity of the DC optimal power flow calculation of the power system.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the attack and defense drilling method for data integrity of power system direct current optimal power flow calculation according to the present invention comprises the following steps:
1) obtaining the state parameters of each branch in the power system when the power system operates stably, and solving the difference value delta P between the actual active power of each branch and the maximum transmission power of each branchl1, 2.., m, where m is the total number of branches in the power system and l represents a branch number;
2) selecting the difference value delta P between the actual active power and the maximum transmission power in each branchlThe minimum N branches (N is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 3);
3) establishing equality constraint conditions to be met in the direct current optimal power flow calculation process according to the node power balance principle, and setting a node ejFor selecting one of the N taken branchesCurrent input node of, node eiFor selecting the branch takenAt the node e, andjactive power of existing loadThen active power is applied to the loadCarrying out false data injection attackRear node ejThe load active power ofFor node e at the same timeiThe load active power of the station carries out false data injection attack, and the attack increment isNode e after dummy data injection attackiThe load active power ofThen there is Pre-attack node e for dummy data injectioniThe load active power; when the attackers respectivelyFor attacking increment to node ei、ejWhen attack is started, the actual transmitted active power on each branch circuitEqual to the maximum active power value allowed to pass through
4) Respectively calculating attack increments of the N branches according to equality constraint conditions which are required to be met in the direct current optimal power flow calculation process obtained in the step 3)Selecting attack increment corresponding to each branchMinimum attack increment inThen attacking the branch corresponding to the minimum attack increment by the minimum attack increment to finish the attack on the data integrity of the optimal power flow calculation of the direct current power system;
5) and promoting the maximum active power allowed to pass through the attacked branch, so that the maximum active power allowed to pass through the promoted branch is larger than the maximum active power allowed to pass through the branch at present, and overcoming the attack of data integrity of the DC optimal power flow calculation of the power system.
Acquiring state parameters of each branch in a power grid during stable operation of a system in step 1), wherein the state parameters of each branch comprise a branch number l, a first node number i, a last node number j, a phase angle theta of each node in the power grid, a series resistor r and active power of each load nodeAnd the maximum value of active power allowed to passWherein, the node i is an input node of the current on the branch circuit, and the node j is an outflow node of the current.
Solving the difference value delta P between the actual active power of each branch and the maximum transmission power thereof in the step 1)lThe specific operation is as follows:
and calculating the admittance value corresponding to each branch, wherein,dlfor the admittance value, Σ r, of branch lijThe sum of all series resistances between a first node i and a last node j on a branch l;
the actual active power on branch l is thenWherein, thetaiFor the phase angle, θ, at node i of the current flowing in branch ljFor the current-outgoing node on branch lThe phase angle at j is used for obtaining the maximum transmission power of the branch lGet the actual active power of branch lAnd its maximum transmission powerDifference value Δ P oflWherein <math>
<mrow>
<msub>
<mi>ΔP</mi>
<mi>l</mi>
</msub>
<mo>=</mo>
<mo>|</mo>
<msub>
<msubsup>
<mi>P</mi>
<mi>l</mi>
<mi>L</mi>
</msubsup>
<mi>max</mi>
</msub>
<mo>-</mo>
<msubsup>
<mi>P</mi>
<mi>l</mi>
<mi>L</mi>
</msubsup>
<mo>|</mo>
<mo>.</mo>
</mrow>
</math>
the concrete operation of establishing the equality constraint condition to be met in the direct current optimal power flow calculation process according to the node power balance principle in the step 2) is as follows:
when the system is operating stably, there are:
wherein,is the active power of the load at node i,is the active power generated at node i, k is the number of generators in the power system, PcPower loss for the power system dc network;
let PcIf it is 0, the equality constraint condition that should be satisfied in the dc optimal power flow calculation process established according to the node power balance principle is:
wherein,is the active power consumed at node j,being the sum of the actual active power flows on all branches l flowing from node j,is the sum of the actual active power flows on all branches i flowing from node j.
Is obtained by the formula (1)
Wherein n is the total number of nodes in the power grid.
In step 4), attack increment of each branch is calculated according to equality constraint conditions which should be met in the direct current optimal power flow calculation process obtained in step 3)The specific operation is as follows:
node eiThe active power of the load after the injection attack isAnd node ejThe active power of the load after the injection attack isIn formula (2), a modified equation constraint equation is established, wherein the modified equation constraint equation is:
wherein,for the value of the load active power at node j,solving the formula (3) for the value of the output active power at the node j to obtain the attack increment of each branch
The invention has the following beneficial effects:
the attack and defense drilling method of the data integrity of the direct current optimal power flow calculation of the power system selects the branch with the minimum difference value between the actual active power and the maximum transmission power in each branch when in concrete operation, then calculates the attack increment of the selected line, carries out false data injection attack on the corresponding branch through the attack increment, realizes the attack of the data integrity of the direct current optimal power flow calculation of the power system, overcomes the attack of the data integrity of the direct current optimal power flow calculation of the power system through improving the maximum active power allowed on the attacked branch, thereby realizing the attack and defense drilling of the data integrity of the direct current optimal power flow calculation of the power system, has simple operation and strong practicability, and simultaneously provides a convenient and effective method for the safety protection personnel of the power system to defend and detect the attack of the data integrity of the power plant with pertinence through the attack and defense drilling, and the waste of safety protection resources is reduced.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of data integrity attack of DC optimal power flow calculation of a power system according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flowchart of step 2) of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flowchart of step 4) of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings:
referring to fig. 1, the attack and defense drilling method for data integrity of power system dc optimal power flow calculation according to the present invention includes the following steps:
1) obtaining the state parameters of each branch in the power system when the power system operates stably, and solving the difference value delta P between the actual active power of each branch and the maximum transmission power of each branchl1, 2.., m, where m is the total number of branches in the power system and l represents a branch number;
2) selecting the difference value delta P between the actual active power and the maximum transmission power in each branchlThe smallest N branches;
3) establishing equality constraint conditions to be met in the direct current optimal power flow calculation process according to the node power balance principle, and setting a node ejFor selecting current input node of N-branch taken, node eiFor the selected current output nodes of the N branches, and at the node ejActive power of existing loadThen active power is applied to the loadCarrying out false data injection attack, and setting a node e after the false data injection attackjThe load active power ofFor node e at the same timeiThe load active power of the station carries out false data injection attack, and the attack increment isNode e after dummy data injection attackiThe load active power ofThen there is For fake data noteNode e before attackiThe active power of the load. When the attackers respectivelyFor attacking increment to node ei、ejWhen attack is initiated, the branch is takenActual transmission active powerEqual to the maximum value of active power it allows to pass
4) Respectively calculating attack increments of the N branches according to equality constraint conditions which are required to be met in the direct current optimal power flow calculation process obtained in the step 3)Selecting attack increment corresponding to each branchThen attacking the branch corresponding to the minimum attack increment by the minimum attack increment to complete the attack on the data integrity of the optimal power flow calculation of the direct current power system;
5) and promoting the maximum active power allowed to pass through the attacked branch, so that the maximum active power allowed to pass through the promoted branch is larger than the maximum active power allowed to pass through the branch at present, and overcoming the attack of data integrity of the DC optimal power flow calculation of the power system.
Acquiring the state parameters of each branch in the power grid during the stable operation of the system in the step 1), wherein the state parameters of each branch comprise the branch number l, the first node number i, the last node number j, the phase angle theta of each node in each branch, the series resistance r and the load nodeActive powerAnd the maximum value of active power allowed to pass by branch lWherein, the node i is an input node of the current on the branch circuit, and the node j is an outflow node of the current.
Solving the difference value delta P between the actual active power of each branch and the maximum transmission power thereof in the step 1)lThe specific operation is as follows:
and calculating the admittance value corresponding to each branch, wherein,dlfor the admittance value, Σ r, of branch lijThe sum of all series resistors between a first node i and a last node j on a branch l;
the actual active power on branch l is thenWherein, thetaiIs the phase angle, θ, at node i on branch ljObtaining the maximum transmission power of branch l for the phase angle at node j on branch lGet the actual active power of branch lAnd its maximum transmission powerDifference value Δ P oflWherein <math>
<mrow>
<msub>
<mi>ΔP</mi>
<mi>l</mi>
</msub>
<mo>=</mo>
<mo>|</mo>
<msub>
<msubsup>
<mi>P</mi>
<mi>l</mi>
<mi>L</mi>
</msubsup>
<mi>max</mi>
</msub>
<mo>-</mo>
<msubsup>
<mi>P</mi>
<mi>l</mi>
<mi>L</mi>
</msubsup>
<mo>|</mo>
<mo>.</mo>
</mrow>
</math>
the concrete operation of establishing the equality constraint condition to be met in the direct current optimal power flow calculation process according to the node power balance principle in the step 2) is as follows:
when the system is operating stably, there are:
wherein,is the active power of the load at node i,is the active power generated at node i, k is the number of generators in the power system, PcPower loss for the power system dc network;
let PcIf it is 0, the equality constraint condition that should be satisfied in the dc optimal power flow calculation process established according to the node power balance principle is:
wherein,is the active power consumed at node j,being the sum of the actual active power flows on all branches l flowing from node j,is the sum of the actual active power flows on all branches i flowing from node j.
Is obtained by the formula (1)
Wherein n is the total number of nodes in the power grid.
In step 4), attack increment of each branch is calculated according to equality constraint conditions which should be met in the direct current optimal power flow calculation process obtained in step 3)In particular operation ofComprises the following steps:
node eiThe active power of the load after the injection attack isAnd node ejThe active power of the load after the injection attack isIn formula (2), a modified equation constraint equation is established, wherein the modified equation constraint equation is:
wherein,for the value of the load active power at node j,solving the formula (3) for the value of the output active power at the node j to obtain the attack increment of each branch
Claims (5)
1. An attack and defense drilling method for data integrity of direct current optimal power flow calculation of a power system is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
1) obtaining the state parameters of each branch in the power system when the power system operates stably, and solving the difference value delta P between the actual active power of each branch and the maximum transmission active power of each branchl1, 2.., m, where m is the total number of branches in the power system and l represents a branch number;
2) selecting the difference value delta P between the actual active power and the maximum transmission power in each branchlMinimum N piecesA way;
3) establishing equality constraint conditions to be met in the direct current optimal power flow calculation process according to the node power balance principle, and setting a node ejFor the current input node, node e, of any one of the selected N branches liFor selecting the current output node of the taken branch l, and at said node ejActive power of existing loadThen active power is applied to the loadCarrying out false data injection attack, and setting a node e after the false data injection attackjThe load active power ofFor node e at the same timeiThe load active power of the station carries out false data injection attack, and the attack increment isNode e after dummy data injection attackiThe load active power ofThen there is Pre-attack node e for dummy data injectioniThe load active power; when the attackers respectivelyAndfor attacking increment to node eiAnd node ejWhen attack is initiated, the actual transmission active power on branch lEqual to the maximum value of active power it allows to pass
4) Respectively calculating attack increments of the N branches according to equality constraint conditions which are required to be met in the direct current optimal power flow calculation process obtained in the step 3)Selecting attack increment corresponding to each branchThen attacking the branch corresponding to the minimum attack increment by the minimum attack increment to complete the attack on the data integrity of the optimal power flow calculation of the direct current power system;
5) and promoting the maximum active power allowed to pass through the attacked branch, so that the maximum active power allowed to pass through the promoted branch is larger than the maximum active power allowed to pass through the branch at present, and overcoming the attack of data integrity of the DC optimal power flow calculation of the power system.
2. The attack and defense drilling method for the data integrity of the DC optimal power flow calculation of the electric power system as claimed in claim 1, wherein the step 1) obtains the state parameters of each branch in the power grid during the stable operation of the system, and the state parameters of each branch comprise the branch number l, the first node number i, the last node number j, the phase angle θ of each node, the series resistance r, and the active power of each load nodeAnd the maximum value of active power allowed to pass through by each branchWherein, the node i is an input node of the current on the branch circuit, and the node j is an outflow node of the current.
3. The method for performing attack and defense of data integrity of DC optimal power flow calculation in electric power system as claimed in claim 2, wherein the difference Δ P between the actual active power of each branch and the maximum transmission power thereof is solved in step 1)lThe specific operation is as follows:
and calculating the admittance value corresponding to each branch, wherein,dlfor the admittance value, Σ r, of branch lijThe sum of all series resistors between a first node i and a last node j on a branch l;
the actual active power on branch l is then Pl L＝dl(θi-θj) Wherein, thetaiIs the phase angle, θ, at node i on branch ljObtaining the maximum transmission power of branch l for the phase angle at node j on branch lGet the actual active power P of branch ll LAnd its maximum transmission powerDifference value Δ P oflWherein <math>
<mrow>
<msub>
<mi>ΔP</mi>
<mi>l</mi>
</msub>
<mo>=</mo>
<mo>|</mo>
<msub>
<msubsup>
<mi>P</mi>
<mi>l</mi>
<mi>L</mi>
</msubsup>
<mi>max</mi>
</msub>
<mo>-</mo>
<msubsup>
<mi>P</mi>
<mi>l</mi>
<mi>L</mi>
</msubsup>
<mo>|</mo>
<mo>.</mo>
</mrow>
</math>
4. the attack and defense drilling method for the data integrity of the direct current optimal power flow calculation of the power system according to claim 3, wherein the concrete operation of establishing the equality constraint condition to be met in the direct current optimal power flow calculation process according to the node power balance principle in the step 2) is as follows:
when the system is operating stably, there are:
wherein,is the active power of the load at node i,is the active power generated at node i, k is the number of generators in the power system, PcPower loss for the power system dc network;
let PcIf it is 0, the equality constraint condition that should be satisfied in the dc optimal power flow calculation process established according to the node power balance principle is:
wherein,is the active power consumed at node j,being the sum of the actual active power flows on all branches l flowing from node j,is the sum of the actual active power flows on all branches l flowing from the node j;
is obtained by the formula (1)
And n is the total number of nodes in the power grid.
5. The attack and defense drilling method for the data integrity of the DC optimal power flow calculation of the power system as claimed in claim 2, wherein in the step 4), each branch is calculated according to the equality constraint condition which is satisfied in the DC optimal power flow calculation process obtained in the step 3)Attack increment ofThe specific operation is as follows:
node eiThe active power of the load after the injection attack isAnd node ejThe active power of the load after the injection attack isIn formula (2), a modified equation constraint equation is established, wherein the modified equation constraint equation is:
wherein,for the value of the load active power at node j,solving the formula (3) for the value of the output active power at the node j to obtain the attack increment of each branch
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| CN109872017A (en) * | 2017-12-04 | 2019-06-11 | 广东电网有限责任公司电力调度控制中心 | It is a kind of based on the information attack of penalty method to the appraisal procedure of effect on power system |
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