CN104883681A - Mobile RFID mutual authentication method based on dynamic shared secret key - Google Patents

Mobile RFID mutual authentication method based on dynamic shared secret key Download PDF

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Publication number
CN104883681A
CN104883681A CN201510222060.2A CN201510222060A CN104883681A CN 104883681 A CN104883681 A CN 104883681A CN 201510222060 A CN201510222060 A CN 201510222060A CN 104883681 A CN104883681 A CN 104883681A
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reader
label
tag
tables
data base
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CN104883681B (en
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王国伟
张敏
郭海儒
薛曼君
彭维平
贾宗璞
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Henan University of Technology
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Henan University of Technology
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a mobile RFID mutual authentication method based on a dynamic shared secret key to solve the problem that synchronous security updating of a dynamic shared secret key and a synchronous mechanism once the dynamic shared secret key has been attacked cannot be realized as well as the problem about other security threats that may exist in terms of a wireless radio frequency identification authentication method. The technical scheme improves a conventional method that only utilizes randomized numbers to carry out identity authentication, therefore, a randomized number generated by a label can serve as parameters for mutual authentication between the label and a background database, and also serves as a seed of a dynamic updated shared secret key for the background database, a reader and the label. In this way, shared secret key security and random dynamic updating are achieved. According to the scheme, a background database stores the historical shared secret key by a list, and a dynamic adding and deleting method is carried out, thus guaranteeing synchronization of the shared secret key for the reader, the label and the background database after an attack. Multiple security attacks for a mobile RFID system can be prevented, and the quite high efficiency in terms of the performance of key labels is exhibited.

Description

A kind of mobile RFID mutual authentication method based on Dynamic-shared key
Technical field
The present invention relates to radio RF recognition technology, particularly relate to the safety certifying method based on stochastic and dynamic shared key that mobile wireless radio-frequency (RF) identification is relevant.
Background technology
Radio frequency identification (Radio Frequency Identification, RFID) is one of Key Implementation Technology of Internet of Things.RFID is at the serious security threat of the simultaneous promoting Internet of Things fast development, and wherein most important two aspects are authentication and secret protection.In mobile RFID system, removable reader all communicates at unsafe open channel in wireless signal mode with between label with background data base, removable reader.Therefore the security risk that faces of mobile RFID system is also more serious and diversified.
In the authentication method that at home and abroad scholar proposes, great majority design for traditional rfid system, these methods are by fixed reader wired connection background data base and premised on securely communicating, and therefore can not be applicable to reader and background data base carries out the mobile RFID system of insecure communication in wireless signal mode.In mobile RFID authentication method, adopt the mechanism dynamically updating shared key effectively can solve the problem of cipher key management difficult, but there is a very important data synchronization problems: the label key preserved in background data base must upgrade with the key synchronization stored in the label.But in rfid system, the label of low cost relies on external electromagnetic induction supply energy, once there is power down or communication blocking, the shared key between background data base and label will be caused inconsistent, make legitimate tag in upper once verification process cannot by certification and identification.In addition, if upgrade the parameter of shared key not there is confidentiality, make by intercepting and capturing the data transmitted in dangerous passage and then calculating the key after renewal, then can bring the risk of key exposure.Therefore, the secure synchronization renewal of key and the synchronization mechanism after being attacked become a difficult problem for this type of mobile RFID authentication protocol.
Current authentication method can only be taken precautions against desynchronization to a certain extent and attack, and can not take precautions against the desynchronization attack recurred more than more than 2 times; The authentication method also had is when forgery label and corresponding legitimate tag are in reader wireless signal coverage, opponent forges label by the third party forged and cheats legal reader and unlock and the information showing legitimate tag, therefore can not take precautions against label forge and there is man-in-the-middle attack and Replay Attack leak, label can not be taken precautions against and forge and Replay Attack.
Summary of the invention
For solve adopt Dynamic-shared key mobile RFID authentication method in thoroughly can not take precautions against that desynchronization is attacked, Dynamic-shared key cannot security update problem, and subject to various security attack problem, the present invention proposes a kind of mobile RFID mutual authentication method based on Dynamic-shared key, while taking precautions against the security attack for mobile RFID, there is higher tag performance.
For reaching above object, the technical solution used in the present invention is as follows:
One, initial phase: back-end data lab setting four tables of data are used for shared key and the identification information of storage tags and reader and background data base, storage tags ID in the current information table Tag_c_au of wherein label, current shared key, label ID take current key as the Hash code of parameter; The Hash code that in the history information table Tag_h_au of label, storage tags ID, label history shared key, label ID are parameter with history shared key; Reader identify label and current key is stored in reader current information table Reader_c_au; Reader identify label and history key is stored in reader history information table Reader_h_au; Store the shared key with background data base in each label, and comprise an One-way Hash function and Pseudo-random number generator; The shared key of reader storage and background data base, and comprise same Hash function and Pseudo-random number generator;
Two, authentication phase:
The first step: reader sends authentication request Query to label;
Second step: label produces random number S tand calculate one-way Hash function and pseudo random number then will with send to reader, wherein ID tfor the ID of label identifies, for the current shared key of label and background data base, for label and background data base upgrade after shared key, for the current shared key of reader and background data base;
3rd step: reader generates random number S r, calculate then will and S rand send to background data base, wherein ID rfor the ID of reader identifies;
4th step: background data base carries out certification to reader and label respectively;
1) reader authentication: background data base traversal Reader_c_au tables of data is also according to the S received rcalculate each and to receive then compare, if exist consistent, then reader passes through certification; If do not exist consistent, then travel through Reader_h_au tables of data and calculate each and and to receive compare, if exist consistent, then reader passes through certification; If twice traversal does not all exist consistent situation, then reader is illegal, authentification failure;
2) smart-tag authentication: when reader authentication passes through, background data base according to inquiry Tag_c_au tables of data: (1) if inquire result at Tag_c_au table, then takes out and to receive then carry out XOR, can obtain then carry out computing, and and to receive compare, if unanimously, then label is by certification, if inconsistent, then label is illegal, and certification terminates; (2) if in the inquiry of Tag_c_au tables of data less than result, then travel through Tag_h_au tables of data and inquire about, if the result of inquiring, take out then carry out with computing, and and to receive compare, if unanimously, then label is by certification, if inconsistent, then label is illegal, and certification terminates; 3) if all inquire about less than result at Tag_c_au table and Tag_c_au table, care label is illegal, authentification failure;
3) when reader and label are all by certification:
(1) background data base calculates and by ID in Reader_c_au rcorresponding current shared key is updated to background data base carries out judging and operating according to the derived data table carrying out comparison of coherence in the 4th step reader authentication process: if Reader_c_au tables of data, then background data base deletes the data that in Reader_h_au tables of data, this reader is corresponding, then will and ID radd in Reader_h_au tables of data; If Reader_h_au tables of data, then any operation is not carried out to Reader_h_au tables of data;
(2) background data base calculates and by ID in Tag_c_au tcorresponding current shared key is updated to the Hash code of label ID is updated to then ID is inquired according in the 4th step smart-tag authentication process tderived data table carry out judging and calculating: if Tag_c_au tables of data, background data base deletes the data that in Tag_h_au tables of data, this label is corresponding, then will iD twith add in Tag_h_au tables of data; If Tag_h_au tables of data, then any operation is not carried out to Tag_h_au tables of data;
4) background data base uses the shared key with reader computations symmetric encipherment algorithm then will with be transmitted to reader;
5th step: reader uses to decipher with the shared key of background data base and receives calculate then according to the S obtained rwith original random number S rcompare, if unanimously, then background data base is by certification, and reader uses the S obtained tupgrade shared key then send to label; If more inconsistent, then authentification failure.
6th step: after label receives data, calculates and and to receive compare, if more inconsistent, authentification failure; If consistent, then reader is legal, tag update shared key beneficial effect of the present invention:
After adopting the present invention, when certification, the multinomial security threat such as location tracking, Replay Attack, desynchronization attack, man-in-the-middle attack for rfid system can be taken precautions against, make up the safety defect that similar RFID authentication method exists.
In addition, the present invention can also realize the security update of shared key stochastic and dynamic, and does not derive by the data in verification process, and label efficiency performance is better.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is certification basic flow sheet of the present invention.
Embodiment
Symbol description
Table 1 symbol description
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing, the present invention is described in further detail.
Initial phase: during system initialization, back-end data lab setting four tables of data are used for shared key and the identification information of storage tags and reader and background data base.Storage tags ID in the current information table Tag_c_au of wherein label, current shared key, label ID take current key as the Hash code of parameter; The Hash code that in the history information table Tag_h_au of label, storage tags ID, label history shared key, label ID are parameter with history shared key; Reader identify label and current key is stored in reader current information table Reader_c_au; Reader identify label and history key is stored in reader history information table Reader_h_au.Store the shared key with background data base in each label, and comprise an One-way Hash function and Pseudo-random number generator; The shared key of reader storage and background data base, and comprise same Hash function and Pseudo-random number generator.
Authentication phase:
The first step: reader sends authentication request Query to label.
Second step: label produces random number S tand calculate with then will with send to reader.
3rd step: reader generates random number S r, calculate then will and S rand send to background data base.
4th step: background data base carries out certification to reader and label respectively.
1) reader authentication: background data base traversal Reader_c_au tables of data is also according to the S received rcalculate each and to receive then compare, if exist consistent, then reader passes through certification; If do not exist consistent, then travel through Reader_h_au tables of data and calculate each and and to receive compare, if exist consistent, then reader passes through certification; If twice traversal does not all exist consistent situation, then reader is illegal, authentification failure.
2) smart-tag authentication: when reader authentication passes through, background data base according to traversal Tag_c_au tables of data is inquired about: (1), if inquire result at Tag_c_au table, takes out and to receive then carry out XOR, can obtain then carry out computing, and and to receive compare, if unanimously, then label is by certification, if inconsistent, then label is illegal, and certification terminates.(2) if in the inquiry of Tag_c_au tables of data less than result, then travel through Tag_h_au tables of data and inquire about, if the result of inquiring, take out then carry out with computing, and and to receive compare, if unanimously, then label is by certification, if inconsistent, then label is illegal, and certification terminates.3) if all inquire about less than result at Tag_c_au table and Tag_c_au table, care label is illegal, authentification failure.
3) when reader and label are all by certification:
(1) background data base calculates and by ID in Reader_c_au rcorresponding current shared key is updated to then, background data base carries out judging and operating according to the derived data table carrying out comparison of coherence in the 4th step reader authentication process: if Reader_c_au tables of data, then background data base deletes the data that in Reader_h_au tables of data, this reader is corresponding, then will and ID radd in Reader_h_au tables of data; If Reader_h_au tables of data, then any operation is not carried out to Reader_h_au tables of data.
(2) background data base calculates and by ID in Tag_c_au tcorresponding current shared key is updated to the Hash code of label ID is updated to then ID is inquired according in the 4th step smart-tag authentication process tderived data table carry out judging and calculating: if Tag_c_au tables of data, background data base deletes the data that in Tag_h_au tables of data, this label is corresponding, then will iD twith add in Tag_h_au tables of data; If Tag_h_au tables of data, then any operation is not carried out to Tag_h_au tables of data.
4) background data base uses the shared key with reader computations then will with be transmitted to reader.
5th step: reader uses to decipher with the shared key of background data base and receives calculate then according to the S obtained rwith original random number S rcompare, if unanimously, then background data base is by certification, and reader uses the S obtained tupgrade shared key then send to label; If more inconsistent, then authentification failure.
After label receives data, calculate and and to receive compare, if more inconsistent, authentification failure; If consistent, then reader is legal, tag update shared key so far certification terminates.

Claims (1)

1., based on a mobile RFID authentication method for stochastic and dynamic shared key, wherein mobile RFID system is made up of background data base, mobile reading device and label, it is characterized in that comprising the following steps:
One, initial phase: back-end data lab setting four tables of data are used for shared key and the identification information of storage tags and reader and background data base, storage tags ID in the current information table Tag_c_au of wherein label, current shared key, label ID take current key as the Hash code of parameter; The Hash code that in the history information table Tag_h_au of label, storage tags ID, label history shared key, label ID are parameter with history shared key; Reader identify label and current key is stored in reader current information table Reader_c_au; Reader identify label and history key is stored in reader history information table Reader_h_au; Store the shared key with background data base in each label, and comprise an One-way Hash function and Pseudo-random number generator; The shared key of reader storage and background data base, and comprise same Hash function and Pseudo-random number generator;
Two, authentication phase:
The first step: reader sends authentication request Query to label;
Second step: label produces random number S tand calculate one-way Hash function and pseudo random number then will with send to reader, wherein ID tfor the ID of label identifies, for the current shared key of label and background data base, for label and background data base upgrade after shared key, for the current shared key of reader and background data base;
3rd step: reader generates random number S r, calculate then will and S rand send to background data base, wherein ID rfor the ID of reader identifies;
4th step: background data base carries out certification to reader and label respectively;
1) reader authentication: background data base traversal Reader_c_au tables of data is also according to the S received rcalculate each and to receive then compare, if exist consistent, then reader passes through certification; If do not exist consistent, then travel through Reader_h_au tables of data and calculate each and and to receive compare, if exist consistent, then reader passes through certification; If twice traversal does not all exist consistent situation, then reader is illegal, authentification failure;
2) smart-tag authentication: when reader authentication passes through, background data base according to inquiry Tag_c_au tables of data: (1) if inquire result at Tag_c_au table, then takes out and to receive then carry out XOR, can obtain then carry out computing, and and to receive compare, if unanimously, then label is by certification, if inconsistent, then label is illegal, and certification terminates; (2) if in the inquiry of Tag_c_au tables of data less than result, then travel through Tag_h_au tables of data and inquire about, if the result of inquiring, take out then carry out with computing, and and to receive compare, if unanimously, then label is by certification, if inconsistent, then label is illegal, and certification terminates; 3) if all inquire about less than result at Tag_c_au table and Tag_c_au table, care label is illegal, authentification failure;
3) when reader and label are all by certification:
(1) background data base calculates and by ID in Reader_c_au rcorresponding current shared key is updated to background data base carries out judging and operating according to the derived data table carrying out comparison of coherence in the 4th step reader authentication process: if Reader_c_au tables of data, then background data base deletes the data that in Reader_h_au tables of data, this reader is corresponding, then will and ID radd in Reader_h_au tables of data; If Reader_h_au tables of data, then any operation is not carried out to Reader_h_au tables of data;
(2) background data base calculates and by ID in Tag_c_au tcorresponding current shared key is updated to the Hash code of label ID is updated to then ID is inquired according in the 4th step smart-tag authentication process tderived data table carry out judging and calculating: if Tag_c_au tables of data, background data base deletes the data that in Tag_h_au tables of data, this label is corresponding, then will iD twith add in Tag_h_au tables of data; If Tag_h_au tables of data, then any operation is not carried out to Tag_h_au tables of data;
4) background data base uses the shared key with reader computations symmetric encipherment algorithm then will with be transmitted to reader;
5th step: reader uses to decipher with the shared key of background data base and receives calculate then according to the S obtained rwith original random number S rcompare, if unanimously, then background data base is by certification, and reader uses the S obtained tupgrade shared key then send to label; If more inconsistent, then authentification failure.
6th step: after label receives data, calculates and and to receive compare, if more inconsistent, authentification failure; If consistent, then reader is legal, tag update shared key K t i + 1 = PRNG S t ( K t i ) .
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CN105138937A (en) * 2015-09-24 2015-12-09 北京芯联创展电子技术有限公司 Method and device of radio-frequency identification and security demonstration
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CN106446663A (en) * 2016-08-30 2017-02-22 德阳市闪通思动科技有限责任公司 Tag reader and database three-way authentication system and method
CN106446663B (en) * 2016-08-30 2019-07-16 德阳市闪通思动科技有限责任公司 A kind of label reader and database three-dimensional Verification System and method
CN106712962A (en) * 2016-12-23 2017-05-24 西安电子科技大学 Mobile RFID system bidirectional authentication method and system
CN107147498A (en) * 2017-05-15 2017-09-08 吉林大学 A kind of strong anonymous RFID authentication protocols based on Hash functions and Dynamic-shared key
CN107147498B (en) * 2017-05-15 2020-06-02 吉林大学 Authentication method and encryption method for transmitting information in RFID authentication process
CN107480564A (en) * 2017-07-11 2017-12-15 天津大学 A kind of improved RFID groups authentication method
CN107480564B (en) * 2017-07-11 2020-07-17 天津大学 Improved RFID group authentication method
CN107403211A (en) * 2017-08-03 2017-11-28 广东工业大学 A kind of method and system of mobile RFID certification
CN108259485A (en) * 2018-01-09 2018-07-06 殷周平 Security protocol verification method based on mobile RFID system
CN110190965A (en) * 2019-05-17 2019-08-30 西安电子科技大学 A kind of RFID cluster label authentication protocol based on hash function

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