CN104702599A - Safety exchange method for MMS specification application layer - Google Patents

Safety exchange method for MMS specification application layer Download PDF

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Publication number
CN104702599A
CN104702599A CN201510084933.8A CN201510084933A CN104702599A CN 104702599 A CN104702599 A CN 104702599A CN 201510084933 A CN201510084933 A CN 201510084933A CN 104702599 A CN104702599 A CN 104702599A
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China
Prior art keywords
mms
application layer
service
access control
client
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CN201510084933.8A
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Chinese (zh)
Inventor
陶文伟
李金�
张喜铭
梁寿愚
胡荣
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China Southern Power Grid Co Ltd
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China Southern Power Grid Co Ltd
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Priority to CN201510084933.8A priority Critical patent/CN104702599A/en
Publication of CN104702599A publication Critical patent/CN104702599A/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
    • H04L63/168Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer above the transport layer
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a safety exchange method for an MMS specification application layer. When an intelligent substation device uses MMS message communication, the MMS application layer safety reinforcing exchange method enables both MMS protocol communication sides to perform identity authentication at the application through carrying out safety improvement on the MMS application layer and controls the access authority of an MMS client through using role-based access based on the authentication. The safety exchange method for the MMS specification application layer includes steps that 1) starting an MMS association authorization function, and extending authorization data structure; 2) through extending the authorization data structure, using a public encryption algorithm to carry out identity authorization on the association process of the MMS application layer, and at the same time, performing relay attack protection; 3) using a role-based access control technology to construct the access control relationship between the MMS client and MMS service, after passing the association authentication, allowing an MMS server to use a configured access control relation table to carry out fine-grained access control on the MMS client, if the MMS client meets the demand, allowing the MMS client to access the corresponding service, otherwise, refusing to provide service.

Description

A kind of MMS utilization layer safety interacting method
Technical field
The present invention relates to power information field of communication security, relate in particular to a kind of MMS application layer and reinforce safety interacting method based on MMS (Microsoft Media Server) Protocol.
Background technology
MMS (Manufacturing Message Specification: manufacture message specification) is the communication packet specification for industrial control system that ISO/IEC9506 standard defines.MMS specification industrial circle has the communication behavior of the intelligent sensor of communication capacity, intelligent electronic device, intelligent control device, uses and have interoperability between the equipment of different manufacturer, the system integration is become simply, convenient.
DL/T 860 (be equal to and quote international standard IEC 61850) is intelligent substation communication stipulations national standard, propose one group of common communication standard of transformer station, by a series of standardization to equipment, make IED (intelligent electronic device) seamless link can be carried out under unified standard.The feature of DL/T 860 is 1) object-oriented modeling; 2) Abstract Common Service Interface; 3) towards real-time service; 4) configuration language; 5) whole electric power system unified Modeling.Transformer substation communication system is divided into substation level, wall, process layer by DL/T 860 standard.The network service upper strata of DL/T860 is unified adopts Abstract Common Service Interface, to concrete network, by bottom layer realization interface mappings being docked to abstract communication interface.Between substation level and wall, Abstract Common Service Interface is mapped to and manufactures message specification (MMS), TCP/IP (TCP/IP) Ethernet or optical networking.Network between wall and process layer adopts the Ethernet transmission of broadcast type.
State Grid Corporation of China clearly proposes the digital transformer substation of research and extension based on DL/T 860 and electronic type PT/CT in Eleventh Five-Year Plan.DL/T 860 proposes the direct access network based on ethernet of all devices between Substation process-level, wall, station level three layers.Network has become most important communication mode in transformer station as can be seen here.
But, due to DL/T 860 standard propose time, only focus on the common share communication between IED, and do not pay attention to the safety in communication process, cause transformer station once invaded, and transformer station inside is without any safeguard procedures, consequence will be difficult to imagine.The MMS specification that DL/T 860 quotes is for the precautionary measures of fail safe, and the interface being also only embodied in access control describes.
In April, 2005, International Organization for standardization IEC has formulated IEC62351 data and communication security standard (draft), to solve data and the communication security problem of field of electric power communication.In IEC62351, certification and encryption are core contents.
Summary of the invention
When the object of the present invention is to provide one for intelligent substation equipment use MMS message communication, by carrying out Safe Transformation to MMS application layer, make to carry out authentication through MMS (Microsoft Media Server) Protocol communicating pair in application, and on the basis of certification, by use based role access to MMS client conduct interviews control of authority MMS application layer security reinforce exchange method.
Object of the present invention realizes by following technical measures:
A kind of MMS application layer security reinforces exchange method, by expanding MMS (Microsoft Media Server) Protocol, increases authentication and access control technology in MMS application layer, makes not to be authorized to user and cannot associate MMS service end and corresponding MMS serves.Method step is as follows:
1) enable MMS and associate authentication function, and extended authentication data structure;
2) by extended authentication data structure, use public encryption algorithm to carry out authentication to the association process of MMS application layer, and carry out Replay Attack protection simultaneously;
3) access control based roles technology is used, access control relation between structure MMS client and MMS serve, and associate after certification passes through, MMS service end utilizes the access control relation table configured to carry out fine-grained access control to MMS client, meet the demands, MMS client access respective service will be allowed, otherwise, denial of service.
The method proposed in the application of the invention makes transformer station's MMS (Microsoft Media Server) Protocol can carry out the MMS service access control of authentication and based role on the application layer to MMS client.Authentication and access control based roles ensure the fail safe of MMS service from coarseness and fine granularity two aspects, authentication to conduct interviews control from coarseness, as long as validated user, by permission, it carries out association certification and passes through for we, if but the Insufficient privilege of user, even validated user, the service that he goes beyond one's commission can not be accessed.
The present invention contrasts prior art, has the following advantages:
One is the data structure being met MMS message specification by expansion, increases application layer authentication, carries out authentication to application layer.
Two is by introducing access control based roles, carrying out fine-grained access control to MMS client.
Three is by authentication and access control based roles, and thickness two granularities are protected MMS service, ensures that MMS service not only refuses disabled user, even legal, under the condition not having access rights, also can only carry out MMS association, and actual service can not be had access to.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1: the logical framework figure being the inventive method;
Fig. 2: be public key algorithm flow for authenticating ID of the present invention;
Fig. 3: be that MMS of the present invention associates certification interaction flow;
Fig. 4: be the access control schematic diagram that the present invention is based on role.
Embodiment
A kind of MMS application layer security reinforces exchange method, by expanding MMS (Microsoft Media Server) Protocol, increases authentication and access control technology in MMS application layer, makes not to be authorized to user and cannot associate MMS service end and corresponding MMS serves.
As shown in Figure 1, this method occurs between MMS client and MMS service end, and concrete steps are as follows:
Step 1: enable authentication function, extended authentication data structure.
As shown in Figure 2, enable the association authentication function unit of the ACSE (Association Control ServiceElement, association authentication service unit) in MMS application layer, and extended authentication data structure, it is as follows,
<C,T,SV>
Extended authentication data structure comprises certificate C, present system time T and the signature value SV using private key to carry out the time.
Step 2: by extended authentication data structure, uses public encryption algorithm to carry out authentication to the association process of MMS application layer, and carries out Replay Attack protection simultaneously;
Adopt the private key of public key encryption algorithm to sign to the time at MMS client, signature value is stored in signature value SV place, and extended authentication data structure is sent to service end with MMS application layer data.
After service end receives data, first extract this extended authentication data structure
<C,T,SV>
Secondly C is verified, if do not pass through, terminate association; Then be decrypted SV by C, and compare with T, if equal, then authentication is passed through, otherwise, terminate.
Service end also will carry out Replay Attack protection to message identifying, service end can preserve the historical time of message identifying, use the last message identifying time, compare with the time of current authentication message, if exceed setup time, then receive, if within setup time, can suspect that client has the possibility of Replay Attack, will certification be refused.
The concrete steps that described use public encryption algorithm carries out authentication to the association process of MMS application layer are as follows:
A kind of function that the ACSE layer that MMS association authentication function is MMS stipulations provides, but in standard, only provide the statement of authentication function unit, do not provide actualizing technology, the present invention then provides MMS to associate the implementation method of certification, as shown in Figure 3, comprises the steps:
MMS associates certification originating end,
Step 2.1: load the originating end certificate of being signed by CA (Certificate Authority authorization center), and be assigned to C;
Step 2.2: obtain present system time, and be assigned to T;
Step 2.3: the private key loading originating end, and time T is signed, signature value is assigned to SV;
Step 2.4: structure extended authentication data structure <C, T, SV>, and as the part of MMS application layer data, be sent to MMS receiving terminal.
MMS associates certification receiving terminal,
Step 2.5: obtain MMS application layer data, extracts extended authentication data structure <C, T, SV>;
Step 2.6: load CA certificate, and certificate C is verified, checking is not passed through, and report an error end;
Step 2.7: use certificate C to carry out solution to signature value SV and sign, obtain the time value T ' after deciphering;
Step 2.8: compare T ' and T, if unequal, then report an error end.
The step that described message identifying carries out Replay Attack protection is as follows:
Step 2.9: configuration determination time value threshold, is defaulted as 10 minutes;
Step 2.10: obtain the last association authenticated time l_time, if nothing, then set to 0;
Step 2.11: extract authenticated time T;
Step 2.12: compare T and l_time, if be less than threshold, then report an error end;
Step 2.13: T value is assigned to l_time.
Step 3: access control based roles.As shown in Figure 4, show access control based roles schematic diagram, describe access control based roles thought, it is made up of three parts, user, role and authority.Access control based roles technology is classified to user, role and resource, and builds user and role, and the relation between role and resource, judges whether user possesses the authority of access resources by role.
Use access control based roles technology, access control relation between structure MMS client and MMS serve, and associate after certification passes through, MMS service end utilizes the access control relation table configured to carry out fine-grained access control to MMS client, meet the demands, MMS client access respective service will be allowed, otherwise, denial of service.
Access control based roles is adopted to conduct interviews restriction to MMS client.Be divided into by MMS client different roles to carry out identity management and control, classify to MMS service, construct access control list, thus compose with different service access authorities different roles, when accessing, MMS client goes to obtain corresponding MMS by role and serves.As MMS client can be divided into administrator role, attendant role, operating personnel role, other staff etc.The service of MMS service discipline is just like identity authentication service, and association service, VMD Service supportive, territory management service, routine call management service, unit controls service, variables access service, exchanges data management service, beacon management service, operator communication is served etc.
By analyzing transformer station's actual conditions, the access relation between structure MMS Consumer Role and MMS serve.As using MMS client role as row, using MMS service as arrange, if role allows access services, then the value that corresponding ranks are corresponding is 1, otherwise is 0.
The access control based roles process of described MMS service is as follows:
Step 3.1: the access control relation table R-S between structure MMS client and MMS serve, and be configured at MMS service end, wherein access control relation table is two dimensional form, R represents role, and S represents the service of negotiation, and the value of R and S intersection represents that can role R access services S, 1 represents and can access, 0 represents and can not access, and r represents the concrete item in R, and s represents the concrete item in S;
Step 3.2:MMS client is by after association authentication, and MMS service end extracts MMS client identity information r;
Step 3.3:MMS service end extracts the service s that MMS client is consulted;
Step 3.4:MMS service end loads access control list R-S, and uses r and s to search in table, if r, s respective value is 1, then allows the request of MMS client, otherwise, terminate.
The present invention be a kind of for intelligent substation equipment use MMS message communication time, by carrying out Safe Transformation to MMS application layer, make to carry out authentication through MMS (Microsoft Media Server) Protocol communicating pair in application, and on the basis of certification, by using the access of based role, MMS client is conducted interviews control of authority.
Embodiments of the present invention are not limited thereto; under stating basic fundamental thought prerequisite on the invention; according to the ordinary technical knowledge of this area and customary means to content of the present invention make the amendment of other various ways, replacement or change, all drop within rights protection scope of the present invention.

Claims (5)

1. MMS application layer security reinforces an exchange method, it is characterized in that comprising the following steps:
Step 1: enable authentication function, extended authentication data structure;
Step 2: by extended authentication data structure, uses public encryption algorithm to carry out authentication to the association process of MMS application layer, and carries out Replay Attack protection simultaneously;
Step 3: use access control based roles technology, access control relation between structure MMS client and MMS serve, and associate after certification passes through, MMS service end utilizes the access control relation table configured to carry out fine-grained access control to MMS client, meet the demands, MMS client access respective service will be allowed, otherwise, denial of service.
2. MMS application layer security according to claim 1 reinforces exchange method, it is characterized in that:
Authentication function is enabled in described step 1, the particular content of extended authentication data structure is: enable ACSE (the Association Control Service Element in MMS application layer, association authentication service unit) association authentication function unit, and extended authentication data structure, as follows
<C,T,SV>
Extended authentication data structure comprises certificate C, present system time T and the signature value SV using private key to carry out the time.
3. MMS application layer security according to claim 2 reinforces exchange method, it is characterized in that: the concrete steps using public encryption algorithm to carry out authentication to the association process of MMS application layer in described step 2 are as follows:
MMS associates certification originating end,
Step 2.1: load the originating end certificate of being signed by authorization center, and be assigned to C;
Step 2.2: obtain present system time, and be assigned to T;
Step 2.3: the private key loading originating end, and time T is signed, signature value is assigned to SV;
Step 2.4: structure extended authentication data structure <C, T, SV>, and as the part of MMS application layer data, be sent to MMS receiving terminal;
MMS associates certification receiving terminal,
Step 2.5: obtain MMS application layer data, extracts extended authentication data structure <C, T, SV>;
Step 2.6: load CA certificate, and certificate C is verified, checking is not passed through, and report an error end;
Step 2.7: use certificate C to carry out solution to signature value SV and sign, obtain the time value T ' after deciphering;
Step 2.8: compare T ' and T, if unequal, then report an error end.
4. MMS application layer security according to claim 1 reinforces exchange method, it is characterized in that:
The step that message identifying in described step 2 carries out Replay Attack protection is as follows:
Step 2.9: configuration determination time value threshold, is defaulted as 10 minutes;
Step 2.10: obtain the last association authenticated time l_time, if nothing, then set to 0;
Step 2.11: extract authenticated time T;
Step 2.12: compare T and l_time, if be less than threshold, then report an error end;
Step 2.13: T value is assigned to l_time.
5. MMS application layer security according to claim 1 reinforces exchange method, it is characterized in that: in described step 3, access control based roles process is as follows:
Step 3.1: the access control relation table R-S between structure MMS client and MMS serve, and be configured at MMS service end, wherein access control relation table is two dimensional form, R represents role, and S represents the service of negotiation, and the value of R and S intersection represents that can role R access services S, 1 represents and can access, 0 represents and can not access, and r represents the concrete item in R, and s represents the concrete item in S;
Step 3.2:MMS client is by after association authentication, and MMS service end extracts MMS client identity information r;
Step 3.3:MMS service end extracts the service s that MMS client is consulted;
Step 3.4:MMS service end loads access control list R-S, and uses r and s to search in table, if r, s respective value is 1, then allows the request of MMS client, otherwise, terminate.
CN201510084933.8A 2015-02-16 2015-02-16 Safety exchange method for MMS specification application layer Pending CN104702599A (en)

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CN105006890A (en) * 2015-06-25 2015-10-28 许继集团有限公司 Intelligent substation equipment program management and control system
CN105006890B (en) * 2015-06-25 2017-10-31 许继集团有限公司 A kind of intelligent substation device program managing and control system
CN104994107B (en) * 2015-07-13 2018-05-01 中国南方电网有限责任公司 A kind of MMS message off-line analysis methods based on IEC62351
CN104994107A (en) * 2015-07-13 2015-10-21 中国南方电网有限责任公司 MMS message off-line analysis method based on IEC62351
CN105306489A (en) * 2015-11-20 2016-02-03 国网智能电网研究院 Method for detecting security of electrical equipment
CN105306489B (en) * 2015-11-20 2020-01-21 国网智能电网研究院 Method for detecting safety of electrical equipment
CN105791285A (en) * 2016-03-01 2016-07-20 积成电子股份有限公司 Online analyzing method of MMS (Manufacturing Message Specification) message in support of IEC62351 encryption
CN107124429A (en) * 2017-06-05 2017-09-01 华北电力大学 A kind of Network security protection method and system designed based on Double Data table
CN107483444A (en) * 2017-08-22 2017-12-15 北京邮电大学 A kind of intelligent grid information transmission security protector and safety protecting method
CN107483444B (en) * 2017-08-22 2020-10-20 北京邮电大学 Intelligent power grid information transmission safety protection device and safety protection method
CN108306863A (en) * 2018-01-02 2018-07-20 东南大学 A kind of electric power message reinforcement means based on communication connection attribute
CN112491929A (en) * 2020-12-15 2021-03-12 北京四方继保工程技术有限公司 Information security method based on digital texture feature recognition
CN112491929B (en) * 2020-12-15 2023-06-20 北京四方继保工程技术有限公司 Information security method based on digital feature recognition

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