CN104363236A - Automatic vulnerability validation method - Google Patents
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- CN104363236A CN104363236A CN201410673547.8A CN201410673547A CN104363236A CN 104363236 A CN104363236 A CN 104363236A CN 201410673547 A CN201410673547 A CN 201410673547A CN 104363236 A CN104363236 A CN 104363236A
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Abstract
The invention provides an automatic vulnerability validation method. The method comprises the steps that firstly, validation information is collected, wherein an active detection way is adopted for carrying out information detection, topological detection, vulnerability detection and website directory structure detection on a target; secondly, the validation information is packaged, wherein suspicious vulnerability key information in vulnerability detection results is extracted, uniform-interface modularized packaging is carried out on the data; thirdly, a validation strategy is searched for, wherein according to the suspicious vulnerability identity and variety information, an appropriate attack script template and a vulnerability utilizing tool are selected; vulnerability validation is carried out, wherein scripts are called to be loaded into the packaged vulnerability information to carry out validation attack, and an utilization voucher is obtained and stored; fifthly, validation traces are removed, wherein validation attack traces are removed, sessions are recycled; finally, a scanning report is generated. The automatic vulnerability validation method solves the problem that an existing vulnerability scanning system is high in false alarm rate and cannot carry out effective validation, is automatic and procedural, can automatically recognize and validate vulnerabilities, lowers the requirement for the ability of non-professional staff and improves the vulnerability validation efficiency.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to information security field, be specifically related to a kind of method of automation validating vulnerability.
Background technology
All can there is thousands of cyberspace vulnerabilities be every year found and announce, the continuous change of additional assailant's means and renewal, security status also becomes increasingly serious in the increase along with security breaches; Fact proved, the attack of 99% all make use of the leak do not repaired, and makes many enterprises having deployed fire compartment wall, intruding detection system and anti-virus software still endure the hardship of leak attack to the fullest extent, suffers huge economic loss.
Look for one's roots and trace to the source, most user lacks complete set, effective leak finds, verifies workflow, fails to implement periodical evaluation and leak repairing work; Only have and more early than assailant grasp oneself cyberspace vulnerability and carry out prevention work, can effectively avoid owing to attacking the loss caused; Although utilize the potential safety hazard of leaking dynamic scanning tools and can find to exist in network, but from the angle of practice, suitable wrong report is there is in current this vulnerability scanning result, the existence of verify leak is wanted to need tester to have higher specialized capability, to all kinds of leak principle and utilize instrument to have certain understanding, requirement is proposed to the ability of tester higher, and spend a large amount of time to verify one by one, be difficult to realize large-scale leak and find and checking; Therefore, in the urgent need to proposing a kind of validating vulnerability method of automation, procedure, automatically can identify and verify leak, reducing the Capability Requirement to deprofessionalization personnel, improve Hole Detection efficiency.
Summary of the invention
The present invention proposes a kind of method of automation validating vulnerability, achieve cyberspace vulnerability automatic Verification, solving existing vulnerability scanning system cannot provide leak to there is evidence, can not carry out the problem of confirmatory vulnerability exploit.
Technic relization scheme of the present invention is as follows: a kind of automation validating vulnerability method, is characterized in that comprising the following steps.
1) information: information detection, topology probe, fragility detection and the detection of directory web site structure are carried out to target.
2) data are carried out the modularized encapsulation of unified interface by data encapsulation: the key message extracting suspicious leak in fragility result of detection.
3) leak analysis: search strategy storehouse, analyzes suspicious leak.
4) validating vulnerability: obtain vulnerability exploit voucher and preserve, whether main detection successfully can set up associated session, obtain confidential information or promote invader's authority etc.
5) the result is preserved: preserving the result proves.
6) verify that vestige is removed: remove confirmatory attack vestige and reclaim session.
7) report generation is verified: generate checking report, the information such as security breaches, leak proof of the OS Type comprising network system or main frame, the port opened, service, network topology, existence.
Above-mentioned steps 1) in target be the information such as IP or domain name in order to clear and definite sweep object, can be an independent main frame, also can be an IP section or a website.
Above-mentioned steps 1) specific implementation be.
11) information detection: adopt active probe mode according to operation system fingerprint identification the other side operating system, obtain the machine name of target machine; Utilize password dictionary to guess user name and the weak passwurd of the other side, common password security scanning comprises FTP password, POP3 password, SQL password; Carry out TCP, adopt tcp port scanning and udp port scanning.
12) topology probe: the Topology Discovery being carried out objective network by SNMP, ICMP agreement.
13) fragility detection: the information such as the open-ended situation obtained according to information detection and the COS of operation, mates with vulnerability database, determines whether there is such fragility hidden danger; Send packet to target, fragility simulation test is carried out to goal systems, if containing characteristic information in returned packet, then illustrate that goal systems may also exist relevant fragility leak, preserves the information of this leak, for validating vulnerability afterwards.
14) directory web site crawls: crawl directory web site structure by crawlers, this step only target be website or detect when target opens WEB service and enable.
Above-mentioned steps 2) described in the key message of suspicious leak comprise: destination address, operation system information, leak port, leak type, leak position, leak parameter, leak mark, application version information, account with power of attorney or cookies etc.
Above-mentioned steps 3) described in analysis to system vulnerability and WEB leak is comprised to suspicious leak analysis; For system vulnerability, according to suspicious leak mark and kind of information, choose suitable attack script template and vulnerability exploit instrument; For WEB leak, then analyze and crawl the dynamic parameter can submitted in address, set up the mapping relations of dynamic parameter and page address.
Above-mentioned steps 4) described in validating vulnerability subsystem validating vulnerability and WEB validating vulnerability two kinds, can work simultaneously.
Above-mentioned steps 5) described in the result preserve be: the result of preservation is chosen according to the classification of leak; Weak passwurd leak will preserve and crack after username and password information; Injection type leak can be preserved and return leak page cache etc.
Above-mentioned steps 11) in operation system fingerprint identification refer to: send identical protocol stack (TCP/IP), the data of different operating system to specific format are surrounded by different responses; This response difference, becomes operating system stack fingerprint.
Above-mentioned steps 11) in TCP mainly use TCP SYN to scan; Scanning imaging system is unnecessary opens a TCP connection completely, and what it sent is a SYN packet.
The specific implementation of described system vulnerability checking is.
41) read data in encapsulating structure, be configured to operational factor, pass ginseng and call vulnerability exploit instrument.
42) read data in encapsulating structure, be filled to attack script template.
43) choose filling vulnerability exploit code to attack script template, call load operation script.
44) constantly the type of filling code is attacked in change, attempt attacking until success attack or exceed the number of attempt of regulation or stop after having traveled through all attack codes, and in proof procedure, monitor the change of target memory, buffer state and the result of feedback.
The specific implementation of described WEB validating vulnerability is.
401) in the page crawled, select the dynamic page allowing to submit parameter to, read the mapping table of dynamic parameter, select corresponding parameter to be then filled in URL with attack code.
402) submit the URL after filling to, monitor return information.
403) analyzing responding page code, if there is the keyword that attack code is submitted to or leak data library information, illustrates to have this leak.
404) constantly the type of filling code is attacked in change, attempts attacking until success attack or exceed the number of attempt of regulation or stop after having traveled through all attack codes.
Described attack code refers to and does not construct concrete menace code or functional code, under the prerequisite ensureing verification the verifying results, only carry out invasion or the attack of minimum degree.
Compared with prior art, advantage of the present invention is.
1, show leak intuitively, user can observe the result of vulnerability exploit, understanding leak harmfulness that can be more deep.
2, the result data of the present invention to preliminary detection unifies encapsulation process, and the advantage so done has two: the exchanges data that the first, can effectively realize between disparate modules utilizes, and improves the degree of automation; The second, can effective compatible third-party vulnerability scanners, because encapsulation process extracts is the essential information such as numbering, address, position, version of leak, all drain sweep equipment of these essential informations all can provide; Only need add a shell script and just can obtain these key messages in third party's scanning result, the encapsulated result generated afterwards can be verified module use equally.
3, the full-automation of validating vulnerability process completes, decrease tester manually call executing means, manual analysis result time cost and labour consume, improve leak confirm efficiency and automaticity.
Accompanying drawing explanation
In order to be illustrated more clearly in the embodiment of the present invention or technical scheme of the prior art, below the accompanying drawing used required in describing embodiment is briefly described.
Fig. 1 is a kind of automation validating vulnerability method schematic diagram provided by the invention.
Fig. 2 is the module relationship schematic diagram of a kind of automation validating vulnerability system that the embodiment of the present invention provides.
Fig. 3 is the schematic flow sheet of a kind of automation validating vulnerability system that the embodiment of the present invention provides.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawing in the embodiment of the present invention, the technical scheme in the embodiment of the present invention is clearly and completely described; Based on the embodiment in the present invention, those of ordinary skill in the art, not making the every other embodiment obtained under creative work prerequisite, belong to the scope of protection of the invention.
See Fig. 1, be a kind of automation validating vulnerability method schematic diagram provided by the invention, concrete manner of execution is as follows.
S100: carry out information to target, if target is host computer system, then adopts active probe mode, according to operation system fingerprint identification destination OS, obtains the machine name of target machine, obtains network topology structure; Then carry out TCP, adopt tcp port scanning and udp port to scan two kinds of patterns; If target is web system, then detection of a target web server kind, service release number, webpage use the essential information such as language, directory web site; After information detection terminates, result data can be collected.
S101: the information such as the open-ended situation obtained according to information detection and the COS of operation, starts fragility detection, determines whether there is such fragility hidden danger; Send packet to target, fragility simulation test is carried out to goal systems, if containing characteristic information in returned packet, then illustrate that goal systems may also exist relevant fragility leak, preserves the information of this leak, for validating vulnerability afterwards.
The mode of the employing Intelligent Recognition of detection, such as, detects that web services opened by main frame in a main frame scanning, then can automatically open web detection mode; After fragility has detected, will unify to sort out to vulnerability information and collect.
S102: leak key message extracts and encapsulation; Extract the key message of suspicious leak in fragility result of detection, data are carried out the modularized encapsulation of unified interface, call for validating vulnerability; The key message of leak comprises.
Destination address: the IP address of scanning target.
Operation system information: the operating system of object run, for screening the corresponding version of validating vulnerability script.
Leak port: utilize the required port connected of leak.
Leak type: the type of mark leak.
Leak position: the page address referring to webpage leak here.
Leak parameter: the vulnerability parameter referring to webpage leak here.
Leak identifies: the unique number of leak, consistent with standard vulnerability database.
Application version information: comprise WEB assembly and the leaky application version number of other tools.
Authorized user or cookies: when verifying webpage leak, some may have and log in restriction, the account password logged in or cookies can be encapsulated together in a package before user, can Automatically invoked when needs debarkation authentication.
Above-mentioned all data all will be packaged into template, be convenient to data call and transmission.
S103: analyze suspicious leak mark, leak type, application version information, operation system information, choose suitable attack script template and vulnerability exploit instrument.
S104: by fill attack script program or by Parameter transfer on validating vulnerability instrument, realize verifying the existence of leak; Validating vulnerability in this step is the attack code of structure destruction or functional code not, under the prerequisite ensureing verification the verifying results, only carry out invasion or the attack of minimum degree.
S105: after being proved to be successful, relevant information is preserved in evidence obtaining.The result of preserving is chosen according to the classification of leak, and such as Long-distance Control class leak can preserve the information such as session process, system sectional drawing; Weak passwurd leak will preserve the user name after cracking, encrypted message; Injection type leak can be preserved and return leak page cache etc.
S106: after completing all validation tasks, will remove confirmatory attack vestige by Run Script on the target system and reclaim session, the process of whole validating vulnerability can not leave any vestige on the target system.
S107: generate report, the OS Type of network system or main frame should be comprised, the information such as security breaches, leak proof of the port opened, service, network topology, existence.
See Fig. 2, the invention provides a kind of implementation of automation validating vulnerability method, this module relationship realizing system is as follows.
S200: user interactive module, provides user to access the interface with control system, can communicate with information detection module; There is provided the mode of three kinds of user interactions, control desk access, WEB access are accessed with graphic interface.
S201: vulnerability database, the vulnerability database data such as synchronous CNNVD, CVE, provide leak feature for vulnerability scanning module.
S202: information detection module itself is a dynamic instrumentation process with several functions, and can operationally dynamic expansion; Whole detection process can operate in the middle of internal memory, and employs the communication means of encryption, effectively can avoid the detection of the safety means such as fire compartment wall, IDS, WAF; Different according to executive mode, detection is mainly divided three classes: essential information detection, topological structure detection and fragility detection.
Data for extracting the key message of suspicious leak in result of detection, being carried out the modularized encapsulation of unified interface, being convenient to calling of scheduler module by S203: data encapsulation module.
S204: card module, that provide some expansions, easy-to-use shell script, for calling, allows change; Script plug-in unit can directly call, and the vulnerability information data encapsulated can be filled into script and perform; Package types comprises: database plug-in unit, session plug-in unit, thread plug-in unit, socket plug-in unit etc.; Also have some class of languages plug-in units, such as ruby plug-in unit etc., its effect provides running environment for the execution of script; Vulnerability exploit script provides a large amount of practical type of knowing clearly, such as spillover-type vulnerability exploit, Remote Code Execution Vulnerability utilization, the utilization of database injection loophole, cross site scripting vulnerability exploit etc.; Mainly some run the execution environment needed, such as java API, c++ API, php API, ruby API, network AP I etc. to running environment script, mainly call for the relative program under scheduler module.
S205: tool model, mainly more integrated green validating vulnerability instrument implantation tools, with the addition of the interface that a number is reportedly passed, and can be called execution validating vulnerability by input operational factor; Instrument classification mainly comprises implantation tool, uploading tools, password cracking, smell to visit a prisoner and listen, carry power instrument, overflow tool, Long-distance Control, denial of service, wireless invasive, data base tool etc.
S206: scheduler module, scheduler module serves as the middleware between validating vulnerability module and each module, and primary responsibility takes out data and padding data.
S207: validating vulnerability module is the nucleus module of native system; Realize primarily of compilation and C language, generally do not allow directly to call; What compilation part mainly completed is the function relevant with corresponding operating system (as windows, linux etc.), the mainly realization etc. of shellcode; The function ratio that C language completes is more, calling of main card module and tool model, comprises that ruby is relevant, internal memory is relevant, network is relevant, reverse-examination surveys relevant etc.; Mostly the application of its instrumental is directly to come from other tool software; Validating vulnerability functions of modules comprises.
1. Payload: the infiltration code that the code operated on distance host by some dynamics forms, for the checking of Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.
2. flooding: spilling is the mistake that the deficiency of program designer when designing is brought, mainly utilize the leak of operating system, by calling S204 card module and S205 tool model, after adding the operation of corresponding parameter, the control that target has keeper's qualification just can be obtained.
3.shellcode encodes: heavy attack code (shellcode) is encoded, in order to realize reverse-examination brake etc.
4.WEB validating vulnerability: for verifying the authenticity of WEB target leak, supports that the kind of checking has.
1) user's credential management leak: do not have correct to create user's voucher, preserve, transmit and protection etc.
2) authority, privilege and access control leak: the crucial page is not verified the authority of user.
3) buffer memory leak: refer to that assailant cheats the authenticity that dns server makes it to believe the DNS response of forgery; The object of this type flaw attack is the address of the victim depending on this dns server being redirected to other.
4) cross site scripting leak: because programmer does not do sufficient filtration to some variablees when coding, directly the data that user submits to are delivered in SQL statement and perform, the statement causing user can submit some to so specially constructing is all generally with this kind of scripted codes such as picture JavaScript.
5) leak is encrypted: some website ciphertext cryptographic algorithm is cracked, can backward recovery plaintext.
6) path switches leak: input can comprise characters such as " .. " and switches application path and read.
7) code injection leak: because programmer does not do sufficient filtration when writing webpage to some variablees, directly in the middle of the code insertion page of user's submission.
8) leak is configured; Configuration file due to website does not do hides process etc., can directly be read or revise.
9) data and information leakage leak.
10) SQL injection loophole: because programmer is when writing code, does not judge the legitimacy of user input data; User can submit one piece of data library inquiry code to, according to the result that program returns, obtains some sensitive data.
11) connect and follow the tracks of leak: allow user directly or by links and accesses or download user to have no right the file of accessing.
12) assembly leak: some assemblies for website support or the defect leak of template class website self, such as common dicuz, apache leak etc.
5. weak passwurd cracks: can crack the weak passwurd account that database, FTP user, long-distance user and backstage, website etc. need login authentication program.
6. aided verification: some supplementary modules, in order to realize auxiliary attack, is realized by the instrument calling S205 tool model.
See seeing Fig. 3, it is the schematic flow sheet of a kind of automation validating vulnerability system that the embodiment of the present invention provides.Idiographic flow is as follows.
S300: initialization system, mainly completes the operations such as each module self-inspection, DataBase combining test.
S301: carry out engineering installation, input essential information by user; To carry out main frame vulnerability detection, then engineering name, Target IP, engineering parameter should be set; To carry out website domain name detection, then engineering name, domain name addresses, engineering parameter relevant information should be set.
S302: select host detection, this step and the detection of S310 website are coordination, and both use different engines, can carry out simultaneously and be independent of each other.
S303: host detection starts, entry port detection circulation.Port detection is divided into custom field and well known port two class, and wherein well known port is the port that the general service of system default uses, and also self-definedly can arrange the scope of TCP.
S304: when detecting an open-ended, system can judge the type of this port operation service, then record.
S305: judge whether this port opens web services, if the result is negative, then returns step S303 and proceeds port detection; If result is yes, then opens the task of a website detection, synchronously carry out step S311, then return the detection of step S303 continuation port.
S306: after whole port detection, start OS (operating system) detection.With the different main frame of ICMP agreement Ping, on screen, the ttl value of echo can be different because of the difference of different host operating system.To return results and mate with Protocol fingerprint storehouse, judge remote operating system with this.
S307: port and OS identify it is basic detection, after these processes terminate, opens fragility detection process; Packet is sent to target, fragility simulation test is carried out to goal systems, characteristic information in return data and the leak feature in vulnerability database are compared, if containing characteristic information in returned packet, then illustrates that goal systems may also exist relevant fragility leak.
S308: after the detection phase completes, object information is encapsulated in conjunction with essential information.
S309: read the data structure after encapsulation, invoke script or Tool validation leak; If be proved to be successful, then preservation session or sectional drawing are used for leak proves.
S310: this step is the beginning link of website vulnerability checking.
S311: information, obtains the information such as web server type, domain name mapping address, type of database mainly through detection process.
S312: the programming language used by script Detection Techniques automatic acquisition webpage, corresponding detection module is surveyed in choosing automatically.
S313: open reptile multithreading, crawl bibliographic structure and the page info of whole website.
S314: respectively each page crawled is analyzed, filter out the dynamic parameter that can initiatively submit to; The dynamic parameter of extraction and URL are set up mapping relations, with automatic filling attack code during validating vulnerability.
S315: the information obtain the detection phase and dynamic ginseng mapping relations encapsulate.
S316: invoke script or Tool validation leak; If be proved to be successful, then preserve page cache or the URL address that adds test code proves for leak.
S317: generate report; So far, whole system operational process leaves it at that, and user can pass through user interface, the essential information of scanning target, and leak result and leak prove to check.
Example of the present invention is only used to illustrate, to explain the present invention, is not intended to limit the present invention.
One of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that all or part of step realized in above-described embodiment method is that the hardware that can carry out instruction relevant by program has come, described program can be stored in a computer read/write memory medium.
The above, be only the present invention's preferably embodiment, but protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto, is anyly familiar with those skilled in the art in the technical scope that the present invention discloses, the change that can expect easily or replacement, all should be encompassed in protection scope of the present invention; Therefore, protection scope of the present invention should be as the criterion with the protection range of claim.
Claims (10)
1. an automation validating vulnerability method, is characterized in that, comprises the following steps:
1) information: information detection, topology probe, fragility detection and the detection of directory web site structure are carried out to target;
2) data are carried out the modularized encapsulation of unified interface by data encapsulation: the key message extracting suspicious leak in fragility result of detection;
3) leak analysis: search strategy storehouse, analyzes suspicious leak;
4) validating vulnerability: obtain vulnerability exploit voucher and preserve, whether main detection successfully can set up associated session, obtain confidential information or promote invader's authority etc.;
5) the result is preserved: preserving the result proves;
6) verify that vestige is removed: remove confirmatory attack vestige and reclaim session;
7) report generation is verified: generate checking report, the information such as security breaches, leak proof of the OS Type comprising network system or main frame, the port opened, service, network topology, existence.
2. according to the method described in claim 1, it is characterized in that: the target in described step 1) is the information such as IP or domain name in order to clear and definite sweep object, can be an independent main frame, also can be an IP section or a website;
The specific implementation of described step 1) is:
Information detection: adopt active probe mode according to operation system fingerprint identification the other side operating system, obtain the machine name of target machine; Utilize password dictionary to guess user name and the weak passwurd of the other side, common password security scanning comprises FTP password, POP3 password, SQL password; Carry out TCP, adopt tcp port scanning and udp port scanning;
Topology probe: the Topology Discovery being carried out objective network by SNMP, ICMP agreement;
Fragility detects: the information such as the open-ended situation obtained according to information detection and the COS of operation, mates, determine whether there is such fragility hidden danger with vulnerability database; Send packet to target, fragility simulation test is carried out to goal systems, if containing characteristic information in returned packet, then illustrate that goal systems may also exist relevant fragility leak, preserves the information of this leak, for validating vulnerability afterwards;
Directory web site crawls: crawl directory web site structure by crawlers, this step only target be website or detect when target opens WEB service and enable.
3. according to the method described in claim 1, it is characterized in that: described step 2) described in the key message of suspicious leak comprise: destination address, operation system information, leak port, leak type, leak position, leak parameter, leak mark, application version information, account with power of attorney or cookies etc.
4. according to the method described in claim 1, it is characterized in that: described in described step 3), the analysis to system vulnerability and WEB leak is comprised to suspicious leak analysis; For system vulnerability, according to suspicious leak mark and kind of information, choose suitable attack script template and vulnerability exploit instrument; For WEB leak, then analyze and crawl the dynamic parameter can submitted in address, set up the mapping relations of dynamic parameter and page address.
5. according to the method described in claim 1, it is characterized in that: validating vulnerability subsystem validating vulnerability described in described step 4) and WEB validating vulnerability two kinds, can work simultaneously.
6. according to the method described in claim 1, it is characterized in that: the result described in described step 5) is preserved and is: the result of preservation is chosen according to the classification of leak; Weak passwurd leak will preserve and crack after username and password information; Injection type leak can be preserved and return leak page cache etc.
7. method according to claim 2, is characterized in that: the operation system fingerprint identification in described step 11) refers to: send identical protocol stack (TCP/IP), the data of different operating system to specific format are surrounded by different responses; This response difference, becomes operating system stack fingerprint; TCP in described step 11) mainly uses TCP SYN to scan; Scanning imaging system is unnecessary opens a TCP connection completely, and what it sent is a SYN packet.
8. method according to claim 5, is characterized in that: the specific implementation of described system vulnerability checking is:
41) read data in encapsulating structure, be configured to operational factor, pass ginseng and call vulnerability exploit instrument;
42) read data in encapsulating structure, be filled to attack script template;
43) choose filling vulnerability exploit code to attack script template, call load operation script;
44) constantly the type of filling code is attacked in change, attempt attacking until success attack or exceed the number of attempt of regulation or stop after having traveled through all attack codes, and in proof procedure, monitor the change of target memory, buffer state and the result of feedback.
9. method according to claim 5, is characterized in that: the specific implementation of described WEB validating vulnerability is:
401) in the page crawled, select the dynamic page allowing to submit parameter to, read the mapping table of dynamic parameter, select corresponding parameter to be then filled in URL with attack code;
402) submit the URL after filling to, monitor return information;
403) analyzing responding page code, if there is the keyword that attack code is submitted to or leak data library information, illustrates to have this leak;
404) constantly the type of filling code is attacked in change, attempts attacking until success attack or exceed the number of attempt of regulation or stop after having traveled through all attack codes.
10. the method described according to Claim 8 with 9, is characterized in that: described attack code refers to and do not construct concrete menace code or functional code, under the prerequisite ensureing verification the verifying results, only carry out invasion or the attack of minimum degree.
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