CN104010299B - Mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer - Google Patents
Mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN104010299B CN104010299B CN201410215889.5A CN201410215889A CN104010299B CN 104010299 B CN104010299 B CN 104010299B CN 201410215889 A CN201410215889 A CN 201410215889A CN 104010299 B CN104010299 B CN 104010299B
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- channel
- terminal
- base station
- key
- dedicated traffic
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active
Links
Landscapes
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer, comprise the following steps: terminal sends initial access request, and base station is terminal distribution private key negotiated channel；Base station and terminal extract the channel characteristics of this channel respectively, and utilize channel characteristics to generate Integrity Key；Base station is terminal distribution Dedicated Traffic Channel, and discharges private key negotiated channel；Terminal and base station use the communication session carried out on the double secret key Dedicated Traffic Channel generated to be encrypted；Periodic measurement and the channel characteristics of extraction Dedicated Traffic Channel, and utilize channel characteristics more new key.By using said method, encryption is bound with wireless channel by the present invention in signal aspect, physically-isolated secure communication conduit is i.e. set up from the communication incipient stage, prevent the sensitive information leakage such as ID in existing mobile communication, thus efficiently solve the dangerous transmission problem of sensitive information in mobile communication process.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer.
Background technology
In UMTS, encryption mechanism is used to ensure telex network safety, but, encryption mechanism starts
Premise be network according to encryption key corresponding to the User Identity information acquisition received, this makes to be linked into from terminal to recognize
Card consults this section of process cannot encryption enabled protective measure.As a example by LTE system signaling process, UE, eNodeB and MME's is basic
Signalling exchange flow process is as shown in Figure 1.As can be drawn from Figure 1, being linked into during certification consults this section from UE request, terminal needs
Submit to the sensitive informations such as identity IMSI to complete authentication process to network, the system which results in exists reveals user
The risk of the sensitive informations such as identity.Certifiede-mail protocol (AKA) in UE access network process is LTE system safety
Basis, but the sensitive information for just exposing before key agreement solves the most well, therefore believes for user identity
The problem that breath plaintext transmission is easily revealed, just in the urgent need to studying corresponding encryption mechanism, and makes corresponding safety measure.
Summary of the invention
The technical problem to be solved in the present invention is to provide a kind of mobile communication session privacy based on safety of physical layer and increases
Strong method, it is possible to solve the safe transmission problem of the sensitive informations such as User Identity in signal aspect, and will encryption and letter
Road is bound, and sets up physically-isolated communication pipe, prevents the sensitive informations such as User Identity, type of service, registration type from leading to
Cross plaintext transmission mode to reveal, thus effectively strengthen the session secret in the safety of mobile communication system and mobile communication process
Property.
The technical scheme is that
A kind of mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer, comprises the following steps:
Step A: terminal sends initial access request, and base station is terminal distribution private key negotiated channel；
Step B: base station and terminal extract the channel characteristics of this private key negotiated channel respectively, and utilize channel characteristics raw
Become Integrity Key；
Step C: base station is terminal distribution Dedicated Traffic Channel, and discharge above-mentioned private key negotiated channel；
Step D: the meeting that communicates that terminal is carried out on Dedicated Traffic Channel with the double secret key generated in base station employing step B
Words are encrypted；
Step E: terminal and base station periodic measurement and the channel characteristics of extraction Dedicated Traffic Channel, and utilize channel characteristics more
New key.
Above-mentioned mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer, the most in step, terminal sends
Initial access request, and base station is concretely comprising the following steps of terminal distribution private key negotiated channel:
Step A1: according to broadcast parameter information, terminal obtains and carries out the physical layer resources of Stochastic accessing and corresponding code collection,
Then on corresponding RACH, send initial random access request；
Step A2: RACH is detected by base station, if be detected that access request, feeds back access,
And be terminal distribution private key negotiated channel by public access channel；
Step A3: RACH is detected by terminal, if be detected that the instruction of private key negotiated channel, then exists
Responding identical information in private key negotiated channel, signals base private key negotiated channel allocation completes, and is otherwise back to step
Rapid A2.
Above-mentioned mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer, the most in stepb, base station and end
End extracts channel characteristics, and generates concretely comprising the following steps of Integrity Key:
Step B1: terminal sends channel measurement signal respectively in private key negotiated channel with base station, extracts special close
The characteristic parameter of key negotiated channel；
Step B2: channel characteristics parameter is quantified by terminal and base station respectively, generating quantification bit sequence, terminal and base
Stand and arrange extracting rule and key length, and each extraction key in quantization bit sequence；
Step B3: terminal and base station carry out consistency desired result to the key of each self-generating, identical to confirm that both sides generate
Key.
Above-mentioned mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer, wherein in step B3, terminal with
Base station carries out concretely comprising the following steps of consistency desired result to the key of each self-generating:
Step B31: terminal generates random number R, and with through terminal key K produced by step B2AIt is encrypted, obtainsIt is then forwarded to base station, whereinRepresent key KAEncryption operator under existence condition；
Step B32: base station is with through base station key K produced by step B2BDecipher the value received, and it is carried out Hash
Operation, then uses KBIt is encrypted, obtainsAnd feed back to terminal again, whereinFor close
Key KBThe deciphering operator of base station end under existence condition, H is Hash operator；
Step B33: terminal KAThe information that deciphering receives, if result is H (R), then sends " affirmative " and confirms to base station
Signal, shows that both sides generate identical key；If result is not H (R), then sends " negating " confirmation signal, show both sides
Key inconsistent, and be back to step A2, redistribute private key negotiated channel.
Above-mentioned mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer, wherein in step C, base station according to
Available channel resources, the tenability of terminal and the rate request of required interactive information in network, be suitable for for terminal distribution
Dedicated Traffic Channel；Terminal is after receiving Dedicated Traffic Channel distribution instruction, then release private key negotiated channel, enables special
Traffic Channel.
Above-mentioned mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer, the most in step D, terminal and base
Information is encrypted by the cipher mode using lightweight of standing, and the information after encryption selects coding and decoding and the rate-matched of adaptation,
And interact on the Dedicated Traffic Channel enabled in step C.
Above-mentioned mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer, the most in step D, it is assumed that terminal
Clear text signal to be sent is x, and dedicated channel status matrix is HAB, the terminal key that terminal generates is KA, then base station receives and adds
Information y after closeBIt is represented by:
Wherein nABFor channel background noise,Represent key KAEncryption operator under existence condition；IfThe most whole process to information encryption can be equivalent to use double secret key Dedicated Traffic Channel HABEncrypted
Journey, the equivalent Traffic Channel after encryption is: H 'AB=HABKA, wherein H 'ABFor the Dedicated Traffic Channel of equivalence, therefore terminal and base station
Between formed equivalence physical isolation channel, User Identity information Dedicated Traffic Channel after encryption interacts.
Above-mentioned mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer, wherein in step E, terminal and base
Measure Dedicated Traffic Channel in standing in the designated time, extract channel parameter, generate the new key consistent with old key parameter；And
And, terminal and base station sets time delay, synchronize to change new key, thus the follow-up communication session carried out is encrypted.
The invention has the beneficial effects as follows: the present invention is by using encryption in physical layer technology so that it is signal based on channel is special
Property be encrypted, and unrelated with the particular content of channel, it is achieved thereby that transport layer encryption, access and encryption in terminal
Consult this section of process, i.e. can start encryption before terminal submits identification information to, the most just solve in signal aspect
The safe transmission problem of the sensitive informations such as User Identity, and will encrypt and channel bonding, set up physically-isolated communication
Pipeline, prevents the sensitive informations such as User Identity, type of service, registration type from being revealed by plaintext transmission mode, Jin Eryou
Effect enhances the session privacy in the safety of mobile communication system and mobile communication process.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings the detailed description of the invention of the present invention is described in further detail.
Fig. 1 is LTE system of the prior art basic Signalling exchange flow chart；
Fig. 2 is the mobile communication session privacy mechanism and enhancement mechanism flow chart based on safety of physical layer of the present invention；
Fig. 3 is that the concordance of the present invention confirms flow chart；
Fig. 4 is the LTE protocol signaling process figure of the present invention.
Detailed description of the invention
Embodiment one: as in figure 2 it is shown, a kind of mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer, bag
Include following steps:
Step 100: terminal sends initial access request, and base station is terminal distribution private key negotiated channel；
Step 200: base station and terminal extract the channel characteristics of this private key negotiated channel respectively, and utilize channel characteristics
Generate Integrity Key；
Step 300: base station is terminal distribution Dedicated Traffic Channel, and discharge above-mentioned private key negotiated channel；
Step 400: terminal and communicating that the double secret key generated in base station employing step B is carried out on Dedicated Traffic Channel
Session is encrypted；
Step 500: terminal and base station periodic measurement and the channel characteristics of extraction Dedicated Traffic Channel, and utilize channel characteristics
More new key.
As preferably, in step 100, terminal sends initial access request, and base station is terminal distribution private key association
Concretely comprising the following steps of business's channel:
Step A1: according to cell system broadcast parameter information, terminal obtains physical layer resources and the phase carrying out Stochastic accessing
The parameter (targeting sequencing set etc.) answered, then sends initial random access request on corresponding RACH；
Step A2: RACH is detected by base station, if be detected that access request, access is carried out descending instead
Feedback, wherein containing private key negotiated channel instruction information (such as frequency shift (FS) etc.) in feedback information, in order to indicate terminal-specific
Key agreement channel time-frequency domain, and be terminal distribution private key negotiated channel by public access channel；
Step A3: RACH is detected by terminal, if be detected that the instruction of private key negotiated channel, terminal
Then can monitor whether there is feedback signal in private key negotiated channel, if the feedback signal of receiving, then assist at private key
Responding identical information on business's channel, signals base private key negotiated channel allocation completes, and is otherwise back to step A2.For terminal
Distribution private key negotiated channel, it is simple to both sides estimate the response of reciprocity more accurate channel magnitude when disturbing less.
In step 200, channel characteristics is extracted with terminal in base station, and generates concretely comprising the following steps of Integrity Key:
Step B1: terminal sends channel measurement signal respectively in private key negotiated channel with base station, extracts special close
The characteristic parameter of key negotiated channel.Wherein, terminal and base station can use the mode of time-division to send measurement signal respectively, and measure
The targeting sequencing that signal behavior is identical；And terminal and base station receive the survey of the other side respectively in private key negotiated channel
Amount signal, in order to estimate channel characteristics parameter (amplitude, phase place etc.), by the reciprocity in short-term of TDD, it is believed that both sides are in the time
The channel magnitude response recorded in the range of the permission of interval is reciprocity；
Step B2: after terminal extracts channel characteristics parameter with base station, respectively channel characteristics parameter is quantified, growing amount
Changing bit sequence, extracting rule that terminal is identical with base station agreement also considers applicable key length, respectively compares since quantization
Special sequence extracts key.Wherein, comprise the information such as channel response amplitude, phase place and signal to noise ratio due to channel characteristics parameter,
Can only extract a kind of parameter in being embodied as or the mixing of several parameter generates key, and quantizing rule choose end to be considered
The practical capacity of end, should not be excessively complicated, simple channel quantitative scheme；
Step B3: terminal and base station carry out consistency desired result to the key of each self-generating, identical to confirm that both sides generate
Key.
Further, as it is shown on figure 3, wherein in step B3, the key of each self-generating is carried out consistent with base station by terminal
Property verification concretely comprise the following steps:
Step B31: terminal generates random number R, and with through terminal key K produced by step B2AIt is encrypted, obtainsIt is then forwarded to base station, whereinRepresent key KAEncryption operator under existence condition；
Step B32: base station is with through base station key K produced by step B2BDecipher the value received, and it is carried out Hash
Operation, then uses KBIt is encrypted, obtainsAnd feed back to terminal again, whereinFor close
Key KBThe deciphering operator of base station end under existence condition, H is Hash operator；
Step B33: terminal KAThe information that deciphering receives, if result is H (R), then sends " affirmative " and confirms to base station
Signal, shows that both sides generate identical key；If result is not H (R), then sends " negating " confirmation signal, show both sides
Key inconsistent, and be back to step A2, redistribute private key negotiated channel.
Embodiment two: on the basis of embodiment one, above-mentioned mobile communication session privacy based on safety of physical layer increases
Strong method, wherein in step C, base station is according to available channel resources, the tenability of terminal and required mutual letter in network
The rate request of breath, the Dedicated Traffic Channel being suitable for for terminal distribution, the requirement bigger to meet follow-up mutual information data amount；
Terminal is after receiving Dedicated Traffic Channel distribution instruction, then release private key negotiated channel, enables Dedicated Traffic Channel.
In step D, terminal and base station use the cipher mode of lightweight to encrypt information, and the information choosing after encryption
Select coding and decoding and the rate-matched of adaptation, and interact on the Dedicated Traffic Channel enabled in step C.
Further, in step D, it is assumed that the clear text signal that terminal is to be sent is x, dedicated channel status matrix is HAB,
The terminal key that terminal generates is KA, then information y after base station receives encryptionBIt is represented by:
Wherein nABFor channel background noise,Represent key KAEncryption operator under existence condition；IfThe most whole process to information encryption can be equivalent to use double secret key Dedicated Traffic Channel HABEncrypted
Journey, the equivalent Traffic Channel after encryption is: H 'AB=HABKA, wherein H 'ABFor the Dedicated Traffic Channel of equivalence, therefore terminal and base station
Between formed equivalence physical isolation channel, User Identity information Dedicated Traffic Channel after encryption interacts.
In step E, terminal and base station measure Dedicated Traffic Channel within the designated time, extract channel characteristics parameter, raw
Become the new key consistent with old key parameter (such as length, quantification gradation etc.)；Further, terminal and base station sets time delay, with
Step changes new key, thus is encrypted the follow-up communication session carried out.Use the method, be because terminal necessary with base station
Real-time update key, causes base station cannot be continuously the key agreement channel that each terminal distribution is special due to resource-constrained,
Therefore, after release private key negotiated channel, terminal and base station with the change of periodic measurement Dedicated Traffic Channel, and can carry
Win the confidence characteristic parameter, generate new key, terminal and base station synchronization more new key after agreement intervals, thus ensure
The time-varying safety of key.
The present invention can bring the change as shown in Figure 4 of LTE protocol, is i.e. responsive to this section of mistake of RRC connection request in access
Encrypting in journey, it is ensured that the safety of follow-up dialog context, under this mechanism, the random access information of the simply terminal of leakage, will not reveal
Any sensitive information relevant to user identity.Although mobile communication session privacy mechanism and enhancement mechanism gesture based on safety of physical layer
Must bring postponing and certain computation complexity of turn-on time, but this process before being initially accessed service communication
Journey, has no effect on follow-up proper communication, is acceptable.
Described on end, by using above-mentioned encryption in physical layer technology, present invention characteristics of signals based on channel is made to add
Close, and unrelated with the particular content of channel, it is achieved thereby that transport layer encryption, access and this section of encrypted negotiation in terminal
Process, i.e. can start encryption before terminal submits identification information to, the most just solve user identity in signal aspect
The safe transmission problem of the sensitive informations such as mark, and will encrypt and channel bonding, set up physically-isolated communication pipe, prevent
The sensitive informations such as User Identity, type of service, registration type are revealed by plaintext transmission mode, and then effectively enhance shifting
Session privacy in the safety of dynamic communication system and mobile communication process, has the strongest practical value.
Above in conjunction with accompanying drawing, the preferred embodiments of the disclosure and embodiment are explained in detail, but the present invention
It is not limited to the above-described embodiment and examples, in the ken that those skilled in the art are possessed, it is also possible to do not taking off
On the premise of present inventive concept, various changes can be made.
Claims (7)
1. a mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer, it is characterised in that comprise the following steps:
Step A: terminal sends initial access request, and base station is terminal distribution private key negotiated channel, specifically includes following step
Rapid:
Step A1: according to broadcast parameter information, terminal obtains and carries out the physical layer resources of Stochastic accessing and corresponding code collection, then
Corresponding RACH sends initial random access request；
Step A2: RACH is detected by base station, if be detected that access request, feeds back access, and leads to
Crossing public access channel is terminal distribution private key negotiated channel；
Step A3: RACH is detected by terminal, if be detected that the instruction of private key negotiated channel, then special
Responding identical information on key agreement channel, signals base private key negotiated channel allocation completes, and is otherwise back to step A2；
Step B: base station and terminal extract the channel characteristics of this private key negotiated channel respectively, and utilize channel characteristics to generate one
Cause property key；
Step C: base station is terminal distribution Dedicated Traffic Channel, and discharge above-mentioned private key negotiated channel；
Step D: the communication session that terminal and base station use the double secret key generated in step B to carry out on Dedicated Traffic Channel enters
Row encryption；
Step E: terminal and base station periodic measurement and the channel characteristics of extraction Dedicated Traffic Channel, and utilize channel characteristics more Xinmi City
Key.
2. mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that:
In stepb, channel characteristics is extracted with terminal in base station, and generates concretely comprising the following steps of Integrity Key:
Step B1: terminal sends channel measurement signal respectively in private key negotiated channel with base station, extracts private key association
The characteristic parameter of business's channel；
Step B2: channel characteristics parameter is quantified by terminal and base station respectively, generating quantification bit sequence, terminal is with base station about
Determine extracting rule and key length, and each extraction key in quantization bit sequence；
Step B3: terminal and base station carry out consistency desired result to the key of each self-generating, identical close to confirm that both sides generate
Key.
3. mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer as claimed in claim 2, it is characterised in that:
In step B3, terminal and base station carry out concretely comprising the following steps of consistency desired result to the key of each self-generating:
Step B31: terminal generates random number R, and with through terminal key K produced by step B2AIt is encrypted, obtains EKA(R),
It is then forwarded to base station, wherein EKA(.) represents key KAEncryption operator under existence condition；
Step B32: base station is with through base station key K produced by step B2BDecipher the value received, and it carried out Hash operation,
Then K is usedBIt is encrypted, obtainsAnd feed back to terminal, wherein D againKB(.) is key KB
The deciphering operator of base station end under existence condition, H is Hash operator；
Step B33: terminal KAThe information that deciphering receives, if result is H (R), then sends " affirmative " confirmation signal to base station,
Show that both sides generate identical key；If result is not H (R), then sends " negating " confirmation signal, show the key of both sides
Inconsistent, and it is back to step A2, redistribute private key negotiated channel.
4. the mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer as according to any one of claim 1 to 2,
It is characterized in that: in step C, base station is according to available channel resources, the tenability of terminal and required mutual letter in network
The rate request of breath, the Dedicated Traffic Channel being suitable for for terminal distribution；Terminal is after receiving Dedicated Traffic Channel distribution instruction, then
Release private key negotiated channel, enables Dedicated Traffic Channel.
5. the mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer as according to any one of claim 1 to 2,
It is characterized in that: in step D, terminal and base station use the cipher mode of lightweight to encrypt information, and the letter after encryption
Breath selects to interact in the coding and decoding adapted to and rate-matched, and the Dedicated Traffic Channel enabled in step C.
6. mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer as claimed in claim 5, it is characterised in that:
In step D, it is assumed that the clear text signal that terminal is to be sent is x, dedicated channel status matrix is HAB, the terminal key of terminal generation
For KA, then information y after base station receives encryptionBIt is represented by:
yB=HABEKA(x)+nAB
Wherein nABFor channel background noise, EKA(.) represents key KAEncryption operator under existence condition；If EKA(x)=KAX, then
The whole process to information encryption can be equivalent to use double secret key Dedicated Traffic Channel HABCiphering process, the equivalence after encryption
Traffic Channel is HAB'=HABKA, wherein HAB' it is equivalent Dedicated Traffic Channel, therefore between terminal and base station, form the thing of equivalence
Reason isolation channel, User Identity information Dedicated Traffic Channel after encryption interacts.
7. mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer as claimed in claim 2, it is characterised in that:
In step E, terminal and base station measure Dedicated Traffic Channel within the designated time, extract channel parameter, generate and join with old key
The new key that number is consistent；Further, terminal and base station sets time delay, synchronize to change new key, thus to follow-up carry out logical
Letter session is encrypted.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201410215889.5A CN104010299B (en) | 2014-05-21 | 2014-05-21 | Mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201410215889.5A CN104010299B (en) | 2014-05-21 | 2014-05-21 | Mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN104010299A CN104010299A (en) | 2014-08-27 |
| CN104010299B true CN104010299B (en) | 2016-12-28 |
Family
ID=51370760
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201410215889.5A Active CN104010299B (en) | 2014-05-21 | 2014-05-21 | Mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN104010299B (en) |
Families Citing this family (15)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE102015220038A1 (en) * | 2015-05-22 | 2016-11-24 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | A method of creating a secret or key in a network |
| DE102015210537A1 (en) * | 2015-06-09 | 2016-12-15 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Method and device for generating a secret key |
| CN106604270B (en) * | 2016-12-05 | 2019-09-27 | 清华大学 | A kind of message encryption method of the information using radio physical layer |
| CN109660334A (en) * | 2017-10-11 | 2019-04-19 | 华为技术有限公司 | A kind of method and apparatus generating key |
| CN110769418B (en) * | 2018-07-26 | 2022-06-28 | 维沃移动通信有限公司 | Key updating method, terminal and network side equipment |
| CN108683462A (en) * | 2018-07-31 | 2018-10-19 | 深圳大学 | A kind of encryption method and system of free space optical communication data |
| CN109347628B (en) * | 2018-09-29 | 2019-07-26 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Lightweight dynamic security encryption method based on physical layer channel characteristics |
| CN111050321B (en) * | 2018-10-12 | 2023-05-16 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Data processing method, device and storage medium |
| CN110830396B (en) * | 2019-10-29 | 2021-05-28 | 西安交通大学 | Physical layer key-based IMSI privacy protection method and device |
| CN111010373B (en) * | 2019-11-21 | 2020-10-09 | 电子科技大学 | Privacy security coding method based on sink anchor |
| CN111294353B (en) * | 2020-02-04 | 2021-05-28 | 西安交通大学 | IMSI/SUPI physical layer key protection method without channel estimation |
| CN111556199B (en) * | 2020-04-26 | 2021-04-13 | 上海掌门科技有限公司 | Method and equipment for presenting background in social application |
| CN114339744A (en) * | 2020-10-10 | 2022-04-12 | 中移(成都)信息通信科技有限公司 | Communication method, device, equipment and storage medium |
| CN116095677A (en) * | 2021-11-08 | 2023-05-09 | ***通信有限公司研究院 | Wireless key generation method, device, equipment and storage medium |
| WO2023229730A1 (en) * | 2022-05-23 | 2023-11-30 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Positioning measurement based secret key sharing between network entities |
Citations (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101895878A (en) * | 2010-07-02 | 2010-11-24 | 武汉大学 | Dynamic password configuration based mobile communication method and system |
| WO2013000174A1 (en) * | 2011-06-30 | 2013-01-03 | 北京邮电大学 | Method for generating consistent cryptographic key based on wireless channel features |
| US8443194B2 (en) * | 2010-10-05 | 2013-05-14 | Brandenburgische Technische Universität Cottbus | Method of authentication and session key agreement for secure data transmission, a method for securely transmitting data, and an electronic data transmission system |
| CN103402200A (en) * | 2013-07-11 | 2013-11-20 | 北京邮电大学 | Secret key generation method based on wireless channel characteristics in frequency division duplex system |
-
2014
- 2014-05-21 CN CN201410215889.5A patent/CN104010299B/en active Active
Patent Citations (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101895878A (en) * | 2010-07-02 | 2010-11-24 | 武汉大学 | Dynamic password configuration based mobile communication method and system |
| US8443194B2 (en) * | 2010-10-05 | 2013-05-14 | Brandenburgische Technische Universität Cottbus | Method of authentication and session key agreement for secure data transmission, a method for securely transmitting data, and an electronic data transmission system |
| WO2013000174A1 (en) * | 2011-06-30 | 2013-01-03 | 北京邮电大学 | Method for generating consistent cryptographic key based on wireless channel features |
| CN103402200A (en) * | 2013-07-11 | 2013-11-20 | 北京邮电大学 | Secret key generation method based on wireless channel characteristics in frequency division duplex system |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN104010299A (en) | 2014-08-27 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN104010299B (en) | Mobile communication session privacy Enhancement Method based on safety of physical layer | |
| US20240064003A1 (en) | Encryption Method, Decryption Method, and Related Apparatus | |
| CN102594555B (en) | Security protection method for data, entity on network side and communication terminal | |
| MX2019011218A (en) | Communication method and device. | |
| CN105516139B (en) | A kind of transmission method of network data, apparatus and system | |
| KR20160112895A (en) | Method and apparatus for performing secure bluetooth communication | |
| CN101742508A (en) | System and method for transmitting files between WAPI terminal and application server | |
| CN104581710B (en) | It is a kind of in the method and system of upper safe transmission LTE user IMSI of eating dishes without rice or wine | |
| CN104253801B (en) | Realize the methods, devices and systems of login authentication | |
| UA100939C2 (en) | Method and apparatus for transmission a message through a random access control channel in a wireless communication system | |
| CN102625300A (en) | Generation method and device for key | |
| CN101183938A (en) | Wireless network security transmission method, system and equipment | |
| CN103841547B (en) | A kind of downlink data transmission method, apparatus and system | |
| WO2017020206A1 (en) | Communication method and related device | |
| CN101164257A (en) | System and method for encryption processing in a mobile communication system | |
| CN109714291A (en) | A kind of data transmission method and device | |
| CN104579662B (en) | Mobile terminal authentication method and system based on WPKI and timestamp | |
| CN110234102B (en) | Communication method and apparatus | |
| CN104200154A (en) | Identity based installation package signing method and identity based installation package signing device | |
| CN103415010A (en) | D2D network authentication method and system | |
| CN106878322A (en) | A kind of encryption and decryption method of the fixed length ciphertext based on attribute and key | |
| CN109152046B (en) | Uplink resource configuration method and related equipment | |
| CN102624892B (en) | A kind of method preventing plug-in client simulation HTTP request | |
| CN104010310A (en) | Heterogeneous network unified authentication method based on physical layer safety | |
| CN103916839A (en) | Method and apparatus for releasing service information |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| C06 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| C10 | Entry into substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| C14 | Grant of patent or utility model | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant |