CN103916393A - Cloud data privacy protection public auditing method based on symmetric keys - Google Patents
Cloud data privacy protection public auditing method based on symmetric keys Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN103916393A CN103916393A CN201410126881.1A CN201410126881A CN103916393A CN 103916393 A CN103916393 A CN 103916393A CN 201410126881 A CN201410126881 A CN 201410126881A CN 103916393 A CN103916393 A CN 103916393A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- data
- audit
- cloud
- party
- signature
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
Landscapes
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a cloud data privacy protection public auditing method based on symmetric keys and belongs to the technical field of cloud computing safety. The method comprises the steps of (1) key generation, (2) signature computing and (3) proving. In the key generation step, a data owner generates four private keys randomly, two private key pairs are formed, one private key pair is shared by the data owner and a cloud server, and the other private key pair is shared by the data owner and a third-party auditor; in the signature computing step, the data owner inputs the private keys and data blocks, signature computing is conducted on each data block and indexes of the data block, and signatures are sent to the cloud server; in the proving step, after the cloud server receives the indexes of the data blocks and challenges generated by the third-party auditor randomly from the third-party auditor, data integrity evidence is obtained through computing and sent to the third-party auditor, and the third-party auditor conducts verification. By means of the cloud data privacy protection public auditing method based on the symmetric keys, computing and storing expenses are reduced, and public auditing and privacy protection can be provided.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to cloud computing safe practice field, be specifically related to a kind of public's auditing method of the secret protection based on symmetric key for cloud data.
Background technology
Cloud computing is a kind of new memory module, and data owner (DO) is outsourced to Cloud Server (CS) by data and alleviates storage burden, visits them by geographical position independently.But outsourcing data have caused the safety problem of data integrity, data owner's concern of data can be lost or change.Traditional data integrity verification method is data owner's downloading data, checked for integrity.But this will cause the high communication overhead of network, and data owner's high computing cost.
For addressing this problem, public's audit is a better selection, and third party's audit (TPA) has replaced data owner to carry out verification of data integrity by a kind of easy method, and data owner does not participate in public's audit phase.By this method, communication overhead and computing cost have all been reduced.And by Audit Report, data owner can check loss of data and distort before visit data, thereby assess the risk of the cloud data server that they subscribe separately.
Under the framework of public's audit, a series of schemes have been designed to different security performances, and such as dynamic data operation is supported, secret protection, audits etc. in batches.But they are the schemes based on PKI, expense can be very large.The existing audit program based on symmetric key cannot provide the public to audit and the security performance of secret protection simultaneously.
Summary of the invention
For the existing defect of existing cloud data storage public's audit program; technical problem to be solved by this invention is to provide a kind of cloud data-privacy protection public auditing method based on symmetric key; to improve the efficiency of public's audit program, and gather around the fail safe that symmetric key provides.
In order to solve the problems of the technologies described above, the present invention adopts following technical scheme:
Cloud data-privacy protection public auditing method based on symmetric key, said method comprising the steps of:
(1) generate the key stage: generate at random four private keys by data owner (DO), form two pairs of private keys pair, share wherein a pair of private key pair by data owner (DO) and Cloud Server (CS), data owner (DO) and third party's audit (TPA) are shared another to private key pair;
(2) the compute signature stage: data owner (DO), using private key and data block as input, for each data block and index calculation signature thereof, sends to Cloud Server (CS) by signature;
(3) prove the stage: Cloud Server (CS) is from third party's audit (TPA) receives the index and the random challenge generating of third party's audit (TPA) of data block, calculating data integrity proves, data integrity is proved to send to third party to audit (TPA), verified by third party's audit (TPA).
In preferred version, in described step (3), Cloud Server (CS), in the time of calculated data integrity certification, generates first at random an element in elliptic curve group, then is proven according to shared cipher key calculation.
The method of the invention provides can both have been saved computing and storage overhead, supports again secret protection and public audit, and it can enjoy with respect to prior art the efficiency that security performance that the scheme based on PKI provides and the scheme based on symmetric key provide simultaneously.
This method is to improving the public audit technology of cloud data, so promote Chinese cloud data service development and prosperity internet economy significant.
Brief description of the drawings
Further illustrate the present invention below in conjunction with the drawings and specific embodiments.
Fig. 1 shares schematic diagram for the invention provides key in method;
Fig. 2 is the mutual schematic diagram that the invention provides Qualify Phase DO, CS, TPA in method.
Embodiment
For technological means, creation characteristic that the present invention is realized, reach object and effect is easy to understand, below in conjunction with concrete diagram, further set forth the present invention.
Cross Cheng Qian in the scheme specific implementation of providing and first explain four definition:
(1) four entities in scheme: data owner DO, Cloud Server CS, third party audit TPA and user.DO has one group of data block M, is each data block m
i∈ M generates signature sigma
i, one group of signature sigma
irepresented by Φ; The major function of CS is to be responsible for Content Management, storage data block M and signature Φ, and it is upper that all data messages relevant to service content are all stored in CS, and allow client download or content information is upgraded; When receiving user data audit request, TPA submits request to cloud service business, and the related data information returned of the cloud service business that audits, rear line return data integrality auditing result; User just uses the Audit Report from TPA, in scheme, will not mention.
(2) definition of data block: the file of supposing DO is divided into a lot of piece Z
p(Z
pthe integer set that representative comprises p element, p is a large prime number);
(3) definition of data block index: to each data block m
i∈ M, the present invention defines respective meta-data, i.e. the index meta of data block
i=(name|i), the information of the unique defined file of name;
(4) definition in elliptic curve: Qualify Phase has adopted elliptic curve cryptography, p represents the size of finite field, G is illustrated in defined elliptic curve in finite field.
The present invention is based on the public that symmetric key has a secret protection to cloud data while auditing, mainly comprise three phases: (1) generates key stage; (2) the compute signature stage; (3) Qualify Phase.
Generating the key stage, DO generates four private key cc at random
1, α
2, β
1, β
2∈ integer set Z
p, be divided into two pairs of private keys to (α
1, β
1) and (α
2, β
2), share α by DO and CS
1, α
2, β
1, β
2∈, DO and TPA share (α
2, β
2) (as shown in Figure 1).
In the compute signature stage, to each data block (m
i∈ M) DO private key to (α
1, β
1), (α
2, β
2) and data block respective index meta
ias input, by HASH function compute signature σ
i, and signature is issued to CS.
At Qualify Phase, (Φ is by a series of signature sigma for the signature Φ that CS reception DO sends
icomposition) and the data Q(Q that sends of TPA comprise the index meta of data block
iwith the random challenge c generating of TPA
i∈ Z
p), CS generates u ∈ G at random, and by u, the private key (α enjoying
1, β
1), data signature σ
iand the data Q calculated data integrity certification { μ, σ } sent of TPA; TPA receive the integrity certification that CS sends μ, σ verify after u}, and checking σ with by μ, u, the private key (α that TPA enjoys
2, β
2), challenge c
i, data block index meta
iwhether calculate result and equate, when equal, the integrity certification of CS is correct, otherwise mistake.
Public's audit program of formation, in the time of operation, proves when CS provides correct data integrity thus, and audit algorithm will necessarily return to correct TRUE; When CS loses or altered data piece, when wrong integrity certification is provided, audit algorithm returns to FALSE, and the probability that returns to TRUE is very little, has realized public's audit aim.
Meanwhile, the data block m of DO
ito can not reveal to TPA, realize secret protection target.
Moreover, by moving this scheme at OPENSTACK platform, can prove that, in the time operating, computing cost, communication overhead and the storage overhead of scheme provided by the invention are all less than other schemes on mass data piece.
For ease of the understanding to the present invention program, will be specifically described the solution of the present invention by an example below.
The present embodiment comprises equally the key stage that generates, generates signature stage and Qualify Phase three phases.
First generate the key stage, the object in this stage is: generated data owner DO, Cloud Server CS and the 3rd auditing party TPA key separately, prepare for calculating below, and comprise the following steps:
Step 100, DO generates four private keys.In this step, using security parameter as input, DO generates four private key cc at random
1, α
2, β
1, β
2∈ Z
p.
Step 101, distributes corresponding shared key.In this step, distribute private key, share pair of secret keys (α by DO and CS
1, β
1), DO and TPA share another pair of secret keys (α
2, β
2).
Then generate the signature stage, this stage object is: be each data block and index generation signature thereof, and issue CS.Comprise the following steps:
Step 102, DO is each data block and index calculation signature sigma thereof
i.In this step, DO is specifically according to shared key α
1, α
2, β
1, β
2∈ Z
p, each data block m
i∈ M and index meta thereof
i, with HASH function compute signature, each data block m
ithe signature sigma of ∈ M
icomposition Φ.
Step 103, the signature Φ calculating is sent to CS by DO.
Finally define Qualify Phase, this stage object is: after CS calculated data integrity certification, send to TPA, and whether correct by the proof of TPA checking CS.Comprise the following steps (as shown in Figure 2):
Step 104, CS accepts index and the random challenge generating of TPA of data block from TPA.Concrete, in this step, CS receives Q={ (meta from TPA
i, c
i) (meta
im
iindex, c
i∈ Z
pthe random challenge generating of TPA).
Step 105, CS calculated data integrity certification also sends to TPA.Concrete, CS generates an element u ∈ G in elliptic curve group at random, according to shared key (α
1, β
1), calculate and prove P={ μ, σ.P comprises two parts μ and σ, and μ ∈ G is by u, c
i, m
iand finite field size, mould p calculates with power, and σ ∈ G is by u, c
i, m
i, meta
i, σ
i, (α
1, β
1) and p calculate with power, wherein data signature σ
i∈ Φ obtains from DO, { (meta
i, c
i)=Q obtains from TPA, (α
1, β
1) be the private key that CS enjoys.After calculating completes, { u, μ, σ } sent to TPA by CS.
Step 106, TPA receive integrity certification μ, σ, after u}, checking σ with by μ, u, (α
2, β
2), ci, meta
i, whether p calculates result and equates, wherein (α
2, β
2) be the private key that TPA enjoys, equal return to TRUE, otherwise return to FALSE.
In the implementation procedure of this example; the hypothesize attack TPA that can disguise oneself as, object is the data block that is obtained DO by integrity certification P, exists effectively the prophesy model can attack algorithm; can prove out that by simulator output procedure this is infeasible so, therefore can carry out secret protection.
Suppose to exist and attack the CS that can disguise oneself as, target is the former data block of amendment and generates new proof P'(P' ≠ P) make to pass through algorithm, can prove that the data block as attacker is different with former data block, corresponding signature is also just different, attacker's puppet produce meet algorithm signature sigma ' possibility very little, therefore can realize public's performance of auditing.
More than show and described general principle of the present invention, principal character and advantage of the present invention.The technical staff of the industry should understand; the present invention is not restricted to the described embodiments; that in above-described embodiment and specification, describes just illustrates principle of the present invention; without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention; the present invention also has various changes and modifications, and these changes and improvements all fall in the claimed scope of the invention.The claimed scope of the present invention is defined by appending claims and equivalent thereof.
Claims (2)
1. the protection of the cloud data-privacy based on symmetric key public auditing method, is characterized in that, said method comprising the steps of:
(1) generate the key stage: by four private keys of the random generation of data owner, form two pairs of private keys pair, share wherein a pair of private key pair by data owner and Cloud Server, data owner and third party audit and share another to private key pair;
(2) the compute signature stage: data owner, using private key and data block as input, for each data block and index calculation signature thereof, sends to Cloud Server by signature;
(3) prove the stage: index and third party that Cloud Server receives data block from third party's audit audit the random challenge generating, calculating data integrity proves, data integrity is proved to send to third party to audit, verified by third party's audit.
2. the cloud data-privacy protection public auditing method based on symmetric key according to claim 1; it is characterized in that; in described step (3), Cloud Server is in the time of calculated data integrity certification; first generate at random an element in elliptic curve group, then be proven according to shared cipher key calculation.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201410126881.1A CN103916393B (en) | 2014-03-31 | 2014-03-31 | Cloud data-privacy protection public's auditing method based on symmetric key |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201410126881.1A CN103916393B (en) | 2014-03-31 | 2014-03-31 | Cloud data-privacy protection public's auditing method based on symmetric key |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN103916393A true CN103916393A (en) | 2014-07-09 |
| CN103916393B CN103916393B (en) | 2017-04-05 |
Family
ID=51041800
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201410126881.1A Active CN103916393B (en) | 2014-03-31 | 2014-03-31 | Cloud data-privacy protection public's auditing method based on symmetric key |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN103916393B (en) |
Cited By (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN104601586A (en) * | 2015-01-29 | 2015-05-06 | 西安电子科技大学 | Publicly verifiable outsourcing statistical method |
| CN104993937A (en) * | 2015-07-07 | 2015-10-21 | 电子科技大学 | Method for testing integrity of cloud storage data |
| CN105491006A (en) * | 2015-11-13 | 2016-04-13 | 河南师范大学 | Device and method for sharing cloud outsourcing key |
| CN105515778A (en) * | 2015-12-25 | 2016-04-20 | 河南城建学院 | Cloud storage data integrity service signature method |
| CN106790303A (en) * | 2017-03-23 | 2017-05-31 | 西安电子科技大学 | The data integrity verification method completed by third party in cloud storage |
| CN113190875A (en) * | 2020-11-12 | 2021-07-30 | 国网江苏省电力有限公司苏州供电分公司 | Public auditing method capable of sharing private data in energy-oriented internet environment |
Citations (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20120116782A1 (en) * | 2010-11-10 | 2012-05-10 | Software Ag | Security systems and/or methods for cloud computing environments |
| CN102611749A (en) * | 2012-01-12 | 2012-07-25 | 电子科技大学 | Cloud-storage data safety auditing method |
| CN103067374A (en) * | 2012-12-26 | 2013-04-24 | 电子科技大学 | Data safety audit method based on identification |
| CN103227780A (en) * | 2013-03-28 | 2013-07-31 | 东南大学 | Method for designing public auditable storage verifiable scheme for cloud data |
| CN103227783A (en) * | 2013-04-01 | 2013-07-31 | 东南大学 | Effective multi-writer model public auditing method for safety of cloud data |
| CN103347085A (en) * | 2013-07-12 | 2013-10-09 | 东南大学 | Public auditing designing method of multiple writing models of cloud data security |
| CN103501352A (en) * | 2013-10-22 | 2014-01-08 | 北京航空航天大学 | Cloud storage data security auditing method allowing group-user identity revocation |
-
2014
- 2014-03-31 CN CN201410126881.1A patent/CN103916393B/en active Active
Patent Citations (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20120116782A1 (en) * | 2010-11-10 | 2012-05-10 | Software Ag | Security systems and/or methods for cloud computing environments |
| CN102611749A (en) * | 2012-01-12 | 2012-07-25 | 电子科技大学 | Cloud-storage data safety auditing method |
| CN103067374A (en) * | 2012-12-26 | 2013-04-24 | 电子科技大学 | Data safety audit method based on identification |
| CN103227780A (en) * | 2013-03-28 | 2013-07-31 | 东南大学 | Method for designing public auditable storage verifiable scheme for cloud data |
| CN103227783A (en) * | 2013-04-01 | 2013-07-31 | 东南大学 | Effective multi-writer model public auditing method for safety of cloud data |
| CN103347085A (en) * | 2013-07-12 | 2013-10-09 | 东南大学 | Public auditing designing method of multiple writing models of cloud data security |
| CN103501352A (en) * | 2013-10-22 | 2014-01-08 | 北京航空航天大学 | Cloud storage data security auditing method allowing group-user identity revocation |
Cited By (11)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN104601586A (en) * | 2015-01-29 | 2015-05-06 | 西安电子科技大学 | Publicly verifiable outsourcing statistical method |
| CN104601586B (en) * | 2015-01-29 | 2017-12-19 | 西安电子科技大学 | The outsourcing statistical method that a kind of disclosure can verify that |
| CN104993937A (en) * | 2015-07-07 | 2015-10-21 | 电子科技大学 | Method for testing integrity of cloud storage data |
| CN104993937B (en) * | 2015-07-07 | 2018-12-11 | 电子科技大学 | A kind of method of inspection for cloud storage data integrity |
| CN105491006A (en) * | 2015-11-13 | 2016-04-13 | 河南师范大学 | Device and method for sharing cloud outsourcing key |
| CN105491006B (en) * | 2015-11-13 | 2018-11-13 | 河南师范大学 | Cloud outsourcing key sharing means and method |
| CN105515778A (en) * | 2015-12-25 | 2016-04-20 | 河南城建学院 | Cloud storage data integrity service signature method |
| CN105515778B (en) * | 2015-12-25 | 2018-10-16 | 河南城建学院 | Cloud storage data integrity services signatures method |
| CN106790303A (en) * | 2017-03-23 | 2017-05-31 | 西安电子科技大学 | The data integrity verification method completed by third party in cloud storage |
| CN113190875A (en) * | 2020-11-12 | 2021-07-30 | 国网江苏省电力有限公司苏州供电分公司 | Public auditing method capable of sharing private data in energy-oriented internet environment |
| CN113190875B (en) * | 2020-11-12 | 2022-06-24 | 国网江苏省电力有限公司苏州供电分公司 | Public auditing method capable of sharing private data in energy Internet environment |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN103916393B (en) | 2017-04-05 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN104811300B (en) | The key updating method of cloud storage and the implementation method of cloud data accountability system | |
| CN109508552B (en) | Privacy protection method of distributed cloud storage system | |
| CN103501352B (en) | A kind of cloud storage data method for auditing safely allowing group user identity to cancel | |
| CN102611749B (en) | Cloud-storage data safety auditing method | |
| Feng et al. | An efficient privacy-preserving authentication model based on blockchain for VANETs | |
| CN103916393A (en) | Cloud data privacy protection public auditing method based on symmetric keys | |
| CN103888262B (en) | Secret key changing and signature updating method for cloud data audit | |
| CN105721158A (en) | Cloud safety privacy and integrity protection method and cloud safety privacy and integrity protection system | |
| CN104978239A (en) | Method, device and system for realizing multi-backup-data dynamic updating | |
| CN103986732A (en) | Cloud storage data auditing method for preventing secret key from being revealed | |
| Luo et al. | An effective integrity verification scheme of cloud data based on BLS signature | |
| Tian et al. | Enabling public auditability for operation behaviors in cloud storage | |
| CN103227780A (en) | Method for designing public auditable storage verifiable scheme for cloud data | |
| CN104901804A (en) | User autonomy-based identity authentication implementation method | |
| CN106790311A (en) | Cloud Server stores integrality detection method and system | |
| Liu et al. | Offline/online attribute‐based encryption with verifiable outsourced decryption | |
| He et al. | Provable data integrity of cloud storage service with enhanced security in the internet of things | |
| CN114124371A (en) | Certificateless public key searchable encryption method meeting MTP (Multi-time programmable) security | |
| CN104899525A (en) | Cloud data integrity proving scheme with improved dynamic operations | |
| Zhan et al. | Cryptanalysis of a certificateless aggregate signature scheme for healthcare wireless sensor network | |
| CN112765570B (en) | Identity-based provable data holding method supporting data transfer | |
| Qiao et al. | An Anonymous and Efficient Certificate-Based Identity Authentication Protocol for VANET | |
| Feng et al. | A new public remote integrity checking scheme with user privacy | |
| CN115174037B (en) | Construction method and device of chameleon hash function based on SM9 signature | |
| CN107070869A (en) | Anonymous authentication method based on secure hardware |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| C06 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| C10 | Entry into substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant |