CN103716322B - Secret key download method, management method, download management method, secret key download device, secret key management device and secret key download management system - Google Patents
Secret key download method, management method, download management method, secret key download device, secret key management device and secret key download management system Download PDFInfo
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- CN103716322B CN103716322B CN201310743261.8A CN201310743261A CN103716322B CN 103716322 B CN103716322 B CN 103716322B CN 201310743261 A CN201310743261 A CN 201310743261A CN 103716322 B CN103716322 B CN 103716322B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0807—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using tickets, e.g. Kerberos
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
- H04L9/0833—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key
- H04L9/0836—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key using tree structure or hierarchical structure
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
- H04L9/3265—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate chains, trees or paths; Hierarchical trust model
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/24—Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/72—Signcrypting, i.e. digital signing and encrypting simultaneously
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- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a secret key download management method. The method includes the steps that an equipment side authenticates legality of an RKS by verifying a digital signature of a work certificate public key of the RKS; the RKS generates an AT, and after the AT is encrypted by using an equipment identity identification public key of the equipment side, a ciphertext is sent back to the equipment side; the equipment side utilizes an equipment identity identification private key of itself to decrypt the ciphertext, then encrypts the ciphertext by using the work certificate public key and sends the ciphertext back to a secret key server; the secret key server utilizes a work certificate private key of itself to decrypt the ciphertext, compares the decrypted AT and a generated AT and judges whether the decrypted AT and the generated AT are the same, if yes, it shows that a POS terminal of equipment is legal, and then bidirectional identity authentication is achieved.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to E-Payment field, particularly relate to the key downloading method of a kind of equipment end, manager
Method, downloading management method and device and system.
Background technology
Bank card (BANK Card) is more and more universal as the means of payment, common bank card paying system
Including point of sales terminal (Point Of Sale, POS), terminal management system (Terminal ManageSystem,
TMS), code keypad (PIN PAD) and hardware encryption equipment (Hardware and Security Module,
HSM).Wherein POS terminal can accept bank card information, has communication function, and accepts the finger of teller
Financial transaction information and the equipment exchanged for information about are made；TMS system carries out concentrate tube to POS terminal
Reason, downloads including parameter, and key is downloaded, and accepts, processes or forward the transaction request of POS terminal, and to
POS terminal loopback transaction results information, is the system of centralized management and trading processing；Code keypad (PIN
PAD) it is that the key that various financial transactions are relevant is carried out safe storage protection, and PIN is encrypted
The safety equipment of protection；Hardware encryption equipment (HSM) is the peripheral hardware devices being encrypted transmission data,
For the encryption of PIN and deciphering, checking message and the correctness of document source and storage key.Individual's mark
Know code (Personal Identification Number, PIN), i.e. personal identification number, be to identify in on-line transaction
The data message of holder's identity legitimacy, in cyber-net system, any link does not the most allow with bright
The mode of literary composition occurs；Terminal master key (Terminal Master Key, TMK), during POS terminal work,
The master key being encrypted working key, is saved in system hardware, can only use, it is impossible to read；POS
Terminal be widely used in bank card pay occasion, such as manufacturer's shopping, hotel accommodations etc., be one can not or
The modernization means of payment lacked, have incorporated the various occasions of people's life.Bank card, particularly debit card,
Typically all being provided with PIN by holder, in carrying out payment process, POS terminal is except above sending bank card
Outside the data such as magnetic track information, holder is also wanted to input the PIN identity legitimacy for issuing bank checking holder,
Guarantee bank card safety of payment, the property safety of protection holder.In order to prevent PIN from revealing or being cracked,
Require that, from terminal to issuing bank in whole information interactive process, whole process carries out safe encipherment protection to PIN,
Not in any link of computer network system, PIN occurs in the way of ciphertext, therefore accepts defeated at present
The POS terminal entering PIN is desirable that outfit key management system.
The key code system of POS terminal is divided into two grades: terminal master key (TMK) and working key (WK).
Wherein TMK is in WK renewal process, and WK is encrypted protection.Every POS terminal and TMS
Between share unique TMK, it is necessary to have safeguard protection, it is ensured that can only write device and participate in calculate, no
Can read；TMK is a root key the most crucial, if TMK is intercepted, working key just compares appearance
Yi Douhui is cracked, by serious threat bank card safety of payment.So TMK to POS can be downloaded safely
Terminal, becomes the key of whole POS terminal safety.Conclude existing TMK download scenarios below as follows:
1, scheme is manually entered in plain text: generated TMK in plain text by TMS, manual mode be directly inputted to
The code keypad of POS terminal.There are the biggest security breaches in this mode, operator easily intercept TMK
In plain text, and there is the probability manually entering mistake, and substantial amounts of equipment needs to input correspondence one by one
TMK, generally for improving safety, the TMK of every POS is the most different, management cost and workload
The most considerably complicated and huge.
2, IC-card ciphertext import plan: IC-card ciphertext imports.After TMK is generated by TMS, there is IC-card
In, and the TMK in IC-card cryptoguard IC-card is set by IC-card holder, when importing POS terminal,
After POS terminal code keypad input IC-card password, import to code keypad from IC-card.The program
Need inserted IC-card when TMS generates POS terminal by management personnel one by one and arrange IC-card sheet password.And
When POS terminal imports, still needing to manually enter IC-card password, IC-card sheet password is revealed and still can be led
Cause TMK leakage and there is also risk, and substantial amounts of POS uses this mode, its management cost and workload
The hugest.
3, local key mother's POS scheme: the current key paying industry downloads to use locally-downloaded mode more,
The master key downloading to financial POS terminal needs this locality just can carry out safe download, i.e. financial POS terminal
Need to be carried to the safe machine room of administrative center, and the key mother POS being positioned at safe machine room carry out physical connection,
And under the operation of manager, download master key from key mother POS, then financial POS cloth is put into deployment
Place, then carry out remote download working key by master key.
Above-mentioned three kinds of schemes all have the disadvantage that: equipment needs the safe machine room of administrative center, by manually
Concentrate and download key.Maintenance centre's machine room, workload is big；Equipment needs computing to pacify to administrative center after dispatching from the factory
Key downloaded by full machine room just can be deployed to trade company.Cost of transportation rises；Fill key to concentrate down, need big
The staff of amount and working time, maintenance cost is big, maintenance period is long.
Currently also there is a kind of remote cipher key download scenarios: program TMS is called encryption equipment and produced a pair public and private key,
POS terminal calls code keypad stochastic generation master key TMK, and after being encrypted with the PKI of TMS on
Pass to TMS, TMS call encryption equipment and store after private key deciphering TMK, close with TMK encrypted work
Key is downloaded to POS terminal.The program has the disadvantage that: TMS lacks identity and differentiates POS terminal, nothing
Method prevents pseudo-terminal from connecting TMS and downloads working key；POS terminal lacks the identity to TMS and differentiates, nothing
Method prevents pseudo-TMS backstage from downloading pseudo-working key.
Summary of the invention
For solving above-mentioned technical problem, the technical scheme that the present invention uses is:
A kind of key downloading method is provided, including: equipment end sends equipment Serial Number DSN and equipment identities mirror
Do not invite and ask to RKS server；Equipment end receives the work CertPubKey that RKS server sends
RKS_WCRT_PK and AT_TK1 ciphertext, described AT_TK1 ciphertext is differentiated PKI by equipment identities
DIK_PK encryption differentiates that token AT and first transmission key components TK1 obtains；Equipment end uses root public key card
The digital signature of book RKS_RCRT verification RKS_WCRT_PK is the most legal, if legal, then uses
Equipment identities differentiates that private key DIK_SK deciphering AT_TK1 ciphertext obtains AT and TK1 in plain text, described DIK_PK
It is unsymmetrical key pair with DIK_SK；Equipment end produces the 3rd random number as the second transmission key components
TK2, obtains TK1 and TK2 XOR transmitting cipher key T K, and the SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains
TK_SHA2；Equipment end uses RKS_WCRT_PK encryption AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 to obtain
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext is also sent to RKS server by AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext；If
Standby end receives the key ciphertext that RKS server sends, and described key ciphertext is needed the close of download by TK encryption
Key obtains；Equipment end uses TK decruption key ciphertext to obtain key plain, preserves key to security module；
Whether equipment end judges that key is downloaded and completes, if downloaded, removes AT, TK and RKS_WCRT_PK.
Another technical solution used in the present invention is:
A kind of key management method is provided, including: RKS server receives setting of at least one equipment end transmission
Standby serial number DSN and equipment identities differentiate request；RKS server reflects from equipment identities with DSN for index
Other database of public keys reads corresponding equipment identities and differentiates PKI DIK_PK；RKS server produces 24 bytes
One random number is as differentiating token AT, and produces the second random number as the first transmission key components TK1；RKS
Server uses DIK_PK encryption AT and TK1 to obtain AT_TK1 ciphertext；RKS server is by employee's card
Book PKI RKS_WCRT_PK and AT_TK1 ciphertext send to equipment end；RKS server receives equipment end
Send AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext, described AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext by
RKS_WCRT_PK encryption AT, the second transmission key components TK2 and TK_SHA2 obtain, described
TK_SHA2 is the SHA256 check value of transmission cipher key T K, and described TK is obtained by TK1 and TK2 XOR；
RKS server use work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK deciphering AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext obtains
To AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 in plain text, described RKS_WCRT_PK and RKS_WCRT_SK right and wrong
Symmetric key pair；RKS server judges that the AT received is the most equal with the AT of transmission, if equal, will
TK1 and TK2 XOR obtains TK, and the SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains TK_256；RKS services
It is the most equal with the TK_SHA2 received that device judges TK_256, if equal, uses TK encryption to need
The key downloaded obtains key ciphertext；Key ciphertext is sent to equipment end by RKS server；RKS server
Remove AT, TK, complete key and download flow process.
Another technical solution used in the present invention is:
A kind of key downloading management method is provided, including: equipment end sends equipment Serial Number DSN and equipment body
Part differentiates that request is to RKS server；RKS server differentiates PKI number for index from equipment identities with DSN
Read corresponding equipment identities according to storehouse and differentiate PKI DIK_PK；RKS server produces 24 byte the first randoms number
As differentiating token AT, and produce the second random number as the first transmission key components TK1；RKS server
DIK_PK encryption AT and TK1 is used to obtain AT_TK1 ciphertext；RKS server is by work CertPubKey
RKS_WCRT_PK and AT_TK1 ciphertext sends to equipment end；Equipment end uses root public key certificate
The digital signature of RKS_RCRT verification RKS_WCRT_PK is the most legal, if legal, then uses equipment
Identity differentiates that private key DIK_SK deciphering AT_TK1 ciphertext obtains AT and TK1 in plain text, described DIK_PK
It is unsymmetrical key pair with DIK_SK；Equipment end produces the 3rd random number as the second transmission key components
TK2, obtains TK1 and TK2 XOR transmitting cipher key T K, and the SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains
TK_SHA2；Equipment end uses RKS_WCRT_PK encryption AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 to obtain
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext is also sent to RKS server by AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext；RKS
Server use work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK deciphering AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext obtains
In plain text, described RKS_WCRT_PK and RKS_WCRT_SK is non-right for AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2
Claim double secret key；RKS server judges that the AT received is the most equal with the AT of transmission, if equal, will
TK1 and TK2 XOR obtains TK, and the SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains TK_256, it is judged that TK_256
The most equal with the TK_SHA2 received, if equal, use TK encryption to need the key downloaded to obtain
Key ciphertext is also sent to equipment end by key ciphertext；It is bright that equipment end uses TK decruption key ciphertext to obtain key
Literary composition, preserves key to security module；Whether equipment end judges that key is downloaded and completes, if downloaded,
Remove AT, TK and RKS_WCRT_PK；RKS server removes AT, TK, completes current-carrying under key
Journey.
Another technical solution used in the present invention is:
A kind of key download apparatus is provided, including: differentiate request transmitting unit, be used for sending equipment Serial Number
DSN and equipment identities differentiate that request is to RKS server；First receives unit, is used for receiving RKS service
Device send work CertPubKey RKS_WCRT_PK and AT_TK1 ciphertext, described AT_TK1 ciphertext by
Equipment identities differentiates that PKI DIK_PK encryption differentiates that token AT and first transmission key components TK1 obtains；
Server identity verification unit, is used for using root public key certificate RKS_RCRT to verify RKS_WCRT_PK
Digital signature the most legal；First decryption unit, for when the verification of server verification unit is legal, making
Differentiate that private key DIK_SK deciphering AT_TK1 ciphertext obtains AT and TK1 in plain text with equipment identities, described
DIK_PK and DIK_SK is unsymmetrical key pair；Second transmission key components signal generating unit, for generation the
Three randoms number are as the second transmission key components TK2；First transmission key arithmetic element, for by TK1 and
TK2 XOR obtains transmitting cipher key T K, and the SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains TK_SHA2；First adds
Close unit, is used for using RKS_WCRT_PK encryption AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 to obtain
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext；First transmitting element, for sending AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext
To RKS server；Second receives unit, for receiving the key ciphertext that RKS server sends, described close
Key ciphertext is needed the key downloaded to obtain by TK encryption；Second decryption unit, is used for using TK decruption key
Ciphertext obtains key plain；Key download unit, for preserving key to security module；First removes list
Whether unit, be used for judging that key is downloaded and complete, and remove when the download is completed AT, TK and
RKS_WCRT_PK。
Another technical solution used in the present invention is:
A kind of key management apparatus is provided, including: differentiate request reception unit, be used for receiving at least one and set
Equipment Serial Number DSN and equipment identities that standby end sends differentiate request；Equipment identities discriminating unit, for
From equipment identities, DSN differentiates that database of public keys reads corresponding equipment identities and differentiates PKI DIK_PK for index；
Differentiate token signal generating unit, for producing 24 byte the first randoms number as differentiating token AT；First transmission
Key generating unit, for producing the second random number as the first transmission key components TK1；Second encryption is single
Unit, is used for using DIK_PK encryption AT and TK1 to obtain AT_TK1 ciphertext；Second transmitting element, uses
In work CertPubKey RKS_WCRT_PK and AT_TK1 ciphertext are sent to equipment end；3rd receives list
Unit, for receiving the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext that equipment end sends, described AT_TK2_TK_SHA2
Ciphertext is encrypted AT by RKS_WCRT_PK, the second transmission key components TK2 and TK_SHA2 obtains,
Described TK_SHA2 is the SHA256 check value of transmission cipher key T K, and described TK is different by TK1 and TK2
Or obtain；3rd decryption unit, is used for using work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK to decipher
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext obtains AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 in plain text, described RKS_WCRT_PK
It is unsymmetrical key pair with RKS_WCRT_SK；Differentiate token verification unit, for judging the AT received
The most equal with the AT sent；Second transmission key arithmetic element, for when described discriminating token verification unit
When judging equal, TK1 and TK2 XOR obtaining TK, the SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains
TK_256；Transmission key verification unit, for judging the TK_256 that the second transmission key arithmetic element generates
The most equal with the TK_SHA2 received；3rd ciphering unit, for when described transmission key verification unit
When judging equal, TK encryption is used to need the key downloaded to obtain key ciphertext；3rd transmitting element, is used for
Key ciphertext is sent to equipment end；Second clearing cell, is used for removing AT, TK, completes current-carrying under key
Journey.
Another technical solution used in the present invention is:
A kind of key download management system is provided, connects including RKS server with described RKS server communication
At least one equipment end connect, described RKS server includes key management apparatus, described key management apparatus
As mentioned above；Described equipment end includes key download apparatus, and described key download apparatus is described above.
The key downloading method of the present invention, management method, downloading management method and device and system, it is achieved set
Standby end downloads master key from RKS Server remote, it is to avoid equipment end needs to concentrate could cloth after downloading master key
It is put into trade company, after equipment end is dispatched from the factory, directly can be put into deployment place by cloth, it is to avoid need to concentrate equipment end
After downloading key to certain fixing machine room, cloth is put into deployment place again.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is the structured flowchart of a kind of key download management system in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is the structured flowchart of a kind of key download apparatus in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 3 is the structured flowchart of a kind of key management apparatus in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 4 is the flow chart of a kind of key downloading method in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 5 is the flow chart of a kind of key management method in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 6 is the flow chart of a kind of key downloading management method in an embodiment of the present invention.
Main element symbol description
Equipment end 1；Key download apparatus 10；RKS server 3；Key management apparatus 30；
Differentiate request transmitting unit 11；First receives unit 12；Server identity verification unit 13；
First decryption unit 14；Second transmission key components signal generating unit 15；
First transmission key arithmetic element 16；First ciphering unit 17；First transmitting element 18；
Second receives unit 19；Second decryption unit 20；Key download unit 21；First clearing cell 22；
Differentiate request reception unit 31；Equipment identities discriminating unit 32；Differentiate token signal generating unit 33；
First transmission Key generating unit 34；Second ciphering unit 35；Second transmitting element 36；
3rd receives unit 37；3rd decryption unit 38；Differentiate token verification unit 39；
Second transmission key arithmetic element 40；Transmission key verification unit 41；
3rd ciphering unit 42；3rd transmitting element 43；Second clearing cell 44.
Detailed description of the invention
By describing the technology contents of the present invention, structural feature in detail, being realized purpose and effect, below in conjunction with
Embodiment also coordinates accompanying drawing to be explained in detail.
First, abbreviation and Key Term to the present invention relates to are defined and illustrate:
Symmetric key: send and receive the both sides of data identical double secret key must be used to be encrypted in plain text and
Deciphering computing.Symmetric key encryption algorithm specifically includes that DES, 3DES, IDEA, FEAL, BLOWFISH
Deng.
Unsymmetrical key: rivest, shamir, adelman two keys of needs: public-key cryptography (public key) and private
There is key (private key).Public-key cryptography and private cipher key are a pair, if entered data with public-key cryptography
Row encryption, only could decipher with corresponding private cipher key；If data are encrypted with private cipher key,
So only could decipher with corresponding public-key cryptography.Because encrypt use with deciphering two different close
Key, so this algorithm is called rivest, shamir, adelman.Rivest, shamir, adelman realizes confidential information exchange
Basic process is: Party A generates pair of secret keys and discloses one therein to other side as Public key；
The Party B obtaining this Public key uses this double secret key confidential information to be then forwarded to Party A after being encrypted；Party A
With another private key oneself preserved, the information after encryption is decrypted again.Party A can use Party B
PKI confidential information is encrypted after be then forwarded to Party B；Party B again with the private spoon of oneself to encryption after
Information is decrypted.Main algorithm has RSA, Elgamal, knapsack algorithm, Rabin, D-H, ECC (ellipse
Circular curve AES).
Digital signature: be the application of non-symetric key cryptography and digital digest technology.Digital signature technology
It is that the summary info private key of sender is encrypted, sends recipient together with original text to.Recipient only uses
The PKI sent could decipher encrypted summary info, then with the original text received produces a summary letter
Breath, with the summary info contrast of deciphering.If identical, then illustrate that the information received is complete, in transmission
During be not modified, otherwise descriptive information is modified, and therefore digital signature is able to verify that the complete of information
Whole property and legitimacy.Digital signature is a process for encryption, and digital signature authentication is a process for deciphering.
RSA: a kind of asymmetric key algorithm.RSA public key encryption algorithm be 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi
Shamirh and Len Adleman develops in (Massachusetts Institute Technology).RSA is named from developing them
The name of three.RSA is the most influential current public key encryption algorithm, and up to the present it can resist
Known all cryptographic attacks, are recommended as public key data encryption standard by ISO.RSA Algorithm is based on one ten
Divide simple number theory true: to be multiplied by two Big prime the easiest.RSA Algorithm is first and can use simultaneously
In the algorithm of encrypted and digitally signed, it is also easy to understand and operation.RSA is to be studied widest PKI
Algorithm, from three ten years proposed till now, experienced by the test of various attack, gradually accepts for people,
It is widely considered to be one of current classic public key scheme.
TDES Triple-DES:DES is a kind of symmetric encipherment algorithm, and key is 8 bytes.TDES is base
In the AES of DES, its key is 16 bytes or 24 bytes.TDES/3DES is English Triple
The abbreviated expression (i.e. triple DES) of DES, DES is then English Data Encryption Standard (number
According to encryption standard) abbreviated expression.DES is a kind of symmetric key encryption algorithm, i.e. data encryption key and deciphering
The AES that key is identical.DES is developed by IBM Corporation at 20 century 70s and discloses, and is subsequently
U.S. government uses, and is recognized by NBS and ANSI (ANSI).
TDES/3DES is a kind of pattern of des encryption algorithm, and it uses the data key of 3 64 to carry out
Tertiary infilling.It it is a safer deformation of DES.
Refer to Fig. 1, be the structured flowchart of a kind of key download management system in an embodiment of the present invention, should
Key download management system include RKS server 3 and with described RKS server 3 communication connection at least one
Individual equipment end 1, described RKS server 3 includes that key management apparatus 30, described equipment end 1 include key
Download apparatus 10, this equipment end 1 is POS terminal, and this RKS server 3 is remote cipher key server,
It is positioned at administrative center's machine room, is responsible for generation and the maintenance etc. of the keys such as POS terminal master key, working key,
This RKS server 3 includes key database, i.e. the master key data base of POS terminal or working key data
Storehouse, represents the TMK key database needed by remote download herein, and this key database is generally by one
Special encryption equipment carries out producing and storing key.
Refer to Fig. 2, be the structured flowchart of a kind of key download apparatus in an embodiment of the present invention.A kind of close
Key download apparatus 10 includes differentiating that request transmitting unit 11, first receives unit 12, server identity verification
Unit the 13, first decryption unit 14, second is transmitted key components signal generating unit 15, first and is transmitted key computing
Unit the 16, first ciphering unit the 17, first transmitting element 18, second receives unit 19, second and deciphers single
Unit 20, key download unit the 21, first clearing cell 22.
Described discriminating request transmitting unit 11 is used for sending equipment Serial Number DSN and equipment identities differentiates request
To RKS server, wherein, DSN and equipment end 1 one_to_one corresponding；First receives unit 12 is used for receiving
The work CertPubKey RKS_WCRT_PK of RKS server 3 transmission and AT_TK1 ciphertext, described
By equipment identities, AT_TK1 ciphertext differentiates that PKI DIK_PK encryption differentiates that token AT and first transmission key divides
Amount TK1 obtains, and wherein, RKS_WCRT_PK comprises the root private key certificate RKS_RCRT_SK number to it
Word is signed, it is ensured that RKS_WCRT_PK's is legal, has no idea to forge.Work certificate RKS_WCRT
Being a pair unsymmetrical key pair, if RSA key, minimum 2048 of figure place, work certificate RKS_WCRT
It is made up of work CertPubKey RKS_WCRT_PK and work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK,
RKS_WCRT needs to be saved in security medium, for example, it is possible to static storage conduct backup in IC-card,
It is then introduced in the secure storage medium of RKS server 3.
Server identity verification unit 13 is used for using root public key certificate RKS_RCRT_PK to verify
The digital signature of RKS_WCRT_PK is the most legal, and wherein, RKS_RCRT_PK dispatches from the factory in equipment end 1
Time prepackage in firmware, key server root certificate RKS_RCRT is a pair unsymmetrical key pair, if
RSA key, minimum 2048 of number, RKS_RCRT is by root public key certificate RKS_RCRT_PK and root
Private key certificate RKS_RCRT_SK forms, and RKS_RCRT_PK is for verifying the conjunction of RKS_WCRT_PK
Method.RKS_RCRT_SK is used for producing digital signature and signs to RKS_WCRT_PK.
RKS_RCRT needs to be stored in security medium, and root private key certificate RKS_RCRT_SK needs strict protection,
Can be saved in IC-card, be only used for work CertPubKey RKS_WCRT_PK is signed.
First decryption unit 14, for when server identity verification unit 13 verifies legal, uses equipment body
Part differentiates that private key DIK_SK deciphering AT_TK1 ciphertext obtains AT and TK1 in plain text, and equipment identities differentiates close
Key is a pair unsymmetrical key pair to DIK, is made up of DIK_PK and DIK_SK, and this double secret key can be by
Equipment end 1 internal random generates, or is imported to set by after the generation of external key maker in a secure environment
Standby end 1, DIK_PK, after equipment end 1 is dispatched from the factory, derives in equipment end 1 or generates from special key
Device is derived, and is stored in the equipment body of RKS server 3 with DSN for index and DSN one to one
Part differentiates in database of public keys, owing to DIK_PK is PKI, can be with plaintext transmission, and such as, pass through mail
Or other easily mode be transmitted.DIK_SK is saved in security medium by equipment end 1, equipment end
1 has attack protection mechanism, it is ensured that destroy DIK_SK after under attack immediately.Wherein, described DIK_PK and
DIK_SK is RSA, Elgamal, knapsack algorithm, Rabin, D-H, ECC (elliptic curve encryption algorithm)
Deng unsymmetrical key, in the present embodiment, described DIK_PK and DIK_SK is RSA key pair.
Second transmission key components signal generating unit 15 is for producing the 3rd random number as the second transmission key components
TK2；First transmission key arithmetic element 16 for obtaining transmitting cipher key T K, meter by TK1 and TK2 XOR
The SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains TK_SHA2；First ciphering unit 17 is used for using
RKS_WCRT_PK encryption AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 obtain AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext；The
One transmitting element 18 is for sending AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext to RKS server 3；Second receives
Unit 19 is for receiving the key ciphertext that RKS server 3 sends, and described key ciphertext is needed by TK encryption
The key downloaded obtains；Second decryption unit 20 is used for using TK decruption key ciphertext to obtain key plain；
Key download unit 21 is for preserving key to security module；First clearing cell 22 is used for judging key
Download and whether complete, and remove AT, TK and RKS_WCRT_PK when the download is completed.
Refer to Fig. 3, be the structured flowchart of a kind of key management apparatus in an embodiment of the present invention.A kind of
Key management apparatus 30 includes differentiating request reception unit 31, equipment identities discriminating unit 32, differentiating token
Signal generating unit the 33, first transmission Key generating unit the 34, second ciphering unit the 35, second transmitting element 36,
3rd receives unit the 37, the 3rd decryption unit 38, the 39, the second transmission key computing of discriminating token verification unit
Unit 40, transmission key verification unit the 41, the 3rd ciphering unit the 42, the 3rd transmitting element 43, second are clear
Except unit 44.
Differentiate that request reception unit 31 is for receiving the equipment Serial Number DSN that at least one equipment end 1 sends
Request is differentiated with equipment identities；Equipment identities discriminating unit 32 is for reflecting from equipment identities with DSN for index
Other database of public keys reads corresponding equipment identities and differentiates PKI DIK_PK；Differentiate that token signal generating unit 33 is used for
Produce 24 byte the first randoms number as differentiating token AT；First transmission Key generating unit 34 is used for producing
Second random number is as the first transmission key components TK1；Second ciphering unit 35 is used for using DIK_PK to add
Close AT and TK1 obtains AT_TK1 ciphertext；Second transmitting element 36 is for by work CertPubKey
RKS_WCRT_PK and AT_TK1 ciphertext sends to equipment end；3rd receives unit 37 is used for receiving equipment
End 1 transmission AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext, described AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext by
RKS_WCRT_PK encryption AT, the second transmission key components TK2 and TK_SHA2 obtain, described
TK_SHA2 is the SHA256 check value of transmission cipher key T K, and described TK is obtained by TK1 and TK2 XOR；
3rd decryption unit 38 is used for using work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK to decipher
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext obtains AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 in plain text, described RKS_WCRT_PK
It is unsymmetrical key pair with RKS_WCRT_SK；Differentiate that token verification unit 39 is for judging the AT received
The most equal with the AT sent；Second transmission key arithmetic element 40 is for when described discriminating token verification list
When unit 39 judges equal, TK1 and TK2 XOR obtaining TK, the SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains
To TK_256；Transmission key verification unit 41 is for judging what the second transmission key arithmetic element 40 generated
TK_256 is the most equal with the TK_SHA2 received；3rd ciphering unit 42 is for when described transmission key
When verification unit 41 judges equal, TK encryption is used to need the key downloaded to obtain key ciphertext；3rd
Send unit 43 for sending key ciphertext to equipment end 1；Second clearing cell 44 is used for removing AT, TK,
Complete key and download flow process.
Refer to Fig. 4, be the flow chart of a kind of key downloading method in an embodiment of the present invention.Under this key
Support method runs in described equipment end 1, and the method includes:
Step S101, equipment end send equipment Serial Number DSN and equipment identities differentiates that request services to RKS
Device；
Step S102, equipment end receive the work CertPubKey RKS_WCRT_PK that RKS server sends
With AT_TK1 ciphertext, by equipment identities, described AT_TK1 ciphertext differentiates that PKI DIK_PK encryption differentiates order
Board AT and first transmission key components TK1 obtains；
Step S103, equipment end use the number of root public key certificate RKS_RCRT verification RKS_WCRT_PK
Word signature is the most legal, if legal, then uses equipment identities to differentiate that private key DIK_SK deciphers AT_TK1
Ciphertext obtains AT and TK1 in plain text, and described DIK_PK and DIK_SK is unsymmetrical key pair；
Step S104, equipment end produce the 3rd random number as the second transmission key components TK2, by TK1 and
TK2 XOR obtains transmitting cipher key T K, and the SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains TK_SHA2；
Step S105, equipment end use RKS_WCRT_PK encryption AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 to obtain
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext is also sent to RKS server by AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext；
Step S106, equipment end receive the key ciphertext that RKS server sends, and described key ciphertext is by TK
Encryption needs the key downloaded to obtain；
Step S107, equipment end use TK decruption key ciphertext to obtain key plain, preserve key to peace
Full module；
Whether step S108, equipment end judge that key is downloaded and complete, if downloaded, remove AT, TK
And RKS_WCRT_PK.
Refer to Fig. 5, be the flow chart of a kind of key management method in an embodiment of the present invention.This key pipe
Reason method runs in described RKS server 3, and the method includes:
Step S201, RKS server receive the equipment Serial Number DSN of at least one equipment end transmission and set
Standby identity differentiates request；
From equipment identities, step S202, RKS server differentiate that database of public keys reads phase for index with DSN
The equipment identities answered differentiates PKI DIK_PK；
Step S203, RKS server produce 24 byte the first randoms number as differentiating token AT, and produce
Second random number is as the first transmission key components TK1；
Step S204, RKS server use DIK_PK encryption AT and TK1 to obtain AT_TK1 ciphertext；
Step S205, RKS server are by work CertPubKey RKS_WCRT_PK and AT_TK1 ciphertext
Send to equipment end；
Step S206, RKS server receive the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext that equipment end sends, described
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext is encrypted AT, the second transmission key components TK2 by RKS_WCRT_PK
Obtaining with TK_SHA2, described TK_SHA2 is the SHA256 check value of transmission cipher key T K, described TK
Obtained by TK1 and TK2 XOR；
Step S207, RKS server use work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK decipher
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext obtains AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 in plain text, described RKS_WCRT_PK
It is unsymmetrical key pair with RKS_WCRT_SK；
Step S208, RKS server judge that the AT received is the most equal with the AT of transmission, if equal,
TK1 and TK2 XOR obtains TK, and the SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains TK_256；
It is the most equal with the TK_SHA2 received that step S209, RKS server judge TK_256, as
The most equal, use TK encryption to need the key downloaded to obtain key ciphertext；
Key ciphertext is sent to equipment end by step S210, RKS server；
Step S211, RKS server remove AT, TK, complete key and download flow process.
Refer to Fig. 6, be the flow chart of a kind of key downloading management method in an embodiment of the present invention.This is close
Key downloading management method runs in described key download management system, and the method includes:
Step S301, equipment end send equipment Serial Number DSN and equipment identities differentiates that request services to RKS
Device；
From equipment identities, step S302, RKS server differentiate that database of public keys reads phase for index with DSN
The equipment identities answered differentiates PKI DIK_PK；
Step S303, RKS server produce 24 byte the first randoms number as differentiating token AT, and produce
Second random number is as the first transmission key components TK1；
Step S304, RKS server use DIK_PK encryption AT and TK1 to obtain AT_TK1 ciphertext；
Step S305, RKS server are by work CertPubKey RKS_WCRT_PK and AT_TK1 ciphertext
Send to equipment end；
Step S306, equipment end use the number of root public key certificate RKS_RCRT verification RKS_WCRT_PK
Word signature is the most legal, if legal, perform step S307, otherwise, performs step S311；
Step S307, equipment end use equipment identities to differentiate, and private key DIK_SK deciphering AT_TK1 ciphertext obtains
In plain text, described DIK_PK and DIK_SK is unsymmetrical key pair to AT and TK1；
Step S308, equipment end produce the 3rd random number as the second transmission key components TK2, by TK1 and
TK2 XOR obtains transmitting cipher key T K, and the SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains TK_SHA2；
Step S309, equipment end use RKS_WCRT_PK encryption AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 to obtain
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext；
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext is sent to RKS server by step S310, equipment end；
Step S311, discriminating RKS server failure, terminate to download flow process；
Step S312, RKS server use work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK decipher
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext obtains AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 in plain text, described RKS_WCRT_PK
It is unsymmetrical key pair with RKS_WCRT_SK；
Step S313, RKS server judge that the AT received is the most equal with the AT of transmission, if equal,
Perform step S314, otherwise, perform step S316；
TK1 and TK2 XOR is obtained TK by step S314, RKS server, calculates the SHA256 of TK
Check value obtains TK_256, it is judged that TK_256 is the most equal with the TK_SHA2 received, if equal,
Perform step S315, otherwise, perform step S316；
Step S315, the key using TK encryption needs to download obtain key ciphertext and key ciphertext are sent
To equipment end；
The failure of step S316, authentication equipment end, terminates to download flow process；
Step S317, equipment end use TK decruption key ciphertext to obtain key plain, preserve key to peace
Full module；
Whether step S318, equipment end judge that key is downloaded and complete, if downloaded, perform step S319,
Otherwise, step S301 is returned；
Step S319, equipment end remove AT, TK and RKS_WCRT_PK；
Step S320, RKS server remove AT, TK, complete key and download flow process.
The key downloading method of the present invention, management method, downloading management method and device and system, it is achieved set
Standby end downloads master key from RKS Server remote, it is to avoid equipment end needs to concentrate could cloth after downloading master key
It is put into trade company, after equipment end is dispatched from the factory, directly can be put into deployment place by cloth, it is to avoid need to concentrate equipment end
After downloading key to certain fixing machine room, cloth is put into deployment place again；
Unsymmetrical key management technique is utilized to realize two-way legal identity certification, it is ensured that RKS server and equipment
The legitimacy of end both sides' identity, equipment end is by the digital signature of the work CertPubKey of verification RKS server
Carrying out the legitimacy of certification RKS server, RKS server generates one and differentiates token AT, by equipment end
After equipment identities differentiates public key encryption, ciphertext returning to equipment end, equipment end differentiates private with its equipment identities
After key deciphering, then return to key server after recruitment deposition public key encryption, its work of key server
After certificate private key deciphering the discriminating token AT of the discriminating token AT of contrast deciphering again and generation whether as, one
Sample then represents that equipment POS terminal is legal, thus realizes bidirectional identity authentication；
Utilizing the symmetric key of stochastic generation to protect the key of download, the TMK of line transmission is interim by one
Transmission key encryption, transmission key is by POS terminal and key server each self-generating one-component, and uses
It is transferred to the other side after the public key encryption of the other side, it is achieved the synchronization of occasional transmission key, thus improves TMK transmission
Safety and efficiency.
The foregoing is only embodiments of the invention, not thereby limit the scope of the claims of the present invention, every profit
The equivalent structure made by description of the invention and accompanying drawing content or equivalence flow process conversion, or directly or indirectly transport
It is used in other relevant technical fields, is the most in like manner included in the scope of patent protection of the present invention.
Claims (6)
1. a key downloading method, it is characterised in that including:
Equipment end sends equipment Serial Number DSN and equipment identities differentiates that request is to RKS server；
Equipment end receives work CertPubKey RKS_WCRT_PK and AT_TK1 that RKS server sends
Ciphertext, by equipment identities, described AT_TK1 ciphertext differentiates that PKI DIK_PK encryption differentiates token AT and first
Transmission key components TK1 obtains；
Whether the digital signature of equipment end use root public key certificate RKS_RCRT verification RKS_WCRT_PK
Legal, if legal, then private key DIK_SK deciphering AT_TK1 ciphertext obtains AT to use equipment identities to differentiate
With TK1 in plain text, described DIK_PK and DIK_SK is unsymmetrical key pair；
Equipment end produces the 3rd random number and transmits key components TK2 as second, is obtained by TK1 and TK2 XOR
To transmission cipher key T K, the SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains TK_SHA2；
Equipment end uses RKS_WCRT_PK encryption AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 to obtain
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext is also sent to RKS server by AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext；
Equipment end receives the key ciphertext that RKS server sends, under described key ciphertext is needed by TK encryption
The key carried obtains；
Equipment end uses TK decruption key ciphertext to obtain key plain, preserves key to security module；
Equipment end judge key download whether complete, if downloaded, removing AT, TK and
RKS_WCRT_PK。
2. a key management method, it is characterised in that including:
RKS server receive at least one equipment end send equipment Serial Number DSN and equipment identities differentiate please
Ask；
From equipment identities, RKS server differentiates that database of public keys reads corresponding equipment identities for index with DSN
Differentiate PKI DIK_PK；
RKS server produces 24 byte the first randoms number as differentiating token AT, and produces the second random number
As the first transmission key components TK1；
RKS server uses DIK_PK encryption AT and TK1 to obtain AT_TK1 ciphertext；
Work CertPubKey RKS_WCRT_PK and AT_TK1 ciphertext are sent to equipment by RKS server
End；
RKS server receives the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext that equipment end sends, described
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext is encrypted AT, the second transmission key components TK2 by RKS_WCRT_PK
Obtaining with TK_SHA2, described TK_SHA2 is the SHA256 check value of transmission cipher key T K, described TK
Obtained by TK1 and TK2 XOR；
RKS server use work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK deciphering AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 is close
Literary composition obtains AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 in plain text, described RKS_WCRT_PK and RKS_WCRT_SK
It it is unsymmetrical key pair；
RKS server judges that the AT that receives is the most equal with the AT of transmission, if equal, by TK1 with
TK2 XOR obtains TK, and the SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains TK_256；
It is the most equal with the TK_SHA2 received that RKS server judges TK_256, if equal, uses
TK encryption needs the key downloaded to obtain key ciphertext；
Key ciphertext is sent to equipment end by RKS server；
RKS server removes AT, TK, completes key and downloads flow process.
3. a key downloading management method, it is characterised in that including:
Equipment end sends equipment Serial Number DSN and equipment identities differentiates that request is to RKS server；
From equipment identities, RKS server differentiates that database of public keys reads corresponding equipment identities for index with DSN
Differentiate PKI DIK_PK；
RKS server produces 24 byte the first randoms number as differentiating token AT, and produces the second random number
As the first transmission key components TK1；
RKS server uses DIK_PK encryption AT and TK1 to obtain AT_TK1 ciphertext；
Work CertPubKey RKS_WCRT_PK and AT_TK1 ciphertext are sent to equipment by RKS server
End；
Whether the digital signature of equipment end use root public key certificate RKS_RCRT verification RKS_WCRT_PK
Legal, if legal, then private key DIK_SK deciphering AT_TK1 ciphertext obtains AT to use equipment identities to differentiate
With TK1 in plain text, described DIK_PK and DIK_SK is unsymmetrical key pair；
Equipment end produces the 3rd random number and transmits key components TK2 as second, is obtained by TK1 and TK2 XOR
To transmission cipher key T K, the SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains TK_SHA2；
Equipment end uses RKS_WCRT_PK encryption AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 to obtain
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext is also sent to RKS server by AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext；
RKS server use work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK deciphering AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 is close
Literary composition obtains AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 in plain text, described RKS_WCRT_PK and RKS_WCRT_SK
It it is unsymmetrical key pair；
RKS server judges that the AT that receives is the most equal with the AT of transmission, if equal, by TK1 with
TK2 XOR obtains TK, and the SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains TK_256, it is judged that TK_256 with connect
The TK_SHA2 received is the most equal, if equal, uses TK encryption to need the key downloaded to obtain key
Key ciphertext is also sent to equipment end by ciphertext；
Equipment end uses TK decruption key ciphertext to obtain key plain, preserves key to security module；
Equipment end judge key download whether complete, if downloaded, removing AT, TK and
RKS_WCRT_PK；
RKS server removes AT, TK, completes key and downloads flow process.
4. a key download apparatus, it is characterised in that including:
Differentiate request transmitting unit, be used for sending equipment Serial Number DSN and equipment identities differentiates to ask to RKS
Server；
First receives unit, for receiving the work CertPubKey RKS_WCRT_PK that RKS server sends
With AT_TK1 ciphertext, by equipment identities, described AT_TK1 ciphertext differentiates that PKI DIK_PK encryption differentiates order
Board AT and first transmission key components TK1 obtains；
Server identity verification unit, is used for using root public key certificate RKS_RCRT to verify
The digital signature of RKS_WCRT_PK is the most legal；
First decryption unit, for when the verification of server verification unit is legal, using equipment identities to differentiate private
Key DIK_SK deciphering AT_TK1 ciphertext obtains AT and TK1 in plain text, described DIK_PK and DIK_SK
It it is unsymmetrical key pair；
Second transmission key components signal generating unit, for producing the 3rd random number as the second transmission key components
TK2；
First transmission key arithmetic element, for obtaining transmitting cipher key T K, calculating by TK1 and TK2 XOR
The SHA256 check value of TK obtains TK_SHA2；
First ciphering unit, is used for using RKS_WCRT_PK encryption AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 to obtain
To AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext；
First transmitting element, for sending AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext to RKS server；
Second receives unit, and for receiving the key ciphertext that RKS server sends, described key ciphertext is by TK
Encryption needs the key downloaded to obtain；
Second decryption unit, is used for using TK decruption key ciphertext to obtain key plain；
Key download unit, for preserving key to security module；
Whether the first clearing cell, be used for judging that key is downloaded and complete, and remove AT, TK when the download is completed
And RKS_WCRT_PK.
5. a key management apparatus, it is characterised in that including:
Differentiate request reception unit, for receiving the equipment Serial Number DSN of at least one equipment end transmission and setting
Standby identity differentiates request；
From equipment identities, equipment identities discriminating unit, for differentiating that database of public keys reads phase for index with DSN
The equipment identities answered differentiates PKI DIK_PK；
Differentiate token signal generating unit, for producing 24 byte the first randoms number as differentiating token AT；
First transmission Key generating unit, for producing the second random number as the first transmission key components TK1；
Second ciphering unit, is used for using DIK_PK encryption AT and TK1 to obtain AT_TK1 ciphertext；
Second transmitting element, for sending work CertPubKey RKS_WCRT_PK and AT_TK1 ciphertext
To equipment end；
3rd receives unit, for receiving the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext that equipment end sends, described
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext is encrypted AT, the second transmission key components TK2 by RKS_WCRT_PK
Obtaining with TK_SHA2, described TK_SHA2 is the SHA256 check value of transmission cipher key T K, described TK
Obtained by TK1 and TK2 XOR；
3rd decryption unit, is used for using work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK to decipher
AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext obtains AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 in plain text, described RKS_WCRT_PK
It is unsymmetrical key pair with RKS_WCRT_SK；
Differentiate token verification unit, the most equal with the AT of transmission for judging the AT received；
Second transmission key arithmetic element, for when described discriminating token verification unit judges equal, by TK1
Obtaining TK with TK2 XOR, the SHA256 check value calculating TK obtains TK_256；
Transmission key verification unit, for judging TK_256 and the reception of the second transmission key arithmetic element generation
The TK_SHA2 arrived is the most equal；
3rd ciphering unit, for when described transmission key verification unit judges equal, uses TK encryption to need
Key to be downloaded obtains key ciphertext；
3rd transmitting element, for sending key ciphertext to equipment end；
Second clearing cell, is used for removing AT, TK, completes key and downloads flow process.
6. a key download management system, connects including RKS server with described RKS server communication
At least one equipment end connect, it is characterised in that described RKS server includes key management apparatus, described
Key management apparatus is as described in right 5；Described equipment end includes key download apparatus, carries under described key
Put as claimed in claim 4.
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201310743261.8A CN103716322B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | Secret key download method, management method, download management method, secret key download device, secret key management device and secret key download management system |
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| CN2013100846716 | 2013-03-15 | ||
| CN201310084671.6 | 2013-03-15 | ||
| CN2013100846716A CN103220270A (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-03-15 | Downloading method, management method, downloading management method, downloading management device and downloading management system for secret key |
| CN201310743261.8A CN103716322B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | Secret key download method, management method, download management method, secret key download device, secret key management device and secret key download management system |
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| CN103716322A CN103716322A (en) | 2014-04-09 |
| CN103716322B true CN103716322B (en) | 2017-01-11 |
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| CN201310743261.8A Active CN103716322B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | Secret key download method, management method, download management method, secret key download device, secret key management device and secret key download management system |
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| GB201105765D0 (en) | 2011-04-05 | 2011-05-18 | Visa Europe Ltd | Payment system |
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Also Published As
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| CN103716322A (en) | 2014-04-09 |
| CN103220270A (en) | 2013-07-24 |
| US20160028548A1 (en) | 2016-01-28 |
| US9647845B2 (en) | 2017-05-09 |
| WO2014139344A1 (en) | 2014-09-18 |
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