CN103347021B - A kind of can the multiserver safety certifying method of memory cipher based on people - Google Patents
A kind of can the multiserver safety certifying method of memory cipher based on people Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of based on people can the multiserver safety certifying method of memory cipher, including registration, log in and authenticating step, registration center RC is according to received server SjLog-on message generate server SjSystem private key, registration center RC is according to received user UiLog-on message generate include cryptoguard parameter AiWith user's uniqueness parameter DiParameter group one, and user's uniqueness parameter D will be includediParameter group two write user UiSmart card；Smart card carries out local verification to user identity, if checking is correct, then smart card generates parameter group three and sends it to server Sj；Server SjJudge user UiThe real-time of log-on message and correctness, if correct judgment, then server SjGenerate parameter group four and send it to user Ui, smart card authentication server SjLegitimacy, if checking is correct, then server SjThe legitimacy of checking user identity, if by checking, then certification success.Technical scheme can resist off-line guessing attack and opposing user's impersonation attack.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of information security and communication, in particular to a multi-server security authentication method based on a human memory password.
Background
The multi-server environment means that a powerful online service provider can simultaneously provide various services in the background of rapid development of internet technology.
The human memorable password means that the password selected by the user can be memorized by people, and the selection of the password is generally related to the personal life of the user, such as birthday, telephone number, license plate number and the like. Therefore, the password selected by the user is not high in randomness, namely entropy, and is easy to be attacked by an attacker by using an offline dictionary or offline guess. This type of cipher was studied in a paper by Jonathan Katz and Rafail Ostrovsky.
Since their first proposal in 1991 for remote user authentication using smart cards and based on passwords, Chang and Wu have since proposed various types of methods, which, although used on a single server have been studied much, are not suitable for multiple servers because people do not remember too many passwords.
To solve the above problems, many multi-server authentication methods have been proposed. The multi-server authentication method needs high efficiency and high security, and many people put forward the method and find out the error by others soon, so many researches are needed in the multi-server authentication method based on dynamic identity. Of which the anonymity of the user is a particular one.
In 2010, Shao and Chin pointed out the disadvantages of the Hsiang-Shin method and proposed a multi-server authentication method based on dynamic identities that not only provides mutual authentication but also resists various attacks. Although their methods do work well and are better than those currently available.
In 2012, Wang and Ma et al performed security analysis on the method by Shao and chi, indicating that the method cannot resist off-line password guessing attacks, users mimic attacks, and the anonymity of users cannot be achieved.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a multi-server security authentication method based on a human memory password, which can resist off-line password guessing attack and resist user imitation attack.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a multi-server security authentication method based on human memory password comprises the steps of registration, login and authentication, wherein the registration step further comprises that a registration center RC receives a server SjGenerates the server SjThe registration center RC receives the user UiIncludes a password protection parameter AiAnd a user uniqueness parameter DiAnd will include the user uniqueness parameter DiWrite parameter set two into user UiThe smart card of (1); the logging step further comprises that the smart card is based on the user UiInput identity IDiAnd a password PiAnd the information in the smart card is locally verified, if soIf the verification is correct, the intelligent card generates a third parameter group and sends the third parameter group to the server Sj(ii) a The authentication step further comprises the server SjJudging the user U according to the private key and the parameter groupiThe real-time and correctness of the login information, if the judgment is correct, the server SjGenerating a parameter group four and sending the parameter group four to the user UiSaid smart card verifying said server SjIf the verification is correct, generating a user identity verification parameter and sending the user identity verification parameter to the server SjSaid server SjAnd verifying the validity of the user identity, and if the user identity passes the verification, the authentication is successful.
Further, the login step further comprises that the intelligent card is used for realizing the multi-server security authentication method based on the human memory password according to the CIDi=h(IDi||b)⊕h(Di⊕Ti||Ni) Generating dynamic identity CIDi。
Further, the login step further comprises the following step that the intelligent card generates a random number NiAnd also generates a key parameter yjVerification parameter GiComparing the parameter C; the parameter group III comprises a parameter comparison parameter C and a verification parameter GiAnd a random number Ni。
Further, a multi-server security authentication method based on human memory password is characterized in that the user U is provided with a password authentication unitiIn the step of registering with the registration center RC, the registration center RC registers the user U according to the user UiThe identity information, the password and the random number b sent by the used terminal generate the first parameter group, and the first parameter group also comprises a user identity protection parameter TiAnd local verification parameter ViAnd Hi(ii) a The second parameter group comprises a parameter Di、Ri、Vi、Hi、h(.)And b.
Further, a multi-server security authentication method based on human memory password, the authentication step further comprises the step that if the user U is in useiThe real-time property and correctness of the login information are judged to be correct, and then the server SjGenerating a random number NjAnd calculating server identity authentication parameters; the parameter group four comprises a random number NjAnd server authentication parameters.
Further, the multi-server security authentication method based on the human memory password further comprises the following steps that the intelligent card is used for authenticating the user U according to the user UiInput identity IDiAnd a password PiAfter local verification is completed, the password information of the user is replaced by the user UiNewly entered password。
Further, the multi-server security authentication method based on the human memory password further comprises the following steps that the server SjAfter the mutual authentication between the intelligent card and the intelligent card is successful, the same session key SK is generated, and the used formula is SK = h (CID)i||SIDj||Ni||Nj)。
The multi-server security authentication method based on the human memory password provided by the invention has the advantages that the password protection parameter A is added in the user registration stageiAnd a user unique parameter DiThis makes it impossible for the password to determine whether the guess is correct without guessing the comparison value, and thus it is possible to resist off-line password guessing attacks. In addition, the added user unique parameter DiSo that the attacker cannot obtain the parameter, and the method can resist the user simulation attack.
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FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the registration step in one embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of the login and authentication steps in an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention will be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.
In a multi-server environment, the security authentication method comprises three parties: user UiServer SjAnd a registry RC. Where the registry is considered trusted, it generates a system private key.
As an embodiment of the invention, a multi-server security authentication method based on human memory password comprises the steps of registration, login and authentication, wherein the step of registration further comprises that a registration center RC receives the server S according to the received passwordjRegistration information generation server SjThe registration center RC receives the user UiIncludes a password protection parameter AiAnd a user uniqueness parameter DiAnd will include a user-uniqueness parameter DiWrite parameter set two into user UiThe smart card of (1); the logging step further comprises the smart card logging in to the user UiInput identity IDiAnd a password PiAnd the information in the intelligent card is locally verified, if the verification is correct, the intelligent card generates a parameter set III and sends the parameter set III to the server Sj(ii) a The authentication step further comprises the server SjJudging the user U according to the private key and parameter groupiThe real-time and correctness of the login information, if the judgment is correct, the server SjGenerating a parameter group four and sending the parameter group four to a user UiSmart card verification server SjIf the verification is correct, generating a user identity verification parameter and sending the user identity verification parameter to the server SjServer SjAnd verifying the validity of the user identity, and if the user identity passes the verification, the authentication is successful. If the verification is not passed in the login stage and the verification included in the authentication step is not passed, the login needs to be re-logged in.
In the above embodiment, the password protection parameter a is added in the user registration stageiAnd a user unique parameter DiThis makes it impossible for the password to determine whether the guess is correct without guessing the comparison value, and thus it is possible to resist off-line password guessing attacks. In addition, the added user unique parameter DiSo that the attacker cannot obtain the parameter, and the method can resist the user simulation attack.
Further, as an embodiment of the present invention, the step of logging in further comprises the smart card logging in according to CIDi=h(IDi||b)⊕h(Di⊕Ti||Ni) Generating dynamic identity CIDi。
Further, as an embodiment of the present invention, the step of logging in further comprises the step of generating a random number N by the smart cardiAnd also generates a key parameter yjVerification parameter GiComparing the parameter C; the third parameter group comprises a parameter comparison parameter C and a verification parameter GiAnd a random number Ni. In this embodiment, the comparison parameter and the verification parameter are selected for local verification. Obtaining identity protection parameter T by calculating verification parameteriThen, whether the identity and the password input by the user are correct or not is judged by comparing the parameter C, the identity and the password can be verified together by adopting the verification parameter, and only the password is verified in other schemes. Using a random number NiIn order to prevent replay attacks.
Further, as an embodiment of the present invention, in the user UiIn the step of registering with the registration center RCRegister RC according to user UiIdentity information, a password and a random number b sent by a used terminal generate a first parameter group, and the first parameter group also comprises a user identity protection parameter TiAnd local verification parameter ViAnd Hi(ii) a The second parameter group comprises a parameter Di、Ri、Vi、HiH (.) and b.
Further, as an embodiment of the present invention, the step of authenticating further comprises, if the user U is a new user UiThe real-time property and correctness of the login information are judged to be correct, and then the server SjGenerating a random number NjAnd calculating server identity authentication parameters; the parameter group four comprises a random number NjAnd server authentication parameters.
As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 1, the registration phase specifically includes: server registration, server SjSelecting an identity SIDjIt is sent to the registration center RC via a secure channel, which calculates the server private key yj=h(h(y)||SIDj) Then y is transmitted through a secure channeljAnd returning to the server. User registration, user UiSelect own IDi、PiAnd a random number b, which is sent to the registration center RC through a secure channel, and the RC calculates an identity protection parameter Ti=h(IDiY), key protection parameter ai=h(PiB), identity and password merging parameter Di=Ti⊕AiKey protection parameter Ri=h(y)⊕h(Ti) Local verification parameter Vi=Ti⊕h(IDi||Pi) And Hi=h(TiB) and will { D | | b) }i，Ri，Vi，HiH (), b } are stored in the smart card and returned to the user U through the secure channeli. In the preferred embodiment, parameter set one includes Ti、Ai、Di、Ri、ViAnd HiThe second parameter set includes Di、Ri、Vi、HiH (.) and b.
For parameter set one, where TiThe identity of the user is protected, so that the identity can be prevented from being leaked or being guessed and attacked; a. theiThe password is protected, and the password is prevented from being leaked or guessed and attacked; diThe identity and the password are combined and then stored in the smart card, so that an attacker can be ensured not to obtain one of the identity and the password when knowing the other of the identity and the password, and the uniqueness of the card is ensured, because the probability of selecting the same identity and the same password is very low; riThe system private key is mainly protected, and only a user can deduce the system private key during login; viThe user identity and the password are combined, so that the user identity protection parameter T can be deduced only when the user inputs the correct identity and the password during local verificationiThen using the parameter HiComparing; h (y) is an irreversible operation, i.e. it is known that y can calculate h (y), otherwise it is impossible. For parameter set two, DiThe method is used for preventing unprotected identities and passwords from being stored in the smart card and preventing important information from being leaked after the smart card is lost; ri、Hi、b、ViOther information is an important intermediate parameter when performing local authentication and login.
The login stage specifically comprises the following steps: user UiFirst input its own IDiAnd PiThe intelligent card carries out self-verification, judges whether the user name and the password input by the user are correct or not, and selects a random number N after the user name and the password are correctiCalculating and verifying the user key parameter yj=h(Ri⊕h(Ti)||SIDj) Dynamic identity parameter CID to protect user anonymityi=h(IDi||b)⊕h(Di⊕Ti||Ni) Parameter G for protecting dynamic identityi=CIDi⊕h(yj||Ni) And a mutual authentication parameter one C = h (CID)i||Gi||Ni) Then { C, G }i,NiSending to the server Sj. In the preferred embodiment described above, parameter set three includes C, GiAnd Ni。
In the preferred embodiment described above, the smartcard calculates the dynamic identity CID during the login phaseiBy CIDi=h(IDi||b)⊕h(Di⊕Ti||Ni) User ID is protectediThe attacker cannot guess the user's IDiThus, the preferred embodiment has more effective anonymity.
As shown in fig. 2, the authentication phase specifically includes: after receiving the user login request information, the server uses the private key y of the serverjAnd a random number N in the request informationiFinding a dynamic identity CIDiThen, the comparison parameter C = h (CID) is calculated againi||Gi||Ni) Verifying whether the user identity is legal by comparing with C in the request information, and generating a random number N by the server after the verification is successfuljCalculating a mutual authentication parameter of two M1=h(CIDi||SIDj||Ni) Adding it to NjSending to the smart card, and calculating by the smart card
h(CIDi||SIDj||Ni) For judging whether the server is legal or not, and then calculating M2=h(CIDi||SIDj||Nj) And sends it to the server, which calculates h (CID)i||SIDj||Nj) And M2The comparison is used to judge the validity of the user again. And finally, the smart card and the server successfully authenticate each other, and both the smart card and the server generate a session key SK = h (CID)i||SIDj||Ni||Nj). In the above preferred embodiment, the parameter set four includes NjAnd server authentication parameters. And for the parameter group four, the server is shown to know the system private key through calculation, the server is proved to be a legal system member, and the random number is used for preventing an attacker from stealing the call and carrying out replay attack. The session key is unique to both the communication parties and must be the same to enable encryption and decryption, the session key uses a value known to both the communication parties, and the two random numbers are used to ensure that the session keys generated each time are different to prevent forward attackAnd the attacker can deduce the previous session key by obtaining the current session key, so that the previous communication information is cracked.
As another preferred embodiment of the present invention, the method further includes the step of changing the password: the user inserts his/her smart card into the card reader and inputs the IDi，Pi，Smart card passing through calculation Ti=Vi⊕h(IDi||Pi) Pass verification HiWhether or not it is equal to h (T)iB) to judge the correctness of the user name and the password, and after verification, the smart card calculates a new user name and the passwordAndand replaces the original value in the card. On the premise of not needing the participation of a registration center, the password is freely changed, so that the invention has good practicability.
The above description is only for the preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention; it is intended that the following claims be interpreted as including all such alterations, modifications, and equivalents as fall within the true spirit and scope of the invention.
Claims (4)
1. A multi-server security authentication method based on human memory password is characterized in that the method comprises the steps of registration, login and authentication, wherein,
the registering step further comprises that the registration center RC receives the server SjGenerates the server SjBased on the received user U, the registration center RC receives the user UiIncludes a password protection parameter AiAnd a user uniqueness parameter DiAnd will include the user uniqueness parameter DiWrite parameter set two into user UiThe smart card of (1);
wherein,Tiidentity protection parameter, T, generated for registry RC calculationsi＝h(IDi||y)，Ai＝h(Pi||b)，PiFor user UiInputting the password of the smart card, b is the user UiSelected random number, yjCalculating a private key of the server for the RC;
at the user UiIn the step of registering with the registration center RC, the first parameter group further includes a user identity protection parameter TiAnd local verification parameter ViAnd Hi(ii) a The second parameter group comprises a parameter Di、Ri、Vi、HiH (.) and b; wherein the key protection parameterLocal authentication parametersAnd Hi＝h(Ti||b)；
The logging step further comprises that the smart card is based on the user UiInput identity IDiAnd a password PiAnd the information in the intelligent card is locally verified, if the verification is correct, the intelligent card generates a third parameter group and sends the third parameter group to the server Sj；
The logging step further comprises the smart card according toGenerating dynamic identity CIDiWherein IDiFor user UiInputting the identity information of the smart card, NiA random number selected for the smart card; the smart card also generates a verification parameter GiComparing the parametersC; the third parameter group comprises a comparison parameter C and a verification parameter GiAnd a random number Ni(ii) a Wherein,C＝h(CIDi||Gi||Ni)；
the authentication step further comprises the server SjJudging the user U according to the private key and the parameter groupiThe real-time and correctness of the login information, if the judgment is correct, the server SjGenerating a parameter group four and sending the parameter group four to the user UiSaid smart card verifying said server SjIf the verification is correct, generating a user identity verification parameter and sending the user identity verification parameter to the server SjSaid server SjAnd verifying the validity of the user identity, and if the user identity passes the verification, the authentication is successful.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of authenticating further comprises authenticating the user U if the user U is authenticatediThe real-time property and correctness of the login information are judged to be correct, and then the server SjGenerating a random number NjAnd calculating server identity authentication parameters; the parameter group four comprises a random number NjAnd server authentication parameters.
3. The multi-server security authentication method based on human memory password as claimed in claim 1 or 2, further comprising the step of said smart card according to user UiInput identity IDiAnd a password PiAfter local verification is completed, the password information of the user is replaced by the user UiNewly entered password Pi new。
4. The multi-server security key based on human memorable passwords as claimed in claim 2The authentication method further comprises the following steps that the server SjAfter the mutual authentication between the intelligent card and the intelligent card is successful, the same session key SK is generated, and the used formula is that SK is h (CID)i||SIDj||Ni||Nj) Wherein SIDiIs the identity of the server Sj.
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| CN101030859A (en) * | 2007-02-06 | 2007-09-05 | 上海交通大学 | Method and system for verifying distributed network |
| CN102377573A (en) * | 2011-12-08 | 2012-03-14 | 华东师范大学 | Double-factor authentication method capable of securely updating password |
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| FR2840479B1 (en) * | 2002-05-31 | 2004-09-10 | Schlumberger Systems & Service | METHOD FOR SECURING AN ONLINE TRANSACTION |
| US7103772B2 (en) * | 2003-05-02 | 2006-09-05 | Giritech A/S | Pervasive, user-centric network security enabled by dynamic datagram switch and an on-demand authentication and encryption scheme through mobile intelligent data carriers |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN101030859A (en) * | 2007-02-06 | 2007-09-05 | 上海交通大学 | Method and system for verifying distributed network |
| CN102377573A (en) * | 2011-12-08 | 2012-03-14 | 华东师范大学 | Double-factor authentication method capable of securely updating password |
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| Cryptanalysis and Improvement of A Remote User Authentication Scheme Based on Dynamic ID Using Smart Card;Jian-ming Cui等;《International Journal of Digital Content Technology and its Applications(JDCTA)》;20130131;第7卷(第1期);第828-837页 * |
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