CN102999785A - Integrated analysis method for process risk assessment - Google Patents
Integrated analysis method for process risk assessment Download PDFInfo
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- CN102999785A CN102999785A CN2012103337624A CN201210333762A CN102999785A CN 102999785 A CN102999785 A CN 102999785A CN 2012103337624 A CN2012103337624 A CN 2012103337624A CN 201210333762 A CN201210333762 A CN 201210333762A CN 102999785 A CN102999785 A CN 102999785A
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 43
- 238000012502 risk assessment Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 30
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 title abstract description 6
- 238000012351 Integrated analysis Methods 0.000 title abstract 2
- 238000004458 analytical method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 55
- 239000011241 protective layer Substances 0.000 claims abstract description 3
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims description 32
- 239000010410 layer Substances 0.000 claims description 14
- 239000011159 matrix material Substances 0.000 claims description 6
- 206010063659 Aversion Diseases 0.000 claims description 5
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000008570 general process Effects 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000013011 mating Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000004886 process control Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 230000002265 prevention Effects 0.000 abstract description 2
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 14
- 230000000977 initiatory effect Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000000116 mitigating effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 239000008186 active pharmaceutical agent Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000006243 chemical reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011156 evaluation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 235000021472 generally recognized as safe Nutrition 0.000 description 1
- 239000000383 hazardous chemical Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000004519 manufacturing process Methods 0.000 description 1
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- 238000012954 risk control Methods 0.000 description 1
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Abstract
The invention provides an integrated analysis method for process risk assessment, which is executed by matching with a related server or software, firstly, deviation guide words are used for checking process deviation, all reasons are listed, related damage consequences and existing safety measures are analyzed, the severity grade of risk is assessed, tolerable risk target frequency is determined according to the severity grade, protective layer analysis is executed if the severity grade is great and more than great, then risk assessment is carried out, if the tolerable risk target frequency is reached, possibility and risk grade are determined, operability improvement suggestions are provided according to needs, and if the tolerable risk target frequency is not reached, safety grade requirements are determined, and further suggestions of other risk prevention or risk reduction measures are determined. Therefore, the risk assessment analysis method with consistent assessment standards and high efficiency can be achieved.
Description
Technical field
The present invention espespecially can reach the consistent and high efficiency risk-assessment method of assessment benchmark about a kind of confluence analysis method of processing procedure risk assessment.
Background technology
General harm and operability analysis (Hazard and Operability Study, HAZOP) be petrochemical complex and manufacturing, use main processing procedure safety assessment and the risk analysis method of the industry of hazardous substances processing procedure, and this prior art is used and is departed from guide word (Deviation Guidewords) combination process parameter (Process Parameters) development processing procedure and depart from, and by processing procedure safety assessment group systematicness, blanket type find out all possible processing procedure damage reason, the harm consequence, demand and the validity of assessment safety prevention measure, and whether risk can be accepted.
Although, advantage comprehensive, trackability that aforesaid safety evaluation method has, but when assessment labor intensive huge, and in the risk assessment for the estimation of the risk possibility support because of the shortcoming statistics, often flow in conjecture, and cause the benchmark of risk assessment can't have consistance.
Summary of the invention
In view of the shortcoming of the confluence analysis method of processing procedure risk assessment in the above-mentioned prior art, the present invention develops a kind of confluence analysis method of processing procedure risk assessment, is a kind of consistent and high efficiency risk-assessment method of assessment benchmark that reaches.
The confluence analysis method of processing procedure risk assessment of the present invention cooperates associated server or software to be carried out, and it comprises the following step:
Step 1: the processing procedure that departs from the guide word check node with processing procedure departs from, and lists all possible causes that cause each processing procedure to depart from, and analyzes relevant harm consequence and identification and prevent the existing safety practice that departs from;
Step 2: the severity level of assessment risk;
Step 3: determine tolerable risk target frequency by severity level;
Step 4: if severity level be great and great more than, with the execute protection layer analysis;
Step 5: again carry out risk assessment, if reached tolerable risk target frequency, then determine possibility grade and risk class, optionally propose afterwards operability and improve suggestion; And
Step 6: if do not reach tolerable risk target frequency in the step 5, then should determine the safe class demand, and then determine other risk-aversions or Risk reduction measure, and propose accordingly the safety improvement suggestion.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is enforcement configuration diagram of the present invention;
Fig. 2 is flow state synoptic diagram of the present invention;
Fig. 3 is seriousness grouped data synoptic diagram of the present invention;
Fig. 4 is tolerable risk target data synoptic diagram of the present invention;
Fig. 5 is layer of protection analysis schematic diagram data of the present invention;
Fig. 6 is possibility definition schematic diagram data of the present invention;
Fig. 7 is risk assessment matrix schematic diagram data of the present invention.
Among the figure:
The 1-server;
The 2-computing machine;
3-seriousness grouped data;
4-tolerable risk target data;
5-layer of protection analysis data;
6-possibility definition data;
7-risk assessment matrix data;
S100-selects node to begin to analyze;
S101-departs from the possible processing procedure that processing procedure departs from the guide word check node;
S102-lists all possible causes;
S103-analyzes and departs from relevant harm consequence (supposing all protection inefficacies);
The S104-identification prevents the existing safety practice that departs from;
The severity level of S105-assessment consequence;
Whether S106-can determine seriousness;
The S107-interpretation of result;
S108-seriousness reaches 4/5;
S109-execute protection layer analysis;
Whether S110-has reached tolerable risk target;
The possibility grade of S111-assessment consequence;
S112-assesses risk class;
Whether the S113-risk is more than or equal to 4;
S114-determines the safe class demand;
S115-determines the SIL of SIF or other risk-aversions/subdue strategy;
S116-proposes the safety improvement suggestion;
S117-repeats all guide words;
S118-proposes operability and improves suggestion.
Embodiment
The invention will be further described below in conjunction with the drawings and specific embodiments, can be implemented so that those skilled in the art can better understand the present invention also, but illustrated embodiment is not as a limitation of the invention.
Such as Fig. 1～shown in Figure 7, be respectively enforcement configuration diagram of the present invention, flow state synoptic diagram of the present invention, seriousness grouped data synoptic diagram of the present invention, tolerable risk target data synoptic diagram of the present invention, layer of protection analysis schematic diagram data of the present invention, possibility of the present invention definition schematic diagram data and risk assessment matrix schematic diagram data of the present invention.Such as Fig. 1～shown in Figure 7: the confluence analysis method of processing procedure risk assessment of the present invention, cooperate associated server 1 or software to be carried out, this software can be built in the computing machine 2 and cooperate server 1 to carry out the analysis of the following step, and it comprises the following step at least when analyzing:
Step 1: the processing procedure that departs from the guide word check node with processing procedure departs from, and lists all possible causes that cause each processing procedure to depart from, and analyzes relevant harm consequence and identification and prevent the existing safety practice that departs from.
Step 2: the severity level of assessment risk.
Step 3: determine tolerable risk target frequency by severity level.
Step 4: if severity level be great and great more than, with the execute protection layer analysis.
Step 5: again carry out risk assessment, if reached tolerable risk target frequency, then determine possibility grade and risk class, optionally propose afterwards operability and improve suggestion.
Step 6: if do not reach tolerable risk target frequency in the step 5, then should determine the safe class demand, and then determine other risk-aversions or Risk reduction measure, and propose accordingly the safety improvement suggestion.
Take above steps as the basis, the implementation process description is as follows:
Select first node to begin to analyze S100(node mentioned herein and be the wherein one-phase of certain processing procedure); after waiting to select; then take processing procedure depart from that possible processing procedure in the guide word check node departs from S101(and this guide word as the keyword of event generation); and list all possible cause S102; analyze again and depart from relevant harm consequence (suppose all protection lost efficacy) S103; and identification prevents the existing safety practice S104 that departs from; at this moment; the severity level S105 that can cooperate seriousness grouped data 3 assessment consequences; and cooperate tolerable risk target data 4 to judge whether to determine seriousness S106; then carry out if not interpretation of result S107; if judge whether that then seriousness reaches 4/5S108; if reach seriousness reach at 4/5 o'clock execute protection layer analysis s109 then; and mating protection layer analysis data 5 during layer of protection analysis, and consider and judgement according to following principle:
(1) event consequences analysis (Impact event description): the analysis consequence that copies and adopt the severity level of assessment consequence.
(2) seriousness analysis (Severity): the grade that copies and adopt seriousness.
(3) initiated failure event analysis (Initiating cause): all possible causes should be discussed item by item.
(4) initiated failure event probability analysis (Initiation lidelihood): link and search initiation event failure-rate data storehouse.
(5) general process design analysis (General process design): whether follow the Generally Recognized as safe design specifications, such as industrial standard or regulation enforcement designs such as API, ASME, NFPA, regional explosive-proof gradves? (0.1) is arranged; Without (1).
(6) basic process control system analysis (BPCS): outside the control system of inefficacy, the supervisory system that it is relevant, as: DCS, PLC, PANEL.(0.1) is arranged; Without (1).
(7) alert analysis (Alarms, ect.): independently security system alarm, the alarm beyond (4) Xiang Yudi (6) the automation operating system, and the SOP of corresponding event will be arranged, (0.1) is arranged; Without (1).
(8) handling safety administrative analysis (Addittioal mitigation, restricted access): for example processing procedure security management program, work permit, site personnel's control, but must for initiation event, (0.1) be arranged; Without (1).
(9) independent protective layer analysis (IPL additional mitigation, dike, pressure relief): abatement system, for example: anti-overflow dike, safety valve, rupture disk, automatic fire control sprinkler system link and search the protective seam event database.
(10) intermediate event probability analysis (Intermediate event likelihood): (4) to (9) product.
(11) safety instrumented systems completeness grade analysis (SIF integrity level): the corresponding fault probability of SIL (PFD).
(12) the event probability analysis (Mitigated event lidelihood) after subduing: the failure event possibility after the risk control, namely risk must be less than tolerable risk target, seriousness grouped data as shown in Figure 3.
After the layer of protection analysis S109 to be finished, be confirmed whether again to have reached tolerable risk target S110, if then cooperate the possibility grade S111 of possibility definition data 6 assessment consequences, and cooperate risk assessment matrix data 7 to assess risk class S112, judge again that afterwards whether this risk is more than or equal to 4 S113, if determine safe class demand S114 more than or equal to 4, determine again afterwards the tactful S115 of the SIL of SIF or other risk-aversions/subdue, and proposition safety improvement suggestion S116, repeat again at last all guide word S117 and again analyze, propose to repeat again all guide word S117 after operability is improved suggestion S118 more than or equal to 4 if risk is non-; And when judging whether that seriousness reaches 4/5 S108, if seriousness does not reach 4/5, then directly cooperate risk assessment matrix data 7 assessment risk class S112.
The above embodiment is the preferred embodiment that proves absolutely that the present invention lifts, and protection scope of the present invention is not limited to this.Being equal to that those skilled in the art do on basis of the present invention substitutes or conversion, all within protection scope of the present invention.Protection scope of the present invention is as the criterion with claims.
Claims (6)
1. the confluence analysis method of a processing procedure risk assessment cooperates associated server or software to be carried out, and it is characterized in that, comprises the following step:
Step 1: the processing procedure that departs from the guide word check node with processing procedure departs from, and lists all possible causes that cause each processing procedure to depart from, and analyzes relevant harm consequence and identification and prevent the existing safety practice that departs from;
Step 2: the severity level of assessment risk;
Step 3: determine tolerable risk target frequency by severity level;
Step 4: if severity level be great and great more than, with the execute protection layer analysis;
Step 5: again carry out risk assessment, if reached tolerable risk target frequency, then determine possibility grade and risk class, optionally propose afterwards operability and improve suggestion; And
Step 6: if do not reach tolerable risk target frequency in the step 5, then determine the safe class demand, and then determine other risk-aversions or Risk reduction measure, and propose accordingly the safety improvement suggestion.
2. the confluence analysis method of processing procedure risk assessment according to claim 1 is characterized in that, cooperates the severity level of seriousness grouped data assessment risk in this step 2.
3. the confluence analysis method of processing procedure risk assessment according to claim 1 is characterized in that, cooperates tolerable risk target data to determine tolerable risk target frequency in this step 3.
4. the confluence analysis method of processing procedure risk assessment according to claim 1 is characterized in that, mating protection layer analysis data and tolerable risk target data execute protection layer analysis in this step 4.
5. the confluence analysis method of processing procedure risk assessment according to claim 1; it is characterized in that; this step 4 when the execute protection layer analysis, can carry out at least event consequences analysis, seriousness analysis, initiated failure event analysis, the probability analysis of initiated failure event, general process design analysis, basic process control system analysis, alert analysis, handling safety administrative analysis, independent protective layer analysis, intermediate event probability analysis, safety instrumented systems completeness grade analysis and subdue after the event probability analysis.
6. the confluence analysis method of processing procedure risk assessment according to claim 1 is characterized in that, determines possibility grade and risk class with possibility definition data and risk assessment matrix data in this step 5.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| TW100133420 | 2011-09-16 | ||
| TW100133420A TW201314607A (en) | 2011-09-16 | 2011-09-16 | Integrated analysis method of process risk evaluation |
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| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN102999785A true CN102999785A (en) | 2013-03-27 |
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| CN2012103337624A Pending CN102999785A (en) | 2011-09-16 | 2012-09-10 | Integrated analysis method for process risk assessment |
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| TW (1) | TW201314607A (en) |
Cited By (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN104809359A (en) * | 2015-05-22 | 2015-07-29 | 中国石油化工股份有限公司 | Risk assessment method for CUI (Corrosion under insulation) |
| CN108510185A (en) * | 2018-03-29 | 2018-09-07 | 北京紫晶立方科技有限公司 | The quick hazard analysis of road vehicle and methods of risk assessment |
| CN111489076A (en) * | 2020-04-07 | 2020-08-04 | 顾敏 | Integrated process hazard analysis method, system and storage medium |
| CN112884285A (en) * | 2021-01-21 | 2021-06-01 | 北京联合普肯工程技术股份有限公司 | Danger and operability analysis method, device, equipment and storage medium |
| CN114506756A (en) * | 2022-01-20 | 2022-05-17 | 中国计量大学 | Target system function safety grading method, device, equipment and storage medium |
Families Citing this family (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN113077186B (en) * | 2021-04-27 | 2023-04-28 | 卡斯柯信号有限公司 | Rail transit safety integrity level identification method and system |
Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20020138416A1 (en) * | 2001-01-02 | 2002-09-26 | Lovejoy Kristin Gallina | Object-oriented method, system and medium for risk management by creating inter-dependency between objects, criteria and metrics |
| CN102156820A (en) * | 2011-04-27 | 2011-08-17 | 北京航空航天大学 | Method for analyzing harmfulness of mechanical assembly process |
-
2011
- 2011-09-16 TW TW100133420A patent/TW201314607A/en unknown
-
2012
- 2012-09-10 CN CN2012103337624A patent/CN102999785A/en active Pending
Patent Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20020138416A1 (en) * | 2001-01-02 | 2002-09-26 | Lovejoy Kristin Gallina | Object-oriented method, system and medium for risk management by creating inter-dependency between objects, criteria and metrics |
| CN102156820A (en) * | 2011-04-27 | 2011-08-17 | 北京航空航天大学 | Method for analyzing harmfulness of mechanical assembly process |
Non-Patent Citations (2)
| Title |
|---|
| 姜春明等: "HAZOP风险分析方法", 《安全、健康和环境》, vol. 6, no. 6, 15 June 2006 (2006-06-15) * |
| 张艳辉等: "改进的HAZOP风险评价方法", 《中国安全生产科学技术》, vol. 7, no. 7, 15 July 2011 (2011-07-15) * |
Cited By (8)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN104809359A (en) * | 2015-05-22 | 2015-07-29 | 中国石油化工股份有限公司 | Risk assessment method for CUI (Corrosion under insulation) |
| CN108510185A (en) * | 2018-03-29 | 2018-09-07 | 北京紫晶立方科技有限公司 | The quick hazard analysis of road vehicle and methods of risk assessment |
| CN108510185B (en) * | 2018-03-29 | 2020-10-27 | 北京紫晶立方科技有限公司 | Rapid hazard analysis and risk assessment method for road vehicles |
| CN111489076A (en) * | 2020-04-07 | 2020-08-04 | 顾敏 | Integrated process hazard analysis method, system and storage medium |
| CN111489076B (en) * | 2020-04-07 | 2023-09-15 | 顾敏 | Integrated process hazard analysis method, system and storage medium |
| CN112884285A (en) * | 2021-01-21 | 2021-06-01 | 北京联合普肯工程技术股份有限公司 | Danger and operability analysis method, device, equipment and storage medium |
| CN114506756A (en) * | 2022-01-20 | 2022-05-17 | 中国计量大学 | Target system function safety grading method, device, equipment and storage medium |
| CN114506756B (en) * | 2022-01-20 | 2024-05-28 | 中国计量大学 | Target system function safety grading method, device, equipment and storage medium |
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| Publication number | Publication date |
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| TW201314607A (en) | 2013-04-01 |
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Application publication date: 20130327 |