CN102609557B - Safety analysis method for uncontained failure of aircraft engine rotors - Google Patents
Safety analysis method for uncontained failure of aircraft engine rotors Download PDFInfo
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- 239000012634 fragment Substances 0.000 claims abstract description 74
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 20
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- 238000004088 simulation Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 6
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 4
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims description 34
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 claims description 16
- 238000013459 approach Methods 0.000 claims description 10
- 238000013519 translation Methods 0.000 claims description 9
- 230000001960 triggered effect Effects 0.000 claims description 5
- 238000009434 installation Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000012216 screening Methods 0.000 claims description 3
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Abstract
The invention discloses a safety analysis method for uncontained failure of aircraft engine rotors, which includes the following steps of importing models of aircrafts and digital prototypes of aircraft engines and simplifying the same, simulating generation of fragments of the aircraft engine rotors and tracks of the fragments flying out of engine crankcases, performing penetrability tests onto the simplified digital prototyping through the fragments; comparing the results of the penetrability tests for the engine fragments and the aircraft digital prototypes to data of the minimum hazard assembly unit capable of causing disastrous hazards of the aircrafts to judge whether hazard events are initiated or not; and solving the probability of disastrous hazards of the aircrafts in different failure modes. The probability of disastrous hazards of the aircrafts caused by uncontained failure of the aircraft engine rotors can be solved by simulation through computers. The safety analysis method for uncontained failure of the aircraft engine rotors has the advantages of low calculation amount, high efficiency, accurate and reliable analysis result and the like, and can provide support for safety design of the aircrafts and airworthiness compliance tests.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to aircraft abnormal risk evaluation areas, relate in particular to the non-inclusive fail safe analytical approach of a kind of aeroengine rotor that utilizes Computer Simulation to realize.
Background technology
The non-inclusive inefficacy of aeromotor refers to high engine speeds when running, and the fragment that comes off from rotor can not be contained by casing, and the failure state that throws away from engine.The non-inclusive inefficacy of aeromotor is to threaten one of typical abnormal risk of flight safety.The non-inclusive fragment of high speed high energy can penetrate airframe, wing, fuel tank, causes cabin decompression, fuel tank to leak on fire, system unit and loses efficacy and equipment malfunction, causes most probably the generation of catastrophic failure.Existing aircraft technology level can't be avoided this risk fully, annual still have both at home and abroad a lot of due to blade or the rotor not inclusive major accident that causes that breaks, thereby huge economic loss and casualties have been caused, for this reason, the airplane design standard all requires to take to design preventive measure both at home and abroad, and the harm that non-inclusive fragment was lost efficacy reduces to minimum.
External each aviation big country pays much attention to the problem that the non-inclusive fragment of engine rotor lost efficacy, just carried out the research work of association area from the sixties in last century, its research field that relates to mainly comprises following aspect comprehensively: the non-inclusive fault statistics of engine and non-inclusive Research on Failure Model, the non-inclusive fail safe assessment and analysis of rotor method research (comprising assessment models foundation and simulation analysis), the research of advanced material fuselage guard technology etc.Abroad the analytical approach based on the non-inclusive rotor fails security of computer software is to set up one take the airplane design model as the basis to aim at the model that the non-inclusive failure analysis of engine is used, the method of PM prototype model paster is obtained, there is inconsistence problems with true digital prototype on information, the relevant information of equipment, parts etc. has disappearance in various degree, thereby will be under some influence on the versatility of analytical approach, be unfavorable for further improvement and the optimization of airplane design, equipment layout, in addition, this software is not considered the failure mode of multiple fragment yet.
Domestic also at the early-stage in this area research, up to the present only the non-inclusive accident of engine was done some statistical works, not yet form an effective analytical approach of cover for safety analysis and assessment aspect, more not can be used for means and the instrument of the non-inclusive fail safe assessment and analysis of rotor.The non-inclusive fail safe appraisal procedure of existing rotor, complete with pure hand computation, for complication system, when analyzing multiple fragment, can cause and omit the combination danger that a plurality of systems lost efficacy simultaneously and cause, difficulty and the workload of analysis and evaluation are very large simultaneously, and analysis is low with assess effectiveness, cost is high, the cycle is long, are unsuitable for engineering and use.
The non-inclusive inefficacy of rotor is the typical abnormal risk of airplane in transportation category, and the security of aircraft is had material impact, although its probability of happening is very little, in case tend to bring about great losses, the serious threat flight safety.In view of the complicacy of aircraft system, non-inclusive inefficacy is analyzed manually to rotor, and not only analytical work amount is large, easily omit crucial danger, and because analyst's ability level there are differences, the result of analysis and precision is affected by it.
Summary of the invention
Technical matters to be solved by this invention is to overcome the deficiencies in the prior art, provide a kind of aeroengine rotor non-inclusive fail safe analytical approach, obtain the aircraft catastrophic failure probability that is caused by the non-inclusive inefficacy of rotor by Computer Simulation, can be the aircraft safety design and provide support with the checking of seaworthiness accordance.
The non-inclusive fail safe analytical approach of aeroengine rotor of the present invention comprises the following steps:
Steps A, importing aircraft and aeromotor digital prototype model, and it is simplified;
Track after step B, simulation aeroengine rotor fragment generate and fragment flies out from engine crankcase carries out penetrability with fragment to the digital prototype after simplifying and detects;
Step C, compare by the minimal risk assembled unit to penetrability testing result and aircraft catastrophic hazard, judge whether hazard event is triggered;
Step D, the danger that obtains according to step C trigger analysis result, obtain the catastrophic hazard probability of aircraft under different failure modes.
Described steps A specifically comprises the following steps:
Steps A 1, importing aircraft and aeromotor digital prototype model;
Steps A 2, aircraft prototyping component information is carried out lightweight process, make only to keep original how much topology informations in the digital prototype model;
Steps A 3, digital prototype is carried out designs simplification, remove the unnecessary aspect of model and parts, complete the assembling again of aircraft digital prototype parts.
Described step B specifically comprises the following steps:
Step B1, by obtaining the information such as aeromotor model, installation site and rotor progression, dimensional parameters, and according to analyzing needs, determine the type of rotor fragment: fan fragment, 1/3rd wheel disc fragments, medium fragment and/or fractionlet;
Step B2, for all stages of all engines, generate corresponding all types of fragments, it is loaded on the rotor-position of corresponding engine;
Step B3, make rotor fragment random release n time in its movement locus scope; Or based on the method for exhaustion, and set separation of fragments angle and translation angular region and iteration step length, the rotor fragment is discharged in the scope that sets;
Aircraft devices and parts that step B4, detection engine debris penetrate in each dispose procedure;
Step B5, export penetrability testing result and the record of the every class fragment of every grade of rotor of each engine.
Described step C specifically comprises the following steps:
Step C1, determine in the range of influence of the non-inclusive failure trigger of rotor the calamitous minimal risk assembled unit of aircraft;
Step C2, determine the non-inclusive failure mode of engine rotor;
Step C3, according to this failure mode, Screening Treatment done in penetrability testing result record, obtain distinctive penetrability testing result under this failure mode;
Step C4, the penetrability testing result that the minimal risk assembled unit in the range of influence and step C3 are obtained are analyzed, and judge that can the fragment that discharge each time trigger the minimal risk assembled unit, thereby cause catastrophic hazard to be triggered.
Described step D specifically comprises the following steps:
Step D1, trigger result according to danger, obtain the catastrophic hazard probability under the different failure modes of rotors at different levels;
Step D2, the result of calculation under the different failure modes of single-stage rotor are obtained the complete machine catastrophic hazard probability under different failure modes as the basis.
The present invention adopts the digital prototype of true aircraft as analytic target, guaranteed the accuracy of analyzing, do not need simultaneously special for rotor non-inclusive fail safe analysis again draw and build new analytical model, alleviated analyst's workload, the digital prototype model is carried out lightweight to be processed, also can increase arithmetic speed, improve analysis efficiency.In non-inclusive event Appraisal process, quote existing safety analysis data, can avoid the safety analysis work of repetition, also guaranteed integrality and the accuracy analyzed simultaneously.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the non-inclusive fail safe analytical approach of aeroengine rotor of the present invention process flow diagram;
Fig. 2 is the model contrast before and after certain part lightweight;
Fig. 3 is designs simplification ratio juris schematic diagram;
Fig. 4 is that the airplane digital model machine is simplified the process schematic diagram;
Fig. 5 is the spatial relationship schematic diagram of engine 1/3 wheel disc fragment and sweeping track and aircraft parts, wherein figure (a) be from, figure (b) is contact, it is crossing that figure (c) is.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing, technical scheme of the present invention is elaborated:
The non-inclusive fail safe analysis of the engine rotor of this specific embodiment can be seamless related with true digital prototype and analysis software take the CATIA secondary developing platform as the basis.Particularly, the non-inclusive fail safe analytical approach of aeroengine rotor of the present invention as shown in Figure 1, comprises the following steps:
Steps A, importing aircraft and aeromotor digital prototype model, and it is simplified; Specifically comprise:
Steps A 1, importing aircraft and aeromotor digital prototype model;
Steps A 2, aircraft prototyping component information is carried out lightweight process, make only to keep original how much topology informations in the digital prototype model;
The lightweight method is in the situation that keep original how much topological characteristics of digital prototype, information to its model is processed, Figure 2 shows that the changing features situation of certain part its model before and after lightweight, the information such as the geometric graphic element before the model after lightweight has not had, restriction relation, only kept its topological structure, and its file take up space in computing machine has been down to 15K by before 83K, light-weighted ratio has reached approximately 80%, this process can be the lightweight of component-level, can be also system-level or even the complete machine level.
Steps A 3, digital prototype is carried out designs simplification, remove the unnecessary aspect of model and parts, complete the assembling again of aircraft digital prototype parts;
The designs simplification method comprises two kinds of situations, and a kind of is in the situation that the most of architectural feature of reservation geometric model is removed as features such as chamfering, fillet, screw threads, reduces the quantity of information (as shown in Fig. 3 (a)) of parts; Another kind of situation is to remove the parts that have nothing to do with research in digital prototype, reaches the purpose (as shown in Fig. 3 (b)) of simplification.
In the analytic process of non-inclusive rotor shotfiring safety, need in digital prototype take the parts geological information of the determined analysis rank of minimal risk assembled unit as the basis, therefore, the simplification of digital prototype information is mainly take the lightweight method as main, should be take the analysis rank of minimal risk assembled unit in safety analysis as the basis when rank is selected in its simplification process, as should include in the Product of digital prototype Tree the minimal risk assembled unit in related parts; In addition, for the non-inclusive failure effect of aircraft engine rotor zone structure in addition, can pass through the designs simplification method, digital prototype is done further to simplify, the airplane digital model machine is simplified process as shown in Figure 3.
Track after step B, simulation aeroengine rotor fragment generate and fragment flies out from engine crankcase carries out penetrability with fragment to the digital prototype after simplifying and detects; Specifically comprise:
Step B1, by obtaining the information such as aeromotor model, installation site and rotor progression, dimensional parameters, and according to analyzing needs, determine the type of rotor fragment: fan fragment, 1/3rd wheel disc fragments, medium fragment and/or fractionlet;
Step B2, for all stages of all engines, generate corresponding all types of fragments, it is loaded on the rotor-position of corresponding engine;
The generation of fragment is to adopt parameterized modeling method to set up the basic model of fragment, and the input by fragment position, radius, thickness parameter makes it become the fragment that is complementary with engine rotor types at different levels.
Step B3, make rotor fragment random release n time in its movement locus scope; Or based on the method for exhaustion, and set separation of fragments angle and translation angular region and iteration step length, the rotor fragment is discharged in the scope that sets;
This embodiment is based on the method for exhaustion, and sets angle of dispersion and translation angular region and the iteration step length of fragment, and the rotor fragment is discharged under its angle of dispersion and translation angle, in the track scope that retrains; By setting angle of dispersion and translation angular region and the iteration step length of fragment, can obtain the frequency n that penetrability detects, and the track scope of constraint refers to angle of dispersion and the translation angular region that fragment is set before penetration analysis.
Aircraft devices and parts that step B4, detection engine debris penetrate in each dispose procedure;
In three-dimensional coordinate space under the CATIA platform, the relation of different parts has three kinds:
I) from
Be separated from each other in the space from two parts of expression, both are without public part, Fig. 5 (a) shown engine 1/3 wheel disc fragment and sweeping track thereof and aircraft parts from relation;
Ii) contact
Contact be in two parts between two faces distance be zero, bonded to each other, Fig. 5 (b) has shown the tangent relation of engine 1/3 wheel disc fragment and sweeping track and aircraft parts;
Iii) intersect
Intersecting is also between two or more parts, interference to have occured, and Fig. 5 (c) has shown that 1/3 wheel disc fragment and sweeping track and aircraft parts thereof intersect, and this situation explanation fragment has penetrated this aircraft components.
Based on the mutual alignment relation between part in above-mentioned three dimensions, on the CATIA platform, by CAA(Component Application Architecture) secondary development, come the relation between detection rotor fragment parts different from the airplane digital model machine, determined whether penetrativity.
In carrying out the penetrability testing process, relate generally to penetrability detection function FunctionClash, comprise the derivation etc. of object definition, setting parameter and the penetrability examining report of this function.
) the penetrability detection function
" penetrability detection " property value of Clash comprises:
a.?catClashComputationTypeBetweenAll
Whether penetrate between any part and other parts in all parts that load in detection CATIA;
b.?catClashComputationTypeInsideOne
Detect in all parts that load in CATIA and whether penetrate between selected parts;
c.?catClashComputationTypeAgainstAll
Detect in all parts that load in selected parts and CATIA, whether other any parts penetrate;
d.?catClashComputationTypeBetweenTwo
Detect between two parts selected in all parts that load in CATIA and whether penetrate.
Therefore, the penetrability type of detection of selecting in the penetrability detection of carrying out between rotor fragment and digital prototype is " catClashComputationTypeAgainstAll " value.
The method of the Clash that uses in the penetrability of rotor fragment and track and digital prototype detects mainly contains " Compute " method and " Export " method.
The model that " Compute " method is mainly used in calculating under selected penetrability type of detection penetrates calculating; " Export " method is that the penetrability testing result is derived, the form of the penetrability report the test of its derivation is the txt form, and the txt form is compared with traditional xml format result report, and content is more regular, be easy to realize to the identification of object information and read, and compatible good.By to the reading of penetrability report the test content, can carry out further safety analysis.
The use sample of " Compute " method and " Export " method is as follows:
NewClash.Compute
……
Dim?ThePath?As?String
NewClash.Export?CatClashExportTypeTXTResultOnly,?"c:\tmp\sample.txt"
Wherein ThePath is the path of penetrability test results report output, CatClashExportTypeTXTResultO-
Nly is the type of output report form.
) the penetrability detecting step
Detect principle and method according to above-mentioned penetrability, the concrete steps of completing the penetrability detection are as follows:
A. define the Clash function of the overall situation in program;
B. determine the usable range (global detection is selected in the penetrability detection at rotor fragment and airplane digital model machine parts) of Clash function;
C. carry out the Clash function, calculate the airplane digital model machine and form in parts relation with rotor fragment release way;
D. export Clash function execution result document;
E. read the object information in the txt file of deriving, and deposit to table data store.
In simulation process, fragment discharge between track and airplane digital model machine parts for " from " or " contact " when concerning, represent that fragment does not damage parts; When between fragment release track and airplane digital model machine parts, the pass is " intersecting ", judge that this part is penetrated, and disabler.
Step B5, export penetrability result and the record of the every class fragment of every grade of rotor of each engine;
The penetrability detection record of all kinds of fragments of every grade of rotor of engine in database in built outcome record table, residing angle of dispersion and translation angle information, the type information of fragment and the component names information that penetrates when recording result and comprising fragment and penetrate.
Step C, compare by the minimal risk assembled unit to penetrability testing result and aircraft catastrophic hazard, judge whether hazard event is triggered; Specifically comprise:
Step C1, determine in the range of influence of the non-inclusive failure trigger of rotor the calamitous minimal risk assembled unit of aircraft;
The calamitous minimum combination of aircraft in the non-inclusive failure effect of rotor zone unit is namely the minimum combination unit that possible cause aircraft generation catastrophic hazard, this element combination can be obtained from aircraft catastrophic event fault tree or Bayesian network in reasoning, compare with traditional direct minimal cut set that generates of fault tree that passes through, the minimum combination unit can be identified and analyze the non-inclusive danger of rotor of the different mission phases of aircraft, and can comprise the polymorphic attribute except 0 and 1.
Step C2, determine the non-inclusive failure mode of engine rotor;
The non-inclusive failure mode of engine rotor be carry out penetration analysis be type, size, the angle value information of corresponding fragment, the non-inclusive inefficacy that the fragment of namely determining which kind occurs under which type of angle of dispersion and translation angle.
Step C3, according to this failure mode, the penetrability detection record is done Screening Treatment, obtain distinctive penetrability testing result under this failure mode.
Step C4, the minimal risk assembled unit in the range of influence and penetrability testing result are analyzed, judge after fragment flies out each time and can trigger the minimal risk assembled unit, and then cause catastrophic hazard to be triggered.
Step D, the danger that obtains according to step C trigger analysis result, obtain the catastrophic hazard probability of aircraft under different failure modes; Specifically comprise:
Step D1, trigger result according to danger, obtain the catastrophic hazard probability under the different failure modes of rotors at different levels;
Under certain fragment failure mode of single-stage rotor, the expectation value of the bust probability that the probability of aircraft generation catastrophic failure can cause with each non-inclusive event represents, namely
Step D2, the result of calculation under the different failure modes of single-stage rotor are obtained the complete machine catastrophic hazard probability under different failure modes as the basis;
Complete machine catastrophic hazard probability is that non-inclusive rotor fails causes aircraft the probability of bust state to occur.According to hypothesis, get that non-inclusive rotor fails occurs the every one-level rotor of all engines and the average that triggers the probability of catastrophic hazard, as complete machine catastrophic hazard average probability.
Calculate take every engine as unit based on above analysis, first obtain the average of the dangerous probability of all rotors on every engine, then obtain the average of the dangerous probability of all engines, this danger average probability is complete machine catastrophic hazard average probability
In formula:
e---engine mumber;
r---the rotor level number;
E---the engine number;
R---rotor progression;
P---single-stage rotor catastrophic hazard probability;
P z---complete machine catastrophic hazard probability.
Claims (1)
1. the non-inclusive fail safe analytical approach of aeroengine rotor, is characterized in that, comprises the following steps:
Steps A, importing aircraft and aeromotor digital prototype model, and it is simplified; Specifically comprise the following steps:
Steps A 1, importing aircraft and aeromotor digital prototype model;
Steps A 2, aircraft prototyping component information is carried out lightweight process, make only to keep original how much topology informations in the digital prototype model;
Steps A 3, digital prototype is carried out designs simplification, remove the unnecessary aspect of model and parts, complete the assembling again of aircraft digital prototype parts;
Track after step B, simulation aeroengine rotor fragment generate and fragment flies out from engine crankcase carries out penetrability with fragment to the digital prototype after simplifying and detects; Specifically comprise the following steps:
Step B1, by obtaining aeromotor model, installation site and rotor progression, dimensional parameters, and according to analyzing needs, determine the type of rotor fragment: fan fragment, 1/3rd wheel disc fragments, medium fragment and/or fractionlet;
Step B2, for all stages of all engines, generate corresponding all types of fragments, it is loaded on the rotor-position of corresponding engine;
Step B3, make rotor fragment random release n time in its movement locus scope; Or based on the method for exhaustion, and set separation of fragments angle and translation angular region and iteration step length, the rotor fragment is discharged in the scope that sets;
Aircraft devices and parts that step B4, detection engine debris penetrate in each dispose procedure;
Step B5, export penetrability testing result and the record of the every class fragment of every grade of rotor of each engine;
Step C, compare by the minimal risk assembled unit to penetrability testing result and aircraft catastrophic hazard, judge whether hazard event is triggered; Specifically comprise the following steps:
Step C1, determine in the range of influence of the non-inclusive failure trigger of rotor the calamitous minimal risk assembled unit of aircraft;
Step C2, determine the non-inclusive failure mode of engine rotor;
Step C3, according to this failure mode, Screening Treatment done in penetrability testing result record, obtain distinctive penetrability testing result under this failure mode;
Step C4, the penetrability testing result that the minimal risk assembled unit in the range of influence and step C3 are obtained are analyzed, and judge that can the fragment that discharge each time trigger the minimal risk assembled unit, thereby cause catastrophic hazard to be triggered;
Step D, the danger that obtains according to step C trigger analysis result, obtain the catastrophic hazard probability of aircraft under different failure modes; Specifically comprise the following steps:
Step D1, trigger result according to danger, obtain the catastrophic hazard probability under the different failure modes of rotors at different levels;
Step D2, the result of calculation under the different failure modes of single-stage rotor are obtained the complete machine catastrophic hazard probability under different failure modes as the basis.
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