CN102546173A - Digital signature system and signature method based on certificate - Google Patents
Digital signature system and signature method based on certificate Download PDFInfo
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- CN102546173A CN102546173A CN2011104264753A CN201110426475A CN102546173A CN 102546173 A CN102546173 A CN 102546173A CN 2011104264753 A CN2011104264753 A CN 2011104264753A CN 201110426475 A CN201110426475 A CN 201110426475A CN 102546173 A CN102546173 A CN 102546173A
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Abstract
The invention discloses a digital signature system based on a certificate, which comprises a system parameter setting module, a user secret key generation module, a user certificate authentication module, a signature module and a checking module. The system parameter setting module generates system main secret key and system public parameter which is transmitted to other modules. The user secret key generation module generates public key and private key pairs of all users. The user certificate authentication module conducts signature on identification and public key of a user, generates the certificate of the user and transmits the certificate to the signature module. The signature module conducts signature on information and transmits the information to the checking module. The checking module checks effectiveness of the signature generated by the signature module. The system has small calculation cost and communication cost on the premise that safety is ensured, improves system operation efficiency, and is capable of reducing calculation cost and communication cost based on a digital signature method of the certificate, and improves operation efficiency of the digital signature method based on the certificate. The digital signature method based on the certificate is further disclosed.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the digital signature technology of network security, be meant a kind of especially safely and efficiently based on the digital signature system and the digital signature method of certificate.
Background technology
Along with the develop rapidly of the computer network and the communication technology, the mankind progressively march toward informationized society, and digitlization, networking will become the new basic platform of global IT application.In the social informatization process, Internet development is very easy to people's study, work and life, and computer application has been penetrated into fields of society such as politics, economy, military affairs, science and culture and family life.Unconsciously; Information becomes most important a kind of resource and wealth; But because processes such as the transmission of information, storage, processing carry out on open communication network often, so information receives the threat of various attack means such as eavesdropping, intercepting, modification, forgery, playback easily.
Digital signature is as one of means that ensure the network information security; Can effectively solve in the network information transfer and forge, deny, pretend to be and distort problem; It is one of core technology that realizes the electronic security(ELSEC) transaction; Aspects such as fail safe, authenticity and non repudiation guaranteeing transaction have important effect, thereby are one of information security core technologies, all have important use to be worth in fields such as encryption key distribution, e-bank, electronics security, e-commerce and e-governments.
Traditional digital signature system is based on PKIX, employing be the authentication mode of certificate, realize the binding of client public key and identity information through authenticating authority mechanism (CA) certificate of being issued, thereby guarantee the authentic and valid of client public key.Certificate management comprises the cancelling of certificate, stores, renewal etc., needs very big amount of calculation and storage capacity, particularly certificate revocation problem.In addition, traditional P KI technology also exists the third party to inquire problem.So-called third party's inquiry is meant the third party before the PKI that uses certain user, and certificate status from this user to CA that need inquire is with the true and validity of verification public key.This method labor time, space and calculating were once becoming the obstacle that common key cryptosystem develops.
In order to simplify the problems such as administration overhead of digital certificate, Shamir had at first proposed the notion based on the cryptographic system of identity in 1984.Cryptographic system based on identity; Need not preserve each user's public key certificate; Do not need a public file yet and store all users' PKI; Each user's PKI all is to generate by his identity is direct, and user's identity can be his name, telephone number, ID card No., mailing address or E-mail address etc., and user's private key then is to produce by trusted party (PKG) is unified.Though the cryptographic system based on identity has overcome the certificate management problem that exists in the conventional public-key cryptographic system; But owing to still need a trusted party to produce and issue user's private key; Thereby exist intrinsic key escrow problem; Be the private key that Any user is known at credible center, thereby can eavesdrop the communication of Any user, and then can decipher the ciphertext of Any user or forge the signature of Any user.
In order to overcome based on the key escrow problem in the cryptographic system of identity; Gentry has proposed the system of a new public key cryptography-based on the public-key cryptosystem (CBC:Certificate-based Cryptography) of certificate in European cryptography meeting in 2003; This system is with traditional public-key cryptosystem with based on the advantages of the cryptographic system of identity; Eliminate the certification authentication process of high cost, and do not had the hidden danger of key escrow.The repertoire that has certificate in the conventional public-key cryptographic system based on the certificate in the public-key cryptosystem of certificate; And in deciphering and signature process as the part of private key, thereby encrypt and signature-verification process in do not exist the third party of cert status to inquire.And in the public-key cryptosystem based on certificate, the transmission of certificate need not passed through safe lane, does not have the problem of key distribution.Though the research based on the digital signature scheme of certificate makes progress to some extent, more or less there are some problem and shortage in the present digital signature method based on certificate at aspects such as security intensity, operational efficiency.
Based on above analysis, the inventor studies improvement to existing digital signature method based on certificate, and this case produces thus.
Summary of the invention
The object of the invention; Be to provide a kind of digital signature system and endorsement method based on certificate; It does not use traditional bilinearity to mapping in signature process and proof procedure, under the prerequisite that guarantees fail safe, has less calculation cost and communication cost, has improved the operational efficiency of system.
Another object of the present invention is to provide a kind of digital signature system and endorsement method based on certificate, and it can reduce based on the calculation cost of the digital signature method of certificate and communication cost, improves the operation efficiency based on the digital signature method of certificate.
In order to reach above-mentioned purpose, solution of the present invention is:
A kind of digital signature system based on certificate comprises system parameter setting module, user key generation module, user certificate authentication module, signature blocks and authentication module;
The system parameter setting module; Be used for generation system master key and system's open parameters; And system's master key sent to the user certificate authentication module, system's open parameters is sent to user key generation module, user certificate authentication module, signature blocks and authentication module;
The user key generation module, the PKI and the private key that are used to generate each user are right, and user's PKI is sent to user certificate authentication module and authentication module, and user's private key is sent to signature blocks;
The user certificate authentication module through system's master key and the system's open parameters that the system parameter setting module is sent, is signed to user's identity and PKI, produces user's certificate, and user's certificate is sent to signature blocks;
Signature blocks, the user certificate through the private key for user and the user certificate authentication module of the transmission of user key generation module are issued message is signed, and the signature that will produce sends to authentication module;
The client public key that authentication module, system's open parameters of sending through the system parameter setting module and user key generation module send is verified the validity of the signature of signature blocks generation.
A kind of digital signature method based on certificate may further comprise the steps:
A: the master key msk of initialization system open parameters params and system;
B: the PKI PK that generates the user according to the said open parameters params of system
IDWith private key usk
ID
C: according to the said open parameters params of system, user's identity ID, master key msk of system and user's PKI PK
IDProduce user's certificate Cert
ID
D: according to user's private key usk
IDCertificate Cert with the user
IDMessage m signed obtain σ;
E: according to said open parameters params of system and user's PKI PK
IDValidity to the signature sigma of message m is verified.
Above-mentioned steps A specifically comprises:
A1: choose two big prime number p and q and satisfy q|p-1;
A2: a generator g of picked at random
, choose a crash-resistant hash hash function H;
A3: picked at random
Computing system Your Majesty key y=g
xModp;
The open parameters params of system is＜p, q, and g, y, H＞, the master key msk of system is x.
Among the above-mentioned steps A2, selected hash hash function H selects hash function MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-2 or SHA-3 for use.
Above-mentioned steps B specifically comprises:
B1: picked at random
Private key usk as the user
ID
B2: calculating
is as user's PKI.
Above-mentioned steps C specifically comprises:
C1: picked at random
Calculate W=g
sModp;
C2: calculate R=s+xH (ID, PK
ID, W) modq obtains user's certificate Cert
ID=＜W, R＞.Above-mentioned steps D specifically comprises:
D1: picked at random
Calculate U=g
rModp;
D2: calculate h
1=H (m, PK
ID, U, W) and h
2=H (m, ID, PK
ID, U, W);
D3: calculate z=R+x
IDH
1+ rh
2Modq, obtain the corresponding signature of message m and be σ=＜U, W, z＞.
Above-mentioned steps E specifically comprises:
E1: calculate h
0=H (ID, PK
ID, W), h
1=H (m, PK
ID, U, W) and h
2=H (m, ID, PK
ID, U, W);
E2: whether checking equality
is set up; If equality is set up; Then accept signature; Otherwise, the refusal signature.
After adopting such scheme; The present invention has reduced the calculation cost and the communication cost of signature scheme under the situation that guarantees signature safety, improved the treatment effeciency of signature server; Having saved the calculation resources of signature server, is a kind of new digital signature method safely and efficiently.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the digital signature system sketch map that the present invention is based on certificate;
Fig. 2 is the flow chart that the present invention is based on the digital signature method of certificate;
Fig. 3 is that the present invention is applied to the sketch map based on component property remote proving system.
Embodiment
Below will combine accompanying drawing, technical scheme of the present invention will be elaborated.
As shown in Figure 1, comprise system parameter setting modules A, user key generation module B, user certificate authentication module C, signature blocks D and authentication module E according to the digital signature system that the present invention is based on certificate.
Wherein, The system parameter setting modules A is used for generation system master key msk and the open parameters params of system; And the master key msk of system sent to user certificate authentication module C, the open parameters params of system is sent to user key generation module B, user certificate authentication module C, signature blocks D and authentication module E respectively.
User key generation module B is used to generate each user's PKI PK
IDWith private key usk
ID, and with user's PKI PK
IDSend to user certificate authentication module C and authentication module E, with user's private key usk
IDSend to signature blocks D.
Master key msk of system and the open parameters params of system that user certificate authentication module C sends through the system parameter setting modules A are to the identity ID and the PKI PK of validated user
IDSign, produce user's certificate Cet
ID, and with user's certificate Cert
IDSend to signature blocks.
The private key for user usk that signature blocks D sends through user key generation module B
IDThe user certificate Cert that issues with user certificate authentication module C
ID, message m is signed, and the signature sigma that produces is sent to authentication module E.
Authentication module E is through the open parameters params of system of system parameter setting modules A transmission and the client public key PK of user key generation module B transmission
ID, the validity of the signature sigma that signature blocks D is produced is verified.
The flow chart that will combine digital signature method below specifies the operation of each module in this digital signature system.
As shown in Figure 2, this system parameter setting modules A is carried out following steps:
A1: choose two big prime number p and q and satisfy q|p-1, wherein p is 1024 a integer, and q is 160 a integer;
A2: a generator g of picked at random
, choose SHA-1 as crash-resistant hash function H ();
A3: picked at random
Computing system Your Majesty key y=g
xModp.
Comprehensive above-mentioned information, system parameter setting modules A retrieval system open parameters params is＜p, q, g, y, H＞, the master key msk of system is x.
This user key generation module B carries out following steps:
B1: picked at random
Private key usk as the user
ID
B2: calculating
is as user's PKI.
This user certificate authentication module C carries out following steps:
C1: picked at random
Calculate W=g
sModp;
C2: calculate R=s+xH (ID, PK
ID, W) modq obtains user's certificate Cert
ID=＜W, R＞.This signature blocks D carries out following steps:
D1: picked at random
Calculate U=g
rModp;
D2: calculate h
1=H (m, PK
ID, U, W) and h
2=H (m, ID, PK
ID, U, W);
D3: calculate z=R+x
IDH
1+ rh
2Modq, obtain the corresponding signature of message m and be σ=＜U, W, z＞.
This authentication module E carries out following steps:
E1: calculate h
0=H (ID, PK
ID, W), h
1=H (m, PK
ID, U, W), h
2=H (m, ID, PK
ID, U, W);
E2: whether checking equality
is set up; If equality is set up; Then accept signature; Otherwise, the refusal signature.
To be applied to describe according to the digital signature system based on certificate of the present invention to aforesaid below based on the situation in the remote proving system of component property trusted terminal.
With prove computing platform credible be that the remote proving of target is one of valuable feature function of Trusted Computing, be subjected to the extensive concern of domestic and international scientific research institution.Along with the continuous development of remote proving, the remote proving scheme (component property-based attestation is called for short CPBA) based on component property has appearred.
In remote proving (CPBA) method based on component property, the issuing, cancel and verify and all use traditional P KI method to realize of component property certificate.Therefore, the efficient of component property proof is lower, during particularly to the attribute proof of big quantity assembly, calculate and communication cost bigger, be not particularly suitable.According to of the present invention efficiently based on the digital signature method of certificate; Not only can with cancelling new method be provided for the certificate issued of credible platform (TPM); And to can be used for credible calculating platform proof of identification method be the structure of privacy CA (Pricacy-CA), thereby can form practical more remote certification method.
As shown in Figure 3, improved remote proving system based on component property comprises assembly production firm, user platform, ISP, these 4 roles of certificate issuance authoritative institution.Except assembly production firm, other 3 roles participate in the remote proving process of component property proof.We represent each participant in the system with following symbol:
CA: the algorithm in the certificate issuance authoritative institution (Certificate Authority), main execution graph 1 system parameter setting modules A and user certificate authentication module C, the generation and the issue of responsible system parameters, cancel the component property certificate;
USER: user platform, comprise main frame (HOST) and credible platform module (TPM) two parts, the algorithm among main execution graph 1 user key generation module B and the signature blocks D belongs to the certifier in the identification protocol;
SP: ISP (Service Provider), the algorithm among the main execution graph 1 authentication module E proposes the attribute demand of proof, and the checking component property proves.
The remote proving scheme (CPBA) based on component property of credible calculating platform is that attribute authority (aa) mechanism is the Attribute certificate that various types of components is issued; Attribute certificate and soft, hardware binding are issued jointly, and the platform certifier proves that to the ISP its current operation configuration status satisfies certain security attribute according to the component property certificate of configuration and the integrity measurement of TPM.Improved remote proving scheme based on component property does not need the third party to inquire, has improved the efficient based on the remote proving system of component property.Architecture by Fig. 3 can find out that improved CPBA proof is made up of following steps:
Initialization (Setup): by the algorithm in certificate issuance authoritative institution (CA) the execution graph 1 system parameter setting modules A, generation system master key msk and the open parameters params of system, and the open parameters params of system sent to USER and SP respectively;
Registration (Register):, generate the PKI PK of user platform by the algorithm among user platform (USER) the execution graph 1 user key generation module B
IDWith private key usk
ID, and with PK
IDSend to CA and SP with the platform component property, CA carries out the algorithm among the user certificate authentication module C then, for the user platform component property is issued certificate Cert
ID
Proof (Attest): user platform (comprising HOST and TPM) is according to ISP's (SP) proof request, and the algorithm among the execution graph 1 signature blocks D is with the private key usk of oneself
IDWith certificate Cert
IDComputing platform component property signature sigma is sent signature sigma to SP then and is carried out remote proving;
Checking (Verify): by the algorithm among ISP (SP) the execution graph 1 authentication module E, with open parameters params of system and user platform PKI PK
IDPlatform assembly attribute signature sigma is verified.
Improved remote proving system based on the component property trusted terminal has introduced the digital signature scheme based on certificate, has eliminated third party's inquiry of certificate, has reduced the calculation cost and the communication cost of system, has improved the efficient of remote proving system.
Concerning the those of ordinary skill of this technical field, can associate other advantage and distortion at an easy rate according to above implementation type.Therefore, the present invention is not limited to above-mentioned specific embodiment, and it carries out detailed, exemplary explanation as just example to a kind of form of the present invention.In the scope that does not deviate from aim of the present invention, those of ordinary skills can according to above-mentioned specific embodiment through various be equal to that the resulting technical scheme of replacement all should be included in the scope of claim of the present invention and the scope that is equal within.
Claims (8)
1. digital signature system based on certificate is characterized in that comprising:
The system parameter setting module; Be used for generation system master key and system's open parameters; And system's master key sent to the user certificate authentication module, system's open parameters is sent to user key generation module, user certificate authentication module, signature blocks and authentication module;
The user key generation module, the PKI and the private key that are used to generate each user are right, and user's PKI is sent to user certificate authentication module and authentication module, and user's private key is sent to signature blocks;
The user certificate authentication module through system's master key and the system's open parameters that the system parameter setting module is sent, is signed to user's identity and PKI, produces user's certificate, and user's certificate is sent to signature blocks;
Signature blocks, the user certificate through the private key for user and the user certificate authentication module of the transmission of user key generation module are issued message is signed, and the signature that will produce sends to authentication module;
The client public key that authentication module, system's open parameters of sending through the system parameter setting module and user key generation module send is verified the validity of the signature of signature blocks generation.
2. endorsement method that adopts the digital signature system based on certificate as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that may further comprise the steps:
A: the master key msk of initialization system open parameters params and system;
B: the PKI PK that generates the user according to the said open parameters params of system
IDWith private key usk
ID
C: according to the said open parameters params of system, user's identity ID, master key msk of system and user's PKI PK
IDProduce user's certificate Cert
ID
D: according to user's private key usk
IDCertificate Cert with the user
IDMessage m signed obtain σ;
E: according to said open parameters params of system and user's PKI PK
IDValidity to the signature sigma of message m is verified.
3. the digital signature method based on certificate as claimed in claim 2 is characterized in that said steps A specifically comprises:
A1: choose two big prime number p and q and satisfy q|p-1;
A2: a generator g of picked at random
, choose a crash-resistant hash hash function H;
A3: picked at random
Computing system Your Majesty key y=g
xModp;
The open parameters params of system is＜p, q, and g, y, H＞, the master key msk of system is x.
4. the digital signature method based on certificate as claimed in claim 3 is characterized in that, in the said steps A 2, selected hash hash function H selects hash function MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-2 or SHA-3 for use.
5. the digital signature method based on certificate as claimed in claim 2 is characterized in that said step B specifically comprises:
B1: picked at random
Private key usk as the user
ID
B2: calculating
is as user's PKI.
6. the digital signature method based on certificate as claimed in claim 2 is characterized in that said step C specifically comprises:
C1: picked at random
Calculate W=g
sModp;
C2: calculate R=s+xH (ID, PK
ID, W) modq obtains user's certificate Cert
ID=＜W, R＞.
7. the digital signature method based on certificate as claimed in claim 2 is characterized in that said step D specifically comprises:
D1: picked at random
Calculate U=g
rModp;
D2: calculate h
1=H (m, PK
ID, U, W) and h
2=H (m, ID, PK
ID, U, W);
D3: calculate z=R+x
IDH
1+ rh
2Modq, obtain the corresponding signature of message m and be σ=＜U, W, z＞.
8. the digital signature method based on certificate as claimed in claim 2 is characterized in that said step e specifically comprises:
E1: calculate h
0=H (ID, PK
ID, W), h
1=H (m, PK
ID, U, W) and h
2=H (m, ID, PK
ID, U, W);
E2: whether checking equality
is set up; If equality is set up; Then accept signature; Otherwise, the refusal signature.
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| CN104868993A (en) * | 2015-05-15 | 2015-08-26 | 河海大学 | Two-side authentication key negotiation method and system based on certificate |
| CN105281910A (en) * | 2015-06-26 | 2016-01-27 | 浙江巨联科技股份有限公司 | Internet of things lock with CA digital certificate serving as network access identity identifier and network access identity identification method |
| CN105376064A (en) * | 2015-11-23 | 2016-03-02 | 河海大学 | Anonymous message authentication system and message signing method thereof |
| CN106209743A (en) * | 2015-05-06 | 2016-12-07 | 广州星海智慧家庭***集成有限公司 | A kind of digital home integrated system authentication method of identity-based signature |
| CN107979459A (en) * | 2016-10-24 | 2018-05-01 | 福建凯特信息安全技术有限公司 | A kind of digital signature applications method based on electronics license |
| CN110768799A (en) * | 2019-12-30 | 2020-02-07 | ***股份有限公司 | Digital signature method, device, equipment, medium and system |
| CN112073173A (en) * | 2020-09-07 | 2020-12-11 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队信息工程大学 | Illegal signer determination system facing block chain PKI |
| CN113541972A (en) * | 2021-09-17 | 2021-10-22 | 杭州天谷信息科技有限公司 | Digital certificate generation method and electronic signature method |
| WO2022116734A1 (en) * | 2020-12-04 | 2022-06-09 | 华为技术有限公司 | Digital certificate issuing method and apparatus, terminal entity, and system |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN106209743A (en) * | 2015-05-06 | 2016-12-07 | 广州星海智慧家庭***集成有限公司 | A kind of digital home integrated system authentication method of identity-based signature |
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| CN105281910A (en) * | 2015-06-26 | 2016-01-27 | 浙江巨联科技股份有限公司 | Internet of things lock with CA digital certificate serving as network access identity identifier and network access identity identification method |
| CN105376064A (en) * | 2015-11-23 | 2016-03-02 | 河海大学 | Anonymous message authentication system and message signing method thereof |
| CN105376064B (en) * | 2015-11-23 | 2018-08-28 | 河海大学 | A kind of anonymity message authentication system and its message signing method |
| CN107979459A (en) * | 2016-10-24 | 2018-05-01 | 福建凯特信息安全技术有限公司 | A kind of digital signature applications method based on electronics license |
| CN110768799A (en) * | 2019-12-30 | 2020-02-07 | ***股份有限公司 | Digital signature method, device, equipment, medium and system |
| CN110768799B (en) * | 2019-12-30 | 2020-04-14 | ***股份有限公司 | Digital signature method, device, equipment, medium and system |
| WO2021135504A1 (en) * | 2019-12-30 | 2021-07-08 | ***股份有限公司 | Digital signing method, apparatus and device, medium, and system |
| CN112073173A (en) * | 2020-09-07 | 2020-12-11 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队信息工程大学 | Illegal signer determination system facing block chain PKI |
| WO2022116734A1 (en) * | 2020-12-04 | 2022-06-09 | 华为技术有限公司 | Digital certificate issuing method and apparatus, terminal entity, and system |
| CN113541972A (en) * | 2021-09-17 | 2021-10-22 | 杭州天谷信息科技有限公司 | Digital certificate generation method and electronic signature method |
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|---|---|
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