CN101873298A - Registration method, terminal, server and system - Google Patents
Registration method, terminal, server and system Download PDFInfo
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- CN101873298A CN101873298A CN200910082068A CN200910082068A CN101873298A CN 101873298 A CN101873298 A CN 101873298A CN 200910082068 A CN200910082068 A CN 200910082068A CN 200910082068 A CN200910082068 A CN 200910082068A CN 101873298 A CN101873298 A CN 101873298A
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Abstract
The embodiment of the invention relates to a registration method, a terminal needing registration, a registration server and a registration system. The registration method comprises the following steps of: receiving a registration request message from the terminal needing registration, wherein the registration request message carries an identifier, a registration request timestamp and the authentication information of the terminal needing registration; encrypting the identifier and the registration request timestamp to generate encryption results; and determining that the encryption results are the same as the authentication information and registering the terminal needing registration. By encrypting the identifier and the registration request timestamp in the registration request message and determining that the generated encryption results are the same as the authentication information in the registration request message, the embodiment of the invention realizes the verification of an encryption algorithm used by a remote maintenance agent (RMA) making a request for registration, prevents an illegal RMA from personating a legal RMA to transmit the registration request message to a remote maintenance server (RMS) to hostilely attack the RMS, and ensures the network security of a remote maintenance system.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to communication technical field, relate in particular to a kind of register method and terminal, server, system.
Background technology
Along with the continuous expansion of communication network scale, remote maintenance system has replaced manual type that service terminal is safeguarded gradually.Remote maintenance system comprise the remote maintenance server (Remote Maintenance Server, hereinafter to be referred as: RMS) and remote maintenance agency (Remote Maintenance Agent, hereinafter to be referred as: RMA).RMS is arranged on the management server, and managing portal (portal) is provided, and by the web interface service terminal is carried out remote monitoring and attended operation for the attendant; RMA is arranged on the terminal equipment, receives and carry out the remote maintenance instruction that RMS sends, and realizes remote monitoring and the attended operation of RMS to RMA.
In realizing process of the present invention, the inventor finds to exist at least in the prior art following defective:
In the prior art, the RMS register method lacks safety protecting mechanism, and illegal RMA can pretend to be legal RMA to send request registration message to RMS, and RMS is carried out malicious attack, has had a strong impact on the network security of remote maintenance system.
Summary of the invention
The embodiment of the invention provides a kind of register method and terminal, server, system, pretends to be legal RMA to send request registration message to RMS in order to prevent illegal RMA, and RMS is carried out malicious attack, improves the internet security of RMS.
The embodiment of the invention provides a kind of register method, comprising:
Receive the request registration message that registration terminal sends, carry identify label, request registration timestamp and the authentication information of described registration terminal in the described request registration message;
Cryptographic calculation is carried out in described identify label and request registration timestamp, generate encrypted result;
Determine that described encrypted result is identical with described authentication information, registers described registration terminal.
The embodiment of the invention provides a kind of register method, comprising:
Cryptographic calculation is carried out in identify label and request registration timestamp, generate authentication information;
Send request registration message to registrar, the described request registration message carries described identify label, request registration timestamp and authentication information.
The embodiment of the invention provides a kind of registrar, comprising:
Request registration message sink module is used to receive the request registration message that registration terminal sends, and carries identify label, request registration timestamp and the authentication information of described registration terminal in the described request registration message;
The encrypted result generation module is used for cryptographic calculation is carried out in described identify label and request registration timestamp, generates encrypted result;
Registering modules is used for determining that described encrypted result is identical with described authentication information, and described registration terminal is registered.
The embodiment of the invention provides a kind of registration terminal, comprising:
The authentication information generation module is used for cryptographic calculation is carried out in identify label and request registration timestamp, generates authentication information;
The request registration message transmission module is used for sending request registration message to registrar, and the described request registration message carries described identify label, request registration timestamp and authentication information.
The embodiment of the invention provides a kind of Accreditation System, comprising: registrar and registration terminal,
Described registrar is used to receive the request registration message that registration terminal sends, and carries identify label, request registration timestamp and the authentication information of described registration terminal in the described request registration message; Cryptographic calculation is carried out in described identify label and request registration timestamp, generate encrypted result; Determine that described encrypted result is identical with described authentication information, registers described registration terminal.
Described registration terminal, be used for cryptographic calculation is carried out in identify label and request registration timestamp, generate authentication information, and send request registration message to registrar, the described request registration message carries described identify label, request registration timestamp and authentication information.
As shown from the above technical solution, the embodiment of the invention is by carrying out cryptographic calculation to identify label in the request registration message and request registration timestamp, and the encrypted result that determine to generate is identical with authentication information in this request registration message, thereby realized the employed cryptographic algorithm of the RMA of request registration is verified, prevented that illegal RMA from pretending to be legal RMA to send request registration message to RMS, RMS is carried out malicious attack, guaranteed the internet security of remote maintenance system.
Description of drawings
The schematic flow sheet of the register method that Fig. 1 provides for the embodiment of the invention;
The schematic flow sheet of the register method that Fig. 2 provides for another embodiment of the present invention;
The schematic flow sheet of the register method that Fig. 3 provides for further embodiment of this invention;
The schematic flow sheet of the register method that Fig. 4 provides for another embodiment of the present invention;
The structural representation of the RMS that Fig. 5 provides for the embodiment of the invention;
The structural representation of the RMS that Fig. 6 provides for another embodiment of the present invention;
The structural representation of the RMS that Fig. 7 provides for further embodiment of this invention;
The structural representation of the RMA that Fig. 8 provides for the embodiment of the invention;
The structural representation of the Accreditation System that Fig. 9 provides for the embodiment of the invention.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing specific embodiments of the invention are described in further detail.
The schematic flow sheet of the register method that Fig. 1 provides for the embodiment of the invention.As shown in Figure 1, the embodiment of the invention can may further comprise the steps:
Registration terminal in the embodiment of the invention is the terminal with RMA, this registration terminal can be notebook computer, personal digital assistant (the Personal Digital Assistant that is provided with RMA, hereinafter to be referred as: PDA) wait minicomputer or personal computer (Personal Computer, hereinafter to be referred as: PC) wait terminal equipment, RMA sends request registration message by the internet to the registrar that is provided with RMS, to initiate register requirement, the telemanagement of obtaining registrar to registrar.Registrar in the embodiment of the invention is that example describes with RMS, and the registration terminal in the embodiment of the invention is that example describes with RMA.
When RMA inserted RMS, RMA need be registered to RMS by the register method that the embodiment of the invention provides.Before the flow process of the register method of the embodiment of the invention begins, RMA for example adopts cryptographic algorithm in advance: information-summary (Message-Digest Algorithm 5, hereinafter to be referred as: MD5) algorithm is to the identify label (IDentity of RMA, hereinafter to be referred as: ID) carry out cryptographic calculation, generate authentication information with the request registration timestamp.Wherein, the ID of RMA is the sign that sets in advance, and for example the ID of RMA is 5, to distinguish different RMA.The request registration timestamp is a multidate information, the request registration timestamp is expressed as a dynamic timestamp (timestamp) information, system time when this timestamp information is RMA transmission request registration message, for example: the system time when RMA sends request registration message is 23:30, and then this request registration timestamp is 23:30.In addition, the cryptographic algorithm in the embodiment of the invention is that example describes with MD5, but is not limited to MD5.
RMA is before sending request registration message, be specially when adopting the md5 encryption algorithm that the ID of RMA and request registration timestamp are encrypted, RMA adopt the md5 encryption algorithm to ID, 9 bytes 0, share key and the request registration timestamp (is expressed as: the 0+shared secret+timestamp of ID+9 byte) carry out cryptographic calculation, the generation authentication information.Wherein, shared key is the encryption string of md5 encryption algorithm configuration, when RMA and RMS use the md5 encryption algorithm of same type simultaneously, this RMA can obtain identical shared key with RMS, like this, if RMA and RMS use the md5 encryption algorithm of same type simultaneously, authentication information and RMS that RMA carries out the cryptographic algorithm acquisition carry out the encrypted result that cryptographic algorithm obtains, should be identical, if different, the then illegal registration of explanation.After finishing cryptographic calculation, RMA is combined into request registration message with ID, request registration timestamp and authentication information and sends to RMS.Wherein, can also carry Internet Protocol (Internet Protocol in the request registration message, hereinafter to be referred as: IP) address, this IP address are the sign of RMA in the internet, for example: 198.162.13.10, to distinguish the different RMA in the network, during the RMA access network, the IP address can change in the embodiment of the invention, after RMS confirms that the IP address of RMA changes, can send to RMA and re-register message, indication RMA re-registers RMS.Need to prove, the mode of RMA access network can be Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line (Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line in the embodiment of the invention, hereinafter to be referred as: ADSL), public switched telephone network (Published Switched Telephone Network, hereinafter to be referred as: PSTN), integrated services digital network (Integrated Service Digital Network, hereinafter to be referred as: mode such as ISDN), access way in the embodiment of the invention is that example describes in the ADSL mode, but is not limited to the ADSL mode.
Receive the request registration message of RMA transmission as RMS after, in order to prevent that illegal RMA from pretending to be legal RMA to send request registration message to RMS, RMS is carried out malicious attack, whether the authentication information that the request registration message that RMS needs basis to receive, checking send cryptographic algorithm that RMA the uses acquisition of this request registration message uses the encrypted result of cryptographic algorithm acquisition identical with RMS.
The method of checking is specially, the md5 encryption algorithm that uses self to ID, 9 bytes 0, share key and the request registration timestamp carries out cryptographic calculation, generate encrypted result, and determine whether the authentication information that carries in this encrypted result and the request registration information is identical, if it is identical, the RMA identity that then sends request registration message is legal, and RMS finishes this RMA is registered; If inequality, then stop to be this RMA registration, i.e. this RMA registration failure.
Owing to the authentication information that carries in the request registration message be equally to ID, 9 bytes 0, share key and request registration timestamp and carry out cryptographic calculation and obtain, when RMA uses identical md5 encryption algorithm with RMS, this md5 encryption algorithm is that RMA is identical with the shared key that RMS distributes, and also identical with encrypted result through the authentication information that obtains behind the cryptographic calculation.
Need to prove, employed md5 encryption algorithm does not have decrypt scheme in the embodiment of the invention, that is: the md5 encryption algorithm only can be encrypted data, can't be decrypted data encrypted, and, the kind of md5 encryption algorithm is more, causes illegal RMA can't obtain the employed md5 encryption algorithm of legal RMA.Therefore, when illegal RMA pretend to be legal RMA adopt with RMS md5 encryption algorithm inequality to ID, 9 bytes 0, when sharing key and request registration timestamp and carrying out cryptographic calculation, the shared key of the md5 encryption algorithm assigns that the shared key of the illegal employed md5 encryption algorithm assigns of RMA and RMS use is inequality, and also inequality through the authentication information and the encrypted result that obtain behind the cryptographic calculation.
When the cryptographic algorithm of carrying in RMS determines encrypted result and request registration message is identical, RMA registered be specially, RMS uses the request registration timestamp and the IP address of carrying in the request registration message to upgrade the successful hour of log-on stamp and the successful registered address of self preserving, and returns the message that succeeds in registration to this RMA.Send the timestamp information of request registration message when wherein, successful hour of log-on stamp was successfully registered for this RMA the last time.This success registered address sends the employed IP of request registration message address when successfully registering for this RMA the last time.
After RMS registers RMA, RMS allows RMA to carry out repeated registration, during repeated registration, RMS uses new request registration timestamp and IP address to upgrade original successful hour of log-on and stabs and successful registered address, the successful hour of log-on of preserving in the database of registrar is stabbed and successful registered address all is request registration timestamp and IP address when successfully registering the last time.
The embodiment of the invention is by carrying out cryptographic calculation to ID in the request registration message and request registration timestamp, and the encrypted result that determine to generate is identical with authentication information in this request registration message, thereby realized the employed cryptographic algorithm of the RMA of request registration is verified, prevented that illegal RMA from pretending to be legal RMA to send request registration message to RMS, RMS is carried out malicious attack, guaranteed the internet security of remote maintenance system.
The schematic flow sheet of the register method that Fig. 2 provides for another embodiment of the present invention, the embodiment of the invention is on the basis of the register method that above-mentioned Fig. 1 provides, increased the step that definite request registration timestamp stabs greater than successful hour of log-on, after having prevented the request registration message of illegal RMA hijack legitimate RMA, use this request registration message to insert RMS, the situation of RMS being carried out malicious attack takes place.As shown in Figure 2, the embodiment of the invention can may further comprise the steps:
Before the flow performing of embodiment of the invention register method, RMA adopts the md5 encryption algorithm that self ID and request registration timestamp are carried out cryptographic calculation, generates authentication information.After finishing cryptographic calculation, RMA is combined into request registration message with ID, request registration timestamp and authentication information.
When RMA starts, send request registration message from trend RMS, carry ID, request registration timestamp and the authentication information of RMA in this request registration message.
Further, after RMA successfully registered, RMA periodically sent ID and IP address to RMS, when RMS detects the IP address change of this RMA, trigger RMA and re-register, RMA sends request registration message from trend RMS, its process will be described in detail in next embodiment, not give unnecessary details herein.
Wherein, the particular content of the ID in the request registration message, request registration timestamp and authentication information is illustrated in the foregoing description one, is not giving unnecessary details herein.
RMS obtains ID and request registration timestamp in this request registration message after receiving the request registration message of RMA transmission.
After RMA successfully registers each time, RMS is saved in request registration message at that time in the self database, this request registration message is called successfully log-on message, timestamp information in this success log-on message is that successful hour of log-on for example stabs: this success hour of log-on stabs and is timestamp 8:00, the system time when expression RMA sends this success log-on message.The ID of this success log-on message and RMA has corresponding relation.
RMS searches the successful hour of log-on stamp that has corresponding relation with this ID from self database according to the ID in the request registration message.
RMS comparison of request hour of log-on stabs the value of stabbing with successful hour of log-on, when the request registration timestamp stabs greater than successful hour of log-on, the system time that expression RMA sends request registration message is after RMA sends the system time of the last successful log-on message, and then execution in step 205.
When the request registration timestamp is less than or equal to successfully the hour of log-on stamp, the system time of representing the request registration message that this RMA sends sends at RMA before the system time of the last successful log-on message or is identical, can judge this request registration message be illegal RMA hijack legitimate RMA when successfully registering in the last time or before the request registration message that sends, then RMS stops to be this RMA registration, i.e. this RMA registration failure.
Need to prove that successful hour of log-on that this request registration timestamp that sends request registration message and the last success are registered by RMA relatively stabs, for example: the value of 23:30 and 8:00 relatively.Can prevent that the request registration message that illegal RMA directly uses the legal RMA of intercepting and capturing to send from inserting RMS, carries out malicious attack to RMS.When illegal RMA has intercepted and captured the request registration message that is sent when the last or nearest many successes of legal RMA are registered, timestamp information in these request registration message is equal to or less than the timestamp information that the last success is registered, and for example: more illegal RMA hijack legitimate RMA the last time is that 8:00 equals the value that the last successful hour of log-on stabs 8:00 to the request registration timestamp that RMS sends in the request registration message.Be less than or equal to successfully the value that hour of log-on stabs when RMS determines the request registration timestamp, then stop to be this illegal RMA registration, this illegal RMA registration failure.
In the embodiment of the invention, after illegal RMA has intercepted and captured the request registration message that is sent when the last or nearest many successes of legal RMA are registered, can so that determining the request registration timestamp, stab RMS by revising the request registration timestamp in the request captured registration message greater than successful hour of log-on.But because employed md5 encryption algorithm does not have decrypt scheme in the embodiment of the invention, that is: the md5 encryption algorithm only can be encrypted data, can't be decrypted data encrypted.Therefore, illegal RMA can't be decrypted by the request registration message to intercepting and obtain the employed md5 encryption algorithm of legal RMA.And the kind of md5 encryption algorithm is more, makes illegal RMA can't obtain the employed md5 encryption algorithm of legal RMA.
Further, the authentication information in the illegal RMA request captured registration message is by the md5 encryption algorithm ID of RMA and request registration timestamp to be carried out cryptographic calculation to obtain, and this authentication information and request registration timestamp have unique corresponding relation.Therefore, can't obtain under the condition of the employed md5 encryption algorithm of legal RMA, after illegal RMA makes amendment to the request registration timestamp in the request captured registration message, can cause amended request registration timestamp not corresponding with authentication information at illegal RMA.Reason to sum up, for fear of taking place, illegal RMA use amended request registration message to insert RMS, the register method that the embodiment of the invention provides, after determining the value that RMA request registration timestamp stabs greater than successful hour of log-on, RMS needs also further to verify whether the employed cryptographic algorithm of this RMA is identical with the cryptographic algorithm of self using.
RMS extracts after ID and the request registration timestamp from the request registration message that receives, 0 and shared key of 9 bytes of md5 encryption algorithm assigns that RMS uses, and to ID, 9 bytes 0, shared secret and timestamp carry out cryptographic calculation, generates encrypted result.
Need to prove, RMS adopts identical md5 encryption algorithm that ID and request registration timestamp are carried out cryptographic calculation with legal RMA, and RMS is identical with the shared key that the md5 encryption algorithm that legal RMA uses is distributed, therefore, RMS carries out cryptographic calculation to ID and request registration timestamp, and it is identical with the authentication information that RMA generates to generate encrypted result.
If the value of step 206, comparison encryption result and authentication information consistent, then succeeds in registration.
The value of RMS comparison encryption result and authentication information when the value of encrypted result and authentication information is consistent, represents that the employed md5 encryption algorithm of this RMA and RMS is identical, and this RMA is legal RMA, then succeeds in registration, and RMS returns the message that succeeds in registration to RMA; Otherwise registration failure, RMS returns registration failure message to RMA.
Step 207, upgrade successful log-on message, and return the message that succeeds in registration to RMA.
After RMA successfully registers, RMS is saved in request registration message in the list of devices of self database, successful hour of log-on in this list of devices stabbed and successful registered address is updated to the IP address of request registration timestamp and request registration respectively, and return the message that succeeds in registration to RMA.Store in this list of devices: timestamp information and other device attributes that the ID of RMA, IP address, success are registered, for example: the medium access control of RMA (Media Access Control, hereinafter to be referred as: MAC) attribute information such as address, model.
Further, RMS allows RMA to carry out repeated registration, and the IP address with new request registration timestamp and request registration during repeated registration covers original successful hour of log-on stamp and successful registered address.The successful hour of log-on of preserving in the database of registrar is stabbed and successful registered address all is request registration timestamp and IP address when successfully registering the last time.
The value of the embodiment of the invention by determining that the request registration timestamp is registered greater than success, prevented illegal RMA at hijack legitimate RMA after the request registration message that RMS sends, use carries successfully the request registration message access RMS that hour of log-on stabs, RMS is carried out malicious attack, guaranteed the internet security of remote maintenance system.
The schematic flow sheet of the register method that Fig. 3 provides for further embodiment of this invention, the register method that the embodiment of the invention provides based on above-mentioned Fig. 2 after RMA successfully registers, has further increased the flow process that RMS upgrades the IP address of the RMA that self preserves.As shown in Figure 3, the embodiment of the invention can may further comprise the steps:
In the embodiment of the invention, after RMA receives the information that succeeds in registration that RMS returns, need be to periodically uploaded state report of RMS, with in real time to RMS report self current IP address and operating state.Before the flow process of present embodiment begins, the predetermined period that in RMA, preestablishes uploaded state report for example: per hour reported report in 1 time, per 5 minutes 1 time, for RMA according to this predetermined period uploaded state report.For example in RMS, preserve predefined number of times: 3 times, 5 inferior, receive IP address and successful registered address number of times inequality in the status report continuously in order to limit RMS.
The step 301-step 307 of the embodiment of the invention is identical with the step 201-step 207 of the register method that above-mentioned embodiment shown in Figure 1 provides, and is not giving unnecessary details herein.
Step 308, RMS receive the status report that RMA periodically reports, and carry ID and the IP address of RMA in this status report.
After RMA successfully registers, according to the predefined cycle to RMS uploaded state report, for example: the cycle can be set at per hour 1 time, and this status report comprises: the ID of RMA and the current IP address when reporting this status report.
Step 309, RMS obtain successfully the registered address according to the ID of RMA, and wherein, successful registered address is stored in the database of RMS, the IP address when successfully registering for RMA.
After RMS receives the status report that RMA reports, from self database, search and the corresponding successful registered address of ID in the status report.
Whether step 310, to detect successful registered address identical with current IP address, if, then end, if not, then execution in step 311.
RMS compares the current IP address that is carried in the status report that successful registered address and RMA report, whether with IP address identical, if then the IP address of RMA does not change if detecting successful registered address, RMS finishes this renewal process, continues to receive the status report that RMA periodically reports.
Step 311, RMS judge that the number of times that receives the status report that carries above-mentioned current IP address continuously is whether more than or equal to the number of times of subscription settings, if more than or equal to, then execution in step 312, and return to RMA and to re-register message, otherwise, finish follow-up flow process.
RMS accumulative total receives the number of times of the status report that carries above-mentioned current IP address continuously, if number of times that should accumulative total is more than or equal among the RMS during predefined number of times, change has taken place in the IP address that RMA then is described, at this moment RMS returns to RMA and re-registers message, so that RMA registers to RMS again; If number of times that should accumulative total illustrates then that less than among the RMS during predefined number of times the IP address of RMA does not change, finish follow-up flow process this moment.This kind method can prevent that illegal RMA from pretending to be the IP address in the legal RMA malicious modification RMS database of equipment side.Suppose that illegal RMA reports to the RMS uploaded state, comprise in this status report: the IP address of the ID of legal RMA and illegal RMA, after RMS receives this status report, though IP address old when detecting IP address in the status report and successfully registering with the ID of this RMA is different, but because legal RMA still is present in the network, therefore, RMS will receive the status report that legal RMA uses original legal IP address to report behind the one-period at most, RMS can judge that the IP address of this legal RMA does not change, no longer comprehend the status report that this illegal RMA reports, finish follow-up flow process, continue to receive the status report that RMA reports.For example: predefined number of times is 5 times, and accumulative total to receive the number of times of the status report that carries above-mentioned current IP address be 6 times, then the IP address of RMA changes, RMS returns to RMA and re-registers message, indication RMA re-registers RMS, for example: re-register message content and be " RMA is unregistered ".
Step 312, according to the log-on message that carries the current IP address after the change that RMA sends, RMA is registered.
RMA receives that RMS returns re-register message after, again send the request registration message that carries new IP to RMS, RMS repeats the flow process of the related register method of above-mentioned Fig. 1 or Fig. 2 according to this request registration message, RMA is registered, and use new IP address to cover successful registered address, finish the automatic renewal process in IP address of RMA.
When the embodiment of the invention changes by the IP address that detects the uploaded state report, return to RMA and to re-register message, triggering RMA re-registers, thereby when having realized changing in the IP address of newly-increased RMA or RMA, RMS is automatically updated to the merit registered address, reduce the workload that facility information is safeguarded, improved maintenance work efficient.
The schematic flow sheet of the register method that Fig. 4 provides for another embodiment of the present invention.As shown in Figure 4, present embodiment can may further comprise the steps.
In the embodiment of the invention, registration terminal can be the RMA in the register method that above-mentioned Fig. 1 provides, the RMS in the register method that registrar can provide for above-mentioned Fig. 1, wherein, RMA and RMS describe in detail in the embodiment that above-mentioned Fig. 1 provides, are not giving unnecessary details herein.
When RMA inserted RMS, RMA need be registered to RMS by the register method that the embodiment of the invention provides.At first, RMA adopts cryptographic algorithm in advance, and for example: the md5 encryption algorithm carries out cryptographic calculation to ID and the request registration timestamp of RMA, generates authentication information.Wherein, the ID of RMA is the sign that sets in advance, and for example the ID of RMA is 5, to distinguish different RMA.The request registration timestamp can be multidate information, is timestamp information such as the request registration timestamp, the system time when this timestamp information is RMA transmission request registration message, for example: 23:30.Concrete md5 encryption algorithm carries out cryptographic calculation to ID and the timestamp information of RMA, and the method that generates authentication information is described in detail in the embodiment that above-mentioned Fig. 1 provides, and repeats no more herein.After finishing cryptographic calculation, RMA is combined into request registration message with ID, timestamp information and authentication information and sends to RMS.
After RMS receives this request registration, at first obtain the ID in this request registration message, and in self database, search the successful hour of log-on corresponding and stab with this ID, when this success hour of log-on stamp was successfully registered for this RMA the last time, timestamp information in the request registration message that RMS preserved, for example: 8:00.Subsequently, the value that request registration timestamp in the RMS comparison of request registration message and the successful hour of log-on that finds out stab is with the value of determining that this request registration timestamp stabs greater than successful hour of log-on.If not after the request registration message that method RMA hijack legitimate RMA sends, when directly using this request registration message to insert RMS, RMS determines that the request registration timestamp is less than or equal to successfully the value that hour of log-on stabs, and then stops to be this illegal RMA registration, this illegal RMA registration failure; If after the value that the successful hour of log-on that the request registration timestamp in the request registration message that definite RMA sends is stored greater than self stabs, RMS needs also further to verify whether the employed cryptographic algorithm of this RMA is identical with the cryptographic algorithm of self using.Be that RMS adopts the md5 encryption algorithm that ID and the request registration timestamp that extracts in the log-on message carried out cryptographic calculation, generate encrypted result, then, RMS is the authentication information in this encrypted result and the request registration message relatively, to determine that encrypted result is identical with authentication information.If encrypted result that RMS process cryptographic calculation obtains and authentication information are not simultaneously, then stopping is this RMA registration, i.e. this RMA registration failure; When if the encrypted result that RMS process cryptographic calculation obtains is identical with authentication information, then RMS uses the successful log-on message of request registration information updating self preservation that receives, and returns the message that succeeds in registration to RMA.This kind method, can prevent that illegal RMA from having intercepted and captured the request registration message that is sent when legal RMA successfully registers,, utilize request registration message to insert RMS by the mode that use direct use or modification back, RMS is carried out malicious attack, guaranteed the internet security of remote maintenance system.
Further, after RMA receives the message that succeeds in registration that RMS returns, can also comprise: step 403, RMA carry ID and the IP address of RMA to RMS status report periodically in this status report.
After RMA receives the message that succeeds in registration that RMS returns, need according to the predefined cycle to the report of RMS uploaded state, for example: the cycle can be set at per hour 1 time, with in real time to RMS report self current IP address and operating state.Wherein, this status report comprises: the ID of RMA and the current IP address when reporting this status report.Behind the status report that RMS reception RMA reports, from self database, search and the corresponding successful registered address of ID in the status report, and more successful registered address and RMA report be carried at current IP address in the status report, if successful registered address is identical with the IP address, then the IP address of RMA does not change, RMS finishes this renewal process, continues to receive the status report that RMA periodically reports; If successful registered address and IP address are inequality, then RMS accumulative total receives the number of times of the status report that carries above-mentioned current IP address continuously, if number of times that should accumulative total is more than or equal among the RMS during predefined number of times, change has taken place in the IP address that RMA then is described, at this moment RMS returns to RMA and re-registers message, so that RMA registers to RMS again; If number of times that should accumulative total illustrates then that less than among the RMS during predefined number of times the IP address of RMA does not change, finish follow-up flow process this moment.This kind method can prevent that illegal RMA from pretending to be the IP address in the legal RMA malicious modification RMS database of equipment side.Suppose that illegal RMA reports to the RMS uploaded state, comprise in this status report: the IP address of the ID of legal RMA and illegal RMA, after RMS receives this status report, though IP address old when detecting IP address in the status report and successfully registering with the ID of this registration terminal is different, but because legal RMA still is present in the network, therefore, RMS will receive that legal RMA uses the status report of old IP reporting address behind the one-period at most, RMS can judge that the IP address of this legal RMA does not change, no longer comprehend the status report that this illegal RMA reports, finish follow-up flow process, continue to receive the status report that RMA reports.For example: predefined number of times is 5 times, and accumulative total to receive the number of times of the status report that carries above-mentioned current IP address be 6 times, then the IP address of RMA changes, RMS returns to RMA and re-registers message, indication RMA re-registers RMS, for example: re-register message content and be " RMA is unregistered ".
The embodiment of the invention sends to RMS by the request registration timestamp is carried in the request registration message, prevented illegal RMA at hijack legitimate RMA after the request registration message that RMS sends, directly use and carry successfully the request registration message access RMS that hour of log-on stabs, RMS is carried out malicious attack, guaranteed the internet security of remote maintenance system.
The flow process of the register method that the structural representation of the RMS that Fig. 5 provides for the embodiment of the invention, the RMS that the embodiment of the invention provides can be used for realizing that the embodiment of the invention shown in Figure 1 provides.As shown in Figure 5, embodiment of the invention RMS comprises: login request message receiver module 11, encrypted result generation module 12 and Registering modules 13.Wherein, login request message receiver module 11 is used to receive the request registration message that RMA sends, and carries identify label, request registration timestamp and the authentication information of described RMA in the described request registration message; Encrypted result generation module 12 is used for cryptographic calculation is carried out in described identify label and request registration timestamp, generates encrypted result; Registering modules 13 is used for determining that described encrypted result is identical with described authentication information, and described RMA is registered.
When the RMS of the embodiment of the invention worked, at first, login request message receiver module 11 received the request registration message that RMA send, and carries ID, request registration timestamp and the authentication information of RMA in this request registration message.Then, encrypted result generation module 12 uses the md5 encryption algorithm that ID and request registration timestamp are carried out cryptographic calculation, generates encrypted result.At last, after Registering modules 13 is determined this encrypted result and authentication information is identical, RMA is registered.
The embodiment of the invention is carried out cryptographic calculation by identify label and the request registration timestamp in 12 pairs of request registration message of encrypted result generation module, and determine that by Registering modules 13 encrypted result that generate are identical with authentication information in this request registration message, thereby realized the employed cryptographic algorithm of the RMA of request registration is verified, prevented that illegal RMA from pretending to be legal RMA to send request registration message to RMS, RMS is carried out malicious attack, guaranteed the internet security of remote maintenance system.
The structural representation of the RMS that Fig. 6 provides for another embodiment of the present invention, based on the RMS that above-mentioned Fig. 5 provides, the flow process of the register method that can be used for realizing that the embodiment of the invention shown in Figure 2 provides.As shown in Figure 6, embodiment of the invention RMS further comprises: determination module 14 is used for obtaining successfully hour of log-on according to described ID and stabs, and the value of definite described request hour of log-on stamp is greater than the value of described successful hour of log-on stamp.
Further, the result that the encrypted result generation module 12 in the embodiment of the invention is determined according to described determination module 14 carries out cryptographic calculation to described ID and request registration timestamp, generates encrypted result.
When the RMS of the embodiment of the invention worked, at first, login request message receiver module 11 received the request registration message that RMA send, and carries ID, request registration timestamp and the authentication information of RMA in this request registration message.Then, determination module 14 obtains successfully hour of log-on according to this ID and stabs, and determines the value whether value of this request registration timestamp stabs greater than successful hour of log-on.The results that determine when determination module 14 be the value of request registration timestamp stab greater than successful hour of log-on value the time, 12 couples of ID of encrypted result generation module and request registration timestamp carry out cryptographic calculation, the generation encrypted result.At last, after Registering modules 13 is determined this encrypted result and authentication information is identical, RMA is registered.
Determine the value of the value of request registration timestamp by determination module 14 in the embodiment of the invention greater than successful hour of log-on, prevented illegal RMA at hijack legitimate RMA after the request registration message that RMS sends, use carries successfully the request registration message access RMS that hour of log-on stabs, RMS is carried out malicious attack, guaranteed the internet security of remote maintenance system.
The structural representation of the RMS that Fig. 7 provides for further embodiment of this invention, the embodiment of the invention be based on the RMS that above-mentioned Fig. 6 provides, the flow process of the register method that can be used for realizing that the embodiment of the invention shown in Figure 3 provides.As shown in Figure 7, embodiment of the invention RMS further comprises: receiver module 15, successful registered address acquisition module 16 and re-register message transmission module 17.Wherein, receiver module 15 is used to receive described ID and the IP address that RMA periodically sends; Success registered address acquisition module 16 is used for obtaining described successful registered address according to described ID; Re-register message transmission module 17 and be used for, determine that change has taken place in the IP address of described RMA, send to described RMA and re-register message, so that described RMA resends request registration message according to described IP address and successful registered address.
When the RMS of the embodiment of the invention works, after 13 couples of RMA of Registering modules register, receiver module 15 receives ID and the IP address that RMA periodically sends, then, success registered address acquisition module 16 obtains successfully the registered address according to the ID that RMA sends, when re-registering successful registered address that IP address that message transmission module 17 determines that receiver modules 15 receive and successful registered address acquisition module 16 obtain number of times inequality greater than predefined number of times, re-register message transmission module 17 and re-register message, so that this RMA resends request registration message to this RMA transmission.
When the embodiment of the invention determines that by re-registering message transmission module 17 the IP address of RMA changes, return to RMA and to re-register message, triggering RMA re-registers, thereby when having realized changing in the IP address of newly-increased RMA or RMA, RMS is automatically updated to the merit registered address, reduce the workload that facility information is safeguarded, improved maintenance work efficient.
The flow process of the register method that the structural representation of the RMA that Fig. 8 provides for the embodiment of the invention, the RMA that the embodiment of the invention provides can be used for realizing that the embodiment of the invention shown in Figure 4 provides.As shown in Figure 8, embodiment of the invention RMA comprises: authentication information generation module 21 and request registration message transmission module 22.Wherein, authentication information generation module 21 is used for ID and request registration timestamp are carried out cryptographic calculation, generates authentication information; Request registration message transmission module 22 is used for sending request registration message to RMS, and the described request registration message carries described ID, request registration timestamp and authentication information.
When the RMA of the embodiment of the invention worked, at first, authentication information generation module 21 adopted the md5 encryption algorithms that ID and request registration timestamp are carried out cryptographic calculation, generates authentication information.Afterwards, request registration message transmission module 22 authentication information that ID, request registration timestamp information and authentication information generation module 21 are generated is carried in the request registration message and sends to RMS.
Further, embodiment of the invention RMA also comprises: sending module 23.After RMA successfully was registered to RMS, sending module 23 periodically sent ID and IP address to described RMS, so that RMS determines that according to ID and IP address change has taken place in the IP address of RMA.
The embodiment of the invention is carried at the request registration timestamp in the request registration message by request registration message transmission module 22 and sends to RMS, prevented illegal RMA at hijack legitimate RMA after the request registration message that RMS sends, directly use and carry successfully the request registration message access RMS that hour of log-on stabs, RMS is carried out malicious attack, guaranteed the internet security of remote maintenance system.
The structural representation of the Accreditation System that Fig. 9 provides for the embodiment of the invention, the Accreditation System that the embodiment of the invention provides can be used for realizing the flow process of the register method that Fig. 1 provides to the embodiment of the invention shown in Figure 4.As shown in Figure 9, embodiment of the invention Accreditation System comprises: RMS 1 and RMA 2.Wherein, RMS 1 is used to receive the request registration message that RMA 2 sends, carry ID, request registration timestamp and the authentication information of described RMA 2 in the described request registration message, described ID and request registration timestamp are carried out cryptographic calculation, generate encrypted result, determine that described encrypted result is identical with described authentication information, described RMA 2 is registered.RMA 2, are used for ID and request registration timestamp are carried out cryptographic calculation, generate authentication information, and send request registration message to RMS 1, and the described request registration message carries described ID, request registration timestamp and authentication information.
The RMS that RMS 1 in the embodiment of the invention can provide for above-mentioned Fig. 5, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7; The RMA that RMA 2 in the embodiment of the invention can provide for Fig. 8.
The embodiment of the invention is carried out cryptographic calculation by ID and the request registration timestamp in 1 pair of request registration message of RMS, and the encrypted result that determine to generate is identical with authentication information in this request registration message, thereby realized the RMA 2 employed cryptographic algorithm of request registration are verified, prevented that illegal RMA2 from pretending to be legal RMA 2 to send request registration message to RMS 1, RMS 1 is carried out malicious attack, guaranteed the internet security of remote maintenance system.
One of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that: all or part of step that realizes said method embodiment can be finished by the relevant hardware of program command, aforesaid program can be stored in the computer read/write memory medium, this program is carried out the step that comprises said method embodiment when carrying out; And aforesaid storage medium comprises: various media that can be program code stored such as ROM, RAM, magnetic disc or CD.
It should be noted that at last: above embodiment only in order to technical scheme of the present invention to be described, is not intended to limit; Although with reference to previous embodiment the present invention is had been described in detail, those of ordinary skill in the art is to be understood that: it still can be made amendment to the technical scheme that aforementioned each embodiment put down in writing, and perhaps part technical characterictic wherein is equal to replacement; And these modifications or replacement do not make the essence of appropriate technical solution break away from the spirit and scope of various embodiments of the present invention technical scheme.
Claims (13)
1. a register method is characterized in that, comprising:
Receive the request registration message that registration terminal sends, carry identify label, request registration timestamp and the authentication information of described registration terminal in the described request registration message;
Cryptographic calculation is carried out in described identify label and request registration timestamp, generate encrypted result;
Determine that described encrypted result is identical with described authentication information, registers described registration terminal.
2. method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, also comprises:
Obtaining successfully hour of log-on according to described identify label stabs;
After determining value that value that the described request hour of log-on stabs stabs greater than described successful hour of log-on, carry out and described cryptographic calculation is carried out in described identify label and request registration timestamp.
3. method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, the described request log-on message also carries the Internet Protocol IP address of described registration terminal, and described described registration terminal is registered comprises:
Successful hour of log-on stabbed and successful registered address is updated to the IP address of request registration timestamp and request registration respectively, and return the message that succeeds in registration to described registration terminal.
4. method according to claim 3 is characterized in that, also comprises:
Receive described identify label and IP address that described registration terminal periodically sends;
Obtain successfully the registered address according to described identify label;
According to described IP address and successful registered address, determine that change has taken place in the IP address of described registration terminal, send to described registration terminal and re-register message, so that described registration terminal resends request registration message.
5. method according to claim 4 is characterized in that, change has taken place in the IP address of described definite described registration terminal, comprising: receive described IP address and described successful registered address number of times inequality continuously greater than predefined number of times.
6. a register method is characterized in that, comprising:
Cryptographic calculation is carried out in identify label and request registration timestamp, generate authentication information;
Send request registration message to registrar, the described request registration message carries described identify label, request registration timestamp and authentication information.
7. method according to claim 6 is characterized in that, also comprises:
Periodically send described identify label and Internet Protocol IP address to described registrar, so that described registrar determines according to described identify label and IP address whether the IP address of registration terminal changes.
8. a registrar is characterized in that, comprising:
The login request message receiver module is used to receive the request registration message that registration terminal sends, and carries identify label, request registration timestamp and the authentication information of described registration terminal in the described request registration message;
The encrypted result generation module is used for cryptographic calculation is carried out in described identify label and request registration timestamp, generates encrypted result;
Registering modules is used for determining that described encrypted result is identical with described authentication information, and described registration terminal is registered.
9. registrar according to claim 8 is characterized in that, also comprises:
Determination module is used for obtaining successfully hour of log-on according to described identify label and stabs, and the value of definite described request hour of log-on stamp is greater than the value of described successful hour of log-on stamp; The result that described encrypted result generation module is determined according to described determination module carries out cryptographic calculation to described identify label and request registration timestamp, generates encrypted result.
10. registrar according to claim 8 is characterized in that, also comprises:
Receiver module is used to receive described identify label and the Internet Protocol IP address that described registration terminal periodically sends;
Success registered address acquisition module is used for obtaining described successful registered address according to described identify label;
Re-register message transmission module, be used for according to described IP address and successful registered address, change has taken place in the IP address of determining described registration terminal, sends to described registration terminal and re-registers message, so that described registration terminal resends request registration message.
11. a registration terminal is characterized in that, comprising:
The authentication information generation module is used for cryptographic calculation is carried out in identify label and request registration timestamp, generates authentication information;
The request registration message transmission module is used for sending request registration message to registrar, and the described request registration message carries described identify label, request registration timestamp and authentication information.
12. registration terminal according to claim 11 is characterized in that, also comprises:
Sending module is used for periodically sending described identify label and Internet Protocol IP address to described registrar, so that described registrar determines that according to described identify label and IP address change has taken place in the IP address of registration terminal.
13. an Accreditation System is characterized in that, comprising: registrar and registration terminal,
Described registrar, be used to receive the request registration message that registration terminal sends, carry identify label, request registration timestamp and the authentication information of described registration terminal in the described request registration message, cryptographic calculation is carried out in described identify label and request registration timestamp, generate encrypted result, determine that described encrypted result is identical with described authentication information, registers described registration terminal.
Described registration terminal, be used for cryptographic calculation is carried out in identify label and request registration timestamp, generate authentication information, and send request registration message to registrar, the described request registration message carries described identify label, request registration timestamp and authentication information.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN200910082068A CN101873298A (en) | 2009-04-21 | 2009-04-21 | Registration method, terminal, server and system |
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN200910082068A CN101873298A (en) | 2009-04-21 | 2009-04-21 | Registration method, terminal, server and system |
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| CN101873298A true CN101873298A (en) | 2010-10-27 |
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| CN200910082068A Pending CN101873298A (en) | 2009-04-21 | 2009-04-21 | Registration method, terminal, server and system |
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Application publication date: 20101027 |