CN100385941C - Method for processing encoded data for a first domain received in a network pertaining to a second domain - Google Patents
Method for processing encoded data for a first domain received in a network pertaining to a second domain Download PDFInfo
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- CN100385941C CN100385941C CNB038045753A CN03804575A CN100385941C CN 100385941 C CN100385941 C CN 100385941C CN B038045753 A CNB038045753 A CN B038045753A CN 03804575 A CN03804575 A CN 03804575A CN 100385941 C CN100385941 C CN 100385941C
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/60—Network structure or processes for video distribution between server and client or between remote clients; Control signalling between clients, server and network components; Transmission of management data between server and client, e.g. sending from server to client commands for recording incoming content stream; Communication details between server and client
- H04N21/63—Control signaling related to video distribution between client, server and network components; Network processes for video distribution between server and clients or between remote clients, e.g. transmitting basic layer and enhancement layers over different transmission paths, setting up a peer-to-peer communication via Internet between remote STB's; Communication protocols; Addressing
- H04N21/633—Control signals issued by server directed to the network components or client
- H04N21/6332—Control signals issued by server directed to the network components or client directed to client
- H04N21/6334—Control signals issued by server directed to the network components or client directed to client for authorisation, e.g. by transmitting a key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
- H04N21/45—Management operations performed by the client for facilitating the reception of or the interaction with the content or administrating data related to the end-user or to the client device itself, e.g. learning user preferences for recommending movies, resolving scheduling conflicts
- H04N21/462—Content or additional data management, e.g. creating a master electronic program guide from data received from the Internet and a Head-end, controlling the complexity of a video stream by scaling the resolution or bit-rate based on the client capabilities
- H04N21/4627—Rights management associated to the content
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/80—Generation or processing of content or additional data by content creator independently of the distribution process; Content per se
- H04N21/83—Generation or processing of protective or descriptive data associated with content; Content structuring
- H04N21/835—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates
- H04N21/8355—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates involving usage data, e.g. number of copies or viewings allowed
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N7/00—Television systems
- H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
- H04N7/162—Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing
- H04N7/163—Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing by receiver means only
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N7/00—Television systems
- H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
- H04N7/167—Systems rendering the television signal unintelligible and subsequently intelligible
- H04N7/1675—Providing digital key or authorisation information for generation or regeneration of the scrambling sequence
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Multimedia (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Two-Way Televisions, Distribution Of Moving Picture Or The Like (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
Abstract
The invention relates to a method of processing data, encrypted according to an encryption method specific to a first domain such that they cannot be decrypted without the aid of a first secret specific to the first domain, these data being received in a presentation device connected to a network belonging to a second domain. The method comprises the steps consisting, for the presentation device, in: (a) transmitting to a processing device connected to the network at least a portion of said encrypted data; (b) receiving from said processing device at least one element being used to decrypt said received data with the aid of a second secret specific to the second domain, the second secret being contained in the presentation device.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to prevent the field of copy digital data and this data of unauthorized access, especially when data are propagated in the local digital network such as digital home network.
Background technology
Prevent that from the situation that wherein can the copy digital content illegally copies numerical data with the system that is used for determining the territory be known convention.For example, the territory is used to represent to belong to one group of device such as the same family network, and these devices are shared the privacy key of this territory special use, for example password encryption key.The device that belongs to a territory can be a mancarried device.By knowing the privacy key of special domain special use, can determine the member relation of this special domain.
The digital content in this territory can be divided three classes:
-" freely copying ": can in any territory, write down and the such content of playback, therefore, needn't know that the privacy key that is exclusively used in the territory reads such content;
-" private copy ": only at the content that wherein can copy the type to its special domain that carries out playback; Know the privacy key of special domain as required and come recorded content so that can carry out the form of playback.Can not on the equipment that does not belong to this special domain, read such content;
-" read-only ": can only in special domain, read such content, but can not copy; If perhaps carried out the copy of content, can not carry out playback to it afterwards.
Digital content enters the territory by access means or source device usually.For example, such equipment is by using the number bus of the different device in the link field, and the channel by overseas portion obtains numerical data and it is broadcast to miscellaneous equipment in the territory.Particularly, source device can be a digital decoder, is used for via satellite the link of antenna or cable from the outside receiving video program of digital home network, so that it is broadcasted in network.It can also be a CD drive, is used for (audio frequency and/or the video) data that read on CD (in this case, dish comprises the data that are derived from network-external) in home network broadcasting.
Inside in the territory, by such as DVD (" digital versatile disc ") register or hard disk, can recording digital content.
At last, by presentation device content displaying is given the user in territory.These equipment are suitable for the content (numerical data of especially propagating) of acceptance domain in digital home network, so that it to be handled (especially in order being decrypted where necessary) and it to be showed end subscriber.Especially, this relates to and is used to the Hi-fi device watching the television receiver of video data or be used for the listening to audio data.
Source device comprises the module that is known as " conditional access " module or digital rights management module (" DRM ") usually, and this depends on that it still is " broadband content " that content is respectively " broadcasted content ".These module managements are by the suitably protection of the content of setting of content supplier.
For example, consider pay TV programs, content supplier, the person that is the programming provide usually utilized the key that is called as control word the scrambling form (promptly, encryption) digital program, form according to encrypting sends control word self in the message that is called as " ECM " (using ECM) with data.Content supplier also provides key and the conditional access module that is used for decryption control words to the subscriber of paying program receiving, and described conditional access module has especially comprised the algorithm (key and condition control module preferably include in smart card) of decryption control words.The service regeulations of the content that provides also have been provided in content supplier, that is, having defined content is " freely copying ", " private copy " or " read-only " type.
With SmartRight
TMNominal known the preventing in the copy system of (SmartRight is the registered trade mark of THOMSON Guzman Dennis M. De), source device is changed the content that is received according to the service regeulations of these contents.
When the content that source device received of giving localization is " private copy " type, in such a way it to be changed, described mode is: the presentation device that only belongs to special domain could be decrypted (so all devices is shared same privacy key) to it.The french patent application No.0105568 that submits with THOMSON licensing trade company name that submits to April 25 calendar year 2001 relates to the symmetric key management method in the communication network, wherein specifically described and how to have carried out this conversion, so as only to know the presentation device of the privacy key of communication network can decryption content to read it.
Notice, in the following description, term " privacy key " or " symmetric key " are used for being illustrated in the cryptographic key that symmetric cryptography or decipherment algorithm use, for example, with the nominal known algorithm of AES (abbreviation of " advanced encryption standard ") or with the nominal known algorithm of " Rijndael ", in " Proceedings from the first Advanced Encryption StandardCandidate Conference; National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); August 1998, J.Daemen and V.Rijmen ", it has been carried out describing particularly.
When content that source device received was " read-only " type, this source device was also by using the method described in the above-mentioned patent application to come converted contents, thereby only can be read it by the presentation device of the network of knowing the network secret key.In addition, method described in the french patent application No.00 15894 that has realized submitting on December 7th, 2000 with the name of THOMSON Guzman Dennis M. De, thereby can not be in the territory copied content, if or copied, then can not carry out playback to it by the presentation device in the territory.
When the content that is received in the territory was " freely copying " type, it is plaintext normally, and it was kept with form expressly by the source device that receives this content, so that in the territory it is broadcasted.
Because this system is for for the user of received content, keeping the private copy of this content, so that its later individual uses after the provider to this content has paid correlative charges.Only just can read this copy, that is, receive the territory of this content at first by the presentation device in its territory.
Yet, have the situation of wherein wishing to be placed on last time the private copy of first territory making at the presentation device in second territory.Particularly, if the user wishes the copy of the film made in the territory of watching on friend's the territory at him, naturally, can not make copy at its friend's territory.
This also is necessary under the situation of user's associating or separation.Under the situation of associating, if having his territory before each user, then two territories can not be linked to together, and this is because the device in two territories is not shared identical privacy key.In this case, if these two users do not wish to manage two different territories, then must can before the playback on second territory on first territory previous content that writes down.Equally, in the time a territory need being separated into two different territories (because spouse's separation or children have left its father and mother's family), need on two neofields, to read the content that before on PD, writes down.
The objective of the invention is to address the above problem.
Summary of the invention
According to the present invention, a kind of method of deal with data has been proposed, described data comprise first symmetric key that utilizes first privacy key be exclusively used in first territory to encrypt, and described data also comprise the control word of utilizing first symmetric key to encrypt, with presentation device that the network that belongs to second territory links to each other in receive described data, it is characterized in that described method comprises step:
(a) first symmetric key that will utilize first privacy key to encrypt at least by described presentation device is sent to the treatment facility that links to each other with network; (b) by described treatment facility first symmetric key that utilizes first privacy key to encrypt is decrypted, obtains first symmetric key; (c) by described treatment facility described first symmetric key that utilizes second symmetric key to encrypt is encrypted; (d) by described treatment facility utilization being exclusively used in described second symmetric key that second privacy key in second territory encrypts encrypts; (e) will utilize described first symmetric key that second symmetric key encrypts and described second symmetric key that utilizes second privacy key to encrypt to be sent to described presentation device by described treatment facility; And (f) receive from described treatment facility by described presentation device and utilize described second symmetric key that second privacy key be exclusively used in second territory encrypts and described first symmetric key that utilizes second symmetric key to encrypt, described first symmetric key is used for deciphering described control word, and described second privacy key is included in the presentation device.
Therefore, the present invention relates to a kind of method of deal with data, encrypt described data according to the encryption method that is exclusively used in first territory, if thereby do not utilize first privacy key that is exclusively used in described first territory, just can not be decrypted it, with presentation device that the network that belongs to second territory links to each other in receive described data.According to the present invention, at presentation device, described method comprises step:
(a) the described enciphered data of near small part sends to the treatment facility that links to each other with network;
(b) receive at least one element from described treatment facility, described element is used to utilize second privacy key that is exclusively used in described second territory, deciphers the described data that receive, and described second privacy key is included in the presentation device.
Therefore, the deciphering of data authorized know first privacy key that is exclusively used in first territory and the data division that it received is carried out the treatment facility of handling, thereby the presentation device in second territory can be deciphered the data that received simply by second privacy key of known proprietary in second territory.
In addition,, therefore, have only when treatment facility links to each other with the network in second territory, can decipher the data that received owing to the privacy key in first territory is not sent to the presentation device in second territory.
According to a particular embodiment of the invention, utilize first symmetric key that the data that received in presentation device are decrypted, come together to receive described first symmetric key according to the described data of the form of utilizing first privacy key to encrypt.In this embodiment, step (a) is: first symmetric key that will utilize first privacy key to encrypt sends to treatment facility; And step (b) is: receive following content from treatment facility: first symmetric key that utilizes second symmetric key to encrypt; And second symmetric key that utilizes second secret key encryption that is exclusively used in second territory.
According to concrete feature of the present invention, at presentation device, this method also comprises step:
(c) utilize second privacy key to decipher second encrypted symmetric key;
(d) utilize second symmetric key to decipher first encrypted symmetric key; And
(e) utilize first symmetric key to decipher by the received data of described presentation device.
According to a particular embodiment of the invention, this method also comprises step: in step (a) before, at presentation device, produce random number, in step (a), random number is sent to treatment facility with the encryption of first symmetric key.In this embodiment, the data that received in step (b) comprise random number and first symmetric key that utilizes second symmetric key encryption; Step (d) also comprises utilizes second symmetric key, the encrypted random number that deciphering is received in step (b); And in step (e) before, this method also comprises verification step, is used for verifying whether the random number of deciphering in step (d) equals the random number that produces before in step (a); Negating under the situation about verifying only, ability execution in step (e).
According to another feature of the present invention, IncFlds identifier in the data that presentation device received; During step (a), relam identifier is sent to treatment facility; And have only when treatment facility comprises identical relam identifier, just execution in step (b).
Description of drawings
By utilizing the description of the concrete non-limiting example that accompanying drawing explains, other features and advantages of the present invention can be apparent, wherein:
-Fig. 1 is the block diagram of digital home network that interconnection belongs to the equipment in first territory;
-Fig. 2 shows the block diagram of the home network of the equipment that belongs to second territory comprising of one embodiment of the invention;
-Fig. 3 shows among Fig. 2 the sequential chart of cipher key change between two equipment in the home network;
-Fig. 4 shows among Fig. 2 the sequential chart of exchanges data between the equipment on the home network, can be used for reading the content that (not copying) write down in second territory in first territory.
Embodiment
At first,, the example of home network is described, wherein realized preventing the system that copies with reference to figure 1, thus can only be therein to making the private copy of digital content in its home network that copies, so that use in the future.
This network comprises source device 1, presentation device 2 and the recording equipment 3 that links together by number bus 4, and for example, number bus 4 is the buses according to standard IEEE 1394.
Source device 1 comprises digital decoder 10, and this decoder is equipped with the intellignet card fetch that smart card 11 has been installed.This decoder receiving digital data, the particularly audio of distributing by the service provider.
Presentation device 2 comprises digital television receiver (DTV) 20, is equipped with the intellignet card fetch that smart card 21 has been installed, and particularly, recording equipment 3 is digital video cassette recorder (DVCR).
For example, the numerical data that enters network by source device 1 is normally such as according to the data after the scrambling of the former reason of pay TV content supplier.In this case, utilize control word (CW) that data are carried out scrambling, this control word is according to utilizing encryption key K
FThe form of encrypting transmits in data flow, is included in simultaneously in the using ECM (ECM).With encryption key K
FOffer the user who has paid, particularly, it is stored in the smart card for the reception data.In the example of Fig. 1, smart card 11 comprises such key K
FWith conditional access CA module 14 that can decryption control words CW.
Receive these the source device 1 of encrypted digital data it is formatd so that it is broadcasted on digital network according to the protection form that is exclusively used in home network.Decoder 10 comprises " ECM " module 13, is used for extracting to comprise from the data flow that received utilizing key K
FThe ECM message of the control word of encrypting is so that send it to CA module 14.CA module 14 decryption control words CW also send it to the conversion module 12 that is also contained in the smart card 11.
The task of conversion module 12 is that the information translation that will be included in the ECM message is to utilize LECM (" local right the control messages ") message of the cryptographic key protection that is exclusively used in local home network, and described key is called as key K
N1
Suppose that conversion module had before produced symmetric key K randomly
C, and asked to utilize the network secret key K
N1To key K
CEncrypt.Therefore, conversion module has key K in memory
C, and by netkey K
N1Encryption key K
C: E{K
N1(K
C).
In the following description, symbol E{K} (M) will be used for representing to utilize key K enciphered data M all the time.
Above-mentioned french patent application No.01 05568 describes a kind of method in detail, and this method makes conversion module utilize the network secret key K
N1Obtain key K
CEncryption, in presentation device, carry out this encryption.Especially, the presentation device of network, for example the equipment among Fig. 12 is unique netkey K that have
N1Equipment.Netkey K
N1Be included in the smart card 21 with terminal module 22, especially, terminal module 22 is responsible for utilizing netkey K
N1The operation of encryption and decryption.
System operates in the following manner.When receiving numerical data in decoder 10, " ECM unit " module 13 is extracted to have comprised and is utilized the key K that is exclusively used in content supplier
FThe ECM message of the control word of encrypting, and provide it to CA module 14.CA module 14 decryption control words CW also send it to conversion module 12.In addition, ECM message can also comprise the information of control of the copy of the relevant content that sends, and is illustrated in whether can freely copy this content in the network or whether can only watch this content such as (or listen to) in network.Also this information is sent to conversion module.
Then, conversion module is according to these data configurations LECM message.This message preferably includes:
-part A expressly specifically comprises the information of the control of related content copy, that is, having indicated this content is " freely copying ", " private copy " or " read-only " type; Usually with this information representation VCI (" watching control information ").This plaintext part has also comprised utilizes netkey encrypted secret key K
C: E{K
N1(K
C).
-part B utilizes key K
cEncrypt, and mainly comprise the control word CW that has deciphered; This part can be summarized as: E{K
C(CW).
-integrity field forms by the result who was applied to the hash function of all part A and B before the encryption of part B.Advantageously, this integrity field is used to verify the validity of LECM message, and guarantees it not to be carried out illegal modifications.
Then, LECM message is sent to the ECM unit, the ECM unit inserts LECM message and substitutes ECM message in the data flow.It should be noted that, when the content that is received also is not in aforesaid scrambling form and do not comprise any ECM message, in this case, conversion module 12 is responsible for making data to be in this form, thereby the data flow of broadcasting is in and grouping shown in Figure 1 40 similar data block forms all the time on network 4, comprises LECM message and scrambled data.
The content of this grouping can be summarized as follows:
LECM|E{CW} (<data 〉); Or:
E{K
N1(K
C) | VCI|E{K
C(CW) | integrity field | E{CW} (<data 〉);
Wherein " | " represents concatenation operator.
When digital television receiver 20 receives these packets, send it to " LECM unit " module 23, this module is from wherein extracting LECM message, so that send it to terminal module 22.Terminal module 22 at first utilizes key K
N1Decipher E{K
N1(K
C) to obtain key K
CThen, utilize key K
C, it deciphers E{K
C(CW) to obtain control word CW, send it to " LECM unit " module 23.Then, " LECM unit " module 23 can be utilized control word descrambling data E{CW} (<data 〉).Then, give the user with the data display of no scrambling.Under the situation of video data, can on television receiver 20, watch data.
If write down the data flow that comprises grouping 40 by digital video cassette recorder 3, so that carry out playback subsequently, note, do not comprise the wherein secret key K in the territory of record data if will show the presentation device of data thereon
N1, then can not do like this.Hereinafter, this territory is called N1.
Remember that in the example of Fig. 1, the territory is digital home network and all coupled devices, also might link to each other and belong to the kinsfolk's who has home network portable exhibiting device (not shown) with home network.When it comprises key K
N1The time, think that portable exhibiting device (for example compress music files reader) has constituted the part of territory N1.With reference to the description that at how the key of territory N1 is sent to the new presentation device in " entering " this territory (for example, when the member of family has bought new equipment) among the above-mentioned french patent application No.01 05568.
Now hypothesis is wanted and can be watched this film with being known as on the television receiver in other territory of N2 belonging to the user of the content (for example film) that has write down " private copy " type on the N1 of its territory.
In this case, for example user's tape that will include film inserts in the digital video cassette recorder of territory N2.This video box type record machine will be broadcasted film on the home network of territory N2, so that watch on the television receiver of territory N2.But, because the television receiver of territory N2 is not known the key K of territory N1
N1, it can not decipher the content of LECM message, therefore can not descrambling data so that give the user with flex film.
Following content description according to the present invention, how can in the N2 of territory, watch the content that is write down as " private copy " at territory N1, and need not to make the copy of this content at territory N2, or at least, if N2 has made copy in the territory, can not in territory 2, playback should copy.
For this purpose, be provided with special module, the function of conversion module and terminal module combined, and preferably it is included in the smart card.After this, it is called terminal/conversion module or terminal/converter card.
At first, must be in the N1 of territory this module of initialization, with the privacy key of acceptance domain N1, i.e. key K
N1, then, it will link to each other with territory N2, to utilize the key K of the packet that constitutes this content
N1Carry out the deciphering of encryption section.
To provide more details how to carry out these steps now.
Fig. 2 schematically shows the digital home network of the territory N2 that has wherein realized the preferred embodiment of the present invention.Only show required for the understanding of the present invention key element.
In this network, number bus 204 interconnected digital video cassette recorder 203, presentation device 202 and source device 201.Preferably, number bus 202 is the buses according to standard IEEE 1394.Presentation device 202 comprises digital television receiver DTV 220, the smart card 221 that it comprises " LECM unit " module 223 and comprises terminal module 222.Secret key K with territory N2
N2Be stored in the smart card 221.
In fact, terminal/converter card 211 belongs to the user of territory N1, and wish to watch at territory N1 during that this user inserts this terminal/converter card in the source device of territory N2 (or in the presentation device that it will be appreciated that in a second embodiment) as this user as the content of " private copy " record at territory N2.
The key of terminal module 214 IncFlds N1 receives this key during the initial phase of the terminal/converter card 211 in the N1 of territory.
Especially, before the network with territory N2 linked to each other, terminal/converter card 211 at first substituted " terminal " card (smart card that comprises the terminal module of card 21 among similar Fig. 1) by being inserted in the presentation device among the N1, and network next and among the N1 of territory links to each other.Then, think that terminal module 214 is " original ",, does not belong to any territory that is.
Define term " original ", " initiator " and " s.m.p generation " among the aforementioned french patent application No.0105568, and represented presentation device (or more accurately, its terminal module) respectively:
-do not link to each other and IncFlds privacy key (" original " terminal module or equipment) not with any territory;
-have the privacy key in the territory and can send it to the new original presentation device (" initiator " terminal module or equipment) that may link to each other with this territory; And
-have the privacy key in territory but can not send it to another equipment (" s.m.p generation " terminal module or equipment).
Aforementioned patent applications has also been described the mechanism of the safe transmission that is used for the privacy key between the distinct device.
After the initial phase of territory N1, then, terminal/converter card 211 is watched at territory N1 with hope and is linked to each other as the territory N2 of the content of " private copy " record.In Fig. 2, be inserted in the digital decoder 210 of source device 201.
Fig. 3 shows with terminal/converter card 211 and performed step after the network of territory N2 links to each other.
During first step 100, the conversion module 212 of terminal/converter card 211 produces symmetric key K randomly
C', and it is stored in the card 211.
In following step 101, source device 201 is broadcast request message on the network of territory N2, to receive the Public key of presentation device on the network.In fact each presentation device has a pair of symmetric key that is stored in the smart card that has comprised terminal module.For example, the presentation device among Fig. 2 202 has Public key K
PUB_T2With private key K
PRI_T2Use these keys according to mode known per se, thereby utilize asymmetric cryptographic algorithm (for example according to founder's name Rivest, the Shamir and the RSA Algorithm of Adleman name) to carry out and encrypt or decryption oprerations.
Any presentation device among the N2 of territory all can respond this request 101.Hereinafter, suppose in step 102 that presentation device 202 passes through its Public key K
PUB_T2Send to source device 201 and come response request.
Then, conversion module 212 utilizes the Public key K that is received
PUB_T2Carry out symmetric key K
C' encryption (step 103), the E{K as a result that will encrypt then
PUB_T2(K
C') send to presentation device 202 (step 104).Described presentation device 202 utilizes its private key K
PRI_T2Decipher the result who is received, so that obtain K
C' (step 105).Then, utilize the key K of territory N2
N2Carry out K
C' encryption, to obtain E{K
N2(K
C'), this result is sent to source device 201 in step 107.In following step 108, with this E{K as a result
N2(K
C') be stored in terminal/converter card 211.
Now, terminal/converter card has been ready to carry out the deciphering at " private copy " content of the territory N1 of territory N2.
With reference to figure 4, below be the explanation that is used for the process of this situation.
Fig. 4 has used downward vertical axis t to come the express time axle, represented when at broadcast source on the digital home network of territory N2 during from the fresh content of territory N1, by the performed processing of digital video cassette recorder DVCR203, presentation device 202 and terminal/converter card 211, and the exchange between these assemblies.
At first, for example, the user will be included in the videocassette of the video frequency program that territory N1 write down and insert in the digital video cassette recorder 203 of territory N2.Video tape recorder is broadcasting recorded data on tape on the network of territory N2 in the conventional mode.
Suppose that the user wishes to watch content on presentation device 202.Therefore, this user is set to this equipment on the broadcast channel of digital video cassette recorder 203, so that receive data.
These data of broadcasting comprise the packet of similar following grouping in the step 401 among Fig. 4:
LECM1|E{CW} (<data 〉), or
E{K
N1(K
C) | E{K
C(CW) | and integrity field | E{CW} (<data 〉), wherein calculation of integrity field in the following manner:
Hash(E{K
N1}(K
C)|CW),
Wherein Hash (x) represents hash function, and promptly a kind of mathematical function is used for input data set is closed the data acquisition system (y) that " x " is converted to fixed dimension, usually less than the size of importing data, and has represented the input data; This function still is a kind of one-way function, that is, known " y " can not obtain " x " once more, for example y=Hash (x).Preferably, use the SHA-1 function described in the file " Secure HashStandard, FIPS PUB 180-1, National Institute of Standard Technology, 1995 ".
When receiving this packet in presentation device 202, " LECM unit " module 223 is extracted LECM 1 message from packet, and sends it to terminal module 222.
In step 402, terminal module 222 at first detects this LECM1 message source from the territory that is different from territory N2.
For this purpose, according to first preferred variants of the present invention, LECM1 message promptly, is not utilized key K in its plaintext part
CIn the part of encrypting, also comprise relam identifier ID
N1This identifier has identified territory N1 in unique mode, for example, is that hash function is applied to secret key K among the N1 of territory
N1The result.Identifier ID
N1Be included in any terminal card of presentation device of territory N1.In this case, it also is included in terminal/converter card 211.
Except the privacy key of territory N2, the terminal card 221 of presentation device 202 is gone back the identifier ID of IncFlds N2
N2Therefore, terminal module 222 will be included in the identifier ID in the LECM1 message
N1With the identifier ID that is included in terminal/converter card
N2Compare.When two identifiers not simultaneously, terminal module 222 is from wherein deriving: the LECM1 message source that is received is from being different from the territory of territory N2.
According to second variant of embodiment, LECM1 message is the IncFlds identifier not.In this case, terminal module 222 will use the integrity field of LECM1 message to verify whether this message is derived from territory N2.
Especially, if terminal module 222 utilizes key K
N2Deciphering LECM1 message, and " Hash (x) " is applied to decrypted data with aforesaid hash function, then the result who is obtained can be different from the integrity field of LECM1 message, and terminal module 222 meetings are from wherein deriving: the LECM1 message source is from the territory that is different from territory N2.
In following step 403, module 222 produces random number R.Preferably, utilize pseudorandom number generator known per se to generate this numerical value.Numerical value R is the needs that are used to prevent " Replay Attack (replay attack) " (attack that exists) when resetting the message that is write down.In step 403, numerical value R is stored in temporarily in the kept secure district of card 221.
Then, in step 404, presentation device 202 is broadcasted the message that comprises following data on network:
R|E{K
N1}(K
C)|IDN1
Only in first variant of the foregoing description, identifier ID
N1Just be included in this message.
Utilize the asynchronous channel of bus 204 to carry out this broadcasting, propagate command messages (showing the transmission that the asynchronous channel by bus 204 carries out) by this bus usually by the dotted arrow among Fig. 4.
The source device 201 that receives this message sends it to terminal/converter card 211.
Only under the situation of first variant of previous embodiment following step 405 takes place, this step is: the identifier in the message that checking is included in the step 404 to be received whether be included in terminal/converter card 211 in identical.If two identifier differences, then processing stops, and this is because terminal/converter card 211 can not decryption information E{K
N1(K
C).Yet, if identifier is identical, handles and continue step 406, during this step, terminal/converter card is utilized key K
N1Decipher E{K
N1(K
C) to obtain key K
C
Under the situation of second variant that uses embodiment, execution in step 405, and any terminal/converter card that links to each other with the network of territory N2 with execution in step 406 and subsequently 407 and 408.
In step 407, terminal/converter card utilize key K '
CCome enciphered data R and K
C, it constructs following message then:
E{K
N2}(K′
C)|E{K′
C}(R|K
C)
In step 408, still, this message is sent to presentation device 202 by the asynchronous channel of bus 204.
In step 409, terminal module 222 utilizes key K
N2Deciphering E{K
N2(K '
C) with obtain key K '
C,, utilize this secret key decryption E{K ' in following step 410
C(R|K
C), thereby obtain R|K
C
Then, in step 411, the numerical value R that terminal module 222 checking obtains in step 410 whether really with in step 403, generated and stored identical.If not this situation, then to handle and stop, this is because the message that this means in step 408 to be received is not effective.
If checking is sure, then handle and continue step 412, wherein utilize the key K that obtains in step 410
CDecipher LECM1 message.More accurately, decryption information E{K
C(CW) to obtain control word CW expressly.
In step 412, terminal module 222 is also verified the integrality of LECM1 message by following calculating:
Based on the above Hash of decrypted data (E{K
N1(K
C) | CW), and the integrity field of this result and LECM1 message compared.
When realizing second variant of the foregoing description, if a plurality of terminal/converter card links to each other with the network of territory N2, then presentation device 202 can be received in the message of a plurality of the type of step 408 transmission where necessary.In this case, terminal module 222 is in message execution in step 409 to 412 that step 408 received, and when the integrity verification of LECM1 message was correct, terminal module was therefrom derived: the message that receives in step 408 is the message that is derived from terminal/converter card of territory N1.
If integrity verification is all failed in all cases, then stop to handle.Suggestion is showed alert message to the user in this case.
Otherwise the control word that terminal module 222 will have been deciphered sends to " LECM unit " module of television receiver 220, so this module can be in step 413, and descrambling is in packet that step 401 received.
Utilizing identical key K
CWhen protecting the LECM1 message of these groupings, according to the key K of its interim storage
C, presentation device 202 can also be deciphered the packet of the content of being broadcasted by digital video cassette recorder 203 subsequently.If key K
COnce changed, then repeating step 403 to 412, so that presentation device 202 receives the new key K of self terminal/converter card 211
C
Then, when receiving all packets of constitution content and utilize presentation device 202 that it is decrypted, presentation device 202 is deleted from its memory in step 414 and is stored to carry out the numerical value R and the key K of above calculating temporarily
C
Fig. 2 shows and replaces common converter card, terminal/converter card is inserted the embodiment of the source device of territory N2.
Yet terminal/converter card can also be inserted in the source device of territory N2, to replace common converter card in a second embodiment.This processing according to operate with reference to mode identical shown in figure 3 and 4.Yet in this case, naturally, territory N2 must comprise at least two presentation devices, thereby at least one equipment can keep the IncFlds key K
N2Terminal card so that realize the step shown in Fig. 3 and 4.
The exemplary embodiments that the present invention is not limited to just describe; it similarly can be applied to wherein utilize a pair of unsymmetrical key that is exclusively used in the territory of network belonging to come in the digital home network of protected data (particularly LECM message); the Public key of network is included in the source device; so that enciphered data; and private key is included in the presentation device, so that data decryption.In this case, after initial phase, terminal/converter card must comprise the private key of the first territory N1 and the Public key of the second territory N2, again encrypt thereby can decipher, thereby can utilize the presentation device in second territory that data are decrypted at the first territory ciphered data and to it.
Similarly; the present invention can also be applied under other particular case; in these cases; receive the numerical data of the conditional access system protection that utilizes content supplier at given territory N2; and directly data are recorded in the recording equipment of territory N2, and the conversion module that need not at first to utilize territory N2 with its " conversion " so that carry out playback at territory N2.When receiving these data that write down so that it is showed the user by the presentation device of territory N2 after a while, this presentation device can not be deciphered and wherein comprise by the privacy key that is exclusively used in content supplier (typically, the key K that occurs in the CA module 14 among Fig. 1
F) ECM of the control word CW that protected.In this case, think that " first territory " on the meaning of the present invention is the territory of content supplier.Then, presentation device is broadcasted ECM message on the network of territory N2, thus the LECM message that described ECM message conversion is decrypted for the privacy key that can utilize territory N2 by the conversion module (being associated) of territory N2 with the conditional access module of content supplier.
Claims (4)
1. the method for a deal with data (LECM1), described data comprise utilizes the first privacy key (K that is exclusively used in first territory
N1) encrypt (E{K
N1(K
C)) the first symmetric key (K
C), and described data also comprise and utilize the first symmetric key (K
C) control word (CW) of encrypting, in the presentation device (202) that links to each other with the network that belongs to second territory, receive described data, it is characterized in that described method comprises step:
(a) will utilize the first privacy key (K at least by described presentation device (202)
N1) encrypt (E{K
N1(K
C)) first symmetric key transmit (404) to the treatment facility (211) that links to each other with network;
(b) by described treatment facility (211) to utilizing the first privacy key (K
N1) encrypt (E{K
N1(K
C)) first symmetric key be decrypted, obtain the first symmetric key (K
C);
(c) by described treatment facility (211) to utilize second symmetric key (K '
C) encrypt (E{K '
C(K
C)) the described first symmetric key (K
C) encrypt;
(d) utilization is exclusively used in the second privacy key (K in second territory by described treatment facility (211)
N2) encrypt (E{K
N2(K '
C)) described second symmetric key (K '
C) encrypt;
(e) by described treatment facility (211) will utilize second symmetric key (K '
C) encrypt (E{K '
C(K
C)) the described first symmetric key (K
C) and utilize the second privacy key (K
N2) encrypt (E{K
N2(K '
C)) described second symmetric key (K '
C) be sent to described presentation device (202); And
(f) from described treatment facility (211), receive (408) by described presentation device (202) and utilize the second privacy key (K that is exclusively used in second territory
N2) encrypt (E{K
N2(K '
C)) described second symmetric key (K '
C) and utilize second symmetric key (K '
C) encrypt (E{K '
C(K
C)) described first symmetric key, the described first symmetric key (K
C) be used for deciphering described control word (CW), the described second privacy key (K
N2) be included in the presentation device.
2. method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, at described presentation device, described method also comprises step:
(g) utilize the second privacy key (K
N2) decipher (409) second encrypted symmetric key (K '
C);
(h) utilize second symmetric key (K '
C) decipher (410) first encrypted symmetric key (K
C); And
(i) utilize the first symmetric key (K
C) decipher by the received control word of described presentation device (CW).
3. method according to claim 2 is characterized in that in step (a) before, described method also comprises step (403), at presentation device, is used to produce random number (R),
In step (a), with described random number (R) with utilize the first privacy key (K
N1) encrypt (E{K
N1(K
C)) first symmetric key be sent to treatment facility together;
Wherein, in step (f) received data comprise utilize second symmetric key (K ' C) encrypt respectively (E{K '
C(R|K
C)) the random number (R) and the first symmetric key (K
C);
Step (h) also comprise utilize second symmetric key (K '
C) deciphering received encrypted random number (R) in step (f); And
In step (i) before, described method also comprises verification step (411), is used for verifying whether the random number (R) of deciphering in step (h) equals the random number (R) that is produced before in step (a); Only affirming under the situation about verifying, just execution in step (i).
4. according to the described method of one of aforementioned claim, it is characterized in that relam identifier (ID
N1) be included in the data (LECM1) that presentation device (202) received; And
During step (a), described relam identifier is sent to treatment facility (211);
Have only the treatment facility of working as to comprise under the situation of identical relam identifier, just execution in step (f).
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR0202330A FR2836609A1 (en) | 2002-02-25 | 2002-02-25 | Data transfer process for domestic digital network includes decoding and encoding using secrets specific to transmitting and receiving domains |
FR02/02330 | 2002-02-25 |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
CN1640127A CN1640127A (en) | 2005-07-13 |
CN100385941C true CN100385941C (en) | 2008-04-30 |
Family
ID=27676033
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
CNB038045753A Expired - Fee Related CN100385941C (en) | 2002-02-25 | 2003-02-21 | Method for processing encoded data for a first domain received in a network pertaining to a second domain |
Country Status (9)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US7529375B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1479234B1 (en) |
JP (1) | JP4538234B2 (en) |
KR (1) | KR100927920B1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN100385941C (en) |
AU (1) | AU2003224212A1 (en) |
BR (1) | BR0307779A (en) |
FR (1) | FR2836609A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2003073761A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (10)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
KR20050007830A (en) * | 2003-07-11 | 2005-01-21 | 삼성전자주식회사 | Method for Domain Authentication for exchanging contents between devices |
KR100636169B1 (en) * | 2004-07-29 | 2006-10-18 | 삼성전자주식회사 | Method for transmitting content which is processed by various DRM System, and the method for reproducing the contents |
KR100694064B1 (en) * | 2004-10-08 | 2007-03-12 | 삼성전자주식회사 | Method and Apparatus for converting DRM |
US8291236B2 (en) * | 2004-12-07 | 2012-10-16 | Digital Keystone, Inc. | Methods and apparatuses for secondary conditional access server |
US20080195548A1 (en) * | 2005-04-11 | 2008-08-14 | Hyun Gon Chu | License Data Structure and License Issuing Method |
FR2892222A1 (en) | 2005-10-17 | 2007-04-20 | Thomson Licensing Sa | METHOD FOR ETCHING, PROVIDING AND SECURE DISTRIBUTION OF DIGITAL DATA, ACCESS DEVICE AND RECORDER. |
US8627482B2 (en) * | 2006-07-24 | 2014-01-07 | Thomson Licensing | Method, apparatus and system for secure distribution of content |
KR20080084481A (en) * | 2007-03-16 | 2008-09-19 | 삼성전자주식회사 | Method for transmitting contents between devices and system thereof |
US8418206B2 (en) * | 2007-03-22 | 2013-04-09 | United Video Properties, Inc. | User defined rules for assigning destinations of content |
CN109543452A (en) * | 2018-11-29 | 2019-03-29 | 北京元心科技有限公司 | Data transmission method, device, electronic equipment and computer readable storage medium |
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- 2003-02-21 US US10/505,390 patent/US7529375B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2003-02-21 KR KR1020047013182A patent/KR100927920B1/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2003-02-21 WO PCT/FR2003/000583 patent/WO2003073761A1/en active Application Filing
- 2003-02-21 BR BR0307779-9A patent/BR0307779A/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2003-02-21 EP EP03720633A patent/EP1479234B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2003-02-21 JP JP2003572302A patent/JP4538234B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2003-02-21 AU AU2003224212A patent/AU2003224212A1/en not_active Abandoned
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
BR0307779A (en) | 2004-12-07 |
KR100927920B1 (en) | 2009-11-19 |
JP4538234B2 (en) | 2010-09-08 |
EP1479234B1 (en) | 2012-10-24 |
AU2003224212A1 (en) | 2003-09-09 |
KR20040088525A (en) | 2004-10-16 |
JP2005522902A (en) | 2005-07-28 |
CN1640127A (en) | 2005-07-13 |
EP1479234A1 (en) | 2004-11-24 |
FR2836609A1 (en) | 2003-08-29 |
US20050084109A1 (en) | 2005-04-21 |
WO2003073761A1 (en) | 2003-09-04 |
US7529375B2 (en) | 2009-05-05 |
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