AU777158B2 - Centralised cryptographic system and method with high cryptographic rate - Google Patents

Centralised cryptographic system and method with high cryptographic rate Download PDF

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Publication number
AU777158B2
AU777158B2 AU79404/00A AU7940400A AU777158B2 AU 777158 B2 AU777158 B2 AU 777158B2 AU 79404/00 A AU79404/00 A AU 79404/00A AU 7940400 A AU7940400 A AU 7940400A AU 777158 B2 AU777158 B2 AU 777158B2
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cryptographic
units
data
security
module
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AU7940400A (en
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Nicolas Grosclaude
David Guhl
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Nagravision SARL
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Nagravision SA
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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/43—Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
    • H04N21/442—Monitoring of processes or resources, e.g. detecting the failure of a recording device, monitoring the downstream bandwidth, the number of times a movie has been viewed, the storage space available from the internal hard disk
    • H04N21/4424—Monitoring of the internal components or processes of the client device, e.g. CPU or memory load, processing speed, timer, counter or percentage of the hard disk space used
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
    • H04N21/418—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
    • G06Q20/12—Payment architectures specially adapted for electronic shopping systems
    • G06Q20/123—Shopping for digital content
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
    • G06Q20/12—Payment architectures specially adapted for electronic shopping systems
    • G06Q20/127—Shopping or accessing services according to a time-limitation
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
    • G06Q20/14—Payment architectures specially adapted for billing systems
    • G06Q20/145—Payments according to the detected use or quantity
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F17/00—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services
    • G07F17/0014—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services for vending, access and use of specific services not covered anywhere else in G07F17/00
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
    • H04N21/418—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access
    • H04N21/4181—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access for conditional access
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
    • H04N21/426—Internal components of the client ; Characteristics thereof
    • H04N21/42607—Internal components of the client ; Characteristics thereof for processing the incoming bitstream
    • H04N21/42623—Internal components of the client ; Characteristics thereof for processing the incoming bitstream involving specific decryption arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
    • H04N21/426—Internal components of the client ; Characteristics thereof
    • H04N21/42684—Client identification by a unique number or address, e.g. serial number, MAC address, socket ID
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/43—Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
    • H04N21/436—Interfacing a local distribution network, e.g. communicating with another STB or one or more peripheral devices inside the home
    • H04N21/43607—Interfacing a plurality of external cards, e.g. through a DVB Common Interface [DVB-CI]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N7/00—Television systems
    • H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
    • H04N7/162—Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing
    • H04N7/163—Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing by receiver means only

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Development Economics (AREA)
  • Power Engineering (AREA)
  • Economics (AREA)
  • Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Two-Way Televisions, Distribution Of Moving Picture Or The Like (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
  • Exchange Systems With Centralized Control (AREA)

Description

AUSTRALIA
Patents Act 1990 NAGRAVISION S.A.
COMPLETE SPECIFICATION STANDARD PATENT Invention Title: Centralised cryptographic system and method with high cryptographic rate The following statement is a full description of this invention including the best method of performing it known to us:m:\specifications\100000\110377cmpg22wtm.doc Technical Field This invention concerns a centralised cryptographic procedure and system, particularly intended for applications that need high flux cryptographics.
Background Art In a service system distributed as, for example, pay-television, payment by credit card or by means of Internet, the information exchanged between the operating centre and the user modules uses cryptographic means to guarantee the authenticity and confidentiality of the data.
Depending on the type of application, the number of user modules can be high, and each of these modules sends the information by means of a concentrator to one or several operating centres in charge of authenticating and carrying out the transactions.
These operations are based on encrypted communications and need cryptographic means, on the one hand for the user modules and on the other hand for the operating centre. It can easily be imagined that if a great number of user modules have to be processed, the cryptographic means of the operating centre will need to be very powerful, while those of the user modules, being particular of each user, do not have the same needs.
For this reason, while a processor contained in a smart card is capable of 20 processing such data at the user module level, powerful computers must be installed at the operating centre.
A fundamental point concerns cryptographic keys. At the operating centre the cryptographic operations take place in a specialised cryptographic module, where particular attention is paid to security. These modules consist of a high capacity processor, which carries out the cryptographic operations, and a memory that contains the keys. For security reasons, these modules are either situated in a protected enclosure, such as a safe or a closed room, or they are encapsulated in a box, which, if "opened by whatever means, will erase the sensitive data.
Although these measures have undeniable qualities, these modules suffer oo°• 30 weaknesses in their electronic structure, and can be vulnerable to an operator with bad intentions. In fact, the employee who has the key to the door of the room where the cryptographic modules are situated can easily gain access to the memory where the cryptographic keys are stored. Such a damage can be catastrophic for the system's security and for the credibility of the supplier of the service.
Furthermore, although these cryptographic modules have a great processing capacity, they are not flexible when higher capacities are needed. For example, a 2 power increase involves the doubling of the cryptographic module, which in fact means increasing the capacity by 100%. Another aspect concerns the updating of these modules, which is difficult for a card especially developed for this purpose.
Use of more than one smart card for the decoding operations in the subscriber module is described in WO 96/07267 and in EBU Review Technical N 266 "Functional Model of a Conditional Access System". However, the presence of these multiple cards on the receiver's side is due to the fact that it is necessary to decode several sources using different keys, even different cryptographic functions. The presence of these cards does not process an important flux of data, it only ensures the compatibility with various standards.
Any discussion of documents, acts, materials, devices, articles or the like which has been included in the present specification is solely for the purpose of providing a context for the present invention. It is not to be taken as an admission that any or all of these matters form part of the prior art base or were common general knowledge in the field relevant to the present invention as it existed before the priority date of each claim of this application.
Throughout this specification the word "comprise", or variations such as "comprises" or "comprising", will be understood to imply the inclusion of a stated element, integer or step, or group of elements, integers or steps, but not the exclusion of fee* oo 20 any other element, integer or step, or group of elements, integers or steps.
0000 o0o* Summary of the Invention I According to a first aspect, the present invention provides a centralised high cryptographic rate system localised in an operating centre and intended to treat data to 25 be transmitted to a plurality of user modules, comprising: ~a control module (CM) to administer the entry/exit of data to be processed by the system; and at least one cryptographic module (EM) to ensure the authenticity of the data, .01. characterised in that each cryptographic module comprises at least one interface S 30 module to provide an interface between the control module and a plurality of monolithic security units (PIM), the monolithic security units PIM physically protecting the control module and the interface module, and are connected in parallel to the at least one interface module.
According to a second aspect, the present invention provides a centralised encryption/decryption method of data transmitted between an operating centre and a plurality of user units, consisting in transmitting, by the operating centre, data to be encrypted or decrypted to a control module said module comprising at least one interface module and transmitting by means of said interface modules the data to be coded or decoded to one or several monolithic security units connected in parallel, in charge of cryptographic operations depending on the flux of the data.
Embodiments of the present invention may provide a cryptographic module that offers high security against intrusion, both at the physical and logical level, a great flexibility depending on the cryptographic flux necessities, and that allows an easy updating.
Embodiments of the invention may comprise a centralised cryptographic system, comprising a control module and at least one cryptographic module, characterised in that each cryptographic module comprises one or several interface modules on which are one or several monolithic security units.
A monolithic security unit is a unit that includes all the necessary elements for the cryptographic operations located on a single support in order to ensure security.
They generally consist of a single electronic smart card that has a mechanical or electronic anti-intrusion protection. However, other structures consisting of, for example, two electronic chips are also included in the denomination "monolithic" as long as they are intimately linked and supplied by the distributors as a single element.
o According to further embodiments of the invention, the cryptographic module may comprise a first control module in charge of administering the entry/exit of the data to be processed. It allows determination of the cryptographic flux that is desirable and knows the cryptographic capabilities that are available. This control module can be material or logical. It has one or several interface modules on which are monolithic security units in order to process the data. Each of these units consist of a S 25 cryptographic calculating unit, a memory containing at least a part of the cryptographic keys and means to communicate with the interface module. The keys appear decoded only in the security units, which have, as indicted previously, a high level of security.
S•This level is achieved by the fact that they consist of a single standardised card designed for this purpose. Their structures do not allow them to achieve high :.oo 30 processing capacities. For this reason the increase in cryptographic flux is ensured by using a great number of these units. The more the necessary flux of the cryptographic system increases, the more the number of these working units will increase.
This configuration allows to ensure a great flexibility as to the cryptographic flux of the system by adding security units depending on the needs. This configuration allows to attend to the demand by adding the necessary security units.
According to further embodiments, the monolithic security units may be set on the interface modules in a removable way. This allows an easy updating of the latter, as technology progresses rapidly. Another advantage of this solution is their cost, because these security units are manufactured in large quantities and thus have attractive prices.
According to still further embodiments, the security units may be smart cards following the norms ISO 7816.
Yet further embodiments of the present invention may provide a method of centralised cryptographic processing of data consisting in transmitting the data to be processed to a cryptographic module, said module comprising one or several interface modules and transmitting the data by means of said interface modules to one or several monolithic security modules in charge of the cryptographic operations according to the flux of the data.
According to this method, the number of security units in service depend on the flux of the data required to the cryptographic module. In fact, because each unit has not enough power to process a great number of cryptographic operations in a short time it is necessary to use several security units. The control module and the interface module allow the parallel processing of the resources of the security units.
Preferably, one of the functions of the interface module is the administration of the resources that are further available. The interface module carries out in an initialisation phase the inventory of the security units that are attached to it, as well as o their characteristics. This resource file will be able to direct the requests according to the characteristics of these units.
•According to further embodiments of the invention, this method may consist in executing the same cryptographic operations by means of several security units and comparing the various results. If the results are different, the control module sends an error message to the console. This console can react in different ways, for example, establishing which of the security units is responsible for the error, by using either a reference security unit or several security units and detecting which unit sends a different result.
°•The result of this test will preferably be notified to the resource list so that the defective unit or units are not used any more.
In the hypothetical case that the error is not in one of the security units but concerns all the units of a same interface module, the parallel cryptographic operations are executed by two security units situated in two different interface modules. In fact, some parameters are stored on the interface module, and their modification can produce a malfunction of all the security units.
In order to ensure a good functioning of the various modules, it is possible to execute test operations on the security units that are not being used. These tests can be carried out with reference data of which the result is known in advance, or they can be executed by testing in parallel several modules with randomly generated data and comparing the results.
Brief Description of the Drawings The invention will be better understood with the following detailed description that makes reference to the annexed figures, which are given as a non-limiting example, in which: Figure 1 represents a centralised cryptographic system according to the state of the art; Figure 2 represents a cryptographic system according to the invention.
Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiments In Figure 1 are represented diagrammatically the various blocks of the system that is responsible for the encryption in the operating centre. The data to be encrypted are on the bus, which communicates the various information that are necessary for the functioning of the operating centre. When such an operation is required by the operating centre, the specialised cryptographic system is used, which is represented here by the control module block CM and the cryptographic module block EM. The mission of the control module CM is to filter the access to the cryptographic module EM, that is to say, it offers protection against attacks coming from the exterior by means of the communication bus. It is not conceived to resist a local attack, be it physical or "programming", for example, of the operator.
This control module CM, after having filtered the data, sends them to the cryptographic module EM to be processed. As mentioned above, it has powerful 30 cryptographic means in order to satisfy the high flux of the central bus. To achieve this, it has clear readable keys in its memory. In this example, the module is situated in a physically protected enclosure in order to prevent any non-authorised person from taking out the keys or from modifying the software in his/her own benefit.
In Figure 2 the architecture of the system according to the invention is represented. We find again the control module CM that works as a software filter against external damage. As indicated in Figure 2, this module communicates with several interface modules IM. These modules have a software protection, that is to say, a certain number of operations (for example, the reading) are simply not possible.
These modules, on the other hand, are not physically protected. This function is left to the security units PIM. Each interface module IM has a certain number of these PIM units in order to increase the cryptographic flux.
Another task of this CM module is to direct the requests coming from the central bus towards the security units. When the desired operation is finished (for example, the coding) the result is transmitted to the CM module, which informs the entity that has required this operation. In order to ensure the distribution of the requests, the CM module has a list of the available resources. When an error has been detected, the unit that is responsible for the error is disabled in the resource list.
It is not necessary that all the security units be of the same type. Some may have a cryptographic calculation unit based on a different algorithm than the other units. In this example, some units have, for example, a unit of the type RSA; others have a unit of the type DES or IDEA.
These information are contained in the resource list stored in the CM module.
This module directs the requests depending on the availability and the capability of the security units.
According to another embodiment, the interface modules are cards of the PCI 20 type and the security units are smart cards of the ISO 7816 type.
Although this invention concerns in the first place the coding of data, the architecture described above is equally applicable to the decoding of a flux of data. In fact, it is possible that during an emission purchase many users accede the operating S* centre, generating in this way an important flux to be decoded. The security units are then used for data decoding operations.
It will be appreciated by persons skilled in the art that numerous variations and/or modifications may be made to the invention as shown in the specific embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention as broadly described. The present embodiments are, therefore, to be considered in all respects as 30 illustrative and not restrictive.

Claims (14)

1. A centralised high cryptographic rate system localised in an operating centre and intended to treat data to be transmitted to a plurality of user modules, comprising: a control module (CM) to administer the entry/exit of data to be processed by the system; and at least one cryptographic module (EM) to ensure the authenticity of the data, characterised in that each cryptographic module comprises at least one interface module to provide an interface between the control module and a plurality of monolithic security units (PIM), the monolithic security units PIM physically protecting the control module and the interface module, and are connected in parallel to the at least one interface module.
2. A system according to claim 1 characterised in that the security unit comprises at least one calculation unit to encrypt/decrypt the data, a memory containing the cryptographic keys, and communication means to communicate the data between the security unit and the interface module.
3. A system according to claims 1 or 2 characterised in that the security unit is set S 20 in a removable way on the interface module.
4. A system according to claims 1 to 3 characterised in that the security unit is in the form of a smart card.
5. A system according to claim 4 characterised in that said smart card follows the norms ISO 7816.
6. A system according to any of the preceding claims characterised in that the monolithic security units (PIM) have cryptographic calculation units of a different type, 30 such as RSA, DES, T-DES, or IDEA.
7. A system according to any of the preceding claims characterised in that the control module (CM) has a resource list of the monolithic units comprising the available number, their state, their version, and their cryptographic capability. 8
8. A centralised encryption/decryption method of data transmitted between an operating centre and a plurality of user units, consisting in transmitting, by the operating centre, data to be encrypted or decrypted to a control module said module comprising at least one interface module and transmitting by means of said interface modules the data to be coded or decoded to one or several monolithic security units connected in parallel, in charge of cryptographic operations depending on the flux of data.
9. A cryptographic processing method according to claim 8 characterised in that it consists in transmitting to several security units the same data to be processed, comparing the data when returning from the security units, and informing an external entity if their values differ.
A cryptographic processing method according to claim 9 characterised in that it consists in transmitting the data to be processed to security units situated on different interface modules.
11. A cryptographic processing method according to claim 8 characterised in that it consists in carrying out test operations on one or several security units that are not currently in use and comparing the result with a reference result. o o
12. A cryptographic processing method according to claim 8 characterised in that it consists in carrying out test operations on at least three security units that are not currently in use and comparing the results in order to determine if these units are operative.
13. A cryptographic processing method according to claims 8 to 12 characterised in that it consists in administrating the security units by means ofa resource list situated in the control module this list comprising the number of available units, their state, their version, and their cryptographic capacity. oo.
14. A centralised high cryptographic rate system substantially as herein described and with reference to Figure 2 of the accompanying drawings. A centralised encryption/decryption method substantially as herein described and with reference to Figure 2 of the accompanying drawings. Dated this twenty-seventh day of July 2004 Nagravision S.A. Patent Attorneys for the Applicant: F B RICE CO
AU79404/00A 1999-11-08 2000-11-02 Centralised cryptographic system and method with high cryptographic rate Expired AU777158B2 (en)

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CH204599 1999-11-08
CH2045/99 1999-11-08
PCT/IB2000/001589 WO2001035659A1 (en) 1999-11-08 2000-11-02 Centralised cryptographic system and method with high cryptographic rate

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AU777158B2 true AU777158B2 (en) 2004-10-07

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Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO1996007267A2 (en) * 1994-08-19 1996-03-07 Thomson Consumer Electronics, Inc. System for processing a video signal via series-connected high speed signal processing smart cards

Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO1996007267A2 (en) * 1994-08-19 1996-03-07 Thomson Consumer Electronics, Inc. System for processing a video signal via series-connected high speed signal processing smart cards

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DZ3242A1 (en) 2001-05-17
ES2250199T3 (en) 2006-04-16
DE60023170T2 (en) 2006-06-22
PL355575A1 (en) 2004-05-04
IL149303A0 (en) 2002-11-10
EA200200408A1 (en) 2002-10-31
IL149303A (en) 2007-06-17
ZA200202938B (en) 2003-06-25
EP1228642A1 (en) 2002-08-07
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JP2003514461A (en) 2003-04-15
WO2001035659A1 (en) 2001-05-17
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