WO2013056601A1 - 一种更新密钥的方法及*** - Google Patents
一种更新密钥的方法及*** Download PDFInfo
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- WO2013056601A1 WO2013056601A1 PCT/CN2012/080837 CN2012080837W WO2013056601A1 WO 2013056601 A1 WO2013056601 A1 WO 2013056601A1 CN 2012080837 W CN2012080837 W CN 2012080837W WO 2013056601 A1 WO2013056601 A1 WO 2013056601A1
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- Prior art keywords
- key
- update
- authentication system
- token
- data
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/068—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3234—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of information security, and in particular to a method and system for updating a key.
- Dynamic Token is a specialized device for generating dynamic passwords, usually in the form of hardware, with a built-in microprocessor chip for processing data and running dedicated cryptographic algorithms, based on current time or number of uses. The factors such as the current dynamic password are generated and displayed on the display.
- the current dynamic password generated by the dynamic token needs to be verified by the background authentication server system, which uses the same algorithm, key and dynamic factor as inside the dynamic token.
- the dynamic password generated by the dynamic token is consistent with the dynamic password generated by the authentication server system, the legal identity of the user who uses the dynamic token can be confirmed.
- the present invention provides a method and system for updating a key for preventing risks caused by accidental leakage of a key.
- the present invention provides a method for updating a key, including:
- the background authentication system receives the current dynamic password generated by the dynamic token, and authenticates the current dynamic password. If the authentication succeeds, the key update information is generated and executed 2; otherwise, the key update operation is exited;
- the background authentication system generates a first update key according to the key update information and the first initial key stored by the background authentication system, when the background authentication system uses the first initial secret
- the result of the dynamic password authentication of the key is failure, and the use of the
- the background authentication system copies the first update key to a buffer of the first initial key; the dynamic token acquisition center Defining the key update information, and verifying the key update information, if the verification is successful, generating a second update key according to the key update information and the second initial key stored by the dynamic token, The second update key is copied to the buffer of the second initial key; otherwise, the key update operation is exited.
- the present invention also provides a method for updating a key, including:
- the background authentication system obtains the activation code, and verifies the activation code, if the verification is successful, executes 3; otherwise, exits the key update operation;
- the background authentication system generates a first update key according to the activation code and the first initial key stored by the background authentication system, and the background authentication system uses the first initial key to perform a dynamic password. If the result of the authentication is a failure, and the result of the dynamic password authentication using the first update key is successful, the background authentication system copies the first update key to the buffer of the first initial key.
- the dynamic token generates a second update key according to the activation code and the second initial key stored by itself, and copies the second update key to a buffer of the second initial key.
- the present invention also provides a system for updating a key, including a background authentication system and a dynamic token, where
- the background authentication system is configured to receive a current dynamic password generated by the dynamic token, and authenticate the current dynamic password, and if the authentication fails, exit the key update operation; if the authentication succeeds, generate a key update. And generating, according to the key update information and the first initial key stored by the background authentication system, a first update key; when the background authentication system uses the first initial key to perform dynamic password authentication, the result is If the result of the dynamic password authentication using the first update key is successful, the first update key is copied to the buffer of the first initial key;
- the dynamic token is configured to acquire the key update information, verify the key update information, and if the verification fails, exit the key update operation; if the verification is successful, according to the key Updating information and a second initial key stored by the dynamic token to generate a second update key, copying the second update key to the second initial key Buffer.
- the present invention also provides a system for updating a key, including a background authentication system and a dynamic token, where
- the background authentication system is configured to acquire an activation code generated by the dynamic token, verify the activation code, and if the verification fails, exit the key update operation; if the verification is successful, according to the activation code Generating a first update key with the first initial key stored by the background authentication system, and failing to use the first initial key for dynamic password authentication, and using the first update
- the first update key is copied to the buffer of the first initial key
- the dynamic token is used to generate the activation code, generate a second update key according to the activation code and a second initial key stored by itself, and copy the second update key to the The buffer of the second initial key.
- the beneficial effects achieved by the present invention During the use of the dynamic token, the dynamic token and the key of the dynamic token stored by the background authentication system may be updated according to the needs of the service, and after the key is successfully updated, The original key of the dynamic token is invalidated, and both the dynamic token and the background authentication system use the new key.
- the key update of the dynamic token can effectively prevent the risk caused by the accidental leakage of the key, and improve the security and flexibility of the dynamic token.
- FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for updating a key according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention
- FIG. 2 is a flowchart of another method for updating a key according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
- FIG. 3 is a flowchart of still another method for updating a key according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart of still another method for updating a key according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
- FIG. 5 is a flow chart showing steps added to the background authentication system when the dynamic token is used again according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention.
- FIG. 6 is a system structural diagram of an update key according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention
- FIG. 7 is a structural diagram of a system for updating a key according to Embodiment 7 of the present invention.
- the technical solution of the present invention is as follows:
- the solution includes a dynamic token, a terminal, and a background authentication system, and the terminal functions as a medium between the dynamic token and the background authentication system.
- the dynamic token is pre-stored with an initial key, and the dynamic key internal key is updated by the interaction operation of the three, and the synchronization of the key corresponding to the dynamic token is verified by the internal authentication system, and further Confirm that the key of the dynamic token and the background authentication system correspond to whether the key of the dynamic token is updated synchronously.
- Embodiment 1 of the present invention provides a method for updating a key.
- Step 101 The dynamic token generates a current dynamic password
- the terminal when the user applies for the key update service to the terminal, the terminal prompts the user to input a dynamic password.
- Step 102 The terminal acquires the current dynamic password generated by the dynamic token
- Step 103 The terminal sends the current dynamic password to the background authentication system, and requests the background authentication system to authenticate the current dynamic password.
- Step 104 The background authentication system authenticates the current dynamic password, and if the authentication succeeds, step 105 is performed, and if the authentication fails, the key update operation is exited;
- Step 105 The background authentication system acquires a pre-stored initial key corresponding to the dynamic token, a current update count value, and a length of a normal dynamic password;
- the initial key is expressed in hexadecimal notation, for example K1,
- the current key update count value is C
- the initial value of the current key update count value C is 0,
- the current key update count value C is 0;
- Step 106 The background authentication system generates a dynamic password, and updates the password to the dynamic key, and saves the first key update password;
- the dynamic password is an event type dynamic password
- the algorithm for generating the event type dynamic password may be a national standard SM3 event type algorithm, an OATH event type algorithm, etc.; preferably, in this embodiment, an OATH event type algorithm is adopted;
- the first key update password is 84755224
- Step 107 The background authentication system generates a first random number
- the first random number is an N-digit number, for example, a 6-digit number 123456;
- Step 107 is performed in any of the step items before step 108 and after step 104;
- Step 108 The background authentication system calculates a checksum of the first key update password and the first random number
- the verification mode is to calculate a LUHN checksum
- Step 109 The background authentication system combines the first random number with the checksum to obtain an update factor, and the "the update factor;
- the combination mode is splicing
- the update factor is 60927819;
- Step 110 The background authentication system combines the obtained initial key, the first key update password, and the update factor to obtain first data.
- the combination mode is splicing
- Step 111 The background authentication system performs operations on the first data to obtain a first update key, and saves the first update key;
- the operation is a SHA1 algorithm of a HASH function;
- the first update key is expressed in hexadecimal
- Step 112 The background authentication system records, in the background database, the status of the dynamic token as a key update to be first authenticated;
- the key update to be first authenticated state refers to that the dynamic token internally stores an initial key and an update key, and the initial key and the update key are to be The state in which the key is first authenticated;
- the key update is to be first authenticated to be
- Step 113 The background authentication system returns the first key update password and the update factor to the terminal;
- Step 114 The dynamic token acquires the first key update password and an update factor
- Step 115 The dynamic token calculates a checksum of the first key update password and the update factor
- the checksum is calculated by using the LUHN method
- Step 116 The dynamic token determines whether the checksum in step 115 is 0, if the verification is successful, step 117 is performed to start verifying the first key update password, otherwise the verification fails, and exits. Key update operation;
- Step 117 Dynamic token acquisition window value
- the window value is a preset maximum accumulated secondary value
- the window value is 5;
- Step 118 The dynamic token generates a second key update password within the window value range, and matches the first key update password generated by the background authentication system;
- the method for generating the second key update password by the dynamic token is the same as the method for generating the first key update password by the background authentication system in steps 105 and 106. This is no longer a comment; [74] The process of performing the matching is as follows:
- Step A The dynamic token generates a second key update password, and determines whether it is the same as the first key update password, and then “the currently generated second key update password, jumps out the match, otherwise the step is executed.
- Gland B The dynamic token generates a second key update password, and determines whether it is the same as the first key update password, and then “the currently generated second key update password, jumps out the match, otherwise the step is executed.
- Step B The current accumulated number of values is increased by 1;
- the initial number of accumulation times is 0;
- Step C The dynamic token determines whether the current accumulated number value exceeds the range of the window value, that is, whether it is greater than the maximum accumulated number of times, if the matching fails, the key update operation is exited, otherwise the next matching is continued, and the return is performed. Perform step A.
- Step 119 The dynamic token determines whether the second key update password generated by the dynamic token and the first key update password generated by the background authentication system are successfully matched within the window value range.
- the dynamic token verifies that the first key update password is successful, and step 120 is performed; otherwise, the verification fails, and the key update operation is exited;
- Step 120 The dynamic token acquires the current update count value, adds 1 to the current update count value, and stores the current update count value after 1;
- Step 121 The dynamic token combines the pre-stored initial key, the successfully matched second key update password, and the obtained update factor to obtain the second data.
- the combination mode is splicing
- the initial key stored in advance by the dynamic token is the same as the initial key corresponding to the dynamic token stored by the background authentication system in step 105;
- the background authentication system is the same as the initial key acquired by the dynamic token
- the first key update password is the same as the second key update password that is successfully matched
- the update factor is the same
- the combination manner is In the splicing manner, the second data obtained by combining is the same as the first data;
- Step 122 The dynamic token operates on the second data to obtain a second update key, and saves the second update key.
- the dynamic token in step 122 uses the same algorithm as the background authentication system in step 111. [87] In this embodiment, after the dynamic token generates the second update key, the pre-stored initial key is replaced with the second update key.
- the background authentication system is the same as the algorithm used by the dynamic token, and the second data of the operation is the same as the first data, the calculated second update key is the same as the first update key. , the updated key for the dynamic token.
- the dynamic token and the key of the dynamic token stored by the background authentication system are updated. After the key is successfully updated, the original key of the dynamic token is invalidated, the dynamic token and the background authentication are performed.
- the system uses a new key. Compared with the fixed use of the dynamic token key, the key update of the dynamic token can effectively prevent the risk caused by the accidental leakage of the key, and improve the security and flexibility of the dynamic token.
- Embodiment 2 of the present invention provides another method of updating a key.
- Step 201 The dynamic token generates a current dynamic password
- the terminal when the user applies for the key update service to the terminal, the terminal prompts the user to input a dynamic password.
- Step 202 The terminal acquires the current dynamic password generated by the dynamic token
- Step 203 The terminal sends the current dynamic password to the background authentication system, and requests the background authentication system to authenticate the current dynamic password.
- Step 204 The background authentication system authenticates the current dynamic password, and if the authentication succeeds, step 205 is performed, and if the authentication fails, the key update operation is exited;
- Step 205 The background authentication system returns the information of successful authentication to the terminal;
- Step 206 The dynamic token receives the information, and generates a token random number. [100] Specifically, in this embodiment, when the user passes the personal certificate, the dynamic token is triggered, and the trigger is triggered.
- the operation can be a trigger of a button, or a trigger of multiple button combinations.
- the token random number is 3568 24 ;
- Step 207 The terminal acquires the service information and the token random number generated by the dynamic token.
- the service information is input by a user, or is generated by the back-end authentication system and sent to the terminal;
- the service information includes a teller number, a transaction serial number, a date, and the like; Preferably, in this embodiment, the service information is 00031000220110915;
- Step 208 The terminal sends the token random number and the industry information to the background authentication system;
- Step 209 The background authentication system reads in the received token random number and the industry ff;
- Step 210 The background authentication system checks the token random number, and if the verification succeeds, step 211 is performed, otherwise the key update operation is exited;
- Step 211 The background authentication system performs operation on the token random number to obtain a token random number response value, and performs operation on the obtained service information to obtain a service information digest value;
- the token random number response value is three digits, expressed in hexadecimal.
- the token random number response value is 852;
- the service information digest value is a four-digit number, expressed in hexadecimal.
- Step 212 The background authentication system combines the token random number response and the industry summary digest value to obtain third data;
- the combination mode is splicing
- the token random number response value is three digits, and the service information digest value is four digits;
- Step 213 The background authentication system calculates a checksum of the third data, and after adding the third data, obtains a key update response value;
- the verification mode uses a LUHN checksum, and the calculated checksum is 1; [119] correspondingly, in this embodiment, the key update response value is 85280071;
- Step 214 The background authentication system acquires a pre-stored initial key corresponding to the dynamic token
- Step 215 The background authentication system combines the obtained initial key, the token random number, and the key update response value to obtain fourth data.
- the combination mode is splicing
- Step 216 The background authentication system performs operations on the fourth data to obtain a first update key.
- the operation uses a SHA1 algorithm of a HASH function
- the first update key is expressed in hexadecimal
- Step 217 The background authentication system records, in the background database, that the current state of the dynamic token is a key update to be first authenticated;
- the key update to be first authenticated state refers to that the dynamic token internally stores both an initial key and an update key, and the initial key and the update key are to be The state in which the key is first authenticated;
- the key update is to be first authenticated to be
- Step 218 The background authentication system sends the key update response value to the terminal;
- Step 219 The dynamic token acquires the key update response value
- Step 220 The dynamic token calculates a checksum of the acquired key update response value
- the verification uses a LUHN method to calculate a checksum
- Step 221 The dynamic token determines whether the calculated checksum is 0, if the check is successful, step 222 is performed to start verifying the key update response value, otherwise the key update operation is exited;
- Step 222 The dynamic token obtains the token random number from the acquired key update response value should be ⁇ i; [135] Step 223: The dynamic token calculates a response value according to the token random number;
- the algorithm used by the dynamic token in step 223 is the same as the algorithm used by the background authentication system in step 211;
- Step 224 The dynamic token compares whether the calculated response in the step 223 is the same as the obtained token random number response value, and the face certificate is successfully updated. Failed to exit the key update operation;
- Step 225 The dynamic token combines the pre-stored initial key, the generated token random number, and the key update response value to obtain fifth data;
- the combination mode is splicing
- the background authentication system is the same as the initial key obtained by the dynamic token, the token random number and the key update response value are the same, and the combination manner is a splicing manner,
- the fifth data is the same as the fourth data;
- Step 226 The dynamic token operates on the fifth data to obtain a second update key, and stores the second update key.
- the pre-stored initial key is replaced with the second update key.
- the background authentication system is the same as the algorithm used by the dynamic token, and the fifth data of the operation is the same as the fourth data, the calculated second update key is the same as the first update key.
- the key after the dynamic token is updated.
- the dynamic token and the key of the dynamic token stored by the background authentication system are updated. After the key is successfully updated, the original key of the dynamic token is invalidated, the dynamic token and the background authentication are performed.
- the system uses a new key. Compared with the fixed use of the dynamic token key, the key update of the dynamic token can effectively prevent the risk caused by the accidental leakage of the key, and improve the security and flexibility of the dynamic token.
- Embodiment 147 of the present invention provides another method for updating a key. [148] See Figure 3, the specific steps are as follows:
- Step 301 The dynamic token generates a current dynamic password
- the terminal when the user applies for the key update service to the terminal, the terminal prompts the user to input a dynamic password.
- Step 302 The terminal acquires the current dynamic password generated by the dynamic token.
- Step 303 The terminal sends the current dynamic password to the background authentication system, and requests the background authentication system to authenticate the current dynamic password.
- Step 304 The background authentication system authenticates the current dynamic password, and if the authentication succeeds, step 305 is performed, and if the authentication fails, the key update operation is exited;
- Step 305 The background authentication system sends a prompt message for successful authentication to the terminal;
- Step 306 The terminal sends a request for obtaining a token activation code to the background authentication system
- Step 307 The background authentication system generates a token activation code
- the token activation code is 74918118;
- Step 308 The background authentication system acquires a pre-stored initial key
- Step 309 The background authentication system combines the initial key and the token activation code to obtain sixth data.
- the combination mode is splicing
- Step 310 The background authentication system performs operations on the sixth data to obtain a first update key, and stores the first update key.
- the operation uses a SHA1 algorithm of a HASH function
- the first update key is expressed in hexadecimal, which is fa219c3de3bdld0b2fee82389d03396353975cbc;
- Step 311 The background authentication system records, in the background database, that the current state of the dynamic token is a key update to be first authenticated;
- the key update is to be first authenticated to be
- Step 312 The background authentication system sends the generated token activation code to the terminal;
- Step 313 The dynamic token acquires the token activation code;
- Step 314 The dynamic token verifies the obtained token activation code, and if the verification is successful, step 315 is performed, and if the verification fails, the key update operation is exited;
- Step 315 The dynamic token acquires the pre-stored initial key
- Step 316 The dynamic token combines the initial key with the token activation code to obtain seventh data.
- the seventh data and the sixth data obtained by combining are obtained because the background authentication system is the same as the initial key acquired by the dynamic token, the token activation code is the same, and the combination manner is the same. the same;
- Step 317 The dynamic token operates on the seventh data to obtain a second update key, and stores the second update key.
- the pre-stored initial key is replaced with the second update key.
- the background authentication system is the same as the algorithm used by the dynamic token, and the seventh data and the sixth data are the same, the calculated second update key is the same as the first update key.
- the dynamic token and the key of the dynamic token stored by the background authentication system are updated. After the key is successfully updated, the original key of the dynamic token is invalidated, the dynamic token and the background authentication are performed.
- the system uses a new key. Compared with the fixed use of the dynamic token key, the key update of the dynamic token can effectively prevent the risk caused by the accidental leakage of the key, and improve the security and flexibility of the dynamic token.
- Embodiment 177 of the present invention provides another method of updating a key.
- Step 401 Dynamic token receiving button trigger information
- the dynamic token when the user needs to update the key of the dynamic token, the dynamic token is triggered by a button, and the button triggering may be a triggering operation of a certain button, or a combination of multiple Trigger operation,
- the button trigger is a trigger operation of a button
- Step 402 The dynamic token determines whether the button triggering is to perform a key update operation for triggering the dynamic token, and if yes, executing step 403, otherwise ending the operation;
- Step 403 The dynamic token determines whether the operation of the current key update is the first update, if yes, step 404 is performed, otherwise the operation ends;
- the dynamic token is pre-stored with an initial key, such as K1.
- the dynamic token can be updated once after being shipped from the factory;
- Step 404 The dynamic token generates a first activation code
- the first activation code is 79225563
- Step 405 The terminal acquires the first activation code generated by the dynamic token.
- Step 406 The terminal sends the first activation code to the background authentication system.
- Step 407 The background authentication system # ⁇ The received first activation code, if successful, step 408 is performed, and if it fails, the key update system is exited;
- Step 408 The background authentication system obtains an initial key
- Step 409 The background authentication system combines the initial key and the first activation code to obtain eighth data;
- the combination mode is splicing
- Step 410 The background authentication system performs operations on the eighth data to obtain a first update key, and stores the first update key.
- the operation uses a SHA1 algorithm of a HASH function
- Step 411 The background authentication system records, in the background database, that the current state of the dynamic token is a key update to be first authenticated state;
- the key update is to be first authenticated to be
- Step 412 The background authentication system returns a prompt message indicating that the key activation is successful to the terminal;
- Step 413 Dynamic token reception ⁇ confirmation information;
- the terminal displays the prompt information that the key activation is successful, the user triggers the dynamic token by pressing the confirm key;
- Step 414 The dynamic token acquires the pre-stored initial key
- Step 415 The dynamic token combines the initial key and the generated first activation code to obtain ninth data
- the terminal when the terminal prompts that the key activation is successful, the user triggers a button on the dynamic token, and triggers the dynamic token to generate an update key;
- the background authentication system is the same as the initial key acquired by the dynamic token
- the first activation code is the same
- the combination manner is the same
- the ninth data and the eighth data obtained by the combination are combined. the same;
- Step 416 The dynamic token operates on the ninth data to obtain a second update key, and stores the second update key.
- the pre-stored initial key is replaced with the second update key.
- the background authentication system uses the same algorithm as the dynamic token, and the ninth data and the eighth data are the same, the calculated second update key is the same as the first update key.
- the new key obtained by the dynamic token update.
- the embodiment of the present invention updates the dynamic token and the key of the dynamic token stored by the background authentication system. After the key is successfully updated, the original key of the dynamic token is invalidated, the dynamic token and the background authentication are performed. The system uses a new key. Fixed compared to dynamic token key The constant use mode, the key update of the dynamic token can effectively prevent the risk caused by the accidental leakage of the key, and improve the security and flexibility of the dynamic token.
- the background authentication system performs the following authentication process, as follows:
- Step 501 The background authentication system determines whether the current state of the dynamic token recorded in the background database is the key update to be first authenticated state, if yes, step 502 is performed, otherwise step 509 is performed;
- the background authentication system determines whether the current state of the dynamic token recorded in the background database is an ST-NEW state
- Step 502 The background authentication system uses the update key and the original key to perform dynamic port authentication.
- the update key is K2;
- the original key is an initial key pre-stored by the background authentication system.
- the original key is stored in the background authentication system after the last update key.
- Step 503 The background authentication system determines whether the authentication using the update key is successful and the use of the original key authentication fails, if yes, step 506 is performed, otherwise step 504 is performed;
- Step 504 The background authentication system determines whether the authentication using the update key fails and the original key authentication is successful, if yes, step 507 is performed, otherwise step 505 is performed;
- Step 505 The background authentication system confirms that the authentication process performed by the key update to be first authenticated fails, and the authentication process ends;
- Step 506 The background authentication system copies the update key into the buffer of the original key
- Step 507 The background authentication system will record the dynamic token in the background database. The key update is restored to the other state after the first authentication state;
- the background authentication system restores the ST-NEW state to another state
- Step 508 The background authentication system confirms that the key update process to be performed in the first authentication state is successful, and the authentication process ends;
- Step 509 The background authentication system uses the original key to perform a dynamic port verification certificate, and ends the authentication process.
- step 506 the following operations are additionally performed:
- the back-end authentication system increments the current update count value C by 1, and re-stores the current update count value C.
- the dynamic password authentication is performed by using the update key and the original key respectively, and determining whether to copy the update key to the original key according to the authentication result is determined.
- the punch zone can ensure the unification of the keys in the background authentication system and the dynamic token.
- FIG. 6 is a system structural diagram of an update key according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention, including a background authentication system 610 and a dynamic token 620, where
- the background authentication system 610 is configured to receive the current dynamic password generated by the dynamic token 620, and authenticate the current dynamic password. If the authentication fails, the key update operation is exited; if the authentication succeeds, the secret is generated. Key update information, generating a first update key according to the key update information and the first initial key stored by the background authentication system 610; when the background authentication system 610 uses the first initial key to perform dynamic port The result of the witness is a failure, and when the result of the dynamic password authentication using the first update key is successful, the first update key is copied to the buffer of the first initial key;
- the dynamic token 620 is configured to acquire the key update information, and further to the key The new information is verified, if the verification fails, the key update operation is exited; if the verification is successful, the second update key is generated according to the key update information and the second initial key stored by the dynamic token 620, The second update key is copied to a buffer of the second initial key.
- the key update information may be a first key update password and an update factor.
- the background authentication system 610 is specifically configured to generate the first key update password and a random number, and obtain a checksum of the first key update password and the random number, The random number and the checksum are combined to obtain the update factor.
- the background authentication system 610 is specifically configured to combine the first key update password, the update factor, and the first initial key stored by the background authentication system 610 to obtain first data, according to The first data generates the first update key.
- the dynamic token 620 is specifically configured to obtain a checksum of the first key update password and an update factor, determine whether the checksum is zero, and determine the generated by the dynamic token 620. Whether the second key update password matches the first key update password, if it matches, then ⁇ succeeds; otherwise, ⁇ is failing.
- the dynamic token 620 is specifically configured to combine the update factor, the second initial key, and a second key update password that matches the first key update password to obtain a Two data; generating the second update key according to the second data.
- the above key update information may also be a key update response value.
- the background authentication system 610 is configured to acquire a token random number and service information, generate a token random number response value according to the token random number, and generate a service information digest value according to the service information. And combining the token random number response value and the service information digest value to obtain third data; acquiring a checksum of the third data, and performing the school face and the third data Combine to get the key update response value.
- the background authentication system 610 is specifically configured to combine the key update response value, the token random number, and the first initial key to obtain fourth data; according to the fourth data. Generating the first update key.
- the dynamic token 620 is specifically configured to obtain a checksum of the key update response value, determine whether the checksum is zero, and determine a token random number response obtained according to the token random number. The value and the token random number response obtained from the key update response value Whether the values are the same, if they are the same, the verification is successful; otherwise the verification fails.
- the dynamic token 620 is specifically configured to combine the key update response value, the token random number, and the second initial key to obtain fifth data, according to the fifth data. Generating the second update key.
- the above key update information may also be a token activation code.
- the background authentication system 610 is specifically configured to combine the token activation code with the first initial key to obtain sixth data, and generate the first data according to the sixth data. Update the key.
- the dynamic token 620 is specifically configured to combine the token activation code and the second initial key to obtain seventh data, and generate the second update key according to the seventh data. .
- the dynamic token and the key of the dynamic token stored by the background authentication system are updated. After the key is successfully updated, the original key of the dynamic token is invalidated, the dynamic token and the background authentication are performed.
- the system uses a new key. Compared with the fixed use of the dynamic token key, the key update of the dynamic token can effectively prevent the risk caused by the accidental leakage of the key, and improve the security and flexibility of the dynamic token.
- FIG. 7 is a system structural diagram of an update key according to Embodiment 7 of the present invention, including a background authentication system 710 and a dynamic token 720, where
- the background authentication system 710 is configured to acquire an activation code generated by the dynamic token 720, verify the activation code, and if the verification fails, exit the key update operation; if the verification is successful, The activation code and the first initial key stored by the background authentication system 710 generate a first update key, and when the background authentication system 710 performs dynamic password authentication using the first initial key, the result is a failure, and is used. When the result of the dynamic password authentication by the first update key is successful, the first update key is copied to the buffer of the first initial key.
- the background authentication system 710 is specifically configured to combine the activation code and the first initial key to obtain eighth data, according to the eighth data generation
- the first update key is described.
- the dynamic token 720 is configured to generate the activation code, generate a second update key according to the activation code and a second initial key stored by itself, and copy the second update key to the A buffer for the second initial key.
- the dynamic token 720 is specifically configured to combine the activation code and the second initial key to obtain ninth data, and generate the second update key according to the ninth data. key.
- the dynamic token and the key of the dynamic token stored by the background authentication system are updated. After the key is successfully updated, the original key of the dynamic token is invalidated, the dynamic token and the background authentication are performed.
- the system uses a new key. Compared with the fixed use of the dynamic token key, the key update of the dynamic token can effectively prevent the risk caused by the accidental leakage of the key, and improve the security and flexibility of the dynamic token.
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Abstract
本发明公开一种更新密钥的方法及***,该方法,包括:①、后台认证***接收动态令牌生成的当前动态口令,对所述当前动态口令进行认证,如果认证成功,则生成密钥更新信息,并执行②;②、所述后台认证***根据所述密钥更新信息和所述后台认证***存储的第一初始密钥生成第一更新密钥,将所述第一更新密钥复制到所述第一初始密钥的缓冲区;所述动态令牌获取所述密钥更新信息,对所述密钥更新信息进行验证,如果验证成功,则根据所述密钥更新信息和所述动态令牌存储的第二初始密钥生成第二更新密钥,将所述第二更新密钥复制到所述第二初始密钥的缓冲区;否则,退出密钥更新操作。本发明的技术方案能够防止密钥意外泄露而导致的风险。
Description
一种更新密钥的方法及***
技术领域
[01] 本发明涉及信息安全领域, 特别是涉及一种更新密钥的方法及 ***。
背景技术
[02] 动态令牌是一种专用的用于生成动态密码的装置, 通常以硬件 形式存在, 内置有微处理器芯片, 用于处理数据及运行专用的密码 算法, 并根据当前时间或使用次数等因素生成当前动态口令, 并显 示在显示屏上。
[03] 动态令牌生成的当前动态口令需要通过后台认证服务器***的 验证, 认证服务器***使用与动态令牌内部相同的算法、 密钥和动 态因子。 当动态令牌生成的动态口令与认证服务器***生成的动态 口令一致时, 才能确认使用该动态令牌的用户的合法身份。
[04] 现有技术中, 动态令牌的密钥通常是固定不变的, 一旦密钥意 外泄露, 会导致非法用户的进入。
发明内容
[05] 本发明提供了一种更新密钥的方法及***, 用于防止密钥意外 泄露而导致的风险。
[06] 本发明提供一种更新密钥的方法, 包括:
[07] ①、 后台认证***接收动态令牌生成的当前动态口令, 对所述 当前动态口令进行认证, 如果认证成功, 则生成密钥更新信息, 并 执行②; 否则, 退出密钥更新操作;
[08] ②、 所述后台认证***根据所述密钥更新信息和所述后台认证 ***存储的第一初始密钥生成第一更新密钥, 当所述后台认证*** 使用所述第一初始密钥进行动态口令认证的结果为失败, 且使用所
述第一更新密钥进行动态口令认证的结果为成功时, 所述后台认证 ***将所述第一更新密钥复制到所述第一初始密钥的緩冲区; 所述 动态令牌获取所述密钥更新信息, 对所述密钥更新信息进行验证, 如果验证成功, 则根据所述密钥更新信息和所述动态令牌存储的第 二初始密钥生成第二更新密钥, 将所述第二更新密钥复制到所述第 二初始密钥的緩冲区; 否则, 退出密钥更新操作。
[09] 本发明还提供一种更新密钥的方法, 包括:
[10] ①、 动态令牌生成激活码;
[11] ②、 后台认证***获取所述激活码, 对所述激活码进行验证, 如果驗证成功, 则执行③; 否则, 退出密钥更新操作;
[12] ③、 后台认证***根据所述激活码和所述后台认证***存储的 第一初始密钥生成第一更新密钥, 当所述后台认证***使用所述第 一初始密钥进行动态口令认证的结果为失败, 且使用所述第一更新 密钥进行动态口令认证的结果为成功时, 所述后台认证***将所述 第一更新密钥复制到所述第一初始密钥的緩冲区; 所述动态令牌根 据所述激活码和自身存储的第二初始密钥生成第二更新密钥, 将所 述第二更新密钥复制到所述第二初始密钥的緩冲区。
[13] 本发明还提供一种更新密钥的***, 包括后台认证***和动态 令牌, 其中,
[14] 所述后台认证***, 用于接收动态令牌生成的当前动态口令, 对所述当前动态口令进行认证, 如果认证失败, 则退出密钥更新操 作; 如果认证成功, 则生成密钥更新信息, 根据所述密钥更新信息 和所述后台认证***存储的第一初始密钥生成第一更新密钥; 当所 述后台认证***使用所述第一初始密钥进行动态口令认证的结果为 失败,且使用所述第一更新密钥进行动态口令认证的结果为成功时, 将所述第一更新密钥复制到所述第一初始密钥的緩冲区;
[15] 所述动态令牌, 用于获取所述密钥更新信息, 对所述密钥更新 信息进行验证, 如果验证失败, 则退出密钥更新操作; 如果验证成 功, 则根据所述密钥更新信息和所述动态令牌存储的第二初始密钥 生成第二更新密钥, 将所述第二更新密钥复制到所述第二初始密钥
的緩冲区。
[16] 本发明还提供一种更新密钥的***, 包括后台认证***和动态 令牌, 其中,
[17] 所述后台认证***, 用于获取所述动态令牌生成的激活码, 对 所述激活码进行验证, 如果验证失败, 退出密钥更新操作; 如果验 证成功, 则根据所述激活码和所述后台认证***存储的第一初始密 钥生成第一更新密钥, 当所述后台认证***使用所述第一初始密钥 进行动态口令认证的结果为失败, 且使用所述第一更新密钥进行动 态口令认证的结果为成功时, 将所述第一更新密钥复制到所述第一 初始密钥的緩冲区;
[18] 所述动态令牌, 用于生成所述激活码, 根据所述激活码和自身 存储的第二初始密钥生成第二更新密钥, 将所述第二更新密钥复制 到所述第二初始密钥的緩冲区。
[19] 本发明达到的有益效果: 动态令牌在使用过程中, 可以根据业 务需要, 对动态令牌及后台认证***所存储的该动态令牌的密钥进 行更新, 密钥更新成功后, 动态令牌的原有密钥作废, 动态令牌及 后台认证***均使用新的密钥。 相比于动态令牌密钥固定不变的使 用方式, 动态令牌的密钥更新可以有效防止密钥意外泄露而导致的 风险, 提高动态令牌的安全性和灵活性。
附图说明
[20]图 1为本发明实施例一提供的一种更新密钥的方法流程图;
[21]图 2为本发明实施例二提供的另一种更新密钥的方法流程图;
[22]图 3为本发明实施例三提供的又一种更新密钥的方法流程图;
[23]图 4为本发明实施例四提供的再一种更新密钥的方法流程图;
[24]图 5为本发明实施例五提供的再次使用动态令牌时后台认证系 统增加的步骤流程图;
[25]图 6为本发明实施例六中的一种更新密钥的***结构图;
[26]图 7为本发明实施例七中的一种更新密钥的***结构图。
具体实施方式
[27]为使本发明的目的、 技术方案和优点更加清楚, 下面将结合附 图对本发明实施方式做进一步的详细描述。
[28]本发明的技术方案如下: 本方案包括动态令牌、 终端和后台认 证***, 所述终端在动态令牌与后台认证***之间起到媒介的作 用。 所述动态令牌内部预先存储有一初始密钥, 通过三者的交互操 作实现动态令牌内部密钥的更新, 以 ^台认证***内部对应于该 动态令牌的密钥的同步更新, 同时进一步确认动态令牌的密钥和后 台认证***对应于该动态令牌的密钥是否同步更新成功。
[29]实施例一
[30]本发明实施例一提供了一种更新密钥的方法。
[31]参见图 1, 具体步骤如下:
[32]步骤 101: 动态令牌生成当前动态口令;
[33]具体地, 在本实施例中, 当用户向终端申请密钥更新业务时, 终端提示用户输入动态口令;
[34]步骤 102: 终端获取动态令牌生成的所述当前动态口令;
[35]步骤 103:终端向后台认证***发送所述当前动态口令,并请求 后台认证***认证所述当前动态口令;
[36]步骤 104:后台认证***认证所述当前动态口令,认证成功则执 行步骤 105, 认证失败则退出密钥更新操作;
[37]步骤 105:后台认证***获取预先存储的对应所述动态令牌的初 始密钥、 当前更新计数值和普通动态口令的长度;
[38]优选地, 在本实施例中,
[39]所 述初 始 密 钥 用 十 六 进制 表示 , 例 如 K1 ,
3132333435363738393031323334353637383930;
[40]所述当前密钥更新计数值为 C,
[41]所述当前密钥更新计数值 C的初始值为 0,
[42]例如, 当动态令牌第一次更新密钥时, 所述当前密钥更新计数 值 C为 0;
[43]所述普通型动态口令的长度为 8;
[44]步骤 106:后台认证***生成一动态口令,并将所述动态口^ Ht 为第一密钥更新口令, 并保存所述第一密钥更新口令;
[45]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述动态口令为事件型动态口令;
[46]相应地, 运算生成所述事件型动态口令的算法可以是国密标准 SM3事件型算法, OATH事件型算法等; 优选地, 在本实施例中, 采用 OATH事件型算法;
[47]相应地, 在本实施例中, 所述第一密钥更新口令为 84755224;
[48]步骤 107: 后台认证***生成第一随机数;
[49]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述第一随机数为 N位数字, 例如 6 位数字 123456;
[50]步骤 107在步骤 108之前、步骤 104之后的任一步骤项中执行;
[51]步骤 108:后台认证***计算出所述第一密钥更新口令和所述第 一随机数的校验和;
[52]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述校验方式是计算 LUHN校验和;
[53]步骤 109:后台认证***将所述第一随机数与所述校验和进行组 合, 得到更新因子, 并^ "所述更新因子;
[54]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述组合方式为拼接;
[55]相应地, 所述更新因子为 60927819;
[56]步骤 110:后台认证***将所述获取的初始密钥、第一密钥更新 口令、 更新因子进行组合, 得到第一数据;
[57]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述组合方式是拼接;
[58]步骤 111:后台认证***对所述第一数据进行运算得到第一更新 密钥, 并保存所述第一更新密钥;
[59]优选地,在本实施例中,所述运算是 HASH函数的 SHA1算法;
[60]相应地, 所述第一更新密钥用十六进制表示, 为
883b l2b0467823f7a95aa7e4bfca8bb22cd87fcb;
[61]步骤 112:后台认证***在后台数据库中记录下所述动态令牌的 状态为密钥更新待首次认证状态;
[62]具体地, 在本实施例中, 所述密钥更新待首次认证状态指的是, 动态令牌内部同时存储有初始密钥和更新密钥,待对所述初始密钥 和更新密钥进行首次认证的状态;
[63]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述密钥更新待首次认证状态为
ST-NEW状态;
[64]步骤 113:后台认证***将所述第一密钥更新口令和更新因子返 回给终端;
[65]步骤 114: 动态令牌获取所述第一密钥更新口令和更新因子;
[66]步骤 115:动态令牌计算出所述第一密钥更新口令和所述更新因 子的校验和;
[67]优选地, 在本实施例中, 采用 LUHN方式计算校验和;
[68]步骤 116: 动态令牌判断步骤 115中的所述校验和是否为 0, 是 则校验成功, 执行步骤 117, 开始验证所述第一密钥更新口令, 否 则校验失败, 退出密钥更新操作;
[69]步骤 117: 动态令牌获取窗口值;
[70]具体地, 在本实施例中, 所述窗口值为预先设定的最大累加次 数值,
[71]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述窗口值为 5;
[72]步骤 118: 动态令牌在所述窗口值范围内生成第二密钥更新口 令, 并与所述后台认证***生成的第一密钥更新口令相匹配;
[73]具体地, 在本实施例中, 动态令牌生成所述第二密钥更新口令 的方法与步骤 105、 步骤 106中后台认证***生成所述第一密钥更 新口令的方法相同, 在此不再赞述;
[74]所述进行匹配的过程如下:
[75]步骤 A: 动态令牌生成第二密钥更新口令, 判断是否与所述第 一密钥更新口令相同, 是则^ "当前生成的第二密钥更新口令, 跳 出匹配, 否则执行步腺 B;
[76]步骤 B: 当前累加次数值加 1;
[77]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述累加次数初始值为 0;
[78]步骤 C: 动态令牌判断当前累加次数值是否超出所述窗口值的 范围, 即是否大于最大累加次数值, 是则匹配失败, 退出密钥更新 操作, 否则继续进行下一次匹配, 返回执行步骤 A。
[79]步骤 119:动态令牌判断在所述窗口值范围内所述动态令牌生成 的第二密钥更新口令与后台认证***生成的所述第一密钥更新口 令是否匹配成功, 是则动态令牌验证所述第一密钥更新口令成功, 执行步骤 120, 否则验证失败, 退出密钥更新操作;
[80]步骤 120:动态令牌获取当前更新计数值,对所述当前更新计数 值进行加 1计算, 并存储所 1后的当前更新计数值;
[81]步骤 121:动态令牌将预先存储的初始密钥、 匹配成功的第二密 钥更新口令、 获取的更新因子进行组合, 得到第二数据;
[82]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述组合方式是拼接;
[83]所述动态令牌预先存储的初始密钥与步骤 105 中所述后台认证 ***存储的对应该动态令牌的初始密钥相同;
[84]在本实施例中, 由于后台认证***与动态令牌获取的初始密钥 相同、 第一密钥更新口令与匹配成功的第二密钥更新口令相同、 更 新因子相同, 且组合方式均为拼接方式, 则组合得到的所述第二数 据与所述第一数据相同;
[85]步骤 122: 动态令牌对所述第二数据进行运算得到第二更新密 钥, 并保存所述第二更新密钥。
[86]步骤 122中动态令牌使用与步骤 111 中后台认证***相同的算 法。
[87]在本实施例中, 动态令牌生成所述第二更新密钥后, 将预先存 储的初始密钥替换成所述第二更新密钥。
[88]由于后台认证***与动态令牌使用的算法相同、 进行运算的所 述第二数据与第一数据相同, 则计算得到的所述第二更新密钥与所 述第一更新密钥相同, 为动态令牌更新后的密钥。
[89]本发明实施例对动态令牌及后台认证***所存储的该动态令牌 的密钥进行更新, 密钥更新成功后, 动态令牌的原有密钥作废, 动 态令牌及后台认证***均使用新的密钥。相比于动态令牌密钥固定 不变的使用方式, 动态令牌的密钥更新可以有效防止密钥意外泄露 而导致的风险, 提高动态令牌的安全性和灵活性。
[90]实施例二
[91]本发明实施例二提供了另一种更新密钥的方法。
[92]参见图 2, 具体步骤如下:
[93]步骤 201: 动态令牌生成当前动态口令;
[94]具体地, 在本实施例中, 当用户向终端申请密钥更新业务时, 终端提示用户输入动态口令;
[95]步骤 202: 终端获取动态令牌生成的所述当前动态口令;
[96]步骤 203:终端向后台认证***发送所述当前动态口令,并请求 后台认证***认证所述当前动态口令;
[97]步骤 204:后台认证***认证所述当前动态口令,认证成功则执 行步骤 205, 认证失败则退出密钥更新操作;
[98]步骤 205: 后台认证***将认证成功的信息返回给终端;
[99]步骤 206: 动态令牌接收到^^发信息, 生成令牌随机数; [100]具体地, 在本实施例中, 当用户通过身 人证后, 触发动态令 牌, 所述触发操作可以是一个按键的触发, 或者是多个按键组合的 触发,
[101]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述令牌随机数为 356824;
[102]步骤 207: 终端获取业务信息和动态令牌生成的所述令牌随机 数;
[103]具体地, 在本实施例中, 所述业务信息是用户输入的, 或是后 台认证***生成并发送给终端的;
[104]所述业务信息包括柜员号、 交易流水号、 日期等; 优选地, 在 本实施例中, 所述业务信息为 00031000220110915;
[105]步骤 208:终端将所述令牌随机数和所述业^ ft息发送给后台认 证***;
[106]步骤 209: 后台认证***读入接收到的令牌随机数和业 ^ff息;
[107]步骤 210:后台认证***校验所述令牌随机数,校验成功则执行 步骤 211 , 否则退出密钥更新操作;
[108]步骤 211:后台认证***对所述令牌随机数进行运算得到令牌随 机数应答值, 对所述获取的业务信息进行运算得到业务信息摘要 值;
[109]优选地, 在本实施例中,
[110]所述令牌随机数应答值为三位数, 用十六进制表示,
[111]相应地, 所述令牌随机数应答值为 852;
[112]所述业务信息摘要值为四位数, 用十六进制表示,
[113]相应地, 所述业 ^ff息摘^ i为 8007;
[114]步骤 212:后台认证***将所述令牌随机数应^ i和所述业^ ff 息摘要值进行组合, 得到第三数据;
[115]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述组合方式为拼接;
[116]优选地, 所述令牌随机数应答值为三位数, 所述业务信息摘要 值为四位数;
[117]步骤 213:后台认证***计算出所述第三数据的校验和,补充到 所述第三数据之后, 得到密钥更新响应值;
[118]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述校验方式采用 LUHN校验和, 所 述计算得出的校验和为 1;
[119]相应地, 在本实施例中, 所述密钥更新响应值为 85280071;
[120]步骤 214:后台认证***获取预先存储的对应所述动态令牌的初 始密钥;
[121]步骤 215:后台认证***将所述获取的初始密钥、所述令牌随机 数与所述密钥更新响应值进行组合, 得到第四数据;
[122]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述组合方式为拼接;
[123]步骤 216:后台认证***对所述第四数据进行运算,得到第一更 新密钥;
[124]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述运算采用 HASH函数的 SHA1算 法;
[125]相应地, 所述第一更新密钥用十六进制表示, 为
3d2dfded01cclcff24032182aa81367200938f63;
[126]步骤 217:后台认证***在后台数据库中记录下所述动态令牌的 当前状态为密钥更新待首次认证状态;
[127]具体地, 在本实施例中, 所述密钥更新待首次认证状态指的是, 动态令牌内部同时存储有初始密钥和更新密钥,待对所述初始密钥 和更新密钥进行首次认证的状态;
[128]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述密钥更新待首次认证状态为
ST-NEW状态;
[129]步骤 218: 后台认证***将所述密钥更新响应值发送给终端;
[130]步骤 219: 动态令牌获取所述密钥更新响应值;
[131]步骤 220: 动态令牌计算所述获取的密钥更新响应值的校验和;
[132]优选地,在本实施例中,所述校验采用 LUHN方式计算校验和;
[133]步骤 221: 动态令牌判断所述计算出的校验和是否为 0, 是则校 验成功, 执行步骤 222, 开始验证所述密钥更新响应值, 否则退出 密钥更新操作;
[134]步骤 222:动态令牌从所述获取的密钥更新响应值中获取令牌随 机数应 ^i;
[135]步骤 223: 动态令牌根据令牌随机数计算出应答值;
[136]在本实施例中,步骤 223中所述动态令牌使用的算法与步骤 211 中后台认证***使用的算法相同;
[137]步骤 224:动态令牌比较所述步骤 223中计算得出的应^ i是否 与所述获取的令牌随机数应答值相同,是则臉证所述密钥更新响应 值成功, 否则 失败, 退出密钥更新操作;
[138]步骤 225:动态令牌将所述预先存储的初始密钥、所述生成的令 牌随机数与所述密钥更新响应值进行组合, 得到第五数据;
[139]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述组合方式为拼接;
[140]在本实施例中, 由于后台认证***与动态令牌获取的初始密钥 相同、 令牌随机数和密钥更新响应值相同, 且组合方式均为拼接方 式, 则组合得到的所述第五数据与所述第四数据相同;
[141]步骤 226:动态令牌对所述第五数据进行运算,得到第二更新密 钥, 并存储所述第二更新密钥。
[142]所述运算与上述步骤 216中的运算方法相同, 以下不再赘述;
[143]在本实施例中, 动态令牌生成所述第二更新密钥后, 将预先存 储的初始密钥替换成所述第二更新密钥。
[144]由于后台认证***与动态令牌使用的算法相同、 进行运算的第 五数据与第四数据相同, 则计算得到的所述第二更新密钥与所述第 一更新密钥相同, 为动态令牌更新后的密钥。
[145]本发明实施例对动态令牌及后台认证***所存储的该动态令牌 的密钥进行更新, 密钥更新成功后, 动态令牌的原有密钥作废, 动 态令牌及后台认证***均使用新的密钥。相比于动态令牌密钥固定 不变的使用方式, 动态令牌的密钥更新可以有效防止密钥意外泄露 而导致的风险, 提高动态令牌的安全性和灵活性。
[146]实施例三
[147]本发明实施例三提供了又一种更新密钥的方法
[148]参见图 3, 具体步骤如下:
[149]步骤 301: 动态令牌生成当前动态口令;
[150]具体地, 在本实施例中, 当用户向终端申请密钥更新业务时, 终端提示用户输入动态口令;
[151]步骤 302: 终端获取动态令牌生成的所述当前动态口令;
[152]步骤 303:终端向后台认证***发送所述当前动态口令,并请求 后台认证***认证所述当前动态口令;
[153]步骤 304:后台认证***认证所述当前动态口令,认证成功则执 行步骤 305, 认证失败则退出密钥更新操作;
[154]步骤 305: 后台认证***向终端发送认证成功的提示信息;
[155]步骤 306: 终端向后台认证***发送获取令牌激活码的请求;
[156]步骤 307: 后台认证***生成令牌激活码;
[157]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述令牌激活码为 74918118;
[158]步骤 308: 后台认证***获取预先存储的初始密钥;
[159]步骤 309:后台认证***将所述初始密钥和所述令牌激活码进行 组合得到第六数据;
[160]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述组合方式为拼接;
[161]步骤 310:后台认证***对所述第六数据进行运算,得到第一更 新密钥, 并存储所述第一更新密钥;
[162]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述运算采用 HASH函数的 SHA1算 法;
[163]相应地, 所述第一更新密钥用十六进制表示, 为 fa219c3de3bdld0b2fee82389d03396353975cbc;
[164]步骤 311:后台认证***在后台数据库中记录下所述动态令牌的 当前状态为密钥更新待首次认证状态;
[165]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述密钥更新待首次认证状态为
ST-NEW状态;
[166]步骤 312: 后台认证***将所述生成的令牌激活码发送给终端; [167]步骤 313: 动态令牌获取所述令牌激活码;
[168]步骤 314:动态令牌校验所述获取的令牌激活码,校验成功则执 行步骤 315, 校验失败则退出密钥更新操作;
[169]步骤 315: 动态令牌获取所述预先存储的初始密钥;
[170]步骤 316: 动态令牌将所述初始密钥与所述令牌激活码进行组 合, 得到第七数据;
[171]所述组合方式与上述步骤 309中相同, 以下不再赞述;
[172]在本实施例中, 由于后台认证***与动态令牌获取的初始密钥 相同、 令牌激活码相同, 且组合方式相同, 则组合得到的所述第七 数据与所述第六数据相同;
[173]步骤 317: 动态令牌对所述第七数据进行运算得到第二更新密 钥, 并存储所述第二更新密钥。
[174]所述运算与上述步骤 310中的运算相同, 在此不再赘述;
[175]在本实施例中, 动态令牌生成所述第二更新密钥后, 将预先存 储的初始密钥替换成所述第二更新密钥。
[176]由于后台认证***与动态令牌使用的算法相同、 进行运算的第 七数据与第六数据相同, 则计算得到的所述第二更新密钥与所述第 一更新密钥相同, 为动态令牌更新得到的新密钥。
[177]本发明实施例对动态令牌及后台认证***所存储的该动态令牌 的密钥进行更新, 密钥更新成功后, 动态令牌的原有密钥作废, 动 态令牌及后台认证***均使用新的密钥。相比于动态令牌密钥固定 不变的使用方式, 动态令牌的密钥更新可以有效防止密钥意外泄露 而导致的风险, 提高动态令牌的安全性和灵活性。
[178]实施例四
[179]本发明实施例四提供了再一种更新密钥的方法。
[180]参见图 4, 具体如下:
[181]步骤 401: 动态令牌接收按鍵触发信息;
[182]具体地, 在本实施例中, 当用户需要更新动态令牌的密钥时, 通过按鍵触发动态令牌, 所述按键触发可以是某一个按鍵的触发操 作, 或是多个 的组合触发操作,
[183]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述按键触发是某一个按键的触发操 作;
[184]步骤 402:动态令牌判断所述按键触发是否为触发动态令牌进行 密钥更新的操作, 是则执行步骤 403, 否则结束操作;
[185]步骤 403: 动态令牌判断本次密钥更新的操作是否为首次更新, 是则执行步骤 404, 否则结束操作;
[186]动态令牌出厂时内部预先存有一初始密钥, 例如 K1 , 优选地, 在本实施例中, 动态令牌出厂后可进行一次密钥更新操作;
[187]步骤 404: 动态令牌生成第一激活码;
[188]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述第一激活码为 79225563;
[189]步骤 405: 终端获取动态令牌生成的所述第一激活码;
[190]步骤 406: 终端将所述第一激活码发送给后台认证***;
[191]步骤 407:后台认证*** #ϋ所述接收到的第一激活码, 成 功则执行步骤 408, 失败则退出密钥更新***;
[192]步骤 408: 后台认证***获取初始密钥;
[193]步骤 409:后台认证***将所述初始密钥和所述第一激活码进行 组合得到第八数据;
[194]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述组合方式为拼接;
[195]步骤 410:后台认证***对所述第八数据进行运算,得到第一更 新密钥, 并存储所述第一更新密钥;
[196]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述运算采用 HASH函数的 SHA1算 法;
[197]相 应 地 , 所 述 第 一 更 新 密 钥 为 bab55d645e49f3715699b83cf52106dcb76c2a89;
[ 198]步骤 411:后台认证***在后台数据库中记录下所述动态令牌的 当前状态为密钥更新待首次认证状态;
[199]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述密钥更新待首次认证状态为
ST-NEW状态;
[200]步骤 412: 后台认证***向终端返回密钥激活成功的提示信息; [201]步骤 413: 动态令牌接收 ^^确认信息;
[202]具体地, 在本实施例中, 当终端显示密钥激活成功的提示信息 时, 用户通过按确认键触发动态令牌;
[203]步骤 414: 动态令牌获取所述预先存储的初始密钥;
[204]步骤 415:动态令牌将所述初始密钥和所述生成的第一激活码进 行组合, 得到第九数据;
[205]在本实施例中, 当终端提示密钥激活成功时, 用户触发动态令 牌上的按键, 触发动态令牌生成更新密钥;
[206]所述组合方式与上述步骤 409中相同, 以下不再赞述;
[207]在本实施例中, 由于后台认证***与动态令牌获取的初始密钥 相同、 第一激活码相同, 且组合方式相同, 则组合得到的所述第九 数据与所述第八数据相同;
[208]步骤 416: 动态令牌对所述第九数据进行运算得到第二更新密 钥, 并存储所述第二更新密钥。
[209]所述运算与上述步骤 410中的运算相同, 在此不再赘述;
[210]在本实施例中, 动态令牌生成所述第二更新密钥后, 将预先存 储的初始密钥替换成所述第二更新密钥。
[211]由于后台认证***与动态令牌使用相同的算法、 进行运算的第 九数据与第八数据相同, 则计算得到的所述第二更新密钥与所述第 一更新密钥相同, 为动态令牌更新得到的新密钥。
[212]本发明实施例对动态令牌及后台认证***所存储的该动态令牌 的密钥进行更新, 密钥更新成功后, 动态令牌的原有密钥作废, 动 态令牌及后台认证***均使用新的密钥。相比于动态令牌密钥固定
不变的使用方式, 动态令牌的密钥更新可以有效防止密钥意外泄露 而导致的风险, 提高动态令牌的安全性和灵活性。
[213]实施例五
[214]在实施例一、 实施例二、 实施例三和实施例四的基础上, 当用 户再次使用动态令牌进行动态口令认证时,后台认证***进行以下 认证过程, 具体如下:
[215]参见图 5, 具体步骤如下:
[216]步骤 501:后台认证***判断后台数据库中记录的所述动态令牌 的当前状态是否为密钥更新待首次认证状态, 是则执行步骤 502, 否则执行步骤 509;
[217]优选地, 在本实施例中, 后台认证***判断后台数据库中记录 的所述动态令牌的当前状态是否为 ST-NEW状态;
[218]步骤 502:后台认证***分别使用更新密钥和原密钥进行动态口 "^人证;
[219]优选地, 在本实施例中, 所述更新密钥为 K2;
[220]当首次更新密钥时, 所述原密钥为后台认证***预先存储的初 始密钥, 当不是首次更新密钥时, 所述原密钥为上次更新密钥后后 台认证***存储的密钥;
[221]步骤 503:后台认证***判断是否使用所述更新密钥认证成功且 使用所述原密钥认证失败, 是则执行步骤 506, 否则执行步骤 504;
[222]步骤 504:后台认证***判断是否使用所述更新密钥认证失败且 使用原密钥认证成功, 是则执行步骤 507, 否则执行步骤 505;
[223]步骤 505:后台认证***确认密钥更新待首次认证状态下进行的 认证过程失败, 结束认证过程;
[224]步骤 506:后台认证***将所述更新密钥拷贝到所述原密钥的緩 冲区中;
[225]步骤 507:后台认证***将后台数据库中记录的所述动态令牌的
密钥更新待首次认证状态恢复为其它状态;
[226]优选地, 在本实施例中, 后台认证***将 ST-NEW状态恢复为 其它状态;
[227]步骤 508:后台认证***确认密钥更新待首次认证状态下进行的 人证过程成功, 结束认证过程;
[228]步骤 509:后台认证***使用原密钥进行动态口^ Η人证,结束认 证过程。
[229]针对实施例一的情况, 在步骤 506之后补充执行以下操作: 后 台认证***将所述当前更新计数值 C加 1, 并重新存储当前更新计 数值 C。
[230]所述加 1后的当前更新计数值 C作为下一次更新密钥时的当前 更新计数值。
[231]本发明实施例在密钥更新待首次认证状态下, 分别使用更新密 钥和原密钥进行动态口令认证, 并根据认证结果确定是否将更新密 钥拷贝到所述原密钥的緩冲区, 能够确保后台认证***和动态令牌 中的密钥的统一。
[232]实施例六
[233]如图 6所示, 为本发明实施例六中的一种更新密钥的***结构 图, 包括后台认证*** 610和动态令牌 620, 其中,
[234]所述后台认证*** 610,用于接收动态令牌 620生成的当前动态 口令, 对所述当前动态口令进行认证, 如果认证失败, 则退出密钥 更新操作; 如果认证成功, 则生成密钥更新信息, 根据所述密钥更 新信息和所述后台认证*** 610存储的第一初始密钥生成第一更新 密钥; 当所述后台认证*** 610使用所述第一初始密钥进行动态口 人证的结果为失败, 且使用所述第一更新密钥进行动态口令认证 的结果为成功时, 将所述第一更新密钥复制到所述第一初始密钥的 緩冲区;
[235]所述动态令牌 620,用于获取所述密钥更新信息,对所述密钥更
新信息进行验证, 如果验证失败, 则退出密钥更新操作; 如果验证 成功, 则根据所述密钥更新信息和所述动态令牌 620存储的第二初 始密钥生成第二更新密钥, 将所述第二更新密钥复制到所述第二初 始密钥的緩冲区。
[236]其中,上述密钥更新信息可以为第一密钥更新口令和更新因子。
[237]相应地,所述后台认证*** 610,具体用于生成所述第一密钥更 新口令和随机数, 获取所述第一密钥更新口令和所述随机数的校验 和, 对所述随机数和所述校验和进行组合, 得到所述更新因子。
[238]所述后台认证*** 610,具体用于对所述第一密钥更新口令、所 述更新因子以及所述后台认证*** 610存储的第一初始密钥进行组 合, 得到第一数据, 根据所述第一数据生成所述第一更新密钥。
[239]所述动态令牌 620,具体用于获取所述第一密钥更新口令和更新 因子的校验和,判断所述校验和是否为零,并判断所述动态令牌 620 生成的第二密钥更新口令是否与所述第一密钥更新口令匹配, 如果 匹配, 则驺 成功; 否则驺正失败。
[240]所述动态令牌 620,具体用于对所述更新因子、所述第二初始密 钥, 以及与所述第一密钥更新口令匹配的第二密钥更新口令进行组 合, 得到第二数据; 根据所述第二数据生成所述第二更新密钥。
[241]上述密钥更新信息还可以为密钥更新响应值。
[242]相应地,所述后台认证*** 610,具体用于获取令牌随机数和业 务信息, 根据所述令牌随机数生成令牌随机数应答值, 根据所述业 务信息生成业务信息摘要值; 对所述令牌随机数应答值和所述业务 信息摘要值进行组合,得到第三数据;获取所述第三数据的校验和, 并对所述校臉和与所述第三数据进行组合, 得到密钥更新响应值。
[243]所述后台认证*** 610,具体用于将所述密钥更新响应值、所述 令牌随机数和所述第一初始密钥进行组合, 得到第四数据; 根据所 述第四数据生成所述第一更新密钥。
[244]所述动态令牌 620, 具体用于获取所述密钥更新响应值的校验 和, 判断所述校验和是否为零, 并判断根据令牌随机数得到的令牌 随机数应答值与从所述密钥更新响应值中获取的令牌随机数应答
值是否相同, 如果相同, 则验证成功; 否则验证失败。
[245]所述动态令牌 620,具体用于对所述密钥更新响应值、所述令牌 随机数和所述第二初始密钥进行组合, 得到第五数据, 根据所述第 五数据生成所述第二更新密钥。
[246]上述密钥更新信息还可以为令牌激活码。
[247]相应地,所述后台认证*** 610,具体用于将所述令牌激活码与 所述第一初始密钥进行组合, 得到第六数据; 根据所述第六数据生 成所述第一更新密钥。
[248]所述动态令牌 620,具体用于对所述令牌激活码和所述第二初始 密钥进行组合, 得到第七数据, 根据所述第七数据生成所述第二更 新密钥。
[249]本发明实施例对动态令牌及后台认证***所存储的该动态令牌 的密钥进行更新, 密钥更新成功后, 动态令牌的原有密钥作废, 动 态令牌及后台认证***均使用新的密钥。相比于动态令牌密钥固定 不变的使用方式, 动态令牌的密钥更新可以有效防止密钥意外泄露 而导致的风险, 提高动态令牌的安全性和灵活性。
[250]实施例七
[251]如图 7所示, 为本发明实施例七中的一种更新密钥的***结构 图, 包括后台认证*** 710和动态令牌 720, 其中,
[252]所述后台认证*** 710,用于获取所述动态令牌 720生成的激活 码,对所述激活码进行验证,如果验证失败,则退出密钥更新操作; 如果验证成功, 则根据所述激活码和所述后台认证*** 710存储的 第一初始密钥生成第一更新密钥, 当所述后台认证*** 710使用所 述第一初始密钥进行动态口令认证的结果为失败, 且使用所述第一 更新密钥进行动态口令认证的结果为成功时, 将所述第一更新密钥 复制到所述第一初始密钥的緩冲区。
[253]具体地,所述后台认证*** 710,具体用于对所述激活码和所述 第一初始密钥进行组合, 得到第八数据, 根据所述第八数据生成所
述第一更新密钥。
[254]所述动态令牌 720,用于生成所述激活码,根据所述激活码和自 身存储的第二初始密钥生成第二更新密钥, 将所述第二更新密钥复 制到所述第二初始密钥的緩冲区。
[255]具体地,所述动态令牌 720,具体用于对所述激活码和所述第二 初始密钥进行组合, 得到第九数据, 根据所述第九数据生成所述第 二更新密钥。
[256]本发明实施例对动态令牌及后台认证***所存储的该动态令牌 的密钥进行更新, 密钥更新成功后, 动态令牌的原有密钥作废, 动 态令牌及后台认证***均使用新的密钥。相比于动态令牌密钥固定 不变的使用方式, 动态令牌的密钥更新可以有效防止密钥意外泄露 而导致的风险, 提高动态令牌的安全性和灵活性。
[257]以上所述仅为本发明的优选实施例而已,并不用于限制本发明, 对于本领域的技术人员来说, 本发明可以有各种更改和变化。 凡在 本发明的精神和原则之内, 所作的任何修改、 等同替换、 改进等, 均应包含在本发明的保护范围之内。
Claims
1、 一种更新密钥的方法, 其特征在于, 包括:
①、 后台认证***接收动态令牌生成的当前动态口令, 对所述 当前动态口令进行认证, 如果认证成功, 则生成密钥更新信息, 并 执行②; 否则, 退出密钥更新操作;
②、所述后台认证***根据所述密钥更新信息和所述后台认证 ***存储的第一初始密钥生成第一更新密钥, 当所述后台认证*** 使用所述第一初始密钥进行动态口令认证的结果为失败,且使用所 述第一更新密钥进行动态口令认证的结果为成功时, 所述后台认证 ***将所述第一更新密钥复制到所述第一初始密钥的緩冲区; 所述 动态令牌获取所述密钥更新信息, 对所述密钥更新信息进行验证, 如果验证成功 , 则根据所述密钥更新信息和所述动态令牌存储的第 二初始密钥生成第二更新密钥,将所述第二更新密钥复制到所述第 二初始密钥的緩冲区; 否则, 退出密钥更新操作。
2、 如权利要求 1所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述密钥更新信 息为第一密钥更新口令和更新因子。
3、 如权利要求 2所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述后台认证系 统生成所述密钥更新信息, 包括:
所述后台认证***生成所述第一密钥更新口令和随机数; 所述后台认证***获取所述第一密钥更新口令和所述随机数 的校驗和;
所述后台认证***对所述随机数和所述校验和进行组合,得到 所述更新因子;
所述后台认证***根据所述密钥更新信息和所述后台认证系 统存储的第一初始密钥生成第一更新密钥, 包括:
所述后台认证***对所述第一密钥更新口令、所述更新因子以 及所述后台认证***存储的第一初始密钥进行组合, 得到第一数 据;
所述后台认证***根据所述第一数据生成所述第一更新密钥。
4、 如权利要求 2所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述动态令牌对 所述密钥更新信息验证, 包括:
所述动态令牌获取所述第一密钥更新口令和更新因子, 并计算 所述第一密钥更新口令和更新因子的校验和, 判断所述校验和是否 为零, 当所述校验和为零时生成第二密钥更新口令并判断生成的所 述第二密钥更新口令是否与所述第一密钥更新口令匹配, 如果匹 配, 则验证成功; 否则, 则验证失败;
所述动态令牌根据所述密钥更新信息和所述动态令牌存储的 第二初始密钥生成所述第二更新密钥, 具体为:
所述动态令牌对所述更新因子、 所述第二初始密钥, 以及与所 述第一密钥更新口令匹配的第二密钥更新口令进行组合,得到第二 数据;
所述动态令牌根据所述第二数据生成所述第二更新密钥。
5、 如权利要求 1所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述密钥更新信 息为密钥更新响应值。
6、 如权利要求 5所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述后台认证系 统生成密钥更新信息, 包括:
所述后台认证***获取令牌随机数和业务信息,根据所述令牌 随机数生成令牌随机数应答值,根据所述业务信息生成业务信息摘 要值;
所述后台认证***对所述令牌随机数应答值和所述业务信息 摘^ i进行组合, 得到第三数据;
所述后台认证***获取所述第三数据的校验和, 并对所述校验 和与所述第三数据进行组合, 得到密钥更新响应值;
所述后台认证***根据所述密钥更新信息和所述后台认证系 统存储的第一初始密钥生成第一更新密钥, 包括:
所述后台认证***将所述密钥更新响应值、所述令牌随机数和 所述第一初始密钥进行组合, 得到第四数据;
所述后台认证***根据所述第四数据生成所述第一更新密钥。
Ί、 如权利要求 5所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述动态令牌对 所述密钥更新信息验证, 包括:
所述动态令牌获取所述密钥更新响应值并计算出所述密钥更 新响应值校验和, 判断所述校验和是否为零, 当所述校验和为零时 从密钥更新响应值中获取第一令牌随机 答值,根据动态令牌自 身生成的令牌随机数计算出第二令牌随机数应^ i, 判断所述第一 令牌随机数应答值与所述第二令牌随机数应答值是否相同,如果相 同, 则验证成功; 否则, 则验证失败;
所述动态令牌根据所述密钥更新信息和所述动态令牌存储的 第二初始密钥生成所述第二更新密钥, 具体为:
所述动态令牌对所述密钥更新响应值、所述令牌随机数和所述 第二初始密钥进行组合, 得到第五数据;
所述动态令牌根据所述第五数据生成所述第二更新密钥。
8、 如权利要求 1所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述密钥更新信 息为令牌激活码;
所述后台认证***根据所述密钥更新信息和所述后台认证系 统存储的第一初始密钥生成第一更新密钥, 包括:
所述后台认证***将所述令牌激活码与所述第一初始密钥进 行组合, 得到第六数据;
所述后台认证***根据所述第六数据生成所述第一更新密钥; 所述动态令牌根据所述密钥更新信息和所述动态令牌存储的 第二初始密钥生成所述第二更新密钥, 具体为:
所述动态令牌对所述令牌激活码和所述第二初始密钥进行组 合, 得到第七数据;
所述动态令牌根据所述第七数据生成所述第二更新密钥。
9、 一种更新密钥的方法, 其特征在于, 包括:
①、 动态令牌生成激活码; ②、 后台认证***获取所述激活码, 对所述激活码进行验证, 如果臉证成功, 则执行③; 否则, 退出密钥更新操作;
③、后台认证***根据所述激活码和所述后台认证***存储的 第一初始密钥生成第一更新密钥, 当所述后台认证***使用所述第 一初始密钥进行动态口令认证的结果为失败,且使用所述第一更新 密钥进行动态口令认证的结果为成功时, 所述后台认证***将所述 第一更新密钥复制到所述第一初始密钥的緩冲区; 所述动态令牌根 据所述激活码和自身存储的第二初始密钥生成第二更新密钥,将所 述第二更新密钥复制到所述第二初始密钥的緩冲区。
10、 如权利要求 9所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述后台认证系 统根据所述激活码和所述后台认证***存储的第一初始密钥生成 第一更新密钥, 包括:
所述后台认证***对所述激活码和所述第一初始密钥进行组 合, 得到第八数据;
所述后台认证***根据所述第八数据生成所述第一更新密钥。
11、 如权利要求 9所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述动态令牌根 据所述激活码和自身存储的第二初始密钥生成第二更新密钥, 包 括 ··
所述动态令牌对所述激活码和所述第二初始密钥进行组合,得 到第九数据;
所述动态令牌根据所述第九数据生成所述第二更新密钥。
12、 一种更新密钥的***, 其特征在于, 包括后台认证***和 动态令牌, 其中,
所述后台认证***, 用于接收动态令牌生成的当前动态口令, 对所述当前动态口令进行认证, 如果认证失败, 则退出密钥更新操 作; 如果认证成功, 则生成密钥更新信息, 根据所述密钥更新信息 和所述后台认证***存储的第一初始密钥生成第一更新密钥; 当所 述后台认证***使用所述第一初始密钥进行动态口令认证的结果 为失败,且使用所述第一更新密钥进行动态口令认证的结果为成功 时, 将所述第一更新密钥复制到所述第一初始密钥的緩冲区; 所述动态令牌, 用于获取所述密钥更新信息, 对所述密钥更新 信息进行 ^, 如果 失败, 则退出密钥更新操作; 如果 成 功, 则根据所述密钥更新信息和所述动态令牌存储的第二初始密钥 生成第二更新密钥,将所述第二更新密钥复制到所述第二初始密钥 的緩冲区。
13、 如权利要求 12所述的***, 其特征在于, 所述密钥更新 信息为第一密钥更新口令和更新因子。
14、 如权利要求 13所述的***, 其特征在于,
所述后台认证***, 具体用于生成所述第一密钥更新口令和随 机数, 获取所述第一密钥更新口令和所述随机数的校验和, 对所述 随机数和所述校验和进行组合, 得到所述更新因子;
所述后台认证***, 具体用于对所述第一密钥更新口令、 所述 更新因子以及所述后台认证***存储的第一初始密钥进行组合,得 到第一数据, 根据所述第一数据生成所述第一更新密钥。
15、 如权利要求 13所述的***, 其特征在于,
所述动态令牌, 具体用于获取所述第一密钥更新口令和更新因 子, 并计算所述第一密钥更新口令和更新因子的校验和, 判断所述 校验和是否为零, 当所述校验和为零时生成第二密钥更新口令并判 断所述第二密钥更新口令是否与所述第一密钥更新口令匹配, 如果 匹配, 则驺 ϋ成功; 否则, 则驺 失败;
所述动态令牌,具体用于对所述更新因子、所述第二初始密钥, 以及与所述第一密钥更新口令匹配的第二密钥更新口令进行组合, 得到第二数据; 根据所述第二数据生成所述第二更新密钥。
16、 如权利要求 12所述的***, 其特征在于, 所述密钥更新 信息为密钥更新响应值。
17、 如权利要求 16所述的***, 其特征在于,
所述后台认证***, 具体用于获取令牌随机数和业^ 息, 根 据所述令牌随机数生成令牌随机数应答值,根据所述业务信息生成 业务信息摘要值; 对所述令牌随机数应答值和所述业务信息摘要值 进行组合, 得到第三数据; 获取所述第三数据的校验和, 并对所述 校验和与所述第三数据进行组合, 得到密钥更新响应值;
所述后台认证***, 具体用于将所述密钥更新响应值、 所述令 牌随机数和所述第一初始密钥进行组合, 得到第四数据; 根据所述 第四数据生成所述第一更新密钥。
18、 如权利要求 16所述的***, 其特征在于,
所述动态令牌, 具体用于获取所述密钥更新响应值并计算出所 述密钥更新响应值校验和, 判断所述校验和是否为零, 当所述校验 和为零时从密钥更新响应值中获取第一令牌随机 ½答值,根据动 态令牌自身生成的令牌随机数计算出第二令牌随机数应答值, 判断 第一令牌随机数应答值与所述第二令牌随机数应答值是否相同,如 果相同, 则验证成功; 否则, 则验证失败;
所述动态令牌, 具体用于对所述密钥更新响应值、 所述令牌随 机数和所述第二初始密钥进行组合, 得到第五数据, 根据所述第五 数据生成所述第二更新密钥。
19、 如权利要求 12所述的***, 其特征在于, 所述密钥更新 信息为令牌激活码;
所述后台认证***, 具体用于将所述令牌激活码与所述第一初 始密钥进行组合, 得到第六数据; 根据所述第六数据生成所述第一 更新密钥;
所述动态令牌, 具体用于对所述令牌激活码和所述第二初始密 钥进行组合, 得到第七数据, 根据所述第七数据生成所述第二更新 密钥。
20、 一种更新密钥的***, 其特征在于, 包括后台认证***和 动态令牌, 其中,
所述后台认证***, 用于获取所述动态令牌生成的激活码, 对 所述激活码进行验证, 如果验证失败, 退出密钥更新操作; 如果验 证成功, 则根据所述激活码和所述后台认证***存储的第一初始密 钥生成第一更新密钥, 当所述后台认证***使用所述第一初始密钥 进行动态口令认证的结果为失败,且使用所述第一更新密钥进行动 态口令认证的结果为成功时,将所述第一更新密钥复制到所述第一 初始密钥的緩冲区;
所述动态令牌, 用于生成所述激活码, 根据所述激活码和自身 存储的第二初始密钥生成第二更新密钥,将所述第二更新密钥复制 到所述第二初始密钥的緩冲区;
所述后台认证***, 具体用于对所述激活码和所述第一初始密 钥进行组合, 得到第八数据, 根据所述第八数据生成所述第一更新 密钥;
所述动态令牌, 具体用于对所述激活码和所述第二初始密钥进 行组合,得到第九数据,根据所述第九数据生成所述第二更新密钥。
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