WO2011130681A1 - Apparatus and method for transitioning from a serving network node that supports an enhanced security context to a legacy serving network node - Google Patents
Apparatus and method for transitioning from a serving network node that supports an enhanced security context to a legacy serving network node Download PDFInfo
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- WO2011130681A1 WO2011130681A1 PCT/US2011/032754 US2011032754W WO2011130681A1 WO 2011130681 A1 WO2011130681 A1 WO 2011130681A1 US 2011032754 W US2011032754 W US 2011032754W WO 2011130681 A1 WO2011130681 A1 WO 2011130681A1
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- security context
- message
- network node
- serving network
- key
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 37
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 41
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 34
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 claims description 8
- 230000011664 signaling Effects 0.000 claims description 7
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 10
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 6
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 6
- 230000001010 compromised effect Effects 0.000 description 4
- 238000009795 derivation Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000003287 optical effect Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000004422 calculation algorithm Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000001413 cellular effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 239000000835 fiber Substances 0.000 description 2
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 2
- 239000002245 particle Substances 0.000 description 2
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007774 longterm Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000010287 polarization Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 1
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
- H04W36/0005—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
- H04W36/0011—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection
- H04W36/0033—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information
- H04W36/0038—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information of security context information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/24—Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
Definitions
- the present invention relates generally to an enhanced security context for user equipment operating in a Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service (UMTS), GSM Edge Radio Access Network (GERAN), and/or Long Term Evolution (LTE) or Evolved UTRAN (E-UTRAN).
- UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service
- GERAN GSM Edge Radio Access Network
- LTE Long Term Evolution
- E-UTRAN Evolved UTRAN
- a successful AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement) authentication in a LTE fourth generation (4G) network or (UMTS third generation (3G) radio access network or in a GERAN networks using 3G AKA authentication results in a pair of shared keys, a cipher key (CK) and an integrity key (IK), for securing communications between a user equipment (UE) and the network.
- the shared keys may be used directly to secure the traffic between the UE and the network as in the case of UTRAN (UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network), or may be used to statically derive keys, e.g., KAS ME or keys derived from it, in the case of E-UTRAN and Kc or Kci28, in the case of GERAN (GSM Edge Radio Access Network).
- a compromised key may result in serious security problems until the keys are changed at a next AKA authentication. Typically, the AKA authentication is not run often due to the significant overhead required. Also, if both keys (CK and IK) are compromised, then the keys used between the UE and the serving Radio Access Network may also get compromised.
- CK and IK both keys
- the keys used between the UE and the serving Radio Access Network may also get compromised.
- R C radio network controller
- Node B may be collapsed together into one node at the edge of the network.
- the RNC needs the keys for functionalities such as user plane ciphering and signaling plane ciphering and integrity protection.
- the RNC functionality may be deployed in an exposed location such as in a Home Node B in a UMTS Femtocell. Accordingly, RNC functionality deployed in possibly insecure locations providing access (including physical access) may allow the keys, CK and IK, to be compromised.
- Session keys (modified version of CK and IK) may be used to lower the security risks associated with exposed RNC functionality. Techniques for providing such session keys are disclosed in U.S. Patent Application Publication No. US 2007/0230707 Al .
- An aspect of the present invention may reside in a method for transitioning a remote station from a current serving network node having first security context to a new serving network node.
- the remote station provides at least one legacy key associated with a second security context, wherein the first security context includes a security property that is not supported by the second security context.
- the remote station generates at least one session key, in accordance with the first security context, based on an information element associated with the first security context.
- the remote station forwards a first message to the new serving network node.
- the first message includes the information element associated with the first security context.
- the remote station receives, in response to the first message, a second message from the new serving network node.
- the second message has a response based on either the at least one legacy key or the at least one session key.
- the remote station determines that the new serving network node does not support the first security context if the response of the second message is based on the at least one legacy key. Accordingly, the remote station protects communications based on the at least one legacy key upon determining that the new serving network node does not support the first security context.
- the information element may comprise a count value.
- the count value may be updated for a session.
- the first security context may be an enhanced UMTS security context
- the second security context may be a legacy security context.
- the second message may include a message authentication code (MAC), and the remote station may determine that the response is based on the at least one legacy key by determining that the MAC was calculated using the at least one legacy key.
- the remote station may comprise a mobile user equipment
- a remote station may include means for providing at least one legacy key associated with a second security context, wherein a first security context of a current serving network node includes a security property that is not supported by the second security context; means for generating at least one session key, in accordance with the first security context, based on an information element associated with the first security context; means for forwarding a first message to a new serving network node, wherein the first message includes the information element signaling associated with the first security context; means for receiving, in response to the first message, a second message from the new serving network node, wherein the second message has a response based on either the at least one legacy key or the at least one session key; means for determining that the new serving network node does not support the first security context if the response of the second message is based on the at least one legacy key; and means for protecting communications based on the at least one legacy key upon determining that the new serving network node does not support the first security context.
- a remote station which may include a processor configured to: provide at least one legacy key associated with a second security context, wherein a first security context of a current serving network node includes a security property that is not supported by the second security context; generate at least one session key, in accordance with the first security context, based on an information element associated with the first security context; forward a first message to a new serving network node, wherein the first message includes the information element associated with the first security context; receive, in response to the first message, a second message from the new serving network node, wherein the second message has a response based on either the at least one legacy key or the at least one session key; determine that the new serving network node does not support the first security context if the response of the second message is based on the at least one legacy key; and protect communications based on the at least one legacy key upon determining that the new serving network node does not support the first security context.
- Another aspect of the invention may reside in a computer program product, comprising computer-readable storage medium, comprising code for causing a computer to provide at least one legacy key associated with a second security context, wherein a first security context of a current serving network node includes a security property that is not supported by the second security context; code for causing a computer to generate at least one session key, in accordance with the first security context, based on an information element associated with the first security context; code for causing a computer to forward a first message to a new serving network node, wherein the first message includes the information element associated with the first security context; code for causing a computer to receive, in response to the first message, a second message from the new serving network node, wherein the second message has a response based on either the at least one legacy key or the at least one session key; code for causing a computer to determine that the new serving network node does not support the first security context if the response of the second message is based on the at least one legacy key; and code for causing
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an example of a wireless communication system.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an example of a wireless communication system in accordance with a UMTS/UTRAN architecture.
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram of an example of a wireless communication system in accordance with a GERAN architecture.
- FIG. 4 is a flow diagram of a method for transitioning a remote station from a serving network node having an enhanced security context to a new serving network node.
- FIG. 5 is a flow diagram of a method for establishing an enhanced security context between a remote station and a serving network based on an attach request message.
- FIG. 6 is a flow diagram of a method for establishing at least one session key from an enhanced security context between a remote station and a serving network based on a service request message.
- FIG. 7 is a flow diagram of a method for establishing at least one session key from an enhanced security context between a remote station and a serving network based on a routing area update request message.
- FIG. 8 is a block diagram of a computer including a processor and a memory.
- FIG. 9 is a block diagram of an example of a wireless communication system in accordance with an E-UTRAN architecture.
- FIG. 10 is a flow diagram of a method for transitioning a remote station from a serving network node having an enhanced security context to a new serving network node.
- an aspect of the present invention may reside in a method 400 for transitioning a remote station 210 from a serving network node 230 having an enhanced security context to a new serving network node 230'.
- the remote station provides at least one legacy key (step 410) and generates at least one session key, in accordance with the enhanced security context, based on an information element associated with the enhanced security context (step 420).
- the remote station forwards a first message to the new serving network node (step 430).
- the first message includes the information element associated with the enhanced security context.
- the remote station receives, in response to the first message, a second message from the new serving network node (step 440).
- the second message has a response based on either the at least one legacy key or the at least one session key.
- the remote station determines that the new serving network node does not support the enhanced security context if the response of the second message is based on the legacy key (step 450). Accordingly, the remote station protects communications based on the legacy key upon determining that the new serving network node does not support the enhanced security context (step 460).
- the information element may comprise a count value.
- a remote station 210 may include means (processor 810) for providing at least one legacy key; means for generating at least one session key, in accordance with an enhanced security context, based on an information element associated with the enhanced security context; means for forwarding a first message to a new serving network node, wherein the first message includes the information element signaling associated with the enhanced security context; means for receiving, in response to the first message, a second message from the new serving network node, wherein the second message has a response based on either the at least one legacy key or the at least one session key; means for determining that the new serving network node does not support the enhanced security context if the response of the second message is based on the legacy key; and means for protecting communications based on the legacy key upon determining that the new serving network node does not support the enhanced security context.
- a remote station 210 which may include a processor 810 configured to: provide at least one legacy key; generate at least one session key, in accordance with an enhanced security context, based on an information element associated with the enhanced security context; forward a first message to a new serving network node, wherein the first message includes the information element associated with the enhanced security context; receive, in response to the first message, a second message from the new serving network node, wherein the second message has a response based on either the at least one legacy key or the at least one session key; determine that the new serving network node does not support the enhanced security context if the response of the second message is based on the legacy key; and protect communications based on the legacy key upon determining that the new serving network node does not support the enhanced security context.
- Another aspect of the invention may reside in a computer program product, comprising computer-readable storage medium 820, comprising code for causing a computer 800 to provide at least one legacy key; code for causing a computer to generate at least one session key, in accordance with the enhanced security context, based on an information element associated with the enhanced security context; code for causing a computer to forward a first message to a new serving network node, wherein the first message includes the information element associated with the enhanced security context; code for causing a computer to receive, in response to the first message, a second message from the new serving network node, wherein the second message has a response based on either the at least one legacy key or the at least one session key; code for causing a computer to determine that the new serving network node does not support the enhanced security context if the response of the second message is based on the legacy key; and code for causing a computer to protect communications based on the legacy key upon determining that the new serving network node does not support the enhanced security context.
- the serving core network 230 is connected to a serving RAN (Radio Access
- the serving RAN includes a Node B and a RNC (Radio Network Controller).
- the serving RAN includes a BTS (Base Transceiver Station) and a BSC (Base Station Controller).
- the serving core network includes an MSC/VLR (Mobile Switching Center/Visitor Location Register) for providing circuit-switched (CS) service, and an SGSN (Serving GPRS Support Node) for providing packet-switched (PS) services.
- the home network includes an HLR (Home Location Register) and an AuC (Authentication Center).
- the UE 210 and the serving core network 230 may be enhanced with new security properties to create an enhanced UMTS security context (ESC) using a COUNT (counter value).
- a 256-bit root key (KASMEU) for the ESC may be derived from the CK and IK when AKA authentication is performed.
- the root key may be set equal to CK
- the COUNT may be a 16-bit counter value that is maintained between the UE and the serving core network.
- a legacy UTRAN security context consists of KSI (a 3 -bit Key Set Identifier), CK (a 128-bit encryption key), and IK (a 128-bit integrity key).
- the present invention provides a technique to smoothly fallback to legacy nodes from enhanced nodes.
- Mobile equipment / User Equipment that supports the ESC may be designated UE+.
- An SGSN and an MSC/VLR that supports ESC may be designated SGSN+ and MSC/VLR+.
- the ESC is an example of the first security context. (A legacy SGSN and MSC/VLR are indicated without the plus sign.)
- the method for fallback to legacy nodes is independent of the method used to determine the session keys. Not supporting the ESC is an example of the second security context.
- the UE+ 210 and the SGSN+ or MSC/VLR+ share the ESC which includes KSI (key set identifier) as currently used in UMTS/GERAN, and the root key KASMEU-
- the session keys CK ⁇ and IK ⁇ are calculated from the root key KASMEU an d the parameter (e.g., the COUNT value) exchanged between the UE+ and the SGSN+ or MSC/VLR+ (step 1010).
- the SGSN+ 230 or MSC/VLR+ also derive CKL and IKL (step 1020), which function as legacy keys, from KASMEU an d fixed parameters such that CKL and IKL are cryptographically independent of each other, i.e., knowing CKL and IKL does not reveal KASMEU ⁇
- the ESC parameters may be moved from an SGSN+ 230 or MSC/VLR+ to a target SGSN 230' or MSC/VLR that does not support the ESC.
- the source SGSN+ or MSC/VLR+ includes CK L and IK L in the Information Elements (IEs) that carry the legacy IK and CK (i.e., in the existing CK/IK IEs) (step 1040.
- K A SMEU is m a new IE (step 1050).
- the COUNT value is also provided to the target to permit derivation of session keys (step 1060). If the target SGSN or MSC/VLR that does not support the ESC, it will ignore the new IEs and use CKL and IKL as the legacy CK and IK.
- the UE+ includes in its messages to the target the relevant information to calculate the session keys.
- the UE+ does not know yet whether the target supports the ESC. If the target is a legacy node (e.g., does not understand the ESC), then it uses CKL and IK L received from the source SGSN+ or MSC/VLR+ as the legacy UMTS security context (along with KSI/CKSN). If the target supports the ESC, then it can continue the use of the ESC.
- the target SGSN+ or MSC/VLR+ signals its support of the ESC to the UE.
- the UE+ may receive the SMC (security mode command) from the SMC (security mode command) from the SMC (security mode command).
- the UE+ uses both the IKL and IK ⁇ to determine whether the ESC is supported by the target SGSN (or MSC/VLR) (step 1080). More specifically, the UE+ calculates the MAC for the SMC using both IK L and IK S . The UE+ checks the calculated MAC with the MAC value included in the SMC. If the received MAC is equal to the MAC calculated with IK ⁇ , then the target supports the ESC. If the received MAC is equal to the MAC calculated with IKL, then the target does not support the ESC (step 1090). Otherwise, the UE+ rejects the received message (e.g., SMC) due to integrity failure.
- the received message e.g., SMC
- GERAN PS the SGSN+ signals its support of the ESC in the Authentication and Ciphering message.
- GERAN CS if security is enabled before signaling of MSC capabilities can be received by the UE+, GERAN key Kc or Kci 28 derived from CKL and IK L may be used temporarily until a switch is possible.
- both the target and the UE+ fall back to using a legacy security context with CKL and IKL as the CK and IK.
- the target could signal support for the ESC in the SMC (e.g., by adding a new IE that the RNC received from the SGSN+ or MSC/VLR+). If no indication is received, the UE+ may assume it is communicating with a legacy SGSN or MSC/VLR.
- This alternative enhancement requires changes to the RNC (i.e., the RNC has to upgraded to send the SMC's with the new IEs).
- Connected Mode active mode
- the UE+ determines the capability of the target SGSN (e.g., SMC is not possible in connected mode or it will result in a break in the on-going call/session, which is not preferable).
- the source SGSN includes
- CK S and IK S in the legacy CK and IK IEs.
- Both the target SGSN and the UE+ realize that the target SGSN only supports a legacy context through subsequent signaling (e.g., idle mode or service requests or SMC) and will fallback to a legacy security context with CKs and IK ⁇ . This is different from idle mode where C3 ⁇ 4 and IKL are used as the IK and CK by the legacy nodes.
- the target SGSN+ supports the ESC, it uses the root key KASMEU to derive the ESC as described before.
- the UE 210 may signal that it supports ESC in a UMTS attach request message (step 510).
- the support signal may be the presence of a new information element (IE) in the message.
- the IE may comprise the COUNT value.
- a serving network SN 230 that does not support ESC will ignore the new IE.
- Authentication data (RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN) is obtained from the HLR/AuC 240 (step 515).
- the SN may indicate ESC support in the AKA challenge (Authentication Request) to the UE (step 520).
- the UE performs the authentication procedures (step 525) and returns a response RES to the SN (step 530).
- the UE and SN derive the root key KASMEU an d the session keys CKs and IKs (step 535).
- the SN forwards the session keys to the RAN 220 in an SMC (Security Mode Command) message (step 540).
- the RAN generates a message authentication code (MAC) using the session key IK S , which is forwarded to the UE in an SMC message (step 545).
- MAC message authentication code
- the UE checks the MAC (step 550) using the session key IK S that the UE derived (step 535), and returns a complete indication to the RAN (step 555), which forwards it to the SN (step 560). The UE is then able to protect communications using the session keys (step 565).
- the UE 210 forwards a service request message which includes the COUNT value to the SN 230 (step 610).
- the UE and SN derive new the session keys CKs and IKs from the root key KASMEU (step 620).
- the SN forwards the session keys to the RAN 220 in an SMC message (step 630).
- the RAN generates a MAC, which is forwarded to the UE in an SMC message (step 640).
- the UE checks the MAC (step 650), and returns a complete indication to the RAN (step 660), which forwards it to the SN (step 670).
- the UE is then able to protect communications using the session keys (step 680).
- a method 700 related to mobility management procedures 700 (such as a Routing Area Update (RAU) or Location Area Update (LAU)
- the UE 210 forwards a RAU (or LAU) request message which includes the COUNT value to the SN 230 (step 710).
- the UE and SN may derive new the session keys CK ⁇ and IK ⁇ from the root key KASMEU (step 720)
- the SN may forward the session keys to the RAN 220 in an SMC message (step 730).
- the RAN may generate a MAC, which may be forwarded to the UE in an SMC message (step 740).
- the UE may check the MAC (step 750), and may return a complete indication to the RAN (step 760), which forwards it to the SN (step 770).
- the SN then sends a RAU accept message to the UE (step 780).
- the UE is then able to protect communications using the session keys.
- New access stratum (AS) keys may be generated for each transition from Idle to
- the COUNT value may be sent in idle mobility messages and in initial layer 3 messages, e.g., Attaches, RAUs, LAUs, for idle, mobility, or service request.
- the SN may check that the sent COUNT value has not been used before, and updates the stored COUNT value in the process. If the COUNT value is new (e.g., received COUNT value > stored COUNT value), the UE and the SN proceed to calculate the new key CK ⁇ and IK ⁇ , using a Key Derivation Function (KDF) such as HMAC-SHA256, from the root key KASMEU an d the sent COUNT value.
- KDF Key Derivation Function
- the KDF may include additional information, such as RAN node identity, for the new key calculation.
- the SN rejects the message.
- Kc and Kc ⁇ s are calculated from CK ⁇ and IK ⁇ , it may be done in the same manner as when calculated from CK and IK.
- the session keys may have a lifetime such that the UE and the serving network keep and use the session keys until either it is no longer necessary to store the keys to send traffic securely between the UE and the network (UE moves to Idle mode), or a new context is created at a subsequent event (e.g., AKA authentication or a mobility event).
- An SGSN will treat CK' as the legacy CK and the IK' as the legacy IK, and ignore the K A SME, whereas an SGSN+ will treat KASME as it's KASMEU and CK' as it's CKs and IK' as it IKs.
- MME and E-UTRAN will be considered as an enhanced serving network as the security context transferred from E-UTRAN is always considered as the enhanced security context.
- the remote station 210 may comprise a computer 800 that includes a storage medium 820 such as memory, a display 830, and an input device 840 such as a keyboard.
- the apparatus may include a wireless connection 850.
- a wireless remote station (RS) 102 may communicate with one or more base stations (BS) 104 of a wireless communication system 100.
- the wireless communication system 100 may further include one or more base station controllers (BSC) 106, and a core network 108.
- Core network may be connected to an Internet 1 10 and a Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) 1 12 via suitable backhauls.
- PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
- a typical wireless remote station may include a handheld phone, or a laptop computer.
- the wireless communication system 100 may employ any one of a number of multiple access techniques such as code division multiple access (CDMA), time division multiple access (TDMA), frequency division multiple access (FDMA), space division multiple access (SDMA), polarization division multiple access (PDMA), or other modulation techniques known in the art.
- CDMA code division multiple access
- TDMA time division multiple access
- FDMA frequency division multiple access
- SDMA space division multiple access
- PDMA polarization division multiple access
- a wireless device 102 may include various components that perform functions based on signals that are transmitted by or received at the wireless device.
- a wireless headset may include a transducer adapted to provide an audio output based on a signal received via the receiver.
- a wireless watch may include a user interface adapted to provide an indication based on a signal received via the receiver.
- a wireless sensing device may include a sensor adapted to provide data to be transmitted to another device.
- a wireless device may communicate via one or more wireless communication links that are based on or otherwise support any suitable wireless communication technology.
- a wireless device may associate with a network.
- the network may comprise a body area network or a personal area network (e.g., an ultra-wideband network).
- the network may comprise a local area network or a wide area network.
- a wireless device may support or otherwise use one or more of a variety of wireless communication technologies, protocols, or standards such as, for example, CDMA, TDMA, OFDM, OFDMA, WiMAX, and Wi-Fi.
- a wireless device may support or otherwise use one or more of a variety of corresponding modulation or multiplexing schemes.
- a wireless device may thus include appropriate components (e.g., air interfaces) to establish and communicate via one or more wireless communication links using the above or other wireless communication technologies.
- a device may comprise a wireless transceiver with associated transmitter and receiver components (e.g., a transmitter and a receiver) that may include various components (e.g., signal generators and signal processors) that facilitate communication over a wireless medium.
- the teachings herein may be incorporated into (e.g., implemented within or performed by) a variety of apparatuses (e.g., devices).
- a phone e.g., a cellular phone
- PDA personal data assistant
- an entertainment device e.g., a music or video device
- a headset e.g., headphones, an earpiece, etc.
- a microphone e.g., a medical device, e.g., a biometric sensor, a heart rate monitor, a pedometer, an EKG device, etc.
- a user I/O device e.g., a watch, a remote control, a light switch, a keyboard, a mouse, etc.
- a tire pressure monitor e.g., a computer, a point-of-sale device, an entertainment device, a hearing aid, a set-top box, or any other suitable device.
- teachings herein may be adapted for use in low power applications (e.g., through the use of an impulse-based signaling scheme and low duty cycle modes) and may support a variety of data rates including relatively high data rates (e.g., through the use of high-bandwidth pulses).
- a wireless device may comprise an access device (e.g., a Wi-Fi access point) for a communication system.
- an access device may provide, for example, connectivity to another network (e.g., a wide area network such as the Internet or a cellular network) via a wired or wireless communication link.
- the access device may enable another device (e.g., a Wi-Fi station) to access the other network or some other functionality.
- another device e.g., a Wi-Fi station
- one or both of the devices may be portable or, in some cases, relatively non-portable.
- DSP digital signal processor
- ASIC application specific integrated circuit
- FPGA field programmable gate array
- a general purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine.
- a processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration.
- a software module may reside in RAM memory, flash memory, ROM memory, EPROM memory, EEPROM memory, registers, hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.
- An exemplary storage medium is coupled to the processor such the processor can read information from, and write information to, the storage medium.
- the storage medium may be integral to the processor.
- the processor and the storage medium may reside in an ASIC.
- the ASIC may reside in a user terminal.
- the processor and the storage medium may reside as discrete components in a user terminal.
- the functions described may be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof. If implemented in software as a computer program product, the functions may be stored on or transmitted over as one or more instructions or code on a computer-readable medium.
- Computer-readable media includes both computer storage media and communication media including any medium that facilitates transfer of a computer program from one place to another.
- a storage media may be any available media that can be accessed by a computer.
- such computer- readable media can comprise RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that can be used to carry or store desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and that can be accessed by a computer.
- any connection is properly termed a computer-readable medium.
- the software is transmitted from a website, server, or other remote source using a coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair, digital subscriber line (DSL), or wireless technologies such as infrared, radio, and microwave
- the coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair, DSL, or wireless technologies such as infrared, radio, and microwave are included in the definition of medium.
- Disk and disc includes compact disc (CD), laser disc, optical disc, digital versatile disc (DVD), floppy disk and blu-ray disc where disks usually reproduce data magnetically, while discs reproduce data optically with lasers. Combinations of the above should also be included within the scope of computer-readable media.
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Abstract
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RU2012148695/07A RU2525083C2 (en) | 2010-04-16 | 2011-04-15 | Apparatus and method for transitioning from serving network node supporting enhanced security context to legacy serving network node |
CA2796511A CA2796511C (en) | 2010-04-16 | 2011-04-15 | Apparatus and method for transitioning from a serving network node that supports an enhanced security context to a legacy serving network node |
AU2011239421A AU2011239421B2 (en) | 2010-04-16 | 2011-04-15 | Apparatus and method for transitioning from a serving network node that supports an enhanced security context to a legacy serving network node |
BR112012026451-6A BR112012026451B1 (en) | 2010-04-16 | 2011-04-15 | EQUIPMENT AND METHOD FOR TRANSITIONING FROM A SERVER NETWORK NODE THAT SUPPORTS AN IMPROVED SECURITY CONTEXT TO A LEGACY SERVER NETWORK NODE |
KR1020127030016A KR101474094B1 (en) | 2010-04-16 | 2011-04-15 | Apparatus and method for transitioning from a serving network node that supports an enhanced security context to a legacy serving network node |
CN201180019386.5A CN102845105B (en) | 2010-04-16 | 2011-04-15 | For the apparatus and method shifted from the serving network node of support of enhanced security context to legacy service network node |
JP2013505194A JP5649248B2 (en) | 2010-04-16 | 2011-04-15 | Apparatus and method for transitioning from a serving network node that supports an improved security context to a traditional serving network node |
SG2012076642A SG184878A1 (en) | 2010-04-16 | 2011-04-15 | Apparatus and method for transitioning from a serving network node that supports an enhanced security context to a legacy serving network node |
EP11717849.1A EP2559292B1 (en) | 2010-04-16 | 2011-04-15 | Apparatus and method for transitioning from a serving network node that supports an enhanced security context to a legacy serving network node |
UAA201213040A UA106531C2 (en) | 2010-04-16 | 2011-04-15 | DEVICE AND METHOD FOR TRANSITION FROM a serving network node that supports enhanced security context to a legacy serving network node |
IL222458A IL222458A (en) | 2010-04-16 | 2012-10-15 | Apparatus and method for transitioning from a serving network node that supports an enhanced security context to a legacy serving network node |
ZA2012/08617A ZA201208617B (en) | 2010-04-16 | 2012-11-15 | Apparatus and method for transitioning from a serving network node that supports an enhanced security context to a legacy serving network node |
HK13107003.5A HK1179804A1 (en) | 2010-04-16 | 2013-06-14 | Apparatus and method for transitioning from a serving network node that supports an enhanced security context to a legacy serving network node |
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KR102208868B1 (en) * | 2017-01-30 | 2021-01-29 | 텔레호낙티에볼라게트 엘엠 에릭슨(피유비엘) | Security anchor function in 5G systems |
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Also Published As
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ZA201208617B (en) | 2013-07-31 |
EP2559292A1 (en) | 2013-02-20 |
IL222458A0 (en) | 2012-12-31 |
TW201203989A (en) | 2012-01-16 |
CA2796511C (en) | 2016-06-21 |
JP5649248B2 (en) | 2015-01-07 |
CN102845105A (en) | 2012-12-26 |
UA106531C2 (en) | 2014-09-10 |
SG184878A1 (en) | 2012-11-29 |
IL222458A (en) | 2017-05-29 |
JP2013526159A (en) | 2013-06-20 |
US9191812B2 (en) | 2015-11-17 |
MY154249A (en) | 2015-05-29 |
HK1179804A1 (en) | 2013-10-04 |
EP2559292B1 (en) | 2017-07-26 |
KR20130018883A (en) | 2013-02-25 |
US20150043734A1 (en) | 2015-02-12 |
RU2525083C2 (en) | 2014-08-10 |
BR112012026451A2 (en) | 2016-08-09 |
CA2796511A1 (en) | 2011-10-20 |
CN102845105B (en) | 2016-03-16 |
RU2012148695A (en) | 2014-05-27 |
TWI477132B (en) | 2015-03-11 |
KR101474094B1 (en) | 2014-12-17 |
BR112012026451B1 (en) | 2021-09-28 |
AU2011239421A1 (en) | 2012-11-08 |
AU2011239421B2 (en) | 2014-06-05 |
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