WO2009037133A1 - Procede fournissant les moyens de reconnaitre l'origine et/ou le contenu d'un signal rf - Google Patents
Procede fournissant les moyens de reconnaitre l'origine et/ou le contenu d'un signal rf Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2009037133A1 WO2009037133A1 PCT/EP2008/061780 EP2008061780W WO2009037133A1 WO 2009037133 A1 WO2009037133 A1 WO 2009037133A1 EP 2008061780 W EP2008061780 W EP 2008061780W WO 2009037133 A1 WO2009037133 A1 WO 2009037133A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- hidden
- code
- information
- modified
- board
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/02—Details of the space or ground control segments
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/16—Obfuscation or hiding, e.g. involving white box
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method providing the means for recognizing the origin and / or the content of an RF signal.
- the present invention relates to a method providing the means for recognizing the origin and / or the content of an RF signal without requiring significant calculation means, these recognition means being accessible only to authorized persons and being virtually unmodifiable and very difficult to detect by unauthorized persons, and this, in various applications using RF signals transmitting information at least partly hidden.
- the method according to the invention is characterized in that spreads information to hide using a hidden code, that distributes this information, using an XOR function (exclusive OR), in known codes using a hidden allocation algorithm, that at the reception we implement the inverse algorithm of the one used for the distribution to access the spread code, that correlates this spread code with the hidden code to retrieve the hidden information.
- the hidden code is shifted at the time of transmission, so that upon reception, during the correlation of this spread code with the hidden code not shifted, the offset is detected. The value of this offset can be used to transmit information.
- GNSS radio-localization signals
- An essential characteristic of the method of the invention is to hide in the spreading sequence a digital signature that can be described as a watermark
- Watermark in English. This watermark is hidden so that it can not be detected directly or using statistical methods in the spreading sequence. Of course, an authorized user can easily extract this watermark from the spreading sequence and use it to determine the source of the received signal.
- the appropriate circuits of the satellite 1 receive hidden signature information 3 which can be stored on board or transmitted from the ground.
- This signature is hidden information known only to the body controlling the satellite and users entitled to know it (for example subscribers to a paid service transmitted by the satellite 1).
- the signature 3 comprises a long sequence, preferably at least one hundred bits, which makes it possible to recognize the origin and / or the content of radio-localization signals and is advantageously dynamically modifiable from the ground by means of encrypted messages by sending either a new sequence or a new seed to generate a new sequence, or a change of signature order among those stored on board.
- a hidden spreading code (watermark) 4 is "modulated" (5) by this signature (3). This modulation consists of spreading the watermark throughout the sequence of the signature 3. A modulated watermark 6 is thus obtained.
- This spreading code 4 is a private code which can also be dynamically modified from the ground as described hereinabove. on for signature 3.
- This modification consists in dynamically inverting some of the elements ("chips" in English) of the code 7, that is to say that this modification is made as code 6 progresses, code 7 being presented to the different cells of the function 8 at each sequence of the modulated watermark 6, the location of these elements within the public code being determined by an algorithm 9 which uses private keys.
- the modulated code 6 having a length greater than that of the code 7 and modifying only a small part of it, the function XOR 8 uses several cells realizing each in real time. XOR operation on code 7 which is presented to each of them.
- the navigation code thus hidden is broadcast (1 1) by the transmitter (not shown) of the satellite 1. It is processed according to operations opposite to those which have been performed on transmission in a radio-navigation receiver 2, as follows.
- the receiving circuits (not shown) of the receiver 2 transmit the signals received from the satellite 1 to an entity 12 which dynamically selects using the public key 13 chip replacement where the operation 8 of "exclusive OR" (XOR) was realized.
- the key 13 makes it possible to generate the hidden watermark spreading code 14 (identical to the code 4).
- This code 14 is sent to a correlator 15 which receives from the entity 12 code sequences in which the chips of the code 7 modified on transmission have been restored to their original values.
- the symbols (16) are obtained which must make it possible to reconstitute the signature 17 after decoding, which must be identical to the signature 3 if the information received from satellite 1 are those issued by the body controlling the satellite, and not a decoy.
- the implementation of the method of the invention is "transparent" for the user who does not need services (generally paying) protected by this method.
- the marking carried out by this method is very difficult to detect because the transmitted code (10) thus modified is virtually unaltered and the public spreading code of navigation (7) is not changed.
- the value of the modified chips also depends on the data transmitted, even if it is possible for malicious people to detect modified chips, it is impossible for them to introduce decoys because they can not determine at which locations they must modify the chips because if they want to transmit the opposite value to the value transmitted by the real system, they only know the location of the chips not to change.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
- Radio Relay Systems (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (8)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
ES08803749.4T ES2648039T3 (es) | 2007-09-21 | 2008-09-05 | Procedimiento que proporciona los medios para reconocer el origen y/o el contenido de una señal de RF |
KR1020107005819A KR101419575B1 (ko) | 2007-09-21 | 2008-09-05 | Rf 신호의 발신원 및/또는 내용을 인식하는 수단을 제공하는 방법 |
JP2010525298A JP5499385B2 (ja) | 2007-09-21 | 2008-09-05 | 無線周波数信号の発信局及び/又は内容を認識するための手段を提供する方法 |
CN2008801076725A CN101803274B (zh) | 2007-09-21 | 2008-09-05 | 提供用于识别射频信号来源和/或内容的装置的方法 |
EP08803749.4A EP2188943B1 (fr) | 2007-09-21 | 2008-09-05 | Procédé fournissant les moyens de reconnaitre l'origine et/ou le contenu d'un signal rf |
US12/675,532 US8391490B2 (en) | 2007-09-21 | 2008-09-05 | Method providing the means for recognizing the origin and/or content of an RF signal |
CA2699179A CA2699179C (fr) | 2007-09-21 | 2008-09-05 | Procede fournissant les moyens de reconnaitre l'origine et/ou le contenu d'un signal rf |
AU2008300695A AU2008300695B2 (en) | 2007-09-21 | 2008-09-05 | Method providing the means for recognizing the origin and/or content of an RF signal |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR0706643 | 2007-09-21 | ||
FR0706643A FR2921528B1 (fr) | 2007-09-21 | 2007-09-21 | Procede fournissant les moyens de reconnaitre l'origine et/ou le contenu d'un signal rf |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2009037133A1 true WO2009037133A1 (fr) | 2009-03-26 |
Family
ID=39363878
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2008/061780 WO2009037133A1 (fr) | 2007-09-21 | 2008-09-05 | Procede fournissant les moyens de reconnaitre l'origine et/ou le contenu d'un signal rf |
Country Status (10)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US8391490B2 (fr) |
EP (1) | EP2188943B1 (fr) |
JP (1) | JP5499385B2 (fr) |
KR (1) | KR101419575B1 (fr) |
CN (1) | CN101803274B (fr) |
AU (1) | AU2008300695B2 (fr) |
CA (1) | CA2699179C (fr) |
ES (1) | ES2648039T3 (fr) |
FR (1) | FR2921528B1 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2009037133A1 (fr) |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2012130891A1 (fr) | 2011-03-31 | 2012-10-04 | Thales | Systeme de positionnement avec mecanisme de detection de fraude par verification de la visibilite des satellites |
EP2562560A1 (fr) | 2011-08-24 | 2013-02-27 | Thales | Procédé et système de détection de fraude d'informations de position d'un dispositif mobile |
EP2584378A1 (fr) | 2011-10-21 | 2013-04-24 | Thales | Procédé et système de détection de fraude d'informations de position d'un dispositif mobile |
US10630338B2 (en) | 2017-09-26 | 2020-04-21 | Thales | Method for transmitting additional information on transmission signals with spectrum spreading and associated system |
Families Citing this family (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR2956540B1 (fr) | 2010-02-12 | 2012-04-20 | Thales Sa | Procede et dispositif d'authentification d'une trajectoire calculee a partir de signaux de radiolocalisation |
FR2978835B1 (fr) * | 2011-08-05 | 2013-08-09 | Thales Sa | Charge utile de satellite pour systemes d'augmentation |
US9470796B2 (en) * | 2014-04-23 | 2016-10-18 | Opentv, Inc. | Techniques for securing live positioning signals |
US10339623B2 (en) | 2017-08-11 | 2019-07-02 | Harris Corporation | Phase rotation watermarking for phase modulation |
US10785086B1 (en) | 2019-07-10 | 2020-09-22 | Eagle Technology, Llc | Detection of phase rotation modulation |
WO2021205272A1 (fr) * | 2020-04-09 | 2021-10-14 | Magellan Systems Japan, Inc. | Procédé et système de fourniture d'authentification à des signaux de service ouverts gnss et de positionnement sécurisé interopérable |
Citations (5)
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US20020191809A1 (en) * | 2001-02-27 | 2002-12-19 | Darko Kirovski | Asymmetric spread-spectrum watermarking systems and methods of use |
WO2004002160A1 (fr) * | 2002-06-24 | 2003-12-31 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Integration de signatures d'authentification d'images |
EP1594122A1 (fr) * | 2004-05-06 | 2005-11-09 | Deutsche Thomson-Brandt Gmbh | Filigrane à spectre étalé |
US7020555B1 (en) * | 2003-12-23 | 2006-03-28 | Trimble Navigation Limited | Subscription GPS information service system |
US7194620B1 (en) * | 1999-09-24 | 2007-03-20 | Verizon Business Global Llc | Method for real-time data authentication |
Family Cites Families (10)
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JP4015288B2 (ja) * | 1997-07-03 | 2007-11-28 | 松下電器産業株式会社 | 情報埋め込み方法と情報抽出方法と情報埋め込み装置と情報抽出装置と記録媒体 |
US7543148B1 (en) * | 1999-07-13 | 2009-06-02 | Microsoft Corporation | Audio watermarking with covert channel and permutations |
JP2001043141A (ja) * | 1999-07-28 | 2001-02-16 | Sony Corp | 情報信号伝送方法、情報信号伝送システム、情報信号送信装置、情報信号受信装置および情報信号記録媒体 |
JP2002158859A (ja) * | 2000-11-20 | 2002-05-31 | Nippon Telegr & Teleph Corp <Ntt> | 電子透かし埋込方法及び装置及び電子透かし埋込プログラムを格納した記憶媒体及びコンテンツデータ記録媒体 |
JP2005502920A (ja) * | 2001-09-05 | 2005-01-27 | コーニンクレッカ フィリップス エレクトロニクス エヌ ヴィ | Dsd信号のための堅牢なウォーターマーク |
WO2004055808A1 (fr) * | 2002-12-17 | 2004-07-01 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Procede de traitement d'un signal analogique |
ES2352546T3 (es) * | 2003-02-24 | 2011-02-21 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Sistema de marca de agua de frecuencias de un repetidor de enlace directo. |
US20060161777A1 (en) * | 2003-07-11 | 2006-07-20 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Watermark embedding and detection |
JP4218539B2 (ja) * | 2004-01-28 | 2009-02-04 | 沖電気工業株式会社 | 電子透かし埋め込み装置,電子透かし検出装置,電子透かし埋め込み方法,および電子透かし検出方法 |
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2007
- 2007-09-21 FR FR0706643A patent/FR2921528B1/fr active Active
-
2008
- 2008-09-05 CN CN2008801076725A patent/CN101803274B/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2008-09-05 ES ES08803749.4T patent/ES2648039T3/es active Active
- 2008-09-05 AU AU2008300695A patent/AU2008300695B2/en active Active
- 2008-09-05 KR KR1020107005819A patent/KR101419575B1/ko active IP Right Grant
- 2008-09-05 CA CA2699179A patent/CA2699179C/fr not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2008-09-05 US US12/675,532 patent/US8391490B2/en active Active
- 2008-09-05 WO PCT/EP2008/061780 patent/WO2009037133A1/fr active Application Filing
- 2008-09-05 JP JP2010525298A patent/JP5499385B2/ja not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2008-09-05 EP EP08803749.4A patent/EP2188943B1/fr active Active
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US7194620B1 (en) * | 1999-09-24 | 2007-03-20 | Verizon Business Global Llc | Method for real-time data authentication |
US20020191809A1 (en) * | 2001-02-27 | 2002-12-19 | Darko Kirovski | Asymmetric spread-spectrum watermarking systems and methods of use |
WO2004002160A1 (fr) * | 2002-06-24 | 2003-12-31 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Integration de signatures d'authentification d'images |
US7020555B1 (en) * | 2003-12-23 | 2006-03-28 | Trimble Navigation Limited | Subscription GPS information service system |
EP1594122A1 (fr) * | 2004-05-06 | 2005-11-09 | Deutsche Thomson-Brandt Gmbh | Filigrane à spectre étalé |
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Cited By (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2012130891A1 (fr) | 2011-03-31 | 2012-10-04 | Thales | Systeme de positionnement avec mecanisme de detection de fraude par verification de la visibilite des satellites |
WO2012130889A1 (fr) | 2011-03-31 | 2012-10-04 | Thales | Systeme de positionnement avec mecanisme de detection de fraude pour application critique |
US9535160B2 (en) | 2011-03-31 | 2017-01-03 | Thales | Positioning system with fraud detection mechanism for a critical application |
EP2562560A1 (fr) | 2011-08-24 | 2013-02-27 | Thales | Procédé et système de détection de fraude d'informations de position d'un dispositif mobile |
EP2584378A1 (fr) | 2011-10-21 | 2013-04-24 | Thales | Procédé et système de détection de fraude d'informations de position d'un dispositif mobile |
FR2981756A1 (fr) * | 2011-10-21 | 2013-04-26 | Thales Sa | Procede et systeme de detection de fraude d'informations de position d'un dispositif mobile |
US10630338B2 (en) | 2017-09-26 | 2020-04-21 | Thales | Method for transmitting additional information on transmission signals with spectrum spreading and associated system |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CA2699179C (fr) | 2015-11-10 |
FR2921528A1 (fr) | 2009-03-27 |
CA2699179A1 (fr) | 2009-03-26 |
CN101803274B (zh) | 2013-10-16 |
JP2010539835A (ja) | 2010-12-16 |
ES2648039T3 (es) | 2017-12-28 |
FR2921528B1 (fr) | 2015-08-21 |
JP5499385B2 (ja) | 2014-05-21 |
KR101419575B1 (ko) | 2014-07-14 |
US8391490B2 (en) | 2013-03-05 |
AU2008300695B2 (en) | 2013-10-24 |
EP2188943A1 (fr) | 2010-05-26 |
EP2188943B1 (fr) | 2017-08-23 |
US20100303235A1 (en) | 2010-12-02 |
KR20100059872A (ko) | 2010-06-04 |
CN101803274A (zh) | 2010-08-11 |
AU2008300695A1 (en) | 2009-03-26 |
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