WO2004082203A1 - 著作物保護システム - Google Patents
著作物保護システム Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2004082203A1 WO2004082203A1 PCT/JP2004/003161 JP2004003161W WO2004082203A1 WO 2004082203 A1 WO2004082203 A1 WO 2004082203A1 JP 2004003161 W JP2004003161 W JP 2004003161W WO 2004082203 A1 WO2004082203 A1 WO 2004082203A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- key
- data
- recording medium
- recording
- media key
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
- G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
- G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
- G11B20/10—Digital recording or reproducing
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0822—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using key encryption key
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
- G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
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- G—PHYSICS
- G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
- G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
- G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
- G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
- G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
- G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
- G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
- G11B20/0021—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
- G11B20/00217—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier the cryptographic key used for encryption and/or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from the record carrier being read from a specific source
- G11B20/00253—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier the cryptographic key used for encryption and/or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from the record carrier being read from a specific source wherein the key is stored on the record carrier
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
- H04L9/3268—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a technique for recording and reproducing digital data on a large-capacity recording medium, and more particularly to a technique for preventing unauthorized recording and reproduction of content by an unauthorized device.
- Akita
- the distributed content is read by a computer or playback device, etc., and can be played back or copied.
- encryption technology is used to protect the copyright of the content, that is, to prevent unauthorized use of the content, such as illegal reproduction or copying.
- the recording device encrypts the content using an encryption key, records the content on a recording medium such as an optical disk, and distributes the content.
- a playback device that has a decryption key corresponding to the encryption key can decrypt the encrypted content read from the recording medium using the decryption key and reproduce the content. it can.
- the content When the content is encrypted and recorded on a recording medium, the content itself is encrypted and recorded using an encryption key corresponding to the decryption key held and reproduced by the playback device, or the content is stored in a certain key.
- the decryption key held by the playback device must be strictly managed so as not to be exposed to the outside, but the decryption key may be illegally analyzed by the unauthorized person inside the playback device. There is a risk that the key will be exposed to the outside world.
- the unauthorized person can manufacture a recording device or playback device that illegally uses the content and sell it illegally, or use a computer program to illegally use the content. It is conceivable to create and distribute such programs via the Internet.
- Patent Document 1 discloses a system for realizing key revocation.
- key revocation information indicating that a key held by the device has been revoked is recorded in advance in a non-rewritable area of a recording medium.
- the device uses the key revocation information recorded on the recording medium to determine whether or not the key held by the device has been revoked.
- the device prevents the use of the recording medium.
- the key revocation information is updated, and the updated key revocation information is recorded on a new recording medium manufactured after the revocation occurs.
- a system in which a new recording medium cannot be used with a key that has been revoked in this way is used.
- reading or writing of content recorded on a recording medium such as an optical disk is generally performed by a personal computer peripheral device called an optical disk drive, but achieves device compatibility. Therefore, the input / output method is generally standardized as public information, and is generally not kept secret. Therefore, the content recorded on the recording medium can be easily read by a personal computer or the like, and the read data can be easily written on another recording medium. Therefore, in a system that protects the copyright of content, an impeachment function that prevents data that can be performed by ordinary users, such as reading data on a recording medium and writing it to another recording medium, is possible.
- the system must be equipped with A technique for preventing data read from a recording medium from being written to another recording medium is called a media binding technique, and Patent Document 2 discloses a mechanism for realizing a media bind.
- a medium identifier for identifying the recording medium is recorded in the non-rewritable area of the recording medium, and the encrypted content recorded on the recording medium is encrypted based on the medium identifier. Therefore, even if only the encrypted content is copied to another recording medium, the other recording medium records a different medium identifier, and the encrypted content is correctly decrypted based on the different medium identifier. I can't.
- Patent Document 3 Patent Document 3
- the present invention provides a copyright protection system, a recording device, a recording method, a reproducing device, a reproducing method, a computer program, and a recording medium that can prevent illegal use of content in order to address the above demands. Aim.
- the present invention comprises a recording device that encrypts and writes content on a recording medium, and a plurality of playback devices that attempt to decrypt the encrypted content recorded on the recording medium. It is a copyright protection system.
- the recording medium includes a read-only non-rewritable area and a readable and writable rewritable area, and the medium-unique number unique to the recording medium is recorded in the non-rewritable area in advance. .
- the recording device generates a media key for each playback device that has not been revoked, and predetermined detection information for each playback device that has been revoked, by encrypting them using the decryption key of the playback device.
- Storage means for storing media key data composed of a plurality of encrypted media keys, Reading means for reading the medium unique number from the non-replaceable area, generating means for generating an encryption key based on the read medium unique number and the medium key, and based on the generated encryption key.
- Encryption means for encrypting the content as digital data to generate encrypted content; reading means for reading the media key data from the storage means; and reading the read media key data and the media key data.
- Writing means for writing the generated encrypted content to the rewritable area of the recording medium.
- Each of the playback devices is read using a reading unit that reads an encrypted media key corresponding to the playback device from media key data written in the rewritable area of the recording medium, and a device key of the playback device.
- Decryption means for decrypting the encrypted media key to generate a decryption media key; and determining whether the generated decryption media key is the detection information.
- Control means for prohibiting the decryption of the encrypted content recorded on the medium and permitting the decryption of the encrypted content when the information is not the detection information; and when the decryption is permitted, the control means for decrypting the encrypted content from the recording medium.
- Decryption means for reading the encrypted content and decrypting the read encrypted content based on the generated decryption media key to generate decryption content. That.
- the recording device encrypts the media key for each playback device that has not been revoked, the predetermined detection information for each playback device that has been revoked, and the device key of the playback device.
- Media key data composed of a plurality of encrypted media keys generated by encryption, and writes the generated encryption key on the basis of the medium unique number and the media key.
- the generated encrypted content is written to a recording medium based on the encryption key.
- the playback device decrypts the encrypted media key using the device key to generate a decrypted media key, and when the generated decrypted media key is the detection information, the decrypted media key is recorded on the recording medium. Prohibit decryption of existing encrypted content. With such a configuration, a disabled playback device can be eliminated.
- the recording apparatus further includes: a comparing unit that compares new and old media key data stored in the another recording medium with the media key data stored in the storage unit; When it is determined that the media key data is newer, the other media key data is read from the another recording medium, and the read another media key data is stored in the storage medium.
- Updating means for overwriting key data wherein the reading means reads the other media key data from the storage means instead of reading the media key data, and the writing means comprises: Instead of writing data, the read other media key data is written to the rewritable area of the recording medium.
- the recording device can update the media key data stored therein to another encrypted media key obtained from another recording medium.
- the storage unit further stores revocation data indicating that a public key assigned to any of the recording device and the plurality of playback devices is revoked.
- a signature generation unit configured to generate a verification information by applying a digital signature to the invalidation data, wherein the writing unit is further configured to rewrite the generated verification information in the recording medium. Write to area.
- the recording device further stores revocation data indicating that a public key assigned to any of the recording device and the plurality of playback devices has been revoked.
- the reproducing device reads the written verification information, and further includes a verification unit that performs signature verification based on the read verification information, and outputs a verification result indicating success or failure of the verification.
- the control means further prohibits decryption of the encrypted content when the verification result indicates that the verification has failed, and when the verification result indicates that the verification has succeeded, Allow decryption of encrypted content.
- the recording device further performs the verification generated by the digital signature. Since the information is written on the recording medium, the reproducing device verifies the verification information, whereby an unauthorized reproducing device can be eliminated.
- the storage unit further stores a public key certificate of the recording device, and the reading unit further reads the public key certificate from the storage unit, and the writing unit The read public key certificate is written in the rewritable area of the recording medium.
- the recording device further stores a public key certificate of the recording device, reads the public key certificate, writes the read public key certificate in the rewritable area of the recording medium,
- the playback device further includes a storage unit that stores first revocation data indicating that a public key assigned to any of the recording device and the plurality of playback devices is revoked, and the recording device Certificate reading means for reading the public key certificate from a medium, and verifying whether or not the public key included in the read public key certificate indicates that the public key has been revoked by the first revocation data.
- the control means further comprising: when the public key is invalidated, prohibits decryption of the encrypted content, and the public key is invalidated. If it has to permit the decryption of the encrypted Con Ten'.
- the recording device writes the public key certificate on the recording medium
- the reproducing device reads the public key certificate from the recording medium, and decrypts the encrypted content when the public key is invalidated. Can be prohibited.
- another recording medium stores second revocation data indicating that a public key assigned to any of the recording device and the plurality of playback devices is revoked
- the playback device further includes: a comparing unit that compares the second invalidation data stored in the another recording medium with the first invalidation data stored in the storage unit. When it is determined that the second invalidation data is newer, the second invalidation data is read from the another recording medium, and the read second invalidation data is stored in the storage unit. Updating means for overwriting the first invalidation data.
- the playback device can update the invalidation data to the latest state.
- the storage unit further stores a device identifier for identifying the recording device.
- the recording device further includes an embedding unit that reads the device identifier from the storage unit, and embeds the read device identifier as an electronic watermark in the content.
- the content in which the device identifier is embedded is encrypted.
- the playback device further reads the device identifier from the storage unit that stores a device identifier for identifying the playback device when decryption is permitted, and reads the read device identifier from the storage unit.
- Embedding means for embedding an electronic watermark in the encrypted content; and writing the encrypted content in which the device identifier is embedded in the recording medium.
- the recording device and the reproducing device write the content in which the device identifier is embedded into the recording medium, when the content is illegally distributed, the recording device and the reproducing device extract the embedded device identifier from the content, thereby It is possible to specify the recording device and the playback device that have recorded the content.
- the media key data stored in the storage unit further includes a data identifier for identifying the media key data, and the writing unit associates the data identifier with the encrypted content. Writing into the rewritable area of the recording medium, and writing the media key data including the data identifier into the rewritable area.
- the media key data stored in the recording device further includes a data identifier for identifying the media key data, the recording device associates the data identifier with the encrypted content, Writing in the rewritable area of the recording medium, writing the media key data including the data identifier in the rewritable area, the reproducing device further specifies the encrypted content recorded in the recording medium; Receiving means for receiving, from the recording medium, the data identifier associated with the encrypted content whose specification has been received, and reading the media key data including the read data identifier. Reading means for reading from a recording medium, wherein the control means reads the read medium key data Then, it is determined whether or not the encrypted content can be decrypted based on the information.
- the recording device associates the data identifier with the encrypted content, writes the data on the recording medium, and writes the media key data including the data identifier on the recording medium. And encryption Media key data corresponding to the content is obtained, and based on the obtained media key data, it is possible to determine whether or not the decryption of the encrypted content is permitted.
- FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram showing a configuration of the content supply system 10.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the recording apparatus 100.
- FIG. 3 is a data structure diagram showing a structure of data recorded on the recording medium 120.
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the reproducing device 200.
- FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing the operation of writing data to the recording medium 120 by the recording device 100.
- FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing an operation of reproducing the data recorded on the recording medium 120 by the reproducing apparatus 200. Continue to Figure 7.
- FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing an operation of reproducing the data recorded on the recording medium 120 by the reproducing apparatus 200. Continued from Figure 6.
- FIG. 8 is a data structure diagram showing a structure of data recorded on n recording media according to a modification of the first embodiment.
- FIG. 9 is a data structure diagram showing a structure of data recorded on a recording medium according to a modification of the first embodiment.
- FIG. 10 is a configuration diagram showing the configuration of the content supply system 20.
- FIG. 11 is a block diagram showing a configuration of the recording device 110.
- FIG. 12 is a data structure diagram showing the structure of data recorded on the recording medium 1300.
- FIG. 13 is a block diagram showing a configuration of the playback device 1200. As shown in FIG. 13
- FIG. 14 is a data structure diagram showing a structure of data recorded on the recording medium 130a.
- FIG. 15 is a data structure diagram showing a structure of data recorded on the recording medium 130b.
- FIG. 16 is a flowchart showing the operation of writing data to the recording medium 130 by the recording device 110. Continue to Figure 17.
- FIG. 17 is a flowchart showing an operation of writing data to the recording medium 1300 by the recording device 1100. Continue to Figure 18.
- FIG. 18 is a flowchart showing an operation of writing data to the recording medium 1300 by the recording device 1100. Continued from Figure 17.
- FIG. 19 is a flowchart showing the operation of reproducing the data recorded on the recording medium 1300 by the reproducing apparatus 1200. Continue to Figure 20.
- FIG. 20 is a flowchart showing the operation of reproducing data recorded on the recording medium 1300 by the reproducing apparatus 1200. Continued from Figure 19. BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION
- a content supply system 10 according to one embodiment of the present invention will be described.
- the content supply system 10 includes a content server device 500, a recording device 100, and a playback device 200a, 200b, 200c, 200d, 200e,.
- the total number of the recording devices 100 and the reproducing devices 200a, 200b, 200c, 200d, 200e, and so on is n.
- the recording device 100 is assigned the device number “1”, and the playback devices 200 a, 200 b, 200 c, 200 d, 200 e,... Are respectively assigned the device number “2”, “3”, “4”, ⁇ , “n” are assigned. Each device is identified by its assigned device number.
- the playback device 200b and the playback device 200c have been exposed to an unauthorized attack by an unauthorized third party. Therefore, the playback device 200b and the playback device 200c are invalidated.
- Content suppliers such as music and movies have a content server device 500 and a recording device 100.
- the content server device 500 encrypts the content and the content. And transmits the content and the corresponding content key to the recording device 100 via the dedicated line 30 in response to a request from the recording device 100. .
- the recording device 100 receives the T, the content and the corresponding content key from the content server device 500 via the dedicated line 30, encrypts the received content and the content key, and encrypts the content and the encrypted content.
- the content key and other related information are written to the recording medium 120.
- the recording medium 120 on which the encrypted content key and other related information are recorded is sold at a store, and the user purchases the recording medium 120.
- the playback device 200 a of the user reads the encrypted content, the encrypted content key, and other related information from the recording medium 120, and reads the other information. Using the relevant information, it is determined whether or not the content can be decrypted. If it is determined that the content can be decrypted, a decrypted content key is generated from the encrypted content key, and the decrypted content is generated using the decrypted content key. Then, movies and music are generated and output from the generated decrypted content.
- the content server device 500 includes an information storage unit 501, a control unit 502, an input unit 503, a display unit 504, and a transmission / reception unit 505 (not shown). .
- the content server device 500 is, specifically, a computer system including a microprocessor, a ROM, a RAM, a hard disk unit, a communication unit, a display unit, a keyboard, a mouse, and the like.
- a computer program is stored in the RAM or the hard disk unit.
- Each component of the content server apparatus 500 achieves its function by the microprocessor operating according to the computer program.
- the transmission / reception unit 505 is connected to the recording device 100 via the dedicated line 30, and transmits / receives information between the recording device 100 and the control unit 502.
- the information storage unit 501 stores the video information and the audio information by compression encoding with high efficiency. A plurality of pairs of generated content and a content key used as a key when encrypting the content are stored in advance.
- the control unit 502 receives a content acquisition request from the recording device 100 via the dedicated line 30 and the transmission / reception unit 505. Upon receiving the acquisition request, the control unit 502 reads the content and the content key indicated by the acquisition request from the information storage unit 501, and transmits the read content and the content key via the transmission / reception unit 505 and the dedicated line 30. To the recording device 100.
- Input unit 503 receives an instruction from the operator of content server device 500, and outputs the received instruction to control unit 502.
- the display unit 504 displays various information under the control of the control unit 502. 1.3 Recording device 100
- the recording device 100 includes a device key storage unit 101, a media key data storage unit 102, a key calculation unit 103, a key calculation unit 104, an encryption unit 105, an encryption unit 106, and a secret key storage unit 107. It comprises a certificate storage unit 108, a 111 storage unit 109, a signature generation unit 110, a drive unit 111, a control unit 112, and a transmission / reception unit 113.
- the recording device 100 is, specifically, a computer system including a microprocessor, a ROM, a RAM, a hard disk unit, and the like, like the content server device 500.
- a computer program is stored in the RAM or the hard disk unit.
- the recording device 100 achieves its function by the microprocessor operating according to the computer program.
- the device key storage unit 101 secretly stores the device key DK-1 so that it cannot be accessed from an external device.
- the device key DK-1 is a key unique to the recording device 100.
- the device key held by the device m is expressed as DK-m.
- the media key data storage unit 102 stores the media key data MDATA I have.
- the media key data MD AT A includes n sets, each set including an encrypted media key and a device number.
- the encrypted media key and device number included in each set correspond to each other.
- n is the recording device 1 as described above.
- the first set is composed of the first encrypted media key and the device number “1”.
- the device number “1” is identification information for identifying the recording device 100.
- the first encrypted media key is a device identified by the device number “1”, that is, a device key DK-1 assigned to the recording device 100, and a media key MK is used as an encryption algorithm E It is generated by applying 1.
- the encryption algorithm E 1 is, for example, D E S (Data Encryption
- E (A, B) indicates a ciphertext obtained by performing the encryption algorithm E on the plaintext B using the key A.
- the media key MK is a key unique to the recording medium 120.
- the second set is composed of the second encrypted media key and the device number “2”, respectively.
- the device number “2” is the playback device
- the third and fourth sets consist of a third encrypted media key and device number “3” and a fourth encrypted media key and device number “4”, respectively.
- the device numbers “3” and “4” are
- the third and fourth encrypted media keys are the devices identified by the device numbers “3” and “4”, that is, the playback device 20.
- 4th encrypted media key E 1 (DK— 4, 0)
- the value “0” is completely unrelated to the media key (MK).
- the value “0” is used instead of the media key MK because the corresponding playback devices 200 b and 200 c are invalidated for the third and fourth encrypted media keys, respectively. This is used as detection information for knowing that the playback devices 2000b and 2000c are invalidated.
- the revoked device use the device key of the revoked device to encrypt data completely unrelated to the media key MK, that is, encrypt the value ⁇ 0 '' to generate an encrypted media key.
- -Only devices other than the revoked device can share the media key MK.
- disabled devices can be excluded from the system.
- the value “0” is used here, other data completely unrelated to the media key MK may be used.
- it may be another fixed value “0xFFFF”, information indicating the date and time when the encrypted media key is generated, the device key of the invalidated device, or the like.
- Patent Document 1 discloses an invalidation method using a tree structure.
- the fifth,..., N-th sets are the fifth encrypted media key and the device number “5”,. It consists of a device number "n".
- the device numbers “5”, “ ⁇ ”, “n” identify the playback devices 200 d, 200 e,.
- the fifth,..., N-th encrypted media keys are devices with device numbers “5”, “n”, respectively, that is, playback devices 200 d, 200 e, and It is generated by applying the encryption algorithm E1 to the media key MK using the device keys DK-5, DK, and DKn assigned to.
- the key calculation unit 103 previously stores the device number “1” assigned to the recording device 100.
- the key calculation unit 103 searches for and reads out a set including the device number “1” stored in advance from n sets of the media key data MDATA stored in the media key data storage unit 102, and reads out the set. Extract the encrypted media key El (DK-1, MK) corresponding to device number “1” from the set.
- the key calculation unit 103 reads the device key DK-1 from the device key storage unit 101, and uses the read device key DK-1 to extract the encrypted media key E 1 (DK-1, MK).
- a decryption algorithm D1 is applied to generate a media key MK.
- the decryption algorithm Dl is an algorithm for decrypting the ciphertext generated by performing the encryption algorithm E1, and is an example of DES.
- D (A, B) indicates a decrypted text obtained by performing a decryption algorithm D on cipher text B using key A.
- key calculating section 103 outputs the generated media key MK to key calculating section 104.
- each block showing each component of the recording apparatus 100 is connected to another block by a connection line.
- connection lines are omitted.
- each connection line indicates a path through which signals and information are transmitted.
- those with a key mark drawn on the connection line indicate a path through which information as a key is transmitted to the key calculation unit 103. ing.
- blocks indicating other components The same applies to other drawings.
- the key calculation unit 104 receives the media key MK from the key calculation unit 103, and reads the medium unique number M ID from the unique number recording area 121 of the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 111.
- key calculation section 104 combines received media key MK and read medium unique number MID in this order to generate a combined value (MK IIMID).
- MK IIMID combined value
- ⁇ II BJ indicates that data A and data B are bit-coupled in this order.
- the key calculation unit 104 calculates the combined value (MK II MID)
- the obtained hash value H is used as a key encryption key KEK
- the key encryption key KEK is used as an encryption unit 105 and Output to signature generation unit 110.
- SHA-1 (A) indicates a hash value obtained by applying the hash function SHA-1 to the information A.
- the key calculation unit 104 uses the hash value obtained by performing the hash function SHA-1 as the key encryption key KEK, but is not limited to this. Part of the obtained hash value may be used as the key encryption key KEK.
- hash function SHA-1 Since the hash function SHA-1 is publicly known, description thereof will be omitted. Note that another hash function may be used.
- the encryption unit 105 receives the content key CK from the content server device 500 via the transmission / reception unit 113, and receives the key encryption key KEK from the key calculation unit 104.
- the encryption unit 105 performs an encryption algorithm E2 on the received content key CK using the received key encryption key KEK to generate an encrypted content key ECK.
- Encrypted content key ECK E 2 (KEK, CK)
- the encryption algorithm E2 is based on DES, for example.
- the encryption unit 105 secures the key recording area 123 on the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 111, and then stores the generated encrypted content key ECK via the drive unit 111. Then, the data is written to the key recording area 123 of the recording medium 120.
- the encryption unit 106 receives the content key CK and the content CNT from the content server device 500 via the transmission / reception unit 113, and uses the received content key CK to apply the encryption algorithm E3 to the received content CNT. To generate the encrypted content ECNT.
- the encryption algorithm E3 is based on, for example, DES.
- the encryption unit 106 stores the data on the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 111.
- the content recording area 124 is secured, and then the generated encrypted content ECNT is written to the content recording area 124 of the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 111.
- the secret key storage unit 107 stores the secret key SK-1 of the recording device 100 so that it cannot be accessed from an external device.
- the secret key SK-1 is based on public key cryptography.
- the public key cryptosystem is, for example, an RSA (Rivest Shamir Adleman) cryptosystem.
- the certificate storage unit 108 stores a public key certificate PKC.
- the public key certificate PKC includes a certificate identifier ID-1, a public key PK-1 and signature data Sig-1.
- Certificate identifier ID-1 is identification information that uniquely identifies the public key certificate PKC.
- the public key PK-1 is a public key corresponding to the secret key SK-1 stored in the secret key storage 107. Also, the signature data S i g — 1 is
- Signature data S ig — 1 S ig (SK—CA, ID—1 II PK_1) where S ig (A, B) applies a digital signature S ig to data B using key A. This shows the signature data obtained.
- An example of the digital signature Sig is a digital signature using RSA using a hash function SHA-1.
- the CRL storage unit 109 records a public key certificate revocation list (hereinafter, referred to as a revocation list CRL) indicating the revoked public key certificate at the first time point.
- a revocation list CRL a public key certificate revocation list
- the revocation list CRL includes one or more certificate identifiers, signature data SigID, and a version number.
- Each certificate identifier is identification information for identifying a revoked public key certificate.
- the signature data Sig ID is used for the combined value of all certificate identifiers included in the revocation list CRL using the private key SK__CA of the certificate authority CA (revocation list
- one certificate identifier is included in the CRL, it is generated by applying the digital signature Sig to the one certificate identifier.
- Signature data Sig ID Sig (SK—CA, combined value of all certificate identifiers) For example, if the public key certificates identified by certificate identifiers ID-3 and ID-4 are invalidated Is the revocation list CRL is the certificate identifier ID—3,
- the version number is information indicating the generation of the revocation list CRL, and indicates that the revocation list CRL is the one at the first time point.
- the version number increases as the generation of the public key certificate revocation list becomes newer.
- the signature generation unit 110 reads the secret key SK-1 from the secret key storage unit 107, reads the revocation list CRL from the storage unit 109, and receives the key encryption key KEK from the key calculation unit 104.
- the signature generation unit 110 combines the received key encryption key KEK and the read invalidation list CRL in this order to generate a combined value (KEK II CRL), and reads the read secret key SK- Using 1, the digital signature Sig is applied to the generated joint value (KEK II CRL) to generate signature data SigCRL.
- Signature data S ig CRL S ig (SK—1, (KEK II CRL))
- the signature generation unit 110 secures a signature recording area 125 on the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 111.
- the generated signature data SigCRL is written to the signature recording area 125 of the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 111.
- the control unit 112 transmits a content acquisition request to the content server device 500 via the transmission / reception unit 113.
- the control unit 112 reads the public key certificate PKC from the certificate storage unit 108, secures a certificate recording area 127 on the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 111, and then reads the certificate.
- Public key certificate PKC via the drive unit 1 1 1 Write to the certificate recording area 127 of the recording medium 120.
- control unit 112 reads the media key data MDATA from the media key data storage unit 102, secures a media key data recording area 122 on the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 111, and Then, the read media key data MDATA is written to the media key data recording area 122 of the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 111.
- the control unit 112 reads the revocation list CRL from the CRL storage unit 109, secures a CRL recording area 126 on the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 111, and then reads the revocation list CRL.
- the list CRL is written to the CRL recording area 126 of the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 111.
- the control unit 112 receives instruction information from the keyboard 180 according to an operation instruction of the operator of the recording device 100, and operates according to the instruction information. In addition, it controls the operation of the other components constituting the recording device 100.
- the transmission / reception unit 113 is connected to the content server device 500 via the dedicated line 30, and transmits / receives information between the content server device 500 and the control unit 112. Under the control of the control unit 112, information is transmitted and received between the content server device 500 and the encryption unit 105 and between the content server device 500 and the encryption unit 106.
- the drive unit 111 reads the medium unique number MID from the unique number recording area 121 of the recording medium 120 under the control of the control unit 112, and sends the read medium unique number MID to the key calculation unit 104. Output.
- the drive unit 111 receives each information from the encryption unit 105, the encryption unit 106, and the signature generation unit 110 under the control of the control unit 112, and stores each area for writing the received information.
- the information is secured on the recording medium 120, and the information is written in the secured area.
- the drive unit 111 receives information from the control unit 112, secures each area for writing the received information on the recording medium 120, and writes the information in the secured area. (14) Key board 180 and monitor 190
- the keyboard 180 receives an operation instruction of the operator of the recording device 100 and outputs instruction information corresponding to the received operation instruction to the control unit 112.
- the monitor 190 displays various information under the control of the control unit 112.
- the recording medium 120 is an optical disk media, and includes a unique number recording area 121 and a general area 129 as shown in FIG.
- a medium unique number MID which is a unique number for identifying the recording medium 120, is recorded in advance.
- the unique number recording area 121 is a non-rewritable area where other information cannot be written or the recorded medium unique number MID cannot be rewritten.
- the medium specific number MID is represented by, for example, 8 hexadecimal digits, and is “0 X 00000006”. In this specification, “0x” indicates that the subsequent display is in hexadecimal.
- the general area 129 is an area where other information can be written. At first, no information is written in the general area 129.
- the general area 129 contains a media key data recording area 122, a key recording area 123, a content recording area 124, a signature recording area 125, and a CRL recording.
- An area 126 and a certificate recording area 127 are secured.
- the total number of the recording devices 100 and the reproducing devices 200a, 200b, 200c, 200d, 200e It is assumed that among the devices, the playback device 200b and the playback device 200c are invalidated, and the n devices each have only one unique device key. Based on such an assumption, various data as specific examples are recorded in each area included in the general area 129 of the recording medium 120.
- media key data MD AT A is recorded.
- the media key data MDATA is composed of n sets, each set including an encrypted media key and a device number.
- the device number is identification information for identifying the device.
- the encrypted media key is generated by applying the encryption algorithm E1 to the media key MK or value "0" using the device key DK-m assigned to the device m indicated by the corresponding device number "m". It was done. Here, when the device m is invalidated, the value “0” is used. If the device m has not been revoked, the media key MK is used.
- Encrypted media key E 1 (DK 1 m, MK) or
- Encrypted media key El (DK_m, 0)
- an encrypted content key ECK is recorded.
- the encrypted content key ECK is generated by applying the encryption algorithm E2 to the content key CK using the key encryption key KEK.
- Encrypted content key ECK E 2 (KEK, CK)
- the key encryption key KEK is a key calculated by using a value obtained by combining the media key MK and the medium unique number MID as an input value and using an output value of a hash function.
- Key encryption key KEK SHA— 1 (MK I I M I D)
- the encrypted content ECNT is recorded.
- the encrypted content ECNT is generated by applying the encryption algorithm E3 to the content using the content key CK.
- signature data Sig CRL is recorded.
- the signature data SigCRL is generated by applying a digital signature Sig to a combined value (KEK I I CRL) of the key encryption key KEK and the revocation list CRL using the secret key SK_1.
- the revocation list CRL is recorded in the CRL recording area 126, and the revocation list CRL describes the ID of the certificate to be revoked. Invalidation squirrel G.
- the CRL includes, as an example, certificate identifier ID-3, ID-4, signature data Sig ID, and version number.
- 'Certificate identifier ID-3, ID_4 is identification information for identifying the revoked public key certificate.
- the signature data Sig ID is used for the combined value of all certificate identifiers included in the revocation list CRL using the private key SK—CA of the certification authority CA (one certificate identifier in the revocation list CRL). Is included, it is generated by applying a digital signature Sig to the one certificate identifier.
- Signature data S ig ID S ig (SK—CA, combined value of all certificate identifiers)
- the signature data from the certification authority CA is included to ensure the validity of the revocation list CRL. .
- the version number is information indicating the generation of the revocation list CRL.
- the format of the CRL may be a known format, or may be a format specialized for a certain system.
- the public key certificate PKC is recorded in the certificate recording area 127.
- the public key certificate PKC includes a certificate identifier ID-1, a public key PK-1 and signature data Sig_l.
- Certificate identifier ID-1 is identification information that identifies the public key certificate PKC.
- the public key PK-1 is based on public key cryptography and corresponds to the secret key SK-1.
- the signature data Sig-1 is digitally signed using the private key SK-CA of the certification authority CA and the combined value (ID-1 II PK-1) of the certificate identifier ID-1 and the public key PK-1. It is generated by applying Sig.
- the reason that the signature data from the certification authority CA is included is to ensure the validity of the public key certificate.
- the format of the public key certificate may be a known format or a format specialized for a certain system.
- the playback device 200 includes a device key storage unit 201, a key calculation unit 202, a key calculation unit 203, a decryption unit 204, a decryption unit 205, a CA public key storage unit 206, a certificate verification unit 207, 11] ⁇ Storage unit 208, one-time verification unit 209 CRL comparison / update unit 210, certificate determination unit 211, signature verification unit 212, switch 213, playback unit 214, control unit 215, input unit 216, display unit 217, and drive It is composed of part 218.
- the playback device 200 is, specifically, a computer system including a microprocessor, a ROM, a RAM, a hard disk unit, and the like, like the content server device 500.
- a computer program is stored in the RAM or the hard disk unit.
- the playback device 200 achieves its functions by the microprocessor operating according to the computer program.
- the device key storage unit 201 secretly stores the device key DK-x so that it cannot be accessed from an external device.
- the device key DK—X is a key unique to the playback device 200.
- the device key DK-x stored in the device key storage unit 201 differs depending on the playback device 200a, 200b, 200c, 200d, 200e,.
- Each of the device key storage units 201 of the playback devices 200a, 200b, 200c, 200d, 200e,- ⁇ ' has a device key DK-2, DK-3, DK-4, DK-5, DK, respectively.
- Key calculation section 202 stores in advance device number “x” assigned to playback device 200.
- the device number “x” stored in the key calculation unit 202 differs depending on the playback devices 200a, 200b, 200c, 200d, 200e,.
- the key calculation units 202 of the playback devices 200 a, 200 b, 200 c, 200 d, 200 e, and ′ are respectively assigned device numbers “2”, “3”, “4”, “5”, and “6”. ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇
- the key calculation unit 202 sequentially reads out n sets of media key data MD AT A from the media key data overnight recording area 122 of the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 218, and from among the read sets, Search for the set containing the stored device number "x".
- an encrypted media key E 1 (DK—X, y) corresponding to the device number “X” is extracted from the found pair.
- the reproducing device 200 is the reproducing device 200b or 200c
- y is a value “0”.
- the playback device 200 is another playback device except the playback devices 200b and 200c
- y is the media key MK.
- the key calculation unit 202 reads the device key DK-X from the device key storage unit 201, and decrypts it into the extracted encrypted media key E 1 (DK_x, y) using the read device key DK-X. Apply algorithm D1 to generate decrypted media key y.
- Decryption media key y Dl (DK—x, (El (DK—x, y))
- the decrypted media key y is either the media key MK or the value “0”.
- key calculation section 202 outputs the generated decrypted media key y to key calculation section 203.
- Key calculation section 203 operates in the same manner as key calculation section 104.
- the key calculation unit 203 receives the decrypted media key y from the key calculation unit 202, and reads the medium unique number MID from the unique number recording area 121 of the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 218.
- the key calculation unit 203 combines the received decrypted media key y with the read medium unique number MID in this order to generate a combined value (yIMID). 'Next, the key calculation unit 203 adds the hash function S to the generated joint value (y I I MI D).
- the key calculation unit 104 uses a part of the obtained hash value as the key encryption key KEK
- the key calculation unit 203 also precedes the obtained hash value.
- the same part as the above part is used as the key decryption key KDK.
- the decryption unit 204 reads the encrypted content key ECK from the key recording area 123 of the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 218, and receives the key decryption key KDK from the key calculation unit 203.
- decryption section 204 performs decryption algorithm D2 on the read encrypted content key ECK to generate decrypted content key DCK.
- the decryption algorithm D 2 is an algorithm for decrypting a cipher text generated by performing the encryption algorithm E 2, and is, for example, DES.
- decryption section 204 outputs the generated decrypted content key DCK to decryption section 205.
- the decryption unit 205 reads the encrypted content ECNT from the content recording area 124 of the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 218, and receives the decrypted content key DCK from the decryption unit 204.
- decryption section 205 applies decryption algorithm D3 to the read encrypted content ECNT to generate decrypted content DCNT.
- the decryption algorithm D3 is an algorithm for decrypting the ciphertext generated by performing the encryption algorithm E3, and is, for example, DES.
- the decrypting unit 205 outputs the generated decrypted content DCNT to the switch 213.
- the CA public key storage unit 206 stores the public key PK—CA of the certificate authority CA in advance. (7) Certificate verification unit 207
- the certificate verification unit 207 reads the public key PK—CA from the CA public key storage unit 206, and reads the public key certificate PKC from the certificate recording area 127 of the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 218. .
- certificate identifier ID- 1 public key the PK-1 and the signature data S i g - 1 then extracted, extracted certificate identifier ID- 1 and the public key PK-1 are combined in this order to generate a combined value (ID-1 IIPK-1 1).
- the certificate verification unit 207 adds the signature verification algorithm V rfy to the extracted signature data S ig-1 and the generated combined value (ID-1 II PK-1). To obtain the verification result RSL2.
- the verification result R S L2 is information indicating either verification success or verification failure.
- the signature verification algorithm V r fy is an algorithm for verifying the signature data generated by the digital signature S ig.
- certificate verification section 207 outputs verification result RSL 2 to switch 213.
- the CRL storage unit 208 records a public key certificate revocation list (hereinafter referred to as a storage revocation list CRL-ST) indicating the revoked public key certificate at the second time point.
- a storage revocation list CRL-ST a public key certificate revocation list
- Stored Revocation List CRL The ST contains one or more certificate identifiers and signature data S ig, similar to the revocation list CRL, which shows the revoked public key certificates at the first point in time. Includes ID and version number.
- the certificate identifier and the signature data SigID are as described above.
- the version number is information indicating the generation of the storage revocation list CRL-ST, and indicates that the storage revocation list CRL-ST is the one at the second time point.
- the version number increases as the generation of the public key certificate revocation list becomes newer.
- the CRL verification unit 209 reads the public key PK-CA from the CA public key storage unit 206, and from the CRL recording area 126 of the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 218. And read the invalidation list CRL.
- the verification unit 209 extracts one or more certificate identifiers and signature data SigID from the read revocation list CRL. If multiple certificate identifiers are extracted here, they are combined in the order in which they are located in the revocation list CRL to generate a combined value. If only one certificate identifier is extracted, the extracted one certificate identifier is used as the combined value.
- the verification unit 209 performs-, a signature verification algorithm V rfy on the extracted signature data Sig ID and the generated combined value using the read public key PK-CA, and verifies the verification result.
- the verification result R S L3 is either verification success or verification failure.
- the CRL verification unit 209 When the obtained verification result RSL 3 indicates that the verification is successful, the CRL verification unit 209 outputs the read revocation list CRL to the signature verification unit 212 and the CRL comparison / update unit 210. '
- the CRL comparing / updating unit 210 receives the revocation list CRL from the CRL verifying unit 209.
- the CRL comparing / updating unit 210 extracts the version number from the received revocation list CRL, reads out the stored revocation list CRL—ST from the CRL storage unit 208, and reads out the stored data.
- Revocation list CRL Extract version number from ST. Next, it is determined whether or not the version number extracted from the revocation list CRL is greater than the version number extracted from the storage revocation list CRL-ST.
- the CRL comparing / updating unit 210 determines that the generation of the revocation list CRL is The revocation list CRL is regarded as newer than the generation of the ST, and the revocation list CRL is overwritten in the CRL storage unit 208 as the storage revocation list CRL-ST.
- the certificate judging unit 211 reads out the storage invalidation list from the CRL storage unit 208.
- the storage invalidation list CRL_ST stored in the CRL storage unit 208 has been updated to the latest one by the CRL comparison / update unit 210.
- the certificate determination unit 211 reads out the public key certificate PKC from the certificate recording area 127 of the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 218.
- the certificate determination unit 211 extracts the certificate identifier ID-1 from the read public key certificate PKC, and the extracted certificate identifier ID-1 is included in the storage revocation list CRL-ST. It is determined whether or not.
- the judgment result JDG is output to the switch 213.
- the judgment result J DG is information indicating whether or not the certificate identifier ID-1 is included in the storage revocation list CRL-ST.
- the signature verification unit 212 receives the key decryption key KDK from the key calculation unit 203.
- the signature data Sig CRL is read from the signature recording area 125 of the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 218, and the public key certificate PKC is read from the certificate recording area 127 of the recording medium 120 via the drive unit 218. Read out. Further, it receives the revocation list CRL from the CRL verification unit 209.
- the signature verification unit 212 extracts the public key PK-1 from the read public key certificate PKC, and combines the received key decryption key KDK with the received revocation list CRL to obtain a combined value (KDK II CRL). Using the extracted public key PK-1 and applying the signature verification algorithm Vr fy to the read signature data Sig CRL and the generated combined value (KDK IIC RL), a verification result RSL 1 is obtained. Verification result RSL 1 is information indicating either verification success or verification failure. Next, the signature verification unit 212 outputs the verification result RSL1 to the switch 213.
- the switch 213 receives the decrypted content D CNT from the decryption unit 205. Further, it receives the judgment result JDG from the certificate judgment unit 211, receives the verification result RSL2 from the certificate verification unit 207, and receives the verification result RSL1 from the signature verification unit 212.
- Received verification result RSL 1 indicates successful verification
- received verification result R Switch 213 receives the decryption only if SL 2 indicates a successful verification and the received decision JDG indicates that certificate identifier ID-1 is not included in the storage revocation list CRL-ST. Outputs the content DCNT to the playback unit 214.
- Received verification result RSL1 indicates verification failure or received verification result RSL2 indicates verification failure, or received judgment result JDG contains certificate identifier ID_1 in accumulation revocation list CRL—ST Switch 213, the switch 213 does not output the received decrypted content DCNT to the playback unit 214.
- the playback unit 214 receives the decrypted content DCNT from the switch 213, generates video information and audio information from the received decrypted content DCNT, and converts the generated video information and audio information into video signals and audio signals of an analog signal. Then, an analog video signal and an audio signal are output to the monitor 290.
- the control unit 215 controls the operation of each component configuring the playback device 200.
- the remote controller 280 has various buttons, generates operation instruction information according to the operation of the buttons by the operator, and outputs the generated operation instruction information by infrared rays.
- the input unit 216 receives, from the remote controller 280, the infrared light carrying the operation instruction information, extracts the operation instruction information from the received infrared light, and outputs the extracted operation instruction information to the control unit 215.
- the display unit 217 displays various information under the control of the control unit 215.
- the drive unit 218 reads information from the recording medium 120.
- the monitor 290 includes a CRT and a speaker, receives an analog video signal and an audio signal from the reproducing unit 214, displays video based on the video signal, and outputs audio based on the audio signal.
- the key calculation unit 103 reads the device key DK_1 and the media key data MDATA from the device key storage unit 101 and the media key data storage unit 102, respectively (step S301), and then reads the read device key DK-1 Then, a media key MK is generated using the media key data MDATA (step S302).
- the key calculation unit 104 reads the medium unique number MID from the unique number recording area 121 of the recording medium 120 (step S303), and uses the generated medium key MID and the read medium unique number MID to A key encryption key KEK is calculated (step S304).
- the encryption unit 105 encrypts the content key CK obtained from the content server device 500 using the calculated key encryption key KEK to generate an encrypted content key ECK (step S305). .
- the encryption unit 106 generates the encrypted content ECNT by encrypting the content CNT obtained from the content server device 500 using the content key CK obtained from the content server device 500 (step S306).
- the signature generation unit 110 reads the secret key SK-1 from the secret key storage unit 107 (step S307), and uses the read secret key SK-1 to generate a key encryption key KEK and a revocation list.
- the signature data SigCRL for the CRL is generated (step S308).
- the recording device 100 stores the media key data MDATA, the encrypted content 1 key ECK :, the encrypted content ECNT, the signature data SigCRL, the revocation list CRL, and the public key certificate PKC in the drive unit 11. 1 to record on recording medium 1 20 (step S 309)
- the playback device 200 transmits the media key data MDATA, the media unique number MID, the encrypted content key ECK, the encrypted content ECNT, the signature data Sig CRL, the revocation list CRL, and the public key certificate PKC from the recording medium 120. It is read out (step S401).
- the key calculation unit 202 reads the device key DK-X from the device key storage unit 201 (step S402), and uses the read media key data MDATA and the device key DK-x to convert the decrypted media key y. (Step S403).
- the key calculation unit 203 calculates a key decryption key KDK from the read medium unique number M ID and the obtained decryption media key y (step S404).
- the decrypting unit 204 decrypts the read encrypted content key ECK using the calculated key decryption key KDK to obtain a decrypted content key DCK (step S405).
- the decrypting unit 205 decrypts the read encrypted content ECNT using the obtained decrypted content key DCK to obtain a decrypted content DCNT (step S406).
- the certificate verification unit 207 reads the public key PK—CA of the certificate authority CA from the CA public key storage unit 206 (step S407), and uses the read public key PK—CA of the certificate authority CA to The validity of the read public key certificate PKC is verified (step S408).
- step S409 If the verification of the validity of the public key certificate PKC has failed (step S409), the control moves to step S422.
- step S409 the 01 verification unit 209 uses the public key PK-CA of the certification authority CA to check the revocation list CRL read out. The validity is verified (step S410).
- step S411 If the validation of the revocation list CRL fails (step S411), the control moves to step S422. If the validity of the revocation list CRL is successfully verified (step S411), the CRL comparison / update unit 210 returns to the CRL storage unit.
- the storage revocation list CRL_ST is read from the storage medium 208 (step S412), and the revocation list CRL read from the recording medium 120 is compared with the storage revocation list CRL-ST read from the CRL storage unit 208 (step S412). S 413).
- step S414 If the revocation list CRL is determined to be newer than the storage revocation list CRL—ST as a result of the above ratio (step S414), the CRL comparison / update unit 210 determines that the revocation list CRL Is overwritten in the CRL storage unit 208 as a storage revocation list CRL—ST (step S415). If it is determined that the revocation list CRL is older than the stored revocation list CRL—ST (step S414), the control moves to step S416.
- the certificate determination unit 211 reads out the storage revocation list CRL-ST from the CRL storage unit 208 (step S416), and finds the certificate identifier ID-1 extracted from the read public key certificate PKC. By determining whether or not the storage revocation list CRL-ST is included in the storage revocation list CRL-ST, it is determined whether the read public key certificate PKC is registered in the storage revocation list CRL-ST (step S4). 17). .
- step S418 If it is determined that the information has been registered (step S418), the control moves to step S422.
- the signature verification unit 212 uses the key decryption key KDK, the public key certificate PKC, and the revocation list CRL to validate the signature data SigCRL. Is verified (step S419).
- step S420 If the verification of the validity of the signature data Sig CRL fails (step S420), the switch 213 is opened, the content is not reproduced (step S422), and the reproducing operation of the reproducing device 200 ends.
- step S420 if the validity of the signature data Sig CRL is successfully verified (step S420), the switch 213 is closed and outputs the decrypted content DCNT to the playback unit 214, and the playback unit 214 transmits the decrypted content.
- the DCNT is reproduced (step 'S421), and the reproducing operation of the reproducing device 200 ends.
- the recording device uses the revocation list CRL as a signature target to sign data Sig CRL. Is generated, and the generated signature data SigCRL is written to a recording medium.
- the present invention is not limited to this configuration. Absent.
- the recording device may calculate a hash value of the revocation list CRL and generate signature data for the hash value.
- HASH (A) is a hash value obtained by performing a hash function HASH on data A.
- the recording device may calculate the hash value of the revocation list CRL, perform an XOR (exclusive OR) operation on the hash value and the media key MK, and generate signature data based on the calculation result. Good.
- Signature data S ig (SK-1, (HASH (CRL)) XOR (MK))
- the recording device generates signature data for the revocation list CRL and the content, By generating the signature data for various key data and writing the generated signature data to the recording medium, it is possible to prevent the revocation list CRL on the recording medium from being falsified or deleted. In these cases, the playback device performs signature verification using the corresponding data.
- the version number is compared. Is not limited to this configuration. For example, if it can be assumed that the size of the revocation list CRL will increase monotonically as the revocation list CRL is updated, the larger CRL size may be determined to be newer.
- a comparison of the number of devices to be invalidated determines that the one with the larger number of invalidated devices is newer. You may.
- configuration der lever can obtain information that can be old and new comparison from the CRL may be any configuration.
- the configuration may be such that the latest version of the media key data is transmitted to the recording device via another recording medium.
- the recording device has media key data in advance.
- the recording device compares the old and new media key data stored in the recording device with the old and new media key data recorded on the recording medium. In comparison, if the media key data recorded on the recording medium is newer than the media key data owned by the user, the media key data is recorded on the recording medium instead of the media key data owned by the user. Write the media key data internally.
- each media key data is provided with-, a version number indicating the generation, and the recording device compares the old and new media key data using each purge key number.
- a part of the media key calculated from the media key data may be a version number, and the remaining part may be generated using a random number.
- the recording device extracts a part of the media key version number from each media key data, and compares the new and old media key data using each extracted version number.
- the number of devices revoked in the media key data is determined by updating the media key data. As the recording device increases, the recording device may use the number of revoked devices included in the media key data to compare the old and new media key data.
- the time information (year, month, day, hour, minute, second) at which the media key data was generated is added to each media key data, and the recording device uses the time information to update the old and new media key data. May be compared.
- any configuration may be used as long as the configuration can correctly compare the old and new media key data.
- each media key data may be given a signature of the certificate authority CA for tampering prevention.
- the recording device verifies the validity of the media key data by verifying the signature.
- the recording device uses the media key data held by itself.
- the recording medium Encrypts the content obtained from the outside (for example, a content server device) based on the media key data recorded in the storage device, generates another encrypted content, and outputs the generated another encrypted content to the It may be written on a recording medium.
- a plurality of media key data, a plurality of public key certificates, and a plurality of revocation list CRLs may exist on the recording medium.
- the recording device compares the media key data on the recording medium with the old and new media key data held by the recording device, and determines that the media key data held by the recording device is newer. For example, it decrypts the encrypted content recorded on the recording medium to generate decrypted content, encrypts the generated decrypted content based on a new media key held by itself, and generates re-encrypted content. Then, the generated re-encrypted content may be written to the recording medium. At this time, the encrypted content recorded on the recording medium may be deleted.
- a digital signature is applied to the key encryption key KEK to generate signature data.
- the present invention is not limited to this configuration.
- a digital signature may be applied to the hash value of the entire content CNT to generate signature data.
- the data to be signed since the signature is intended to confirm the validity of the recording device that records the content, the data to be signed must be information related to the content or information related to the key used for encryption. Any information may be used.
- the recording device 100 includes a device key storage unit 101, a media key data storage unit 102, a key calculation unit 103, a key calculation unit 104, an encryption Unit 105, encryption unit 106, secret key storage unit 107, certificate storage unit 108, ⁇ 11 storage unit 109, signature generation unit 110, drive unit 111, control unit 112, and transmission / reception unit 113
- the present invention is not limited to this configuration.
- device key storage unit 101 For example, device key storage unit 101, media key data storage unit 102, key calculation unit 103, key calculation unit 104, encryption unit 105, encryption unit 106, secret key storage unit 107, certificate storage unit 108, CRL storage unit 109, signature generation unit 1 10, Dora
- a processing device that is composed of a drive unit in which the Eve unit 11 and a part of the control unit 112 are integrated, and the other part of the control unit 112 and the transmission / reception unit 113 are integrated. It may be composed of In this configuration, a drive device that performs data read / write and encryption processing on a recording medium and a processing device that performs other processing are separated.
- the device key storage unit 101, the media key data storage unit 102, the private key storage unit 107, the certificate storage unit 108, and the CRL storage unit 109 store the external storage device. It may be configured on an area.
- an example of the external storage device is a portable secure memory card.
- the playback device 200 includes a device key storage unit 201, a key calculation unit 202, a key calculation unit 203, a decryption unit 2 04, decryption unit 205, CA public key storage unit 206, certificate verification unit 207, CRL storage unit 208, 11 verification unit 209, CRL comparison and update unit 210, certification From the document judgment unit 2 1 1, signature verification unit 2 1 2, switch 2 1 3, playback unit 2 14 and control unit 2 15 and input unit 2 16 and display unit 2 17 and drive unit 2 18
- the present invention is not limited to this configuration.
- It consists of an integrated drive unit, which consists of a playback unit 214, a control unit 215, an input unit 216, and a display unit 217. It may be. In this configuration, a drive device for reading data from a recording medium, performing Z writing and encryption processing, and a processing device for performing other processing are separated. Also, the device key storage unit 210, 08 public key storage unit 206 and 11 1 ⁇ storage unit
- the 208 may be configured on a storage area of an external storage device.
- an example of the external storage device is a portable secure memory card.
- the recording device and the reproducing device may not be integrated devices, but may have different configurations of the data reading / writing device and the processing device.
- the encryption process may be performed by the data read / write device, or the encryption process may be performed by the processing device. You may do it.
- media key data MDATA, encrypted content key ECK, encrypted content ECNT, signature data Sig CRL 3 ⁇ 4 revocation list CRL and public key certificate PKC are all stored on the same storage medium.
- the present invention is not limited to this configuration.
- the recording device 100 records a part of the data such as the signature data Sig CRL revocation list CRL and the public key certificate PKC on a recording medium different from the recording medium 120, and records the recording medium 120 and another recording medium.
- a recording medium may be distributed.
- the recording device 100 is connected to a network represented by the Internet, and a part of the data may be distributed via the network.
- the playback device 200 is also connected to the network, and acquires a part of these data from the recording device 100 via the network.
- the media key data MDATA, the encrypted content key ECK :, the encrypted content ECNT, the signature data Sig CRL, the revocation list CRL, and the public key certificate PKC are stored in one or more recording media. It may be recorded and distributed, or recorded on one or more recording media and distributed via a network.
- the content is encrypted and the encrypted content is decrypted based on the device key, but the present invention is not limited to this configuration.
- the configuration may be such that the recording device and the reproducing device have acquired the usage conditions, and control recording and reproduction based on the usage conditions.
- the usage condition is management information attached to the content, and is, for example, a date, time, or number of times that recording and reproduction of the content are permitted.
- the playback device stores the revocation list C in the CRL storage unit.
- the RL is read, the new and old comparisons are performed, the new revocation list CRL is stored in the CRL storage unit, and the revocation list CRL is read again when confirming whether or not the public key certificate has been registered. It is not limited to this configuration.
- the playback device does not compare the revocation list CRL with the old one and does not store the revocation list CRL determined to be new in the CRL storage unit. After determining whether or not registration is made in the revocation list CRL of the key release certificate, the revocation list CRL read from the recording medium 120 may be stored in the CRL storage unit.
- the order of signature verification and CRL verification public key certificate determination is not limited as described in the first embodiment, and the reproducing device performs signature verification, CRL verification, and so on in various orders.
- the reproduction of the content may be controlled by performing a public key certificate determination.
- the recording device and the playback device may be configured to include a digital watermark processing unit that generates and embeds a digital watermark.
- the recording device may store a device ID specifying the device, and embed the device ID as an electronic watermark in the content when recording the content on the recording medium.
- the recording device that records the content can be specified by extracting the embedded device ID from the content.
- the playback device may be configured to embed its own device ID as a digital watermark in the content on the recording medium during playback.
- the reproducing device that reproduced the content can be specified by extracting the embedded device ID from the content.
- the content supply system may include a device key discovery device that can identify the depice key stored inside when an unauthorized device with an exposed device key is discovered. This unauthorized device has the same configuration as the playback device 20.0.
- the device key discovery device generates n recording media MD1, MD2, 'MD3,..., MDn.
- illustration of data other than the media key data is omitted.
- the recording media MD 1 MD 2, MD 3,..., MDn record the same data as the recording medium 120 shown in FIG. 3 except for the following points.
- the media key data recorded on the recording media MD1, MD2, MD3,..., MDn are different from the media key data recorded on the recording medium 120.
- Fig. 8 shows an example of media key data recorded on recording media MD1, MD2, MD3, ⁇ , MDn.
- the media key data recorded on the recording medium MD1 is composed of n sets. Each set includes an encrypted media key and a device number. The device number is as described in the first embodiment.
- the first encrypted media key is generated by applying the encryption algorithm E1 to the media key MK using the device key DK-1.
- the second, third,..., And n-th encrypted media keys are encrypted to the value “0” using the device keys DK-2, DK-3,. It is generated by applying the program E1.
- the media key data recorded on the recording medium MD2 is composed of n sets. Each set includes an encrypted media key and a device number. The device number is as described in the first embodiment.
- the first encrypted media key is generated by applying the encryption algorithm E1 to the value “0” using the device key DK_1.
- the second encrypted media key is generated by applying the encryption algorithm E1 to the media key MK using the device key DK-2.
- the third,..., And n-th encrypted media keys are generated by applying the encryption algorithm E 1 to the value “0” using the device keys DK-3,. It is a thing.
- the media key data recorded on the recording medium MDi is composed of n sets. Each set includes an encrypted media key and a device number. The device number is as described in the first embodiment.o
- the i-th encrypted media key is generated by applying the encryption algorithm E1 to the value “0” using the device key DK-i.
- Other encrypted media keys are generated by applying the encryption algorithm E1 to the media key MK using the corresponding device key.
- the operator attaches the recording media MD1, MD2, MD3,..., MDn one by one to the unauthorized device in order, and instructs the unauthorized device to reproduce the content.
- n recording media are tried by the unauthorized device.
- the device key that the unauthorized device may have can be specified by the attached recording medium.
- the device key built into the unauthorized device is -DK-1.
- the device key incorporated in the unauthorized device is DK-i.
- the unauthorized device has the same configuration as the playback device 200 and operates as shown in FIGS. 6 to 7, so that the recording media MD1, MD2, MD3,. The content will be played correctly only when one of them is installed.
- a message recovery signature may be used instead of a message appendix signature.
- the message recovery type signature is disclosed in Patent Document 3.
- the signer can embed secret information in the generated signature, and the verifier can obtain the secret information after signature verification.
- the recording device performs an XOR operation (exclusive OR) on the confidential information and key data (for example, a content key), applies a message recovery type signature to the operation result, and signs the result. Generate data.
- the playback device verifies the signature, and if the verification is successful, obtains the operation result, performs an XOR operation (exclusive OR) on the built-in secret information and the operation result, Obtain key data (for example, content key).
- the operation between the confidential information and the key data need not be limited to the XOR operation, but is an addition operation or a configuration that uses the output value of the hash function with the combined data of both data as the input value. May be.
- the information on which the secret information is applied does not need to be a content key, but may be another key such as a key encryption key.
- any configuration may be used as long as content cannot be reproduced unless secret information obtained by signature verification is obtained.
- signature verification is essential for content playback.
- the content key and the content are obtained from outside the recording device, but the present invention is not limited to this configuration.
- the content key and the content may be stored in advance in the content recording device in association with each other.
- the content key may be generated inside the recording device each time it is used.
- a switch 213 controlled based on various verification and determination results is provided between the decoding unit 205 and the reproduction unit 214. Although it is described that whether to output the decrypted content to the playback unit 214 is controlled, the present invention is not limited to this configuration.
- the switch 2 13 may be provided between the decryption unit 204 and the decryption unit 205, and may control whether to output the decrypted content key to the decryption unit 205. .
- the switch 2 13 is provided between the key calculation unit 203 and the decryption unit 204, and controls the decryption unit 204 to determine whether to output the key decryption key KDK. It may be as.
- any configuration may be used as long as the final content reproduction can be controlled based on the result of each verification.
- the switch 213 does not need to be a physical switch, and may be a software-based configuration as long as playback control can be performed.
- the key calculation unit 202 determines that the generated decryption media key y is a value that is detection information. If it is determined whether the value is “0” or not, and if the decryption media key y is determined to have the value “0”, it is instructed to the switch 213 not to output the decrypted content DCNT to the playback unit 214. Is also good.
- the key calculating unit 202 transmits the key decrypting key to all or any of the key calculating unit 203 and the decrypting unit 204. It may be instructed not to generate, generate the decrypted content key, or generate the decrypted content.
- the key calculation unit 202 determines that the decrypted media key y has the value “0”
- the key calculation unit 202 sends a message to the control unit 215 that the decrypted media key y has the value “0”.
- the control unit 215 may instruct the other components of the playback device 200 to stop decoding and playback of the encrypted content.
- the encryption system is adopted from the three layers of the media key, the key encryption key, and the content key, but the present invention is not limited to this configuration.
- a configuration in which the content key is omitted and the content is directly encrypted with the key encryption key may be employed.
- a configuration may be adopted in which a new key is introduced and the hierarchy is increased by one hierarchy.
- the recording device or the reproducing device obtains the latest version of the media key data and the revocation list CRL via a network represented by the Internet, and updates the built-in data. You may.
- the recording device records the revocation list CRL on the recording medium, but the present invention is not limited to this configuration.
- the playback device may acquire the revocation list CRL via a network, and the recording device may not be configured to record the CRL on a recording medium.
- the recording device generates signature data for the information related to the content or content to be recorded on the recording medium, and records the generated signature data on the recording medium.
- the recording device may not perform signature generation.
- the recording device encrypts the content based on the media key data and the media unique number held by itself, and stores the media key data used for the encryption and the encrypted content on the recording medium. May be recorded.
- the playback device reads the media key data, the medium unique number, and the encrypted content from the recording medium, and decrypts the content based on the media key data and the medium unique number.
- the recording device realizes the media binding by generating the key encryption key from the media key and the medium unique number, but the present invention is limited to this configuration. It is not done.
- the recording device may realize the media bind by generating an authenticator based on the media key and the medium unique number and recording the generated authenticator on a recording medium.
- the reproducing device similarly generates an authenticator from the media key and the medium unique number, determines whether the authenticator recorded on the recording medium matches the generated authenticator, and reproduces the content. Control.
- the method of generating the above authenticator is as follows as an example.
- a hash function is applied to the value obtained by combining the media key, the media unique number, and the encrypted content key, and the obtained hash value or a specific part of the hash value is used as an authenticator.
- one recording medium corresponds to only one content supply system, but the present invention is not limited to this configuration.
- one content supply system is a system for supplying movie content.
- Another content delivery system is a system for delivering computer software.
- Yet another content delivery system is a music delivery system.
- different content supply systems are used depending on the type of content to be supplied.
- one content supply system is a system in which a movie supplier A supplies movie contents.
- Another content supply system is a system in which movie supplier B supplies movie content.
- Another content delivery system is a movie delivery service provided by movie supplier C.
- different content supply systems may be used by different content providers.
- the first content supply system implements a copyright protection mechanism by using the key revocation data recorded in the non-rewritable area in advance.
- the second content supply system realizes a copyright protection mechanism with the configuration shown in the first embodiment.
- FIG. 9 shows an example of data recorded on the recording medium.
- the recording medium 700 has a non-rewritable area 7110 and a rewritable area 7200, and the non-rewritable area 7100 has a key invalidation data recording area 7 for the first content supply system. 11 and a unique number recording area 7 1 2 exist.
- the rewritable area 720 includes a key revocation data storage area 721, a first encrypted content key storage area 722, and a second encryption key for the second content supply system. There are an encrypted content key recording area 7 23 and another encrypted content recording area (not shown).
- the key revocation data recording area 72 1 for the second content supply system corresponds to the media key data recording area 122 in the first embodiment. Further, in the first encrypted content key recording area 722, data encrypted based on the key revocation data for the first content supply system is recorded, and similarly, the second encrypted content key is recorded. In the encrypted content key recording area 7 23, data encrypted based on the key revocation data for the second content supply system is recorded.
- the medium unique number means, for example, a 128-bit medium. If a unique incense code is present, the upper 32 bits are not used, the lower 96 bits are used as the medium unique number, or the upper 32 bits of the medium unique number are replaced with all 0s. , 128-bit media unique number.
- the medium unique number previously recorded on the recording medium in common in a plurality of content supply systems, even in a recording medium in which only the medium unique number already marketed and used is recorded. It is possible to realize a system that can protect the copyright of a work.
- the capacity of the non-rewritable area can be reduced.
- the present invention is a copyright protection system that provides a copyright protection mechanism to at least the first and second content supply systems.
- the recording medium includes a read-only non-rewritable area and a readable and writable rewritable area.
- the non-rewritable area includes a medium unique number unique to the recording medium, and a first content supply system. Key revocation data is recorded in advance for use.
- the first content supply system includes a recording device that encrypts and writes content on the recording medium, and a plurality of playback devices that attempt to decrypt the encrypted content recorded on the recording medium. At least one of the plurality of playback devices has been disabled.
- the key revocation data recorded in the non-rewritable area of the recording medium indicates the key of the revoked playback device.
- the recording device is configured to encrypt the content using the invalidation data recorded in the non-rewritable area, and write the generated encrypted content into the rewritable area of the recording medium. Unit.
- a reproducing unit that reads out the key revocation data recorded in the non-rewritable area of the recording medium, the encrypted content that is recorded on the recording medium, A determination unit for determining whether to permit decryption of the encrypted content by using data; and, when decryption is not permitted, decryption of the encrypted content is prohibited, and when decryption is permitted, A decryption unit that decrypts the encrypted content to generate decrypted content.
- the second content supply system includes a recording device that encrypts and writes the content on the recording medium, and a plurality of playback devices that attempt to decrypt the encrypted content recorded on the recording medium. One or more of the playback devices are disabled.
- the recording device encrypts and generates a media key for each playback device that has not been revoked and predetermined detection information for each playback device that has been revoked using the device key of the playback device.
- a storage unit that stores media key data composed of a plurality of encrypted media keys, a reading unit that reads the medium unique number from the non-rewritable area of the recording medium, and the read medium unique number and A generation unit that generates an encryption key based on the media key; an encryption unit that encrypts content that is digital data based on the generated encryption key to generate encrypted content; A reading unit that reads out the media key data from a storage unit; and records the read out media key data and the generated encrypted content.
- Ru Bei a write unit for writing the rewritable region of the body.
- Each of the playback devices includes: a reading unit that reads an encrypted media key corresponding to the playback device from media key data written in the rewritable area of the recording medium; and a read unit that uses a device key of the playback device.
- a decryption unit that decrypts the encrypted media key thus generated to generate a decryption media key; and determines whether the generated decryption media key is the detection information.
- the present invention provides a recording apparatus for encrypting and recording content, a recording medium for recording the encrypted content, and a reproducing apparatus for reading and decrypting the encrypted content from the recording medium.
- Rights protection system The recording device stores revocation data for revoking a key held by a specific device. Holding the content, encrypting the content based on the revocation data, recording the revocation data and the encrypted content on the recording medium, and further encrypting the content or the content.
- a signature is generated for the data related to the conversion, and the generated signature is recorded on the recording medium.
- the recording medium records an identification number for uniquely identifying the recording medium in an area that cannot be rewritten by a user, and further records the invalidation data, the encrypted content,... And the signature.
- the reproducing device reads the invalidation data, the encrypted content, and the signature from the recording medium, decrypts the content based on the invalidation data, and verifies the validity of the signature.
- the reproduction of the decrypted content may be controlled based on the result.
- the recording medium records the invalidation data and the encrypted content, and the signature is transmitted via a recording medium different from the recording medium or a communication medium. And may be distributed.
- the recording device may perform processing by a combination of two or more devices, and may perform processing for each device.
- the playback device may perform processing by a combination of two or more devices, and may share the processing for each device.
- the recording device may record the content based on a usage condition of the content.
- the playback device may play back the content based on usage conditions of the content.
- the recording device holds a device identification number that uniquely identifies the recording device, and embeds the device identification number as a digital watermark in the content when recording the content. Is also good.
- the playback device holds a device identification number that uniquely identifies the playback device, and embeds the device identification number as a digital watermark in the content when playing back the content. Is also good.
- the copyright protection system may include a key discovery device that determines a type of a key held by the unauthorized device when the unauthorized device is discovered.
- the present invention is a recording device for encrypting and recording content. The recording device holds revocation data for revoking a key held by a specific device, encrypts the content based on the revocation data, and stores the revocation data on a recording medium. The encrypted content is recorded, and a signature is generated for the content or data related to the encryption of the content. The generated signature is recorded on the recording medium.
- the recording device may encrypt the content based on an identification number for uniquely identifying the recording medium, in addition to the invalidation data.
- the recording device may record a public key corresponding to a secret key used for generating the signature on the recording medium.
- the recording device may generate a signature with the revocation list of the public key as a signature target.
- the recording device compares the invalidation data held by the recording device with the old and new invalidation data existing on the recording medium. And hold new invalidation data.
- the recording device may compare the new and old invalidation data by comparing the size of the invalidation data, and determine that the invalidation data having a larger size is new.
- the recording device may compare the revocation data with new and old by comparing the number of revoked keys, and determine that revoked data having a large number of revoked keys is new.
- the recording device compares the old and new of the invalidation data by comparing the generation date or the version number of the invalidation data, and the generation date or the 'version number is protected from tampering. It may be.
- the recording device is configured to record the invalidation data and the encrypted content on the recording medium on which the content is recorded, and to record the invalidation data held by the recording device on the recording medium. If the encrypted content is newer than the invalidated data, the encrypted content recorded on the recording medium is similarly decrypted once based on the invalidated data recorded on the recording medium. Equipment owned Re-encryption may be performed based on the invalidation data to be performed.
- the recording device generates secret information inside the recording device, encrypts the content based on the secret information and the invalidation data, and signs the signature as information for embedding the secret information in the signature. It may be generated.
- the present invention is a reproducing apparatus for reading out and decrypting encrypted content from a recording medium.
- the playback device reads the invalidation data, the encrypted content, and the signature from the recording medium. Based on the result of decrypting the content based on the invalidation data and verifying the validity of the signature, And controlling the reproduction of the decrypted content.
- the playback device may decrypt the encrypted content based on an identification number that uniquely identifies the recording medium in addition to the invalidation data.
- an identification number that uniquely identifies the recording medium in addition to the invalidation data.
- the playback device when the revocation list is present on the recording medium, the revocation list held by the playback device, comparing the old and new revocation list existing on the recording medium, You may have a new revocation list.
- the playback device may compare the revocation list with a new revocation list by comparing the size of the revocation list, and determine that the revocation list having a larger size is new.
- the playback device compares the revocation list with the old and new ones by comparing the number of revoked public keys, and determines that the revocation list having a large number of revoked public keys is new. Good.
- the playback device obtains secret information by verifying the validity of the signature.- Assuming that the encrypted content is decrypted based on the obtained secret information and invalidation data. Is also good.
- the present invention is a recording medium for recording an encrypted content.
- the recording medium records an identification number for uniquely identifying the recording medium in an area that cannot be rewritten by a user, and further includes invalidation data, encrypted content, and a signature. Is recorded.
- the recording medium may record the invalidation data and the content encrypted based on the identification number.
- the recording medium may record a public key corresponding to a secret key used for generating the signature.
- the recording device encrypts the content based on the media key calculated from the media key data, and the recording device's own public key certificate.
- the legitimate recording device encrypts the content based on the media key data indicating invalidation of the unauthorized playback device and writes it to the recording medium. Record.
- An unauthorized playback device into which the recording medium is inserted cannot decrypt the media key from the recorded media key data, so that playback of the content by the unauthorized playback device can be prevented.
- the unauthorized recording device encrypts the content based on the old media key data that has not been revoked and records the content on the recording medium.
- the public key certificate of the recording device itself and the generated signature data are also recorded.
- the authorized playback device into which the recording medium is inserted can decrypt the media key from the recorded media key data.
- it is recorded by an unauthorized recording device registered in the revocation list CRL. If the content is the same, the playback can be stopped.
- the content supply system 20 has a configuration similar to that of the content supply system 10, and as shown in FIG. , 1 200 c, 1200 d, 1200 e-, ⁇ ⁇ ⁇
- the distribution station device 1400 includes an information storage unit 1401, a control unit 1402, an input unit 1403, a display unit 1404, and a transmission / reception unit 1405 (not shown).
- the distribution station device 1400 is, specifically, a microprocessor, a R ⁇ M, a RAM, a hard disk unit, a communication unit, a display unit, a keyboard, a mouse, and the like, like the content server device 500 of the first embodiment. It is a computer system composed of A computer program is stored in the RAM or the hard disk unit. The components of the distribution station device 1400 achieve their functions by the microprocessor operating according to the computer program.
- the transmission / reception unit 1405 is connected to the recording device 1100 via the Internet 40, and transmits and receives information between the recording device 1100 and the control unit 1402.
- the information storage unit 1401 stores the key revocation data R DATA and the purge number VR in association with each other.
- the key revocation data RDATA is the same as the media key data MD A 'TA of the first embodiment. Here, detailed description is omitted.
- the version number VR is information indicating the generation of the key revocation data RDATA corresponding to the version number VR.
- the control unit 1402 receives an acquisition request for the key revocation data RDATA from the recording device 1100 via the Internet 40 and the transmission / reception unit 1405. Upon receiving the acquisition request, the control unit 1402 reads the key invalidation from the information storage unit 1401. It reads the encrypted data RD ATA and the version number VR, and transmits the read key revocation data RDATA and the version number VR to the recording device 1100 via the transmission / reception unit 1405 and the Internet 40.
- Input unit 1403 accepts instructions from the operator of distribution station apparatus 1400. The received instruction is output to control unit 1402.
- the display unit 1404 displays various information under the control of the control unit 1402. 2.3 Content server device 1500
- the content server device 1500 has the same configuration as the content server device 500 of the first embodiment. Here, the description is omitted.
- the recording device 1100 includes a device key storage unit 1101, an invalid data storage unit 1102, a key calculation unit 1103, an encryption unit 1105, an encryption unit 1106, an authenticator generation unit 1104, It comprises an assignment unit 1107, a comparison unit 1108, a control unit 1109, a drive unit 1110, and a transmission / reception unit 1111.
- the recording device 1100 is, similarly to the recording device 100, a computer system including a microprocessor, a ROM, a RAM, a hard disk unit, and the like. A computer program is stored in the RAM or the hard disk unit. The recording device 1100 achieves its functions by the microprocessor operating according to the computer program.
- the device key storage unit 1101 secretly stores the device key DK-1 so that it cannot be accessed from an external device.
- the device key DK-1 is a key unique to the recording device 1100.
- the revocation data storage unit 1102 has an area for storing the key revocation data RDATA and the version number VR obtained from the distribution station device 1400.
- the key calculator 1103 has the same configuration as the key calculator 103 of the first embodiment.
- the key calculation unit 1103 reads out the key revocation data RD ATA from the revocation data storage unit 1102, and reads out the device key DK-1 from the device key storage unit 1101. Next, similarly to the key calculation unit 103, the read device key DK-1 is used to generate X, the read key revocation data RDATA is subjected to a decryption algorithm D1 to generate a media key MK, and the generated media key MK is generated. Is output to the authenticator generation unit 1104 and the encryption unit 1105.
- the encryption unit 1105 receives the content key CK from the content server device 1500 via the transmission / reception unit 111, and receives the media key MK from the key calculation unit 1103.
- the encryption unit 1105 performs an encryption algorithm E2 on the received content key CK to generate an encrypted content key ECK.
- Encrypted content key ECK E2 (MK, CK)
- the encryption unit 1105 secures the key recording unit 1323 in the encrypted content file 1320 on the recording medium 1300 via the drive unit 1 110, and then generates the encrypted content key ECK Is written to the key recording unit 1323 via the drive unit 110.
- encryption section 1105 outputs the generated encrypted content key ECK to authenticator generation section 1104.
- the encryption unit 1106 receives the content key CK and the content CNT from the content server device 1500 via the transmission / reception unit 111 and uses the received content key CK to encrypt the received content CNT.
- the encrypted content ECNT is generated by performing the program E3.
- the encryption unit 1 106 is connected via the drive unit 1 1 10-.
- the content recording unit 1324 is secured in the encrypted content file 1320 on the 0, and the generated encrypted content ECNT is written to the content recording area 124 via the drive unit 110.
- the authenticator generating unit 1104 receives the media key MK from the key calculating unit 1103, receives the encrypted content key ECK from the encrypting unit 1105, and stores the fixed numbered recording area 1 301 of the recording medium 1300. Reads the medium unique number MID from
- the authenticator generation unit 1104 combines the received media key MK, the read medium unique number MID, and the received encrypted content key ECK in this order, and generates combined data. Apply the one-way function F to the combined data to generate an authentication MAC (Message Authentication Code) 0
- F (A) indicates a value obtained by performing a one-way function F on data A.
- An example of the one-way function F is a hash function SHA-1.
- the authenticator generating unit 1104 secures the authenticator recording unit 1322 in the encrypted content file 1320 on the recording medium 1300 via the drive unit 110, and generates the generated authentication code.
- the child MAC is written to the authenticator recording unit 1322 via the drive unit 110.
- the authenticator MAC generated in this way is used when the reproducing device 1200 determines the validity of the content.
- the allocating unit 1107 generates a key revocation data identifier R ID for uniquely identifying the key revocation data RDATA in the recording medium 1300 for the key revocation data RDATA recorded on the recording medium 1300.
- the identifier recording unit 1321 is secured in the encrypted content file 1320 on the recording medium 1300 via the drive unit 110, and the generated key revocation data identifier RID is stored in the drive.
- the data is written to the identifier recording unit 1321 via the unit 111.
- the comparison unit 1108 confirms whether or not the key revocation data file exists on the recording medium 1300 via the drive unit 110 in accordance with an instruction from the control unit 1109. You. Next, the presence / absence information indicating whether or not the key revocation data file exists is received from the drive unit 1110.
- the comparing unit 1108 instructs the allocation unit 1107 to generate a key revocation data identifier RID, and For the drive unit 110, the key revocation data RDATA recorded in the revocation data storage unit 1102, its purge number VR, and the key revocation data identifier RID generated by the allocation unit 1107 are used.
- the configured key revocation data file is stored on the recording medium 130.
- the comparing unit 1108 sends the key revocation data file from the key revocation data file on the recording medium 1300 via the drive unit 1110.
- the comparison unit 1108 determines whether or not a version number having the same content as the read version number VR exists in the read one or more version numbers VF. Similarly to the above, it instructs the allocating unit 1107 to generate the key revocation data identifier RID, and also instructs the drive unit 1110 to reject the key revocation recorded in the revocation data storage unit 1102. data
- the comparing unit 1108 outputs to the control unit 1109 information indicating that a version number having the same content as the read version number VR exists.
- the control unit 1109 transmits a request for obtaining the key revocation data RDATA to the distribution station device 1400 via the transmission / reception unit 1111 and the Internet 40.
- the control unit 1109 controls the content server device via the transmission / reception unit 11 11 Send a content acquisition request to 1500.
- the control unit 1109 instructs the comparison unit 1108 to check whether the key revocation data file exists in the recording medium 1300.
- the drive unit 110 When information indicating that a purge number having the same content as the version number VR is present is received from the comparing unit 1108, the drive unit 110 is provided with the same content as the version number VR on the recording medium 1300. Instructs to read the key revocation data identifier RID from the key revocation data file containing the version number, and receives the key revocation data identifier RID from the drive unit 110. Next, the control unit 1109 instructs the key calculation unit 1103 to read out the device key DK-1 and the key revocation data RD AT A and generate the media key MK. Instruct 105 to encrypt content key CK, instruct authenticator generation unit 1 104 to read medium unique number MID and generate authenticator MAC, and encrypt Content for part 1 106
- the generated authenticator MAC, the generated encrypted content key ECK, and the generated encrypted content ECNT are stored on the recording medium 1300 for the unit 1 105 and the encrypting unit 1 106, respectively. To be written in the encrypted content file. Also, it instructs the drive unit 1 110 to secure the identifier recording unit 1303 in the encrypted content file on the recording medium 1300, and
- the transmission / reception unit 111 is connected to the distribution station device 1400 via the Internet 40.
- the content server 150 is connected to the distribution station device 1400 via the Internet 40.
- the transmission / reception unit 111 receives the key revocation data RDATA and the purge number VR from the distribution station device 1400 via the Internet 40.
- key revocation data RDATA and version number VR are received, the received key revocation data Write the data RD ATA and the version number VR to the invalidation data storage unit 1102 in association with each other.
- the transmission / reception unit 111 receives the content key CK and the content CNT from the content server device 1500 via the leased line 30 and encrypts the received content key CK and the content CNT. And outputs the received content key CK to the encryption unit 1105.
- the drive unit 110 reads information from the recording medium 1300 in accordance with an instruction of each component configuring the recording device 1100, and outputs the read information to the component.
- the drive unit 110 secures each area in the recording medium 1300 according to an instruction of each component configuring the recording device 1100, receives information from each component, and receives the information in the secured area. Write the information.
- Keyboard 1180 accepts an operation instruction of an operator of recording device 1100 and outputs instruction information corresponding to the accepted operation instruction to control unit 1109.
- the monitor 1190 displays various information under the control of the control unit 1109.
- the recording medium 1300 is an optical disk media like the recording medium 120, and includes a non-rewritable area 1308 and a rewritable area 1309 as shown in FIG.
- the non-rewritable area 1308 has a unique number recording area 1301 as shown in FIG.
- a medium unique number M ID unique to the recording medium 1300 is recorded in the unique number recording area 1301.
- nothing is recorded in the rewritable area 1309.
- ID is represented by eight hexadecimal digits, specifically, “5”.
- a recording area 1305 and a recording area 1306 are secured in the rewritable area 1309 by the recording device 1100, and the recording area
- One or more key revocation data files are recorded in 1305, and one or more key revocation data files are recorded in the recording area 1306.
- the above encrypted content file is recorded.
- a key revocation data file 13 10 is recorded, and in the recording area 13 06, the encrypted content file 13 20 is recorded.
- the recording medium 1300 shown in FIG. 12 has-.
- one key revocation data file and one encrypted content file are recorded, but one or more keys are revoked.
- An encrypted data file and one or more encrypted content files may be recorded on a recording medium.
- the key revocation data file 1310 includes a version number recording unit 1311, an identifier recording unit 1312, and a data recording unit 1313.
- the version number recording section 1311 records a version number indicating the generation of the key revocation data RDATA
- the identifier recording section 1312 stores the allocation section 1 of the recording device 1100.
- the key revocation data identifier RID assigned by 107 is recorded, and the key revocation data RD ATA is recorded in the data recording section 13 13.
- the purge number, the key revocation data identifier R ID and the key revocation data R D ATA are as described above.
- the version number is represented by four hexadecimal digits, and is specifically “3”.
- the version number of the key revocation data is assigned from the distribution station apparatus 1400. '
- the key revocation data identifier is represented by four hexadecimal digits, and the key revocation data identifier R ID is specifically “1”.
- the encrypted content file 1320 has an identifier recording section 1321, an authenticator recording section 1322, a key recording section 1323, and a content recording section 132. It consists of 3 2 4. Also, a content number for identifying the encrypted content included in the encrypted content file 1320 ′ is added to the encrypted content file 1320 ′ (not shown).
- the key revocation data identifier RID is recorded in the identifier recording unit 1321.
- the key revocation data identifier RID is assigned to the key revocation data used in encrypting the content by the allocation unit 1107 of the recording device 110.
- the authentication element MAC is recorded in the authentication element recording section 1322.
- the authentication code MAC is generated by the authentication code generation unit 1104 of the recording device 1100.
- the encrypted content key ECK generated by the encryption unit 1105 of the recording device 1100 is recorded.
- the encrypted content ECNT generated by the encryption unit 1106 of the recording device 1100 is recorded.
- playback devices 1200a, 1200b, 1200c,... Have the same configuration, they will be described here as the playback device 1200.
- the playback device 1200 includes a device key storage unit 1201, a key calculation unit 1202, an authenticator generation unit 1203, a decryption unit 1204, a decryption unit 1205, a comparison unit 1206, a designation reception unit 1207, an acquisition unit 1208, It comprises a search unit 1209, a switch 1211, a drive unit 1213, a playback unit 1214, a control unit 1215, an input unit 1216, and a display unit 1217.
- the playback device 1200 is, similarly to the playback device 200, a combination system including a microprocessor, a ROM, a RAM, a hard disk unit, and the like.
- a computer program is stored in the RAM or the hard disk unit.
- the playback device 1200 achieves its functions by the microprocessor operating according to the computer program.
- the specification receiving unit 1207 receives the specification of the content to be reproduced from the user via the remote controller 1280 and the input unit 1216, obtains a content number for identifying the received content, and obtains a content number 1208 and an authenticator generation unit 1203. To 'output.
- the acquisition unit 1208 receives the content number from the designation reception unit 1207, and receives the encrypted content file 1320 to which the received content number is added from the recording area 1305 of the recording medium 1300 via the drive unit 1213. From the identifier recording section 1321 of the found and found encrypted content file 1320, Read the key revocation data identifier RID. Next, the read key revocation identifier RID is output to the search unit 1209.
- the search unit 1209 receives the key revocation data identifier R ID from the acquisition unit 1208. Upon receiving the key revocation data identifier RID, one or more key revocation data recorded in the recording area 1305 of the recording medium 1300 via the drive unit 123, and the received key revocation data identifier RID from the evening file Search the key revocation data file containing the same key revocation data identifier in the identifier recording part as the above, and read the key revocation data RDATA from the data recording part of the retrieved key revocation data file.
- the search unit 1209 outputs the read key revocation data RDATA to the key calculation unit 1202.
- the device key DK— is a key unique to the playback device 1200.
- the key calculation unit 1202 receives the key revocation data RDATA from the search unit 1209, and reads out the device key DK_x from the device key storage unit 1201.
- key calculation section 1 202 applies decryption algorithm D 1 to received key revocation data RDATA using read device key DK-X in the same manner as key calculation section 202 to perform decryption. Generate a media key y.
- the decrypted media key y is one of the media key MK and the value “ ⁇ ”.
- key calculation section 1202 outputs the generated decrypted media key y to authenticator generation section 1203 and switch 1 2 1 1.
- the authenticator generation unit 1203 receives the decryption media key y from the key calculation unit 1202, and obtains the medium unique number MID from the unique number recording area 1301 of the recording medium 1300 via the drive unit 123. read out. In addition, from the designated Upon receiving the ten number, the encrypted content file 1320 to which the received content number is added is specified on the recording medium 1300 via the drive unit 1213, and the key recording of the specified encrypted content file 1320 is performed. Reads the encrypted content key ECK from section 1323.
- the received decrypted media key y, the read encrypted content key ECK and the read medium unique number MID are combined in this order to generate combined data, and the generated combined data is one-way.
- the authentication code generation unit 1203 outputs the generated decryption authentication code DMA C to the comparison unit 1206.
- the comparing unit 1206 receives the decrypted authenticator DMA C from the authenticator generating unit 1203. Further, the comparing unit 1206 receives the content number from the designation receiving unit 1207, specifies the encrypted content file 1320 to which the received content number is added on the recording medium 1300 via the drive unit 1213, Read the authenticator MAC recorded in the authenticator recording unit 1322 of the specified encrypted content file 1320.
- the comparing unit 1206 determines whether or not the received decrypted authenticator DMAC matches the read authenticator MAC. If it is determined that they match, a close instruction is output to the switch 1211, and if it is determined that they do not match, an open instruction is output to the switch 1211.
- the opening and closing of the switch 121 1 is controlled by an instruction from the comparison unit 1206. 'The switch 121 1 closes when it receives a close instruction from the comparison unit 1206, and opens when it receives an open instruction.
- the switch 121 1 receives the decryption media key y from the key calculation unit 1202. When receiving the close instruction, it outputs the received decrypted media key y to the decryption unit 1204. When receiving the opening instruction, the decrypted media key y is not output to the outside. (9) Decoding unit 1204
- the decryption unit 1204 receives the decryption media key y from the switch 121 1. Also, the content number is received from the designation receiving unit 1207.
- the encrypted content file 1320 to which the received content number is added is specified on the recording medium 1300 via the drive unit 1213, and the specified encryption is performed.
- the encrypted content key ECK recorded in the key recording unit 1323 of the encrypted content file 1320 is read, and the decrypted content key ECK is subjected to the decryption algorithm D2 using the received decryption media key y.
- a decryption content key DCK is generated, and the generated decryption content key DCK is output to the decryption unit 1205.
- the decryption unit 1205 receives the decrypted content key DCK from the decryption unit 1204. In addition, it receives the content number from the designation receiving unit 1207, specifies the encrypted content file 1320 to which the received content number is added on the recording medium 1300 via the drive unit 1213, and specifies the specified encryption.
- the encrypted content ECNT recorded in the content recording unit 1324 of the content file 1320 is read, and the decrypted content ECNT is subjected to the decryption algorithm D3 using the received decrypted content key DCK and decrypted.
- the content DCNT is generated, and the generated decrypted content DCNT is output to the playback unit 1224.
- the playback unit 1214 receives the decoded content DCNT from the decoding unit 1205, generates video information and audio information from the received decoded content DCNT, converts the generated video information and audio information into analog video signals and audio signals, The analog video signal and audio signal are output to the monitor 1290.
- Control unit 1215 input unit 1216, display unit 1217, drive unit 1213, monitor 1290, and remote control 1280
- the control unit 1215 controls the operation of each component configuring the playback device 1200.o
- the remote control 1280 includes various buttons, generates operation instruction information corresponding to the operation of the button by the operator, and outputs the generated operation instruction information by infrared rays.
- the input unit 1 2 16 receives the infrared ray carrying the operation instruction information from the remote controller 1 280, extracts the operation instruction information from the received infrared light, and transmits the extracted operation instruction information to the control unit 1 2 Output to 15 or the designated reception section 1207.
- the display unit 127 displays various information under the control of the control unit 122.
- the drive unit 123 reads information from the recording medium 130.
- the monitor 1290 has a CRT and a speaker, receives an analog video signal and an audio signal from the playback unit 124, displays a video based on the video signal, and outputs audio based on the audio signal. Output.
- the version number is represented by four hexadecimal digits, and is specifically “3”.
- a version number of key revocation data is assigned from the distribution station device 140.
- the key revocation data issued first is assigned a version number of “1”, and the key revocation data to be issued thereafter has version numbers of “2” and “3”.
- ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ Are assigned.
- new key revocation data When a key is revoked, new key revocation data is issued, and a new version number is assigned at that time. Issuance of new key revocation data is not limited to only when key revocation occurs. For example, from the viewpoint of security, new key revocation data may be issued every predetermined period.
- the key revocation data identifier recorded in the identifier recording unit 1312 is represented by four hexadecimal digits, and the key revocation data identifier RID is ⁇ 1 ''. is there.
- the key revocation data identifier R ID is information for uniquely identifying the key revocation data recorded for each recording medium. Therefore, a key revocation data identifier can be assigned by an independent system for each recording medium.
- the allocating unit 1107 As a specific method of allocating the key revocation data identifier RID by the allocating unit 1107 of the recording device 110, the allocating unit 1107 is already recorded on the recording medium. A value different from the key revocation data identifier assigned to the key revocation data to be assigned is assigned.
- the key revocation data file 1 and the key revocation data file 2 are already recorded on the recording medium 1300a, and the key revocation data identifiers are “1” and “ 2 ".
- the allocating unit 1107 sets a value other than “1” and “2”, for example, “3” as the key revocation data identifier RID. Assign.
- the device key held by the device n is expressed as DK-n.
- the data “0” completely unrelated to the media key MK is encrypted in DK-3 and DK_4 owned by them. Has been recorded.
- the device 1 having the device key DK-1 can decrypt the key revocation data E (DK_1, ⁇ ) with the device key DK-1.
- the device 3 having the device key DK-3 can obtain the media key MK even if the key revocation data E (DK_3, 0) is decrypted by the device key DK-3. I can't get it.
- the devices other than the devices 3 and 4 can share the correct media key MK, and the devices 3 and 4 cannot obtain the correct media key MK.
- the invalidated devices 3 and 4 can be excluded from the system.
- Patent Document 1 discloses an invalidation method using a tree structure.
- the encrypted content file 1320 includes an identifier recording unit 1321, an authenticator recording unit 1322, a key recording unit 1323, and a content recording unit 132. Consists of four.
- the key revocation data identifier recorded in the identifier recording unit 13 21 is represented by four hexadecimal digits, and the key revocation data identifier RID is specifically: It is "1".
- the key revocation data identifier RID is transmitted from the recording medium 1300 to the playback device 12000 by using the key revocation data file 310 used for decrypting the encrypted content to be reproduced. Used to get.
- the reproducing apparatus 1200 when decrypting and reproducing the encrypted content recorded on the recording medium 1300, the identifier recording section 1321 of the encrypted content file 1320 to be reproduced is stored in the identifier recording section 1321.
- a key revocation data file 310 containing the same key revocation ID as the recorded key revocation data identifier RID in the identifier recording unit 1312 is acquired from the recording medium 130.
- the recording medium 1300b stores the key revocation data file 1, the key revocation data file 2, the encrypted content file A, the encrypted content file B, and the encrypted content file. C is recorded.
- the key revocation data identifiers of the key revocation data file 1 and the key revocation data file are “1” and “2”, respectively.
- the key revocation data identifiers of the encrypted content file A, the encrypted content file B, and the encrypted content file C are “1”, “1”, and “2”, respectively.
- the encrypted content file A is generated and recorded on the recording device 1100
- the encrypted content file B is generated and recorded using the key revocation data of the key revocation data file 1.
- the key revocation data in the key revocation data file 2 was used to generate and record the encrypted content file C using the key revocation data in the key revocation data file 1.
- the playback device 1200 decrypts and plays back the encrypted content file B on the recording medium 1300 b shown in FIG. Since the key revocation data identifier is “1”, the key revocation data file 1 with the key revocation data identifier “1” is obtained, and the acquired key Using the key revocation data included in the validation data file 1, decrypt the encrypted content stored in the encrypted content file B.
- the operation of the content supply system 20, particularly the operation of writing data to the recording medium 1300 by the recording device 1100 and the operation of reproducing data recorded on the recording medium 1300 by the reproducing device 1200, will be described.
- Step S1501 Receiveive the key revocation data RDATA and the version number VR via the network 40 and store the received key revocation data RDATA and the version number VR in the revocation data storage unit 1102 in association with each other.
- the reception of the key revocation data RDATA and the version number VR in step S1501 is performed by the distribution station apparatus 1400 by using the new key revocation data RD.
- 1 100 is the received key revocation data R based on this version number VR.
- the distribution station device 140 when the revocation data storage unit 1102 of the recording device 1100 holds the key revocation data with the version number “1” added, the distribution station device 140
- the control unit 1109 of the recording device 1 100 sends the version number “2” added to the received key revocation data. Is compared with the version number “1” added to the key revocation data stored in the revocation data storage unit 1102. Since the version number “2” added to the received key revocation data is newer, the control unit 1109 determines that the received key revocation data is new and replaces the received key revocation data with the received key revocation data. It instructs the transmission / reception unit 111 to store the version number “2” in the invalidation data storage unit 1102. Here, it is assumed that the larger the version number is, the newer the version number is.
- the present invention is not limited to this method.
- the date of issuance of the key revocation data is added to the key revocation data, and the date and time of issuance of the key revocation data may be used to compare the new and old key revocation data.
- the key revocation data is obtained from the distribution station apparatus 140.
- the method for obtaining the key revocation data is not limited to this configuration.
- step S1502 key revocation cade one data and bar and one version number is distributed recording medium which is recorded, the recording apparatus 1 1 0 0, may be read out and the key revocation data and Pajon number from the recording medium c
- the comparison unit 1108 of the recording device 1100 has a key revocation data file in the recording area 1305 of the recording medium 1300 via the drive unit 110. Check whether or not. If it is confirmed that the key revocation data file does not exist (step S1502), the process proceeds to step S1505a described later.
- Step S If it is confirmed that the key revocation data file 310 exists, (Step S
- step S1501 the comparison unit 1108 applies the key invalidation obtained in step S1501 to the version numbers recorded in the version recording unit of all existing key invalidation data files. It is confirmed whether or not there is one having the same content as the version number added to the data (step S1503).
- step S1503 if there is no purge yon number that satisfies the above conditions (step S1504), the flow proceeds to step S155a described later.
- step S1504 if there is a version number that satisfies the above condition (step S1504), the control unit 1109 transmits the above condition via the drive unit 1110.
- the key revocation data identifier RID is read out from the identifier recording unit 1312 of the key revocation data file 1310 containing the satisfying version number (step S155).
- the key calculation unit 111 reads the device key from the device key storage unit 101, and reads the key revocation data from the revocation data storage unit 1102 (step S15).
- the media key MK is calculated by decrypting the read key revocation data with the read device key (step S1507).
- the encrypting unit 1105 encrypts the content key CK received from the content server device 1500 using the calculated media key, and encrypts the encrypted content.
- a key ECK is generated (step S1508).
- the authenticator generation unit 1104 reads the medium unique number MID from the unique number recording area 1301 of the recording medium 1300 (step S1509), and the media key MK calculated by the key calculation unit 1103 and the encryption unit 1105 Then, an authenticator MAC is generated as an output value when a value obtained by combining the encrypted content key ECK generated by the above and the read medium unique number MID is set as an input value of the hash function (step S1510).
- the hash function used here can be realized by a known technique. For example, SHA_1 may be used as a hash function. However, it is not limited to SHA-1.
- the encrypting unit 1106 encrypts the content CNT also received (step S1511).
- the recording device 1100 acquires the data obtained in step S1505 or
- Step S 1 Includes the key revocation data identifier RID assigned in 05a, the authenticator MAC generated in step S1510, the encrypted content key generated in step S1508, and the encrypted content generated in step S1511
- the encrypted content file is recorded in the recording area 1305 of the recording medium 1300 (Step S 1
- step S1502 If it is confirmed that the key revocation data file 1310 does not exist in the recording medium 1300 (step S1502), and if there is no purging number satisfying the condition in step S1503 (step S1504), the allocation unit 1 107 is for the key revocation data obtained in step S 1501, the key revocation data already allocated to all the key revocation data files recorded in the recording area 13 ⁇ 5 of the recording medium 1300.
- a value different from the identifier RID is assigned as a key revocation data identifier (step S1505a).
- the allocating unit 1107 allocates an arbitrary value, for example, “1”. Also, as shown in the example shown in FIG. 14, when the key revocation data files 1 and 2 with the key revocation data identifiers RIDs “1” and “2” exist on the recording medium 1300a, the allocating unit 1 107 assigns a value different from "1" and "2", for example "3".
- the drive unit 1 110 of the recording device 1100 stores the key revocation data obtained in step S1501, the version number of the key revocation data,
- the key revocation data file having the key revocation data identifier allocated in S1505a is recorded in the key revocation data file 1302 of the recording medium 1300 (step S1505b).
- the key revocation data, the version number, and the key revocation data identifier R ID are recorded in the data recording unit 1313, the version number recording unit 1311 and the identifier recording unit 1312 of the key revocation data file 310, respectively.
- the control is shifted to step S1506. Thereafter, steps S1506 to S1512 described above are executed.
- the specification receiving unit 1207 of the playback device 1200 receives the specification of the content to be reproduced (step S1601).
- the acquiring unit 1208 finds an encrypted content file corresponding to the content specified in step S1601 from the recording area 1305 of the recording medium 1300 (step S1602).
- the method of specifying the content to be reproduced in the specification receiving unit 1207 and the method of finding the encrypted content file corresponding to the specified content include, for example, the reproduction device 1200 that stores the recording area 1305 of the recording medium 1300.
- Information that indicates the attributes of all encrypted content files recorded in the file (for example, the file name of the encrypted content, the title of the content, the recording date and time of the content, the summary information of the content, the thumbnail image of the content, and the content Icon is displayed on the display unit 1217 of the playback device 1200, and the user is allowed to select the content to be played from the list, thereby accepting the designation of the content to be played.
- the playback device 1200 learns the file name of the encrypted content file storing the specified content from the attribute information of the specified content, and
- the acquiring unit 1208 reads the key revocation data identifier from the identifier recording unit 1321 of the encrypted content file 1320 found in step S1602 (step S1603).
- the search unit 1209 finds, from the recording area 1305 of the recording medium 1300, the same value as the key revocation data identifier RID read in step S1603, the key revocation data file 310 recorded in the identifier recording unit 1312 (step S 1604). Next, the search unit 1209 acquires the key revocation data file 1310 found in step S1604 (step S1605).
- the key calculation unit 1202 reads the device key from the device key storage unit 1201, and receives the key revocation data from the search unit 1209 (step S1606).
- the key calculation unit 1202 calculates the decrypted media key y by decrypting the key revocation data received in step S1606 using the device key (step S1607).
- the authenticator generation unit 1203 reads the medium unique number MID from the unique number recording area 1301 of the recording medium 1300 (step S1608), and encrypts the medium from the key recording unit 1323 of the encrypted content file 1320 found in step S1602.
- the content key ECK is read (step S16 ⁇ 9), the decryption media key y obtained in step S1607, the encrypted content key ECK read in step S1609, and the medium obtained in step S16 ⁇ 8
- a decryption authenticator D MAC is generated as an output value when the value obtained by combining the unique number MID and the hash function is input (step S1610).
- the hash function used here is the same hash function SHA-1 as used in the recording device 1100.
- the comparing unit 1206 reads the authenticator MAC from the authenticator recording unit 322 of the encrypted content file 1320 found in step S1602 (step S1611), and compares the authenticator MAC with the decrypted authenticator DMAC calculated in step S1610. It is checked whether the authenticator MAC read out in S161 1 matches (step S1612).
- step S1633 If the decryption authenticator DMA C and the authenticator MAC do not match (step S1633), the reproducing operation ends. If the decryption authenticator DMA C matches the authenticator MAC (step S1613), the decryption unit 1204 decrypts the encrypted content key with the decryption media key y calculated in step S1607, and decrypts the decrypted content key DCK Is obtained (step S1614).
- the decryption unit 1205 reads the encrypted content from the content recording unit 1324 of the encrypted content file 1320 found in step S1602 (step S1615), and converts the encrypted content read in step S1615 into step S1615. Using the decrypted content key DCK decrypted in 614, the decrypted content is decrypted, and the reproducing unit 1214 reproduces the decrypted content (step S1616).
- the version number indicating the generation of the key revocation data and the key revocation data identifier for identifying the key revocation data are respectively stored in the version number recording unit in the key revocation data file. And recorded in the identifier recording unit, but the method is not limited to this method.
- a configuration may be employed in which both or at least one of the key revocation data version number and the key revocation data identifier is included in a part of the file name for identifying the key revocation data file.
- the file name of the key revocation data file may be "KRD-n-m".
- n is a version number
- m is a key revocation data identifier.
- the version number of the key revocation data file identified by the file name “KRD_0001-0002” is “1”
- the key revocation data identifier R ID is “2”.
- the playback device can check the file name to see the version number and key revocation data of the key revocation data file.
- the identifier RID can be known, and the processing when searching for a file on the playback device can be reduced.
- the key revocation data identifier is recorded in the identifier recording section of the encrypted content file.
- the present invention is not limited to this method. Not.
- a configuration may be adopted in which a key revocation data identifier is included as a part of a file name for identifying an encrypted content file.
- the file name for identifying the encrypted content may be "ECNT-m".
- m is a key revocation data identifier.
- the key revocation data identifier R ID of the encrypted content file with the file name “ECNT — 0 0 0 2” is “2”.
- the key revocation data identifier can be known by looking at the file name in the playback device, and the key revocation data identifier in the playback device can be obtained. There is an advantage that processing in the case can be reduced.
- the key revocation data file 1 is used for associating the key revocation data with the key revocation data identifier and for associating the encrypted content with the key revocation data identifier RID.
- a version number recording section 1311 and an identifier recording section 1312 are provided in 310, and a purge number and a key revocation data identifier are recorded, respectively, and an identifier is stored in the encrypted content file 1320.
- the recording unit 1321 is provided to record the key revocation data identifier, the present invention is not limited to this configuration.
- the recording device records one or more key revocation data files, one or more encrypted content files, and one key revocation data management file on a recording medium 130 It may be.
- This key revocation data management file contains, for each key revocation data file, a purge number of the key revocation data, a key revocation data identifier, and a unique identification of the key revocation data file on the recording medium.
- the name of the directory where the key revocation data file is recorded, the file name, etc. and the encrypted content file encrypted using the key revocation data file.
- Information for unique identification on the medium for example, the directory name where the encrypted content file is recorded / the file name
- the playback device acquires a key revocation data file related to the encrypted content whose reproduction has been designated, based on the information recorded in the key revocation data management file.
- the configuration is such that both the purge key number of the key revocation data and the key revocation data identifier exist.However, the present invention is not limited to this configuration, and only the key revocation data identifier is used. An existing configuration may be used.
- a key revocation technique is as follows:-A key revocation data to be recorded in a rewritable area of a recording medium is used as a media key by using a device key held by a device that has not been revoked. And a value that is unrelated to the media key (for example, “0”) is encrypted using the device key of the revoked device and the device key of the revoked device.
- a value that is unrelated to the media key for example, “0”
- the encrypted content to be recorded is obtained by encrypting the content based on the media key
- the present invention is not limited to this configuration.
- encrypted content can be decrypted and played back based on the key revocation data and revoked.
- any configuration may be used as long as it satisfies the condition that the encrypted content cannot be decrypted and reproduced based on the key revocation data.
- an authenticator MA C is generated using the medium unique number M ID and the playback device
- the authenticator MAC is compared at 1200, it is not limited to this configuration.
- the recording device 1100 encrypts the content using the medium unique number MID and records it on the recording medium, and the playback device 1200 decrypts the content encrypted using the medium unique number MID. It is good.
- a value that has not been assigned to the key revocation data already recorded in the recording device 110 is used as a key revocation ID.
- the configuration is to be assigned, it is not limited to this configuration.
- the recording device 110 0 stores the already assigned key revocation data identifier together with the medium specific number MID, and based on the above information stored in the recording device 110 0 It is good also as a structure which allocates a data identifier.
- the recording device includes key revocation data storage means for storing key revocation data for revoking a key held by a specific device; Content encryption means for encrypting the content on the basis of the key revocation data, and key revocation data identification information for uniquely identifying the key revocation data in the recording medium with respect to the key revocation data.
- Key-invalidating data recording means for recording the key-invalidating data in association with the key-invalidating data identification information in the recording medium; and key-invalidating the encrypted content.
- Encryption content recording means for recording in association with the data identification information.
- the key revocation data identification information allocating means in the recording device of the present invention a value different from the key revocation data identification information already allocated to the key revocation data recorded on the recording medium, Assigned as key revocation data identification information information.
- the key revocation data identification information allocating means in the recording device of the present invention comprises: key revocation data recorded on the recording medium; and key revocation data stored in the key revocation data storage means. The key revocation data identification information is assigned only when the key revocation data stored in the key revocation data storage means is new.
- the key revocation data identification information allocating means in the recording apparatus comprises: key revocation data recorded on the recording medium; and key revocation data stored in the key revocation data storage means. The old and new are compared based on information related to the date and time when each key revocation data was generated, or information related to the order in which each key revocation data was generated.
- the reproducing apparatus includes: an encrypted content reading unit that reads, from a recording medium, an encrypted content; and key revocation data identification information recorded in association with the encrypted content; and the recording medium.
- a key revocation data reading means for reading key revocation data recorded in association with the same key revocation data identification information as the key revocation data identification information read by the encrypted content reading means; Decrypting the encrypted content read by the encrypted content reading means based on the key revocation data read by the revocation data reading means; Content decrypting means.
- the recording medium in the present invention is a key revocation data storage means for recording key revocation data in association with key revocation data identification information for uniquely identifying the key revocation data on the recording medium.
- encrypted content storage means for recording the encrypted content encrypted based on the key revocation data in association with the revocation data identification information.
- the recording medium of the present invention further records information indicating the old and new of the key revocation data in association with the key revocation data.
- the copyright protection system includes a recording device, a recording medium, and a reproducing device, wherein the recording device stores a key for storing key revocation data for revoking a key held by a specific device.
- Revocation data storage means stores a key for storing key revocation data for revoking a key held by a specific device.
- Revocation data storage means stores a key for storing key revocation data for revoking a key held by a specific device.
- Revocation data storage means content encryption means for encrypting the content based on the key revocation data, and uniquely identifying the key revocation data in the recording medium with respect to the key revocation data.
- Key revocation data identification information allocating means for allocating key revocation data identification information for performing key revocation data.
- Key revocation data for recording the key revocation data in association with the key revocation data identification information on the recording medium.
- the reproducing apparatus may further include: an encrypted content reading unit that reads, from the recording medium, the encrypted content and key revocation data identification information recorded in association with the encrypted content; and the encrypted content reading unit.
- Key revocation data in which the same key revocation data identification information as the key revocation data identification information read out is recorded in association with the key revocation data reading means for reading data; and the key revocation data reading means for reading data Content decryption for decrypting the encrypted content read by the encrypted content reading means based on the key revocation data And means.
- the key revocation data recorded on the recording medium is revoked on the recording medium.
- Key revocation data to uniquely identify data Allocate an ID, record this key revocation data ID as a key revocation data file in association with the key revocation data to be recorded on the recording medium, and use this key revocation data ID with the key revocation data.
- the encrypted content file is recorded as an encrypted content file in association with the encrypted content in the playback device.When decrypting and playing back the encrypted content, a plurality of encrypted content files are recorded on the recording medium.
- the content is data in which video data and audio data are compression-encoded with high efficiency, but the present invention is not limited to this.
- the content may be computer data in which novels, still images, sounds, and the like are digitized.
- the content may be a computer program including a plurality of instructions for controlling an operation of a microprocessor included in the computer.
- the data may be table data generated by spreadsheet software, or may be a database generated by database software.
- Each of the above devices is, specifically, a computer system including a microprocessor, a ROM, a RAM, a hard disk unit, a display unit, a keyboard, a mouse, and the like.
- a computer program is stored in the RAM or the hard disk unit.
- Each device achieves its function by the microprocessor operating according to the computer program.
- the present invention may be the method described above. Further, the present invention may be a computer program that realizes these methods by a computer, It may be a digital signal comprising the computer program. Further, the present invention may be the computer program or the digital signal the computer-readable recording medium, for example, flexibility pull disk, hard Isku CD- ROM, MO, DVD 3 ⁇ 4 DVD -ROM, DVD -RAM, BD (B lu — R ay D isc), semiconductor memory, etc. Further, the present invention may be the computer program or the digital signal recorded on these recording media.
- the computer program or the digital signal may be transmitted via an electric communication line, a wireless or wired communication line, a network represented by the Internet, a data broadcast, or the like.
- the present invention may be a computer system including a microprocessor and a memory, wherein the memory stores the computer program, and the microprocessor operates according to the computer program.
- the program or the digital signal is recorded on the recording medium and transferred, or the program or the digital signal is transferred via the network or the like, so that the program or the digital signal can be transferred to another independent computer system. It may be better implemented.
- the devices and recording media that constitute the present invention can be used in a content distribution industry that produces and distributes content in an administrative, continuous, and repetitive manner. Further, each device and recording medium constituting the present invention can be manufactured and sold in the electric appliance manufacturing industry in a business-wise manner and continuously and repeatedly.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Signal Processing For Digital Recording And Reproducing (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
KR1020057012571A KR101109995B1 (ko) | 2003-03-11 | 2004-03-11 | 저작물 보호시스템 |
CN2004800066605A CN1759559B (zh) | 2003-03-11 | 2004-03-11 | 数字作品的保护***、记录设备、再现设备及记录介质 |
EP04719578.9A EP1624608B1 (en) | 2003-03-11 | 2004-03-11 | Content protection system |
Applications Claiming Priority (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2003-065591 | 2003-03-11 | ||
JP2003065591 | 2003-03-11 | ||
JP2003-158927 | 2003-06-04 | ||
JP2003158927 | 2003-06-04 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2004082203A1 true WO2004082203A1 (ja) | 2004-09-23 |
Family
ID=32992953
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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PCT/JP2004/003161 WO2004082203A1 (ja) | 2003-03-11 | 2004-03-11 | 著作物保護システム |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US8132024B2 (ja) |
EP (1) | EP1624608B1 (ja) |
KR (1) | KR101109995B1 (ja) |
CN (1) | CN1759559B (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2004082203A1 (ja) |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN1759559B (zh) | 2011-12-28 |
EP1624608A4 (en) | 2011-08-17 |
KR20060058047A (ko) | 2006-05-29 |
US20040243814A1 (en) | 2004-12-02 |
US8132024B2 (en) | 2012-03-06 |
KR101109995B1 (ko) | 2012-01-31 |
CN1759559A (zh) | 2006-04-12 |
EP1624608B1 (en) | 2020-09-09 |
EP1624608A1 (en) | 2006-02-08 |
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