US7206576B2 - Using shared secret data (SSD) to authenticate between a CDMA network and a GSM network - Google Patents
Using shared secret data (SSD) to authenticate between a CDMA network and a GSM network Download PDFInfo
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- US7206576B2 US7206576B2 US10/804,267 US80426704A US7206576B2 US 7206576 B2 US7206576 B2 US 7206576B2 US 80426704 A US80426704 A US 80426704A US 7206576 B2 US7206576 B2 US 7206576B2
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/46—Interconnection of networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
- H04W84/04—Large scale networks; Deep hierarchical networks
- H04W84/042—Public Land Mobile systems, e.g. cellular systems
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
- H04W88/16—Gateway arrangements
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W92/00—Interfaces specially adapted for wireless communication networks
- H04W92/02—Inter-networking arrangements
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W92/00—Interfaces specially adapted for wireless communication networks
- H04W92/16—Interfaces between hierarchically similar devices
- H04W92/24—Interfaces between hierarchically similar devices between backbone network devices
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
- H04W12/71—Hardware identity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
- H04W12/72—Subscriber identity
Definitions
- the present invention relates generally to wireless communication systems, and more particularly to systems that permit authenticating between a CDMA network and a GSM network.
- CDMA Code division multiple access
- U.S. Pat. No. 4,901,307 sets forth details of a CDMA system, which can be used to transmit both voice calls and non-voice computer data.
- GSM Global System for Mobile communications
- wireless communication systems can be thought of as having two main components, namely, the wireless radio access network (RAN) and the core infrastructure which communicates with the RAN and with external systems, such as the public switched telephone network (PSTN), the Internet (particularly although not exclusively for data calls), etc.
- RAN wireless radio access network
- PSTN public switched telephone network
- Internet particularly although not exclusively for data calls
- the core infrastructures associated with the various wireless technologies can be very expensive, both in terms of hardware and in terms of developing communication protocols to support particularized, typically system-specific call switching, subscription and attendant authentication and call monitoring, and billing.
- the communication protocols of one wireless system may not be compatible with those of another system without expensively prohibitive alterations in the core infrastructure of one system or the other.
- a dual-mode mobile station may be enabled to advantageously interface with a GSM core infrastructure when in, e.g., Europe, and to use a CDMA infrastructure when in, e.g., the United States.
- a method of wireless communications between a first network and a second network enabling a mobile station (MS) subscribed in the first network to communicate using the second network comprises storing an identity of the mobile station, obtaining authentication information from the first network based on the identity of the mobile station, storing the authentication information from the first network in a general global gateway (GGG), using an algorithm using the authentication information to produce an encryption key, and using the encryption key to authenticate the mobile station.
- GGG general global gateway
- FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of a wireless communications system comprising a CDMA network, a GSM network, General Global Gateway (GGG), and mobile stations;
- CDMA Code Division Multiple Access
- GSM Global System for Mobile communications
- GGG General Global Gateway
- FIGS. 2 a and 2 b shows a flowchart for authenticating a CDMA mobile station with a subscription in a GSM network in accordance with an embodiment not using SSD;
- FIG. 3 depicts the standard ANSI-41 approach to producing authentication
- FIG. 4 shows the authenticating of a GSM subscriber in an ANSI-41 network using GSM authentication credentials by using Kc as SSD-A in accordance with an embodiment
- FIG. 5 shows the information flow for a successful SSD update procedure in which the GGG updates the SSD shared with the serving MSC/VLR in accordance with an embodiment
- FIG. 6 shows an initial registration scenario modified for SSD sharing in accordance with an embodiment
- FIG. 7 shows the information flow for a successful registration with a new MSC/VLR when SSD sharing is allowed in accordance with an embodiment.
- FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of a wireless communications system 10 comprising a CDMA network 12 , a GSM network 14 , General Global Gateway (GGG) 16 , and mobile stations 18 , 20 , 22 , 24 .
- GSM mobile station 20 includes a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) 26 .
- CDMA mobile station 24 includes SIM 28 .
- SIMs 26 , 28 are removable engaged with mobile stations 20 , 24 , respectively, in accordance with principles known in the art.
- the GGG is a GSM Global Gateway.
- the GGG 16 internetworks between the CDMA network 12 and the GSM network 14 .
- the GGG includes a transceiver (not shown) that allows it to send and receive messages to and from the CDMA network 12 and the GSM network 14 .
- the CDMA network is an ANSI-41 network.
- the CDMA network 12 may be any variety of CDMA networks including, but not limited to cdma2000-1x and cdma2000-1xEV-DO.
- the GSM network 14 may be any variety of GSM network or successor network including, but not limited to General Packet Radio Services (GPRS), Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS), and Wideband-CDMA (W-CDMA).
- GPRS General Packet Radio Services
- UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System
- W-CDMA Wideband-CDMA
- the GSM network 14 comprises a GSM Core 30 and a GSM Radio Access Network 32 .
- the GSM Core 30 comprises a GSM Home Location Register (GSM HLR) 34 , a GSM Authentication Center (GSM AuC) 36 , a GSM Short Message Center (GSM SMSC) 38 and a GSM Gateway Mobile Switching Center (GSM GMSC) 40 .
- the CDMA network 12 comprises a a CDMA Home Location Register (CDMA HLR) 42 , a CDMA Authentication Center (CDMA AuC) 44 , CDMA MSC 46 and associated CDMA Radio Access Network (CDMA RAN) 48 .
- CDMA HLR CDMA Home Location Register
- CDMA AuC CDMA Authentication Center
- CDMA MSC CDMA MSC 46
- CDMA Radio Access Network CDMA RAN
- the GGG 16 functions as a Visitor Location Register (VLR) 50 to the GSM network 14 .
- VLR Visitor Location Register
- the GGG 16 functions as a Visitor Location Register (Visitor LR) 52 to the CDMA network 12 .
- Mobile stations 18 , 20 , 22 , 24 do not need to have a subscription in both core infrastructures 12 , 14 and may have a subscription in only one of the core infrastructures 12 , 14 .
- the GGG 16 functions as a Short Message Service Center (SMSC) 54 . It would be apparent to those skilled in the art that the GGG 16 can include or communicate with the SMSC 54 .
- SMSC Short Message Service Center
- Mobile stations 18 , 20 support a GSM signaling protocol, a GSM Authentication procedure, and a GSM Short Message Service.
- mobile stations 22 , 24 support a CDMA signaling protocol, a CDMA Authentication procedure, and a CDMA Short Message Service.
- the GGG acts as an Authentication Controller in a CDMA network, but authenticates the mobile station 24 using the GSM authentication mechanism.
- the GGG acts as an Authentication Controller in a GSM network, but authenticates the mobile station 20 using the CDMA authentication mechanism.
- the GGG acts as a message center via Short Message Service Center 54 .
- SMS messages are routed to and from the mobile station 24 using a CDMA SMS mechanism.
- GSM messages are tunneled to and from mobile station 24 using a CDMA SMS mechanism.
- the GSM messages are encapsulated within CDMA SMS messages.
- SMS messages are routed to and from the mobile station 20 using a GSM SMS mechanism.
- GSM SMS mechanism CDMA messages are tunneled to and from mobile station 20 using a GSM SMS mechanism.
- the CDMA messages are encapsulated within GSM SMS messages.
- GSM gateway MSC GSM gateway MSC
- the GMSC 40 interrogates the GSM LR 50 to determine the location of the subscriber 24 , which is in the CDMA network 12 .
- the location of the GSM subscriber 24 from the perspective of the GSM LR 50 is in the GGG 16 , which appears as a GSM VLR.
- the GGG 16 requests routing information from the GGG 16
- the GGG 16 requests routing information from the serving CDMA LR 52 and thus the call is routed to the CDMA MSC 46 .
- an incoming call to a registered CDMA subscriber 20 arrives at CDMA MSC 46 in the subscriber's home CDMA network 12 .
- the CDMA MSC 46 interrogates the CDMA LR 52 to determine the location of the subscriber 20 , which is in the GSM network 14 .
- the location of the CDMA subscriber 20 from the perspective of the CDMA LR 52 is in the GGG 16 , which appears as a CDMA VLR.
- the GGG 16 requests routing information from the serving GSM LR 50 and thus the call is routed to the GSM GMSC 40 .
- the CDMA-based mobiles stations 22 , 24 communicate with a CDMA mobile switching center (MSC) 46 using a CDMA radio access network (RAN) 48 in accordance with CDMA principles known in the art.
- the CDMA MSC 46 is an IS-41 MSC.
- GSM-based mobiles stations 18 , 20 communicate with a GSM mobile switching center (GSM GMSC) 40 using a GSM RAN 32 in accordance with GSM principles known in the art.
- GSM GMSC GSM mobile switching center
- the CDMA RAN 48 includes base stations and base station controllers.
- CDMA RAN 24 shown in FIG. 1 uses cdma2000, and specifically uses either cdma2000 1x, cdma2000 3x, or cdma2000 high data rate (HDR) principles.
- HDR high data rate
- the GSM RAN 32 includes base stations and base station controllers.
- GSM RAN 32 uses either GSM, GPRS, EDGE, UMTS, or W-CDMA principles.
- the CDMA core infrastructure comprising the CDMA MSC 46 and CDMA RAN 48 can include or can access a CDMA authentication center (CDMA AUC) 44 and a CDMA home location register (CDMA HLR) 42 in accordance with CDMA principles known in the art to authenticate subscriber mobile station 22 , and to collect accounting and billing information as required by the particular CDMA core infrastructure.
- CDMA AUC CDMA authentication center
- CDMA HLR CDMA home location register
- the GSM core 30 can include or can access a GSM authentication center (GSM AUC) 36 and a GSM home location register (GSM HLR) 34 in accordance with GSM principles known in the art to authenticate subscriber mobile station 18 , and to collect accounting and billing information as required by the particular GSM core infrastructure.
- GSM AUC GSM authentication center
- GSM HLR GSM home location register
- the CDMA MSC 46 uses the GGG 16 to communicate with the GSM network 14 .
- the GSM network 14 can include or can access a GSM authentication center 36 and a GSM home location register (HLR) 34 in accordance with GSM principles known in the art to authenticate subscriber mobile station 24 and to collect accounting and billing information as required by the particular GSM core 30 .
- HLR GSM home location register
- GSM GMSC 40 uses the GGG 16 to communicate with the CDMA network 12 .
- the CDMA network 12 can include or can access a CDMA authentication center 44 and a CDMA home location register (HLR) 42 in accordance with CDMA principles known in the art to authenticate subscriber mobile station 20 and to collect accounting and billing information as required by the particular CDMA network 12 .
- HLR home location register
- Both the GSM core 30 and the CDMA core infrastructure can communicate with a network such as a public switched telephone network (PSTN) and/or an Internet Protocol (IP) network.
- PSTN public switched telephone network
- IP Internet Protocol
- the GGG 16 functions as a VLR 50 to the GSM network 14 .
- the GGG meets GSM protocol requirements for a VLR 50 .
- the GGG interacts with GSM core network elements such as GSM HLR 34 and GSM SMSC 38 according to GSM specifications, except that the GGG 16 routes incoming calls to the CDMA network 12 .
- the GSM LR 50 also performs a location update with the GSM network 14 when the mobile station registers in the CDMA network 12 . In this sense, the GGG acts as a VLR to the whole CDMA network 12 .
- the GGG 16 functions as a VLR 52 to the CDMA network 14 .
- the GGG meets CDMA protocol requirements for a VLR 52 .
- the GGG interacts with CDMA core network elements such as CDMA HLR 42 and CDMA MSC 46 according to CDMA specifications, except that the GGG 16 routes incoming calls to the CDMA network 12 .
- the CDMA LR 52 also performs a location update with the CDMA network 12 when the mobile station registers in the GSM network 14 . In this sense, the GGG acts as a VLR to the whole GSM network 14 .
- the call is routed to the CDMA LR 52 in the GGG 16 per standard specifications.
- the GGG 16 routes the call to the CDMA network 12 .
- the CDMA network 12 eventually routes the call to the CDMA MSC 46 serving the mobile station.
- the GGG 16 routes the message to a message center (not shown) within the CDMA network 12 .
- the call is routed to the GSM LR 50 in the GGG 16 per standard specifications.
- the GGG 16 routes the call to the GSM network 14 .
- the GSM network 14 eventually routes the call to the GSM GMSC 40 serving the mobile station.
- an SMS is routed to the GSM network 10 from the CDMA network 12
- the GGG 16 routes the message to a GSM SMSC 38 within the GSM network 14 .
- the CDMA network 12 When a mobile station registers with the CDMA network 12 , the CDMA network 12 sends a location update indication to the GSM network 14 .
- the GSM LR 50 then performs a location update as per standard specifications with the GSM core network 14 .
- the GSM network 14 When a mobile station registers with the GSM network 14 , the GSM network 14 sends a location update indication to the CDMA network 12 .
- the CDMA LR 52 then performs a location update as per standard specifications with the CDMA network 12 .
- the GGG 16 acts as an HLR 52 in the CDMA network 12 .
- the CDMA LR 52 shall meet HLR protocol requirements for GSM to CDMA roaming.
- An important piece of information that the HLR 50 maintains is the address of the CDMA MSC 46 serving the mobile station 24 .
- the GSM LR 50 in the GGG 16 routes a call to the CDMA side 12 , the CDMA LR 52 will further route it to the serving MSC 46 .
- the GGG 16 acts as an HLR 50 in the GSM network 14 .
- the GSM LR 50 shall meet HLR protocol requirements for CDMA to GSM roaming.
- An important piece of information that the HLR maintains is the address of the GSM GMSC 40 serving the mobile station 20 .
- the CDMA LR 52 in the GGG 16 routes a call to the GSM side 14 , the GSM LR 50 will further route it to the serving MSC 40 .
- the GGG acts as an Authentication Controller (AUC) in the CDMA network for GSM subscribers 24 .
- the AUC 44 in a CDMA network 12 is responsible for authenticating a mobile station and permitting/denying access to network resources.
- the AUC function in the GGG does not call for A-key provisioning at the GGG or the MS. Instead the GGG uses the GSM authentication credentials and the GSM authentication method via GSM signaling to authenticate the mobile station 24 .
- the GGG responds to valid messages that can be received by a CDMA AUC 44 .
- the GGG acts as an Authentication Controller (AUC) in the GSM network for CDMA subscribers 20 .
- the AUC 36 in a CDMA network 14 is responsible for authenticating a mobile station and permitting/denying access to network resources.
- the AUC function in the GGG does not call for A-key provisioning at the GGG or the MS. Instead the GGG uses the CDMA authentication credentials and the CDMA authentication method via CDMA signaling to authenticate the mobile station 20 .
- the GGG responds to valid messages that can be received by a GSM AUC 36 .
- the GGG 16 acts as a Message Center (MC) in the CDMA network 12 and routes SMS messages between the CDMA mobile station 24 and GSM GMSC 40 using a GSM SMS mechanism.
- MC Message Center
- the GGG 16 acts as a Message Center (MC) in the GSM network 14 and routes SMS messages between the GSM mobile station 20 and CDMA MSC 46 using a CDMA SMS mechanism.
- MC Message Center
- the CDMA MS 24 is required to have a valid identity in the CDMA network. If this identity is different from the GSM International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) (i.e., if the CDMA network does not use true IMSI), then the GGG provides a mapping between the CDMA identity and the GSM IMSI. It would be apparent to those skilled in the art that any technique/method known in the art to uniquely identify the mobile station 24 may be used.
- IMSI GSM International Mobile Subscriber Identity
- the GSM MS 20 is required to have a valid identity in the GSM network.
- this identity is a GSM IMSI (i.e., if the CDMA network does not use true IMSI). If the identity in the GSM network is different from the identity in a CDMA network, then the GGG provides a mapping between the GSM identity and the CDMA identity. It would be apparent to those skilled in the art that any technique/method known in the art to uniquely identify the mobile station 20 may be used.
- mobile stations 18 , 20 are mobile telephones made by Kyocera, Samsung, or other manufacturer that use GSM principles and GSM over-the-air (OTA) communication air interfaces.
- mobile stations 22 , 24 are mobile telephones made by Kyocera, Samsung, or other manufacturer that use CDMA principles and CDMA over-the-air (OTA) communication air interfaces.
- the present invention applies to other mobile stations such as laptop computers, wireless handsets or telephones, data transceivers, or paging and position determination receivers.
- the mobile stations can be hand-held or portable as in vehicle-mounted (including cars, trucks, boats, planes, trains), as desired.
- wireless communication devices are generally viewed as being mobile, it is to be understood that the present invention can be applied to “fixed” units in some implementations. Also, the present invention applies to data modules or modems used to transfer voice and/or data information including digitized video information, and may communicate with other devices using wired or wireless links. Further, commands might be used to cause modems or modules to work in a predetermined coordinated or associated manner to transfer information over multiple communication channels.
- Wireless communication devices are also sometimes referred to as user terminals, mobile stations, mobile units, subscriber units, mobile radios or radiotelephones, wireless units, or simply as “users” and “mobiles” in some communication systems.
- FIGS. 2 a and 2 b shows a flowchart for authenticating a CDMA mobile station 24 with a subscription in a GSM network 14 in accordance with an embodiment not using SSD.
- FIGS. 2 a and 2 b are described as they inform the description of FIG. 6 .
- step 202 mobile station 24 (MS) roams into a CDMA area and the flow of control proceeds to step 204 .
- the mobile station 24 initiates a registration system access to a CDMA MSC 46 via a CDMA RAN 48 and the flow of control proceeds to step 206 .
- the registration system access is a message to the CDMA MSC 46 via the CDMA RAN 48 , the message including an identity of the mobile station 24 .
- the identity of the mobile station 24 may be provided by the SIM 28 .
- the identity of the mobile station 24 is an IMSI.
- the identity of the mobile station 24 is a Mobile Identification Number (MIN).
- the CDMA MSC 46 determines, based on the mobile station identity, whether the mobile station 24 is a GSM subscriber. In an embodiment, wherein the identity of the mobile station 24 is an IMSI, the MSC 46 can make this determination because the IMSI contains, among other information, a code representing the country and network in which the mobile station has a subscription.
- step 208 the mobile station 22 is authenticated using CDMA principles by the CDMA core infrastructure, using the CDMA HLR 42 and CDMA AUC 44 .
- step 210 the CDMA MSC 46 accesses the GGG 16 by sending an Authentication Request to the CDMA LR 52 in the GGG 16 and the flow of control proceeds to step 212 in accordance with an embodiment. In another embodiment, the flow of control proceeds to step 214 .
- the identity of the mobile station 24 is sent to the CDMA LR 52 as part of the Authentication Request.
- the identity of the mobile station 24 is sent to the CDMA LR 52 in addition to the Authentication Request.
- the Authentication Request may include parameters MIN, ESN and COUNT.
- ESN is an electronic serial number.
- the Authentication Request may include parameters MIN, ESN and COUNT.
- ESN is an electronic serial number.
- COUNT represents a count of a predetermined event that is a mutually agreed upon event between the GGG 16 and mobile station 24 .
- the GGG 16 shares the updating of COUNT with a node that interacts with the GGG 16 . By sharing the update function with another node, the message traffic between the GGG 16 and the other node may be reduced. For example, if the GGG 16 shares the function of updating COUNT with the CDMA MSC 46 , then the message traffic between the GGG 16 and the CDMA MSC 46 may be reduced.
- COUNT represents the number of times a mobile station 24 attempts to access the GSM network 14 .
- the GGG updates a COUNT for the particular mobile station 24 .
- the mobile station 24 also updates its own COUNT for the number of times it accesses the GSM network 14 .
- the GGG 16 stores the value of the ESN.
- COUNT represents a number of requests for authentication by the mobile station. It would be apparent to those skilled in the art that there are many events that can be counted, which the mobile station 24 and GGG 16 can count.
- step 212 the GGG 16 compares the value of COUNT to a count value in a GGG database. If the value of COUNT is equal to the count value in the GGG database, then the flow of control proceeds to step 214 . If the value of COUNT is not equal to the count value in the GGG database, then the flow of control proceeds to step 216 . It would be apparent to those skilled in the art that depending on an application, a variety of criteria may be applied to determine whether an Authentication Request is honored.
- step 214 an Authentication Request Return Result (ARRR) is set to true and the flow of control proceeds to step 218 .
- the Authentication Request Return Result message indicates the result of the Authentication Request.
- step 216 the Authentication Request Return Result is set to false and the flow of control proceeds to step 220 .
- the GGG 16 accesses the GSM network 14 and obtains necessary authentication information from the GSM HLR 34 and GSM AuC 36 .
- the GGG 16 looks up the MIN in its database to obtain a corresponding GSM IMSI and accesses the GSM network 14 by sending a GSM HLR authentication message with the IMSI of the mobile station 24 to the GSM HLR/AuC 34 , 36 , in accordance with an embodiment.
- the flow of control proceeds to step 220 .
- step 218 does not have to be performed before step 220 .
- step 220 the GGG 16 sends the Authentication Request Return Result to the CDMA MSC 46 and the flow of control proceeds to step 222 .
- step 222 the Authentication Request Return Result is tested. If the Authentication Request Return Result is true, then in step 224 the GGG 16 starts a timer, T REG and the flow of control proceeds to step 226 .
- step 228 the CDMA MSC 46 sends a mobile station authentication message to the mobile station 24 indicating the mobile station 24 is not authenticated. It would be apparent to those skilled in the art that the mobile station may reattempt authentication depending on the application.
- the GGG includes a logic unit (not shown) to execute program logic. It would be apparent to those skilled in the art that the logic unit may include a general purpose processor, a special-purpose processor, and/or firmware.
- step 226 the CDMA MSC 46 upon receiving an Authentication Request Return Result indicating successful authentication, sends a Registration Notification to the CDMA LR 52 in the GGG 16 .
- the flow of control proceeds to step 230 .
- step 230 a check is made to determine whether the GGG 16 received the Registration Notification before T REG expired. If the GGG 16 received the Registration Notification before T REG expired, then the flow of control proceeds to step 232 , otherwise the flow of control proceeds to step 234 .
- step 232 Registration Notification Return Result is set to indicate T REG did not expire and the flow of control proceeds to step 236 .
- step 234 Registration Notification Return Result is set to indicate T REG expired and the flow of control proceeds to step 236 .
- step 236 the GGG 16 responds to the Registration Notification with a Registration Notification Return Result indicating whether T REG expired.
- the Registration Notification Return Result is sent from the GGG 16 to the CDMA MSC 46 .
- the GGG 16 sends a message with or within the Registration Notification Return Result indicating SMS only mode/status.
- SMS only means the mobile station 24 sends and receives only SMS messages, not data and/or voice messages. The flow of control proceeds to step 238 .
- step 238 the CDMA MSC 46 sends a Registration Accept message to the mobile station 24 upon receiving the Registration Notification Return Result. Like the Registration Notification Return Result, the Registration Accept message indicates whether T REG expired. The flow of control proceeds to step 240 .
- step 240 the mobile station 24 determines whether the Registration Accept message indicates an accepted registration, i.e., T REG did not expire. If T REG expired, then the flow of control proceeds to step 242 , otherwise the flow of control proceeds to step 244 .
- the mobile station 24 may or may not reattempt registration. It would be apparent to those skilled in the art that depending on a mobile station application, the mobile station may or may not reattempt registration.
- step 244 does not have to be performed after step 242 .
- Step 244 only has to be executed after the GSM HLR authentication message has been sent to the GSM HLR/AuC 34 , 36 of step 218 .
- the GSM HLR/AuC 34 , 36 sends a GGG authentication message including authentication parameters to the GGG 16 and the flow of control proceeds to step 246 .
- step 246 the GGG 16 sends a GSM authentication request message to the CDMA MSC 46 in step 246 .
- the flow of control proceeds to step 248 .
- step 248 the CDMA MSC 46 forwards the GSM authentication request message to the mobile station 24 and the flow of control proceeds to step 250 .
- an application may have more criteria for authenticating mobile stations apart from the criteria applied to the original Authentication Request of step 210 .
- the CDMA MSC 46 sends a second authentication request (not shown) to the GGG 16 and the GGG 16 responds to the second authentication request (not shown).
- step 250 the mobile station 24 responds to the GSM authentication request message by determining authentication parameters such as an encryption key using a GSM authentication method and sending an authentication response including the authentication parameters to the CDMA MSC 46 .
- the authentication response is sent using the IS-637 SMS transport. The flow of control proceeds to step 252 .
- step 252 the CDMA MSC 46 forwards the authentication response to the GGG 16 and the GGG 16 validates that the authentication parameters by matching the authentication parameters to values received from the GSM HLR/AuC 34 , 36 in step 244 .
- the flow of control proceeds to step 254 .
- step 254 the GGG 16 sends an update location message to the GSM HLR 34 to update the location of the mobile station 24 and the flow of control proceeds to step 256 .
- step 256 the GSM HLR 34 sends GSM subscriber profile data of the mobile station 24 to the GSM LR 50 in the GGG 16 .
- the flow of control proceeds to step 258 .
- the GGG 16 maps the GSM subscriber profile data to a CDMA subscriber profile and sends the CMDA profile data in a Qualification Directive to the CDMA MSC 46 and the flow of control proceeds to step 260 .
- the Qualification Directive indicates that the mobile station 24 is qualified, i.e., authorized to communicate with the GSM network 14 . If the mobile station 24 is not qualified, then mobile station 24 is not authorized to communicate with the GSM network 14 (not shown).
- the GGG 16 indicates to the CDMA MSC 46 “full profile,” which in turn is forwarded to the mobile station 24 and indicates to the mobile station 24 that the mobile station 24 can send and receive without being limited to SMS messages.
- step 260 the CDMA MSC 46 responds to the Qualification Directive and sends a Qualification Directive Response to the CDMA LR 52 and the flow of control proceeds to step 262 .
- step 262 responsive to the GSM LR 50 receiving the GSM subscriber profile data, the GGG 16 sends a GSM subscriber profile data response to the GSM HLR/AuC 34 , 36 .
- step 264 responsive to the GSM HLR 34 receiving the update location message from the GGG 16 in step 254 , the GSM HLR 34 responds to the update location message and sends a update location message response to the GSM LR 50 , the update location message response indicating that the location of the mobile station 24 has been updated at the GSM LR 50 .
- the GGG differs most from the J-STD-038 IIF. Since the J-STD-038 IIF requires that the roaming subscriber have dual subscriptions—one for ANSI-41 and the other for GSM—it uses standard ANSI-41 techniques to authenticate the subscriber in ANSI-41 foreign mode. In contrast, the GGG solution does not require that the ANSI-41 foreign mode roamer have a complete ANSI-41 subscription. In particular, either the MS or GGG needs to be provisioned with ANSI-41 A-keys. The following first describes the standard ANSI-41 authentication mechanism. Then modifications to ANSI-41 method are described.
- the standard ANSI-41 approach to producing authentication keys is depicted in FIG. 3 .
- the A-key (which is the secret data known only to the mobile station and authentication center) and a random number called RANDSSD are processed using a CAVE algorithm to produce a 128-bit number called the Secret Shared Data (SSD). This operation is performed in the mobile station and the authentication center.
- the SSD consists of a 64-bit SSD-A key used for authentication and a 64-bit SSD-B key used for encryption.
- the mobile station On each system access the mobile station generates an authentication response (AUTHR) by processing SSD-A, ESN, MIN, authentication data (AUTH_DATA_either IMSI_S or dialed digits depending on the system access type) and a random number (RAND) broadcast by the RAN in overhead messages.
- the processing is performed again by executing the CAVE algorithm.
- the mobile station transmits AUTHR in the system access and is authenticated when the authentication center (or optionally the MSC/VLR) independently performs the same computation and compares the result with that received.
- the goal of authenticating a GSM subscriber in an ANSI-41 network using the GSM authentication credentials can be achieved by using Kc as SSD-A.
- the new method to generate the SSD-A key and AUTHR in accordance with an embodiment is shown in FIG. 4 .
- the secret key Ki known only to the subscriber's SIM and the GSM AuC
- the random number GSM_RAND
- Kc is 64 bits in length just as SSD-A. Therefore, Kc can be substituted for the SSD-A value in the standard ANSI-41 computation of AUTHR using a CAVE algorithm.
- the GGG gets the GSM authentication triplets (i.e., GSM_RAND, SRES and Kc) from the GSM AuC and the RAND, ESN, MIN and AUTH_DATA in an AuthenticationRequest INVOKE it can then use the Kc value as the SSD-A value to authenticate the mobile station using the ANSI-41 method after the mobile station is first authenticated using GSM_RAND.
- the GGG and the mobile station have a common value of Kc after the mobile station executes the GSM authentication procedure using the value of GSM_RAND at the GGG.
- This GSM authentication can be performed in the ANSI-41/CDMA2000 network using GSM signaling over IS-637 SMS transport.
- this value can be used as SSD-A and standard ANSI-41 methods can be used to authenticate the mobile station.
- the advantage of using the ANSI-41 authentication techniques is better signaling efficiency. Note that this approach also meets the goal of authenticating a mobile station in the ANSI-41 network using GSM credentials.
- the ANSI-41 AC in the GGG retains authentication responsibility.
- the serving MSC/VLR is assumed to respond to each mobile station access attempt (e.g., registration, origination, page response and flash) with an AuthenticationRequest INVOKE towards the ANSI-41 HLR/AC in the GGG. While this approach provides maximum security, the tradeoff is more signaling traffic between the ANSI-41 MSC/VLR and the GGG.
- SSD sharing is applied to a GGG-based GSM1x solution if the value of Kc is used for SSD-A as described in reference to FIG. 4 .
- the remainder of this section describes how SSD sharing is performed.
- FIG. 5 shows the information flow for a successful SSD update procedure in which the GGG updates the SSD shared with the serving MSC/VLR in accordance with an embodiment.
- the initial condition for this scenario is that the GGG has previously shared SSD with the serving MSC/VLR and that the MSC/VLR authenticates the MS when it performs a system access.
- step 501 the GGG initiates the SSD update by invoking Authentication Directive (IS41_AUTHDIR) towards the ANSI-41 MSC/VLR with the MIN, ESN and NOSSD parameters.
- IS41_AUTHDIR Authentication Directive
- step 502 the MSC/VLR discards the SSD that it has for the specified MS, and responds by invoking Authentication Directive Return Request towards the GGG.
- the MSC/VLR will now invoke Authentication Request towards the HLR/AC in the GGG for each system access of this MS.
- step 503 the GGG invokes Count Request (IS41 _COUNTREQ) towards the MSC/VLR to request the current value of the CallHistoryCount (COUNT) parameter for the MS.
- Count Request IS41 _COUNTREQ
- COUNT CallHistoryCount
- step 504 the MSC/VLR responds with the Count Request Return Result (IS41_countreq), containing the requested COUNT parameter.
- step 505 if the GGG has no additional GSM authentication triplets for the MS, then the GGG invokes MAP_SEND_AUTHENTICATION_INFO towards the GSM HLR. The next time that the MS accesses the system, the following steps occur:
- step 506 the GSM HLR responds with MAP_send_authentication_info containing a set (at least one) of authentication triplets.
- step 507 the next time the MS accesses the system, the following occurs:
- step 508 since SSD is no longer being shared, the MSC/VLR invokes Authentication Request (IS41_AUTHREQ) towards the GGG to authenticate the MS system access.
- Authentication Request IS41_AUTHREQ
- step 509 the AC in the GGG executes ANSI-41 authentication given the parameters received in the previous step, and the value of Kc (SSD-A) stored for that MS.
- the AC then invokes Authentication Request Return Result (IS41authreq) towards the MSC/VLR to indicate successful ANSI-41 authentication.
- step 510 the GGG initiates the GSM1x authentication process by invoking GSM1x Authentication Requests using the IS41_SMDPP transport.
- step 511 the MSC forwards this SMS to the MS.
- step 512 the MS responds to the GSM1x authentication request by computing SRES and Kc using the GSM authentication method, and sending a response (GSM1x Auth Rsp) using IS-637 SMS transport.
- step 513 the MSC forwards the SMS to the GGG, and the GGG validates that the SRES in the GSM1x Auth Rsp matches the value received from the GSM HLR/AuC. This step completes the SSD update to the MS.
- step 514 upon the next system access by the MS, the MSC/VLR invokes Authentication Request (IS41_AUTHREQ) towards the GGG.
- Authentication Request IS41_AUTHREQ
- step 515 the AC in the GGG executes ANSI-41 authentication given the parameters received in the previous step, and the value of Kc (SSD-A) stored for that MS.
- the AC then invokes Authentication Request Return Result (IS41_authreq) towards the MSC/VLR to indicate successful ANSI-41 authentication.
- the SSD parameter is also included to share SSD with the MSC/VLR.
- FIG. 6 shows an initial registration scenario modified for SSD sharing in accordance with an embodiment.
- the information flow shown in FIG. 6 is similar to the information flow shown in the flowchart of FIG. 2 until step 619 .
- step 601 the initial registration scenario begins when the MS performs a registration system access.
- the ANSI-41 MSC/VLR invokes Authentication Request (IS41_AUTHREQ) towards the HLR in the GGG (the HLR for the GSM1x MS).
- the relevant parameters in this AUTHREQ are MIN, ESN and COUNT.
- the GGG stores the value of ESN and compares the value of COUNT to the value in the database.
- step 603 the GGG looks up the MIN in its database to get the corresponding GSM IMSI and invokes the MAP_SEND_AUTHENTICATION_INFO (Error! Reference source not found.) towards the GSM HLR/AuC.
- step 604 the GGG invokes the Authentication Request Return Result (IS41_authreq) towards the MSC/VLR indicating successful authentication and starts a timer, T REG .
- step 605 upon receiving the IS41_authreq indicating successful authentication the MSC/VLR invokes Registration Notification (IS41_REGNOT) towards the HLR in the GGG.
- IS41_REGNOT Registration Notification
- step 606 if the GGG receives the IS41_REGNOT before T REG expires (as in this scenario), then it responds with a Registration Notification Return Result (IS41_regnot) with a profile macro authorizing SMS only. SMS only is specified as follows:
- step 607 upon receiving the IS41_regnot the MSC/VLR sends registration accept to the MS.
- step 608 the GGG receives the MAP_send_authentication_info from the GSM HLR/AuC containing one or more authentication triplets.
- step 609 after the GGG successfully sends the IS41_regnot to the MSC/VLR (6) and receives the MAP_send_authentication_info from the GSM HLR/AuC (8), it sends the GSM1x authentication request (GSM1x Auth Req) message using IS41_SMDPP transport.
- GSM1x Auth Req GSM1x authentication request
- step 610 the MSC forwards this SMS to the MS.
- step 611 the MS responds to the GSM1x authentication request by computing SRES and Kc using the GSM authentication method and sending a response (GSM1x Auth Rsp) using IS-637 SMS transport.
- step 612 the MSC forwards the SMS to the GGG and the GGG validates that the SRES in the GSM1x Auth Rsp matches the value received from the GSM HLR/AuC.
- step 613 the GGG invokes MAP_UPDATE_LOC towards the GSM HLR to update the location of the MS.
- step 614 the GSM HLR invokes MAP_INSERT_SUB_DATA towards the GSM VLR in the GGG to send the subscriber profile.
- the GGG maps the GSM subscriber profile to an ANSI-41 subscriber profile and sends this ANSI-41 profile to the MSC/VLR by invoking Qualification Directive (IS41_QUALDIR).
- step 616 the MSC/VLR responds to the Qualification Directive of step 615 .
- step 617 The GGG responds to the MAP_INSERT_SUB_DATA of step 614 .
- step 618 the GSM HLR responds to the MAP_UPDATE_LOC of step 613 .
- step 619 upon the next system access by the MS the following steps occur:
- step 620 the MSC/VLR VLR invokes Authentication Request (IS41_AUTHREQ) towards the GGG.
- step 621 the AC in the GGG executes ANSI-41 authentication given the parameters received in the previous step and the value of Kc (SSD-A) stored for that MS.
- the AC then invokes Authentication Request Return Result (IS41_authreq) towards the MSC/VLR to indicate successful ANSI-41 authentication.
- the SSD parameter is also included to share SSD with the MSC/VLR.
- FIG. 7 shows the information flow for a successful registration with a new MSC/VLR when SSD sharing is allowed in accordance with an embodiment.
- step 715 upon the next system access by the MS the following steps occur:
- step 716 the MSC/VLR VLR invokes Authentication Request (IS41_AUTHREQ) towards the GGG.
- step 717 the AC in the GGG executes ANSI-41 authentication given the parameters received in the previous step and the value of Kc (SSD-A) stored for that MS.
- the AC then invokes Authentication Request Return Result (IS41_authreq) towards the MSC/VLR to indicate successful ANSI-41 authentication.
- the SSD parameter is also included to share SSD with the MSC/VLR.
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