CN113484829A - Method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference aiming at synthetic aperture radar - Google Patents

Method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference aiming at synthetic aperture radar Download PDF

Info

Publication number
CN113484829A
CN113484829A CN202110744105.8A CN202110744105A CN113484829A CN 113484829 A CN113484829 A CN 113484829A CN 202110744105 A CN202110744105 A CN 202110744105A CN 113484829 A CN113484829 A CN 113484829A
Authority
CN
China
Prior art keywords
signal
frequency threshold
bit
false
target
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
CN202110744105.8A
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Other versions
CN113484829B (en
Inventor
赵博
陈泉宇
黄磊
张彬
刘仕奇
赵源
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Shenzhen University
Original Assignee
Shenzhen University
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Shenzhen University filed Critical Shenzhen University
Priority to CN202110744105.8A priority Critical patent/CN113484829B/en
Publication of CN113484829A publication Critical patent/CN113484829A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CN113484829B publication Critical patent/CN113484829B/en
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S7/00—Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00
    • G01S7/02—Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00 of systems according to group G01S13/00
    • G01S7/021—Auxiliary means for detecting or identifying radar signals or the like, e.g. radar jamming signals
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S7/00—Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00
    • G01S7/02—Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00 of systems according to group G01S13/00
    • G01S7/38—Jamming means, e.g. producing false echoes
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S13/00—Systems using the reflection or reradiation of radio waves, e.g. radar systems; Analogous systems using reflection or reradiation of waves whose nature or wavelength is irrelevant or unspecified
    • G01S13/88—Radar or analogous systems specially adapted for specific applications
    • G01S13/89—Radar or analogous systems specially adapted for specific applications for mapping or imaging
    • G01S13/90—Radar or analogous systems specially adapted for specific applications for mapping or imaging using synthetic aperture techniques, e.g. synthetic aperture radar [SAR] techniques

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
  • Remote Sensing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Radar Systems Or Details Thereof (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference aiming at a synthetic aperture radar, which comprises the following steps: acquiring a target synthetic aperture radar signal, and constructing a false target signal according to the target synthetic aperture radar signal; preparing for generating a single-frequency threshold signal subsequently, obtaining a single-frequency threshold frequency and a single-frequency threshold phase according to the false target signal, and obtaining the single-frequency threshold signal according to the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase; the single-frequency threshold signal is used for decomposing harmonic waves caused by 1-bit quantization, the 1-bit quantized signal is obtained according to the single-frequency threshold signal and the false target signal, the complexity of an interference machine is reduced, and the 1-bit quantized signal is subjected to interference modulation to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming signal.

Description

Method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference aiming at synthetic aperture radar
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of radar signal processing, in particular to a method for generating 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming aiming at a synthetic aperture radar.
Background
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is a method that enables continuous monitoring in various weather and lighting conditions, and thus has found widespread use in civilian applications, particularly in military reconnaissance. The deception jammer imitates the characteristic of SAR echo, so that the deception jammer can obtain higher processing gain through SAR imaging, and the consumption of interference power is greatly reduced. Thus, the understanding of the SAR image is unknowingly misled by false targets, which is a more covert and harmful countermeasure to SAR. However, the deception jamming modulation requires a large amount of calculation, so that the existing deception jamming modulation method has the problem of high calculation complexity.
Thus, there is still a need for improvement and development of the prior art.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference for synthetic aperture radar, aiming at solving the problem that the computational complexity of the existing spoofing interference modulation method is high due to the fact that a large amount of computation is required for spoofing interference modulation in the prior art.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention for solving the problems is as follows:
in a first aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference for synthetic aperture radar, where the method includes:
acquiring a target synthetic aperture radar signal, and constructing a false target signal according to the target synthetic aperture radar signal;
obtaining a single-frequency threshold frequency and a single-frequency threshold phase according to the false target signal, and obtaining a single-frequency threshold signal according to the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase;
and obtaining a 1-bit quantized signal according to the single-frequency threshold signal and the false target signal, and performing interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming signal.
In one implementation, the constructing false target signals from the target synthetic aperture radar signal includes:
acquiring a slope distance process; wherein the skew distance process is the distance from a deception jamming machine to the SAR system;
and performing fusion calculation on the slope distance process and the target synthetic aperture radar signal to obtain a false target signal.
In one implementation, the obtaining a single-frequency threshold frequency and a single-frequency threshold phase according to the false target signal includes:
calculating scattering distances of two false scatterers of the false target signal;
performing distance translation on the scattering distance and the slope distance process to obtain single-frequency threshold frequency;
and carrying out azimuth translation on the scattering distance and the slope distance process to obtain a single-frequency threshold phase.
In one implementation, the obtaining a single-frequency threshold signal according to the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase includes:
acquiring single-frequency threshold amplitude;
and determining a single-frequency threshold signal according to the single-frequency threshold amplitude, the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase.
In one implementation, the obtaining a 1-bit quantized signal according to the single-frequency threshold signal and the false target signal, and performing interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target spoofed interference signal includes:
acquiring the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal;
acquiring the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal;
obtaining a 1-bit quantized signal according to the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal and the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal;
and carrying out interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-decoy deception jamming signal.
In one implementation, the deriving a 1-bit quantized signal according to the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal and the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal comprises:
when the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal is greater than the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal, the 1-bit quantized signal value corresponding to the instantaneous moment of the false target signal is 1;
when the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal is less than or equal to the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal, the 1-bit quantized signal value corresponding to the instantaneous moment of the false target signal is 0;
a number of said 1-bit quantized signal values are combined into a 1-bit quantized signal.
In one implementation, the performing interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-decoy spoofed interference signal includes:
and performing distance modulation and azimuth modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming signal.
In one implementation, the distance modulating and the azimuth modulating the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-decoy spoofed interference signal includes:
adjusting the time delay of the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a distance-modulated 1-bit quantized signal;
and modulating the Doppler frequency of the 1-bit quantized signal after distance modulation to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming signal.
In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present invention further provides an apparatus for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference for synthetic aperture radar, where the apparatus includes:
the false target signal construction module is used for acquiring a target synthetic aperture radar signal and constructing a false target signal according to the target synthetic aperture radar signal;
a single-frequency threshold signal obtaining module, configured to obtain a single-frequency threshold frequency and a single-frequency threshold phase according to the false target signal, and obtain a single-frequency threshold signal according to the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase;
and the 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming signal acquisition module is used for obtaining a 1-bit quantized signal according to the single-frequency threshold signal and the false target signal, and performing interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming signal.
In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present invention further provides an intelligent terminal, including a memory, and one or more programs, where the one or more programs are stored in the memory, and configured to be executed by one or more processors, where the one or more programs include a program for executing the method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference for synthetic aperture radar according to any one of the above items.
In a fourth aspect, embodiments of the present invention also provide a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, where instructions of the storage medium, when executed by a processor of an electronic device, enable the electronic device to perform the method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference for synthetic aperture radar as described in any one of the above.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: firstly, obtaining a target synthetic aperture radar signal, and constructing a false target signal according to the target synthetic aperture radar signal; preparing for subsequently generating a single-frequency threshold signal, then obtaining a single-frequency threshold frequency and a single-frequency threshold phase according to the false target signal, and obtaining a single-frequency threshold signal according to the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase, wherein the single-frequency threshold signal is used for decomposing harmonics caused by 1-bit quantization; finally, according to the single-frequency threshold signal and the false target signal, obtaining a 1-bit quantized signal, reducing the complexity of an interference machine, and performing interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception interference signal; therefore, in the embodiment of the invention, by the method, a plurality of separated false target deception jamming signals are generated, and the complexity of interference modulation calculation can be effectively reduced.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments described in the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without creative efforts.
Fig. 1 is a schematic flow chart of a method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference for a synthetic aperture radar according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a geometric model diagram of 1-bit split spoofing interference provided by an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of modulation after interception of a skew history in a slow time domain according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is a flowchart illustrating an implementation manner of 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference for synthetic aperture radar according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 5 is a schematic diagram of a simulation result of scatterer spoofing interference provided in an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 6 is a schematic block diagram of a device for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference for synthetic aperture radar according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 7 is a schematic block diagram of an internal structure of an intelligent terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention discloses a method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy deception jamming aiming at a synthetic aperture radar, an intelligent terminal and a storage medium, and in order to make the purpose, the technical scheme and the effect of the invention clearer and clearer, the invention is further described in detail by referring to the attached drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.
As used herein, the singular forms "a", "an", "the" and "the" are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It will be further understood that the terms "comprises" and/or "comprising," when used in this specification, specify the presence of stated features, integers, steps, operations, elements, and/or components, but do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, operations, elements, components, and/or groups thereof. It will be understood that when an element is referred to as being "connected" or "coupled" to another element, it can be directly connected or coupled to the other element or intervening elements may also be present. Further, "connected" or "coupled" as used herein may include wirelessly connected or wirelessly coupled. As used herein, the term "and/or" includes all or any element and all combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.
It will be understood by those skilled in the art that, unless otherwise defined, all terms (including technical and scientific terms) used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs. It will be further understood that terms, such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries, should be interpreted as having a meaning that is consistent with their meaning in the context of the prior art and will not be interpreted in an idealized or overly formal sense unless expressly so defined herein.
As SAR advances, Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) technology is also evolving as the prior art approaches to prevent targets from being detected by local SAR. When an active jammer transmits electromagnetic waves in striving for electronic countermeasures to synthetic aperture radar, a compromise must be made between power consumption and computational complexity. The intercepting jammers interfere with the SAR with high power noise, which is typically not efficiently accumulated by SAR imaging algorithms. The signal-to-noise ratio of the SAR image is continuously reduced under the interception interference. Therefore, it is difficult for the enemy SAR to extract the target feature. Intercepting interference has the advantage of low computational complexity. However, since it is difficult to obtain coherent processing gain similar to SAR by the interference shielding, a large amount of transmission power is used in the interference shielding, making it easy to be exposed. The opposite is true for a spoof jammer. The deception jammer imitates the characteristic of SAR echo, so that the deception jammer can obtain higher processing gain through SAR imaging, and the consumption of interference power is greatly reduced. Thus, the understanding of the SAR image is unknowingly misled by false targets, which is a more covert and harmful countermeasure to SAR. However, spoofing interference modulation requires a large amount of computation. That is, the advantage of the spoofed jammer in terms of power consumption is at the cost of computational complexity. At a certain technical level, the computational complexity is a bottleneck that restricts the implementation and practical application of the deceptive interference.
G. France schetti et al put forward a SAR imaging solution based on one-bit sampling in the literature "Processing of Signal coded SAR Signal: the organ and experiments" (IEE Processing F-Radar and Signal Processing, vol.138, No.3,1991, pp.192-198), and the data volume of imaging Processing is greatly reduced by performing one-bit quantization on echo signals, thereby greatly simplifying the implementation complexity of imaging Processing. The imaging quality loss caused by system simplification is within an acceptable range, the imaging quality is ensured, the cost of imaging processing is greatly reduced, and the real-time performance of SAR imaging is improved.
Gianelli et al introduce a random time-varying threshold into a bit sample in the documents "One-bit compressed sampling with time-varying threshold for sparse parameter estimation" (IEEE Sensor Array and Multichannel Signal Processing Workshop (SAM' 16), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Jul.2016, pp.1-5), thereby enabling high-quality recovery of the absolute amplitude information of the original Signal and ensuring the integrity of the information when a bit Signal is reconstructed. However, the method is established on the premise that the original signal has the sparse characteristic, and is difficult to apply in the non-sparse scene of SAR imaging.
Zhao et al, in the document "derivation jamming for acquired SAR based on multiple receivers" (IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Applied Earth occupancy and Remote Sensing, vol.8, No.8, pp.3988-3998,2015), performed Deception jamming modulation using a multi-receiver system, and greatly improved SAR Deception jamming accuracy and robustness. However, the method is based on the traditional high-precision signal interception, modulation and forwarding system, and still has the problems of complex system and large computation amount.
Zhao et al intercept radar transmission signals using a 1-bit sampling technique in the literature "received SAR jamming based on 1-bit sampling and time-varying thresholds" (IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Applied Earth emissions and Remote Sensing, vol.11, No.3, pp.939-950,2018.). The system complexity is simplified to a certain extent. The random time-varying threshold is equivalent to introducing extra noise into the signal, which may reduce the signal-to-noise ratio and affect the imaging quality.
In order to solve the problems in the prior art, the present embodiment provides a method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference for synthetic aperture radar, and a plurality of separated decoy spoofing interference signals are generated by the method, so that the complexity of interference modulation calculation can be effectively reduced. In specific implementation, firstly, a target synthetic aperture radar signal is obtained, and a false target signal is constructed according to the target synthetic aperture radar signal; preparing for subsequently generating a single-frequency threshold signal, then obtaining a single-frequency threshold frequency and a single-frequency threshold phase according to the false target signal, and obtaining a single-frequency threshold signal according to the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase, wherein the single-frequency threshold signal is used for decomposing harmonics caused by 1-bit quantization; and finally, obtaining a 1-bit quantized signal according to the single-frequency threshold signal and the false target signal, reducing the complexity of an interference machine, and performing interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception interference signal.
Exemplary method
The embodiment provides a method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference aiming at a synthetic aperture radar, and the method can be applied to an intelligent terminal for radar signal processing. As shown in fig. 1 in detail, the method includes:
s100, acquiring a target synthetic aperture radar signal, and constructing a false target signal according to the target synthetic aperture radar signal;
specifically, the target synthetic aperture radar signal may be obtained by a radar receiver, or may be obtained by a spoofing jammer. In this embodiment, a chirp signal (LFM) is typically employed by SAR due to its high resolution and high signal-to-noise ratio gain, and the target synthetic aperture radar signal can be expressed as:
Figure BDA0003142275530000081
where rect (-) is a rectangular function with a width TrEnvelope of the chirp, trIs a fast time, fcIs the carrier frequency, KrIs frequency modulated. For the purpose of deceptive jamming, the jammer has the primary task of simulating the signal emitted by the radar. And obtaining a target synthetic aperture radar signal, and constructing a false target signal in a mode of adding other signals to the target synthetic aperture radar signal or in a mode of re-synthesizing the target synthetic aperture radar signal.
In one implementation of the present invention, the constructing a false target signal according to the target synthetic aperture radar signal includes the following steps:
s101, acquiring a slope distance process; wherein the skew distance process is the distance from a deception jamming machine to the SAR system;
and S102, performing fusion calculation on the slant range process and the target synthetic aperture radar signal to obtain a false target signal.
Specifically, a slope distance process is obtained; wherein the skew distance process is the distance from a deception jamming machine to the SAR system; the SAR system is a synthetic aperture radar system, e.g. as shown in FIG. 2, RO′(ta) In order to deceive the distance between O' where the jammer is located and the SAR system. And then, performing fusion calculation on the slant range process and the target synthetic aperture radar signal to obtain a false target signal. For example, suppose a deception jammer is deployed at O' (x) of the SAR imaging planeO′,yO′) A is represented by RO′(ta) Will be O' (x)O′,yO′) The distance from the SAR system is characterized by a slow time taAs a function of, then jammer interceptionThe LFM signal of (i.e. the false target signal) is:
Figure BDA0003142275530000091
Figure BDA0003142275530000092
Figure BDA0003142275530000093
where c is the propagation velocity of the electromagnetic wave. In the conventional deception jamming machine, the amplitude, the time delay and the doppler frequency of the above formula are directly modulated to generate false targets in the SAR image, that is, the above-mentioned signal processing is performed on the intercepted digitized signals. Aiming at a deception jamming task, the invention improves a 1-bit quantification method based on SFT (single frequency threshold), improves deception jamming effect with extremely low complexity, and the geometric model of the jammer is shown in figure 2, wherein the synthetic aperture radar is supposed to work in a side-view mode in the geometric model of the jammer. The spoof jammer is deployed at O'. As shown by the dashed lines in FIG. 2, a coupled pseudo scatterer P 'is generated'+And P'-And give P'+Are (Δ x ', Δ y ') and P '-(- Δ x ', - Δ y').
After obtaining the false target signal, the following steps can be performed as shown in fig. 1: s200, obtaining a single-frequency threshold frequency and a single-frequency threshold phase according to the false target signal, and obtaining a single-frequency threshold signal according to the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase;
specifically, the false target signal may also be calculated according to some parameter information in the false target signal to obtain a single-frequency threshold frequency and a single-frequency threshold phase, where the single-frequency threshold signal includes information of the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase.
In an implementation manner of the present invention, the obtaining a single-frequency threshold frequency and a single-frequency threshold phase according to the false target signal includes the following steps:
s201, calculating scattering distances of two false scatterers of the false target signal;
s202, performing distance translation on the scattering distance and the slope distance process to obtain single-frequency threshold frequency;
s203, carrying out azimuth translation on the scattering distance and the slant distance process to obtain a single-frequency threshold phase.
Specifically, the scattering distances of two false scatterers of the false target signal are calculated firstly; e.g. coupled dummy scatterer P'+And P'-And give P'+Are (Δ x ', Δ y ') and P '-(- Δ x ', - Δ y') according to the formula:
Figure BDA0003142275530000101
obtaining the scattering distance
Figure BDA0003142275530000102
Then, performing distance translation on the scattering distance and the slope distance process to obtain single-frequency threshold frequency; for example, for a dummy scatterer P 'modulated by a jammer'+And P'-Their projection on the fast time axis is in the same region as O' on the fast time axis. The distance-shifting modulation is actually achieved by introducing an extra frequency offset. The distance translation task is performed by SFT (Single frequency threshold) frequency, using fτ(ta) Executing a distance translation task, wherein a single-frequency threshold frequency expression is as follows:
Figure BDA0003142275530000103
where Θ represents the square of the skew history divided by c2. Since c is much larger than the ramp history, Θ can be ignored.
Figure BDA0003142275530000111
The following values are taken for the skew distance difference:
Figure BDA0003142275530000112
Figure BDA0003142275530000113
ΔR′m(ta)＝[R′+(ta)-R′-(ta)]/2
for practical purposes, Taylor approximation Δ R 'is typically used'±(ta) To make a compromise between performance and complexity, the advantage of spoofing jammers in power consumption is at the cost of computational complexity, since spoofing jammer modulation requires a large amount of computation. The computational complexity is increased to reduce power consumption and increase performance.
Is delta R'+(ta) To give example, P'+May be expressed as:
Figure BDA0003142275530000114
for higher accuracy, P 'is required'-Of delta R'-(ta) The approximate value is:
Figure BDA0003142275530000115
to reduce error, according to P'+Instantaneous difference of slope and P'-Of delta R'-(ta) The instantaneous slope difference is obtained and calculated as follows:
Figure BDA0003142275530000121
according to the difference of modulation precision, canConstant terms are used only, or constant terms and first order terms are used, and if higher accuracy is required, constant terms, first order terms and second order terms can be used, or even higher terms can be introduced. (constant term is t-free)aA first term of (a) is taThe second order term is
Figure BDA0003142275530000122
The above three equations are similar. )
After the single-frequency threshold frequency is obtained, azimuth translation can be performed on the scattering distance and the slope distance process, and a single-frequency threshold phase is obtained. For example: by varying the frequency of the SFT by varying the pulse repetition interval, the true scatterers P are simulated within the ramp+And P-The characteristic of (c). However, the LFM signal intercepted by the jammer, i.e. the structure false target signal, is split and modulated only by half, and the intercepted LFM signal needs to be modulated. From the doppler frequency point of view, the ramp history of the spoofed interferer is inconsistent with that of the real scatterer. Therefore, additional azimuthal modulation is still required to achieve. The azimuth shift task is performed by SFT (Single frequency threshold) phase
Figure BDA0003142275530000123
Executing an azimuth translation task, wherein a single-frequency threshold phase expression is as follows:
Figure BDA0003142275530000124
wherein λ is the wavelength of electromagnetic wave, Δ R'±(ta) Taylor approximation of the slope difference.
In another implementation manner of the present invention, the obtaining a single-frequency threshold signal according to the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase includes the following steps:
s204, acquiring single-frequency threshold amplitude;
s205, determining a single-frequency threshold signal according to the single-frequency threshold amplitude, the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase.
Specifically, a single frequency threshold amplitude A is obtained firstsThen, according to the single-frequency threshold amplitude, the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase, a single-frequency threshold signal is determined, for example, according to the calculated single-frequency threshold frequency and phase, a corresponding single-frequency threshold h is generateds(tr,ta)，hs(tr,ta) Are single frequency thresholds for different parameters at different Pulse Repetition Intervals (PRIs). Single frequency threshold signal hs(tr,ta) The expression of (a) is:
Figure BDA0003142275530000131
wherein f isτ(ta) And
Figure BDA0003142275530000132
is as a function of the slow time taThe frequency of the change and the initial phase.
After obtaining the single frequency threshold signal, the following steps as shown in fig. 1 can be performed: s300, obtaining a 1-bit quantized signal according to the single-frequency threshold signal and the false target signal, and performing interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming signal.
Specifically, 1-bit quantization is the modulation of a signal by 1-bit binary code transmitted samples. Interference modulation is a modulation mode that interferes with the amplitude or frequency or phase of a signal.
In an implementation manner of the present invention, the obtaining a 1-bit quantized signal according to the single-frequency threshold signal and the false target signal, and performing interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target spoofed interference signal includes the following steps:
s301, acquiring the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal;
s302, acquiring the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal;
s303, obtaining a 1-bit quantized signal according to the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal and the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal;
s304, carrying out interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-decoy deception jamming signal.
Specifically, the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal and the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal are obtained first; then obtaining a 1-bit quantized signal according to the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal and the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal; correspondingly, obtaining a 1-bit quantized signal according to the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal and the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal includes the following steps: when the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal is greater than the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal, the 1-bit quantized signal value corresponding to the instantaneous moment of the false target signal is 1; when the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal is less than or equal to the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal, the 1-bit quantized signal value corresponding to the instantaneous moment of the false target signal is 0; a number of said 1-bit quantized signal values are combined into a 1-bit quantized signal. For example, the spectrum of the intercepted synthetic aperture radar signal is complicated by the introduction of SFT, however, it enables a 1-bit quantizer to shift the harmonic spectrum to meet different applications. For a jammer to achieve high efficiency at as low a cost as possible, SFT increases the target number with a low complexity of the jammer modulation by preserving some harmonics. A custom 1-bit SFT quantizer for synthetic aperture radar signal interception can be written as:
sO′1(tr,ta)＝csign[sO′(tr,ta)+hs(tr,ta)]*
wherein, (.)*Calculating the conjugate of a complex signal, csign (-) returning the sign of the complex sample, corresponding to
Figure BDA0003142275530000141
As can be seen from the above process, the modulation after interception is not only simplified by processing the 1-bit quantized signal, but also double false is generated by one modulationThe complexity of the spoofing interference is significantly reduced. And finally, carrying out interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-decoy deception jamming signal. Correspondingly, the interference modulation is performed on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-decoy deception jamming signal, which includes the following steps: and performing distance modulation and azimuth modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming signal. In one implementation, the distance modulation and the direction modulation are performed on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference signal, including the following steps: adjusting the time delay of the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a distance-modulated 1-bit quantized signal; for example, splitting an intercepted synthetic aperture radar into two false scatterers requires traditional spoof-interference modulation to adjust the scattering characteristics and overall position of the two false scatterers, i.e., the coordinate system x ' O ' y ' is modulated to produce the coordinate system x "O" y ". With P ″)+For example, the post-interception modulation can be described as:
Figure BDA0003142275530000142
wherein, R ″)O(ta) Is the instantaneous slope difference between O 'and O',
Figure BDA0003142275530000151
represents P'+The formula is represented by P'+Dot modulation to P ″)+To simulate real scatterers. Delta (·) represents a dirac function,
Figure BDA0003142275530000152
the scattering coefficient is changed. Combining multiple scatterers with the scattering properties described above, false targets and even false scenes can be created. In the distance domain, the task of modulation after interception is still to adjust the pseudo scatterer P ″+And P ″)-To simulate real scatterers
Figure BDA0003142275530000155
And
Figure BDA0003142275530000156
the slope history of (a). The time delay of the truncated 1-bit signal is directly changed to adjust the instantaneous slope difference. After acquisition of the post range domain modulation, a ramp history is obtained as shown in dashed lines in fig. 3. And then modulating the Doppler frequency of the 1-bit quantized signal after distance modulation to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming signal. For example, according to the formula:
Figure BDA0003142275530000153
and modulating the Doppler frequency as the same as intercepting the azimuth modulation in the LFM signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming signal. And finally, forwarding the modulated signal to a radar receiver to form interference on the radar. The flow chart is shown in fig. 4.
The task of deception jamming modulation is divided into internal modulation and external modulation, wherein the internal modulation is internal modulation, namely interception and middle modulation, and the external modulation is modulation after interception. The internal modulation is performed synchronously with the interception of the 1-bit quantized signal, the split false scatterers are moved to the required positions, and the parameters of the SFT at different pulse repetition intervals are adjusted. The outer modulation then provides the scattering properties and further shifts the position of the split scatterers to produce decoy jamming, which can generate multi-decoy jamming with less computation. Therefore, the complexity of the interference machine is reduced, the working efficiency is improved, and the method can be practically applied in multiple scenes.
The effects of the present invention can be further illustrated by the following simulation experiments. The simulation platform uses MATLAB.
The synthetic aperture radar parameters are as follows:
Figure BDA0003142275530000154
Figure BDA0003142275530000161
in the simulation of scatterers, the synthetic aperture radar signal is intercepted by the 1-bit quantizer of the present invention, where Δ x ═ -25m and Δ y ═ 150 m. The simulated figure shows an internally modulated dummy scatterer P'+And P'-. Then, the synthetic aperture radar signal intercepted by the 1-bit quantizer is further subjected to external modulation of Δ x ═ 25m and Δ y ═ 150m, and finally, a pseudo scatterer P ″, is obtained+And P ″)-. O 'and O' are respectively expressed as ` x `and
Figure BDA0003142275530000162
And (4) showing. The scatterer spoofing interference simulation results are shown in fig. 5.
The invention is characterized in that:
(1) the invention discloses a synthetic aperture radar-based 1-bit splitting deceptive interference generation method and a synthetic aperture radar-based 1-bit splitting deceptive interference generation system.
(2) The invention improves the 1-bit quantization scheme, and greatly reduces the complexity of the jammer on the premise of ensuring the focusing quality. The single frequency threshold is used to resolve 1-bit quantization induced harmonics, the parameters of which vary with different pulse repetition intervals to provide controllable modulation. Thus, during 1-bit interception, the synthetic aperture radar signal is split into coupled spurious scatterers. By further amplitude, time delay and doppler frequency modulation of the intercepted signal of the 1-bit quantizer, separate decoys can be generated.
(3) SFT-based 1-bit quantization models were constructed for the purpose of splitting spoofing interference. SFT has the ability of spectral split decomposition with time dependent frequency and phase. In this way, part of the deceptive interference modulation is forwarded to the interception module, consuming very little computational resources.
Exemplary device
As shown in fig. 6, an embodiment of the present invention provides an apparatus for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference for synthetic aperture radar, the apparatus includes a decoy signal construction module 401, a single frequency threshold signal acquisition module 402, and a 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference signal acquisition module 403, where:
a false target signal construction module 401, configured to obtain a target synthetic aperture radar signal, and construct a false target signal according to the target synthetic aperture radar signal;
a single-frequency threshold signal obtaining module 402, configured to obtain a single-frequency threshold frequency and a single-frequency threshold phase according to the false target signal, and obtain a single-frequency threshold signal according to the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase;
a 1-bit multi-decoy spoofed interference signal obtaining module 403, configured to obtain a 1-bit quantized signal according to the single-frequency threshold signal and the decoy target signal, and perform interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-decoy spoofed interference signal.
Based on the above embodiment, the present invention further provides an intelligent terminal, and a schematic block diagram thereof may be as shown in fig. 7. The intelligent terminal comprises a processor, a memory, a network interface, a display screen and a temperature sensor which are connected through a system bus. Wherein, the processor of the intelligent terminal is used for providing calculation and control capability. The memory of the intelligent terminal comprises a nonvolatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system and a computer program. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of an operating system and computer programs in the non-volatile storage medium. The network interface of the intelligent terminal is used for being connected and communicated with an external terminal through a network. The computer program is executed by a processor to implement a method of generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference for synthetic aperture radar. The display screen of the intelligent terminal can be a liquid crystal display screen or an electronic ink display screen, and the temperature sensor of the intelligent terminal is arranged inside the intelligent terminal in advance and used for detecting the operating temperature of internal equipment.
It will be understood by those skilled in the art that the schematic diagram of fig. 7 is only a block diagram of a part of the structure related to the solution of the present invention, and does not constitute a limitation to the intelligent terminal to which the solution of the present invention is applied, and a specific intelligent terminal may include more or less components than those shown in the figure, or combine some components, or have different arrangements of components.
In one embodiment, an intelligent terminal is provided that includes a memory, and one or more programs, wherein the one or more programs are stored in the memory and configured to be executed by the one or more processors, the one or more programs including instructions for:
acquiring a target synthetic aperture radar signal, and constructing a false target signal according to the target synthetic aperture radar signal;
obtaining a single-frequency threshold frequency and a single-frequency threshold phase according to the false target signal, and obtaining a single-frequency threshold signal according to the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase;
and obtaining a 1-bit quantized signal according to the single-frequency threshold signal and the false target signal, and performing interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming signal.
It will be understood by those skilled in the art that all or part of the processes of the methods of the embodiments described above can be implemented by hardware instructions of a computer program, which can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, can include the processes of the embodiments of the methods described above. Any reference to memory, storage, databases, or other media used in embodiments provided herein may include non-volatile and/or volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), Programmable ROM (PROM), Electrically Programmable ROM (EPROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory can include Random Access Memory (RAM) or external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM is available in a variety of forms such as Static RAM (SRAM), Dynamic RAM (DRAM), Synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), Double Data Rate SDRAM (DDRSDRAM), Enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), Synchronous Link DRAM (SLDRAM), Rambus Direct RAM (RDRAM), direct bus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and memory bus dynamic RAM (RDRAM).
In summary, the present invention discloses a method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference for a synthetic aperture radar, an intelligent terminal, and a storage medium, wherein the method includes:
acquiring a target synthetic aperture radar signal, and constructing a false target signal according to the target synthetic aperture radar signal; preparing for generating a single-frequency threshold signal subsequently, obtaining a single-frequency threshold frequency and a single-frequency threshold phase according to the false target signal, and obtaining the single-frequency threshold signal according to the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase; the single-frequency threshold signal is used for decomposing harmonic waves caused by 1-bit quantization, the 1-bit quantized signal is obtained according to the single-frequency threshold signal and the false target signal, the complexity of an interference machine is reduced, and the 1-bit quantized signal is subjected to interference modulation to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming signal.
Based on the above embodiments, the present invention discloses a method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoofing interference for synthetic aperture radar, and it should be understood that the application of the present invention is not limited to the above examples, and it is obvious to those skilled in the art that modifications and changes can be made based on the above description, and all such modifications and changes are intended to fall within the scope of the appended claims.

Claims (10)

1. A method of generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoof interference for synthetic aperture radar, the method comprising:
acquiring a target synthetic aperture radar signal, and constructing a false target signal according to the target synthetic aperture radar signal;
obtaining a single-frequency threshold frequency and a single-frequency threshold phase according to the false target signal, and obtaining a single-frequency threshold signal according to the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase;
and obtaining a 1-bit quantized signal according to the single-frequency threshold signal and the false target signal, and performing interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming signal.
2. The method of generating 1-bit multi-decoy spoof interference for synthetic aperture radar as claimed in claim 1 wherein said constructing a false target signal from said target synthetic aperture radar signal comprises:
acquiring a slope distance process; wherein the skew distance process is the distance from a deception jamming machine to the SAR system;
and performing fusion calculation on the slope distance process and the target synthetic aperture radar signal to obtain a false target signal.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the deriving a single-frequency threshold frequency and a single-frequency threshold phase from the decoy target signal comprises:
calculating scattering distances of two false scatterers of the false target signal;
performing distance translation on the scattering distance and the slope distance process to obtain single-frequency threshold frequency;
and carrying out azimuth translation on the scattering distance and the slope distance process to obtain a single-frequency threshold phase.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein obtaining a single frequency threshold signal according to the single frequency threshold frequency and the single frequency threshold phase comprises:
acquiring single-frequency threshold amplitude;
and determining a single-frequency threshold signal according to the single-frequency threshold amplitude, the single-frequency threshold frequency and the single-frequency threshold phase.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the obtaining a 1-bit quantized signal according to the single-frequency threshold signal and the false target signal, and performing interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target spoof interference signal comprises:
acquiring the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal;
acquiring the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal;
obtaining a 1-bit quantized signal according to the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal and the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal;
and carrying out interference modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-decoy deception jamming signal.
6. The method of claim 5, wherein the deriving a 1-bit quantized signal from the instantaneous amplitude of the decoy target signal and the instantaneous amplitude of the single frequency threshold signal comprises:
when the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal is greater than the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal, the 1-bit quantized signal value corresponding to the instantaneous moment of the false target signal is 1;
when the instantaneous amplitude of the false target signal is less than or equal to the instantaneous amplitude of the single-frequency threshold signal, the 1-bit quantized signal value corresponding to the instantaneous moment of the false target signal is 0;
a number of said 1-bit quantized signal values are combined into a 1-bit quantized signal.
7. The method of claim 5, wherein the interference modulating the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-decoy spoofed interference signal comprises:
and performing distance modulation and azimuth modulation on the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming signal.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the distance-modulating and the direction-modulating the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a 1-bit multi-decoy spoof-jamming signal comprises:
adjusting the time delay of the 1-bit quantized signal to obtain a distance-modulated 1-bit quantized signal;
and modulating the Doppler frequency of the 1-bit quantized signal after distance modulation to obtain a 1-bit multi-false-target deception jamming signal.
9. An intelligent terminal comprising a memory, and one or more programs, wherein the one or more programs are stored in the memory, and wherein the one or more programs being configured to be executed by the one or more processors comprises instructions for performing the method of any of claims 1-8.
10. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, wherein instructions in the storage medium, when executed by a processor of an electronic device, enable the electronic device to perform the method of any of claims 1-8.
CN202110744105.8A 2021-06-30 2021-06-30 Method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy deception jamming aiming at synthetic aperture radar Active CN113484829B (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202110744105.8A CN113484829B (en) 2021-06-30 2021-06-30 Method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy deception jamming aiming at synthetic aperture radar

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202110744105.8A CN113484829B (en) 2021-06-30 2021-06-30 Method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy deception jamming aiming at synthetic aperture radar

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CN113484829A true CN113484829A (en) 2021-10-08
CN113484829B CN113484829B (en) 2023-09-05

Family

ID=77937472

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CN202110744105.8A Active CN113484829B (en) 2021-06-30 2021-06-30 Method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy deception jamming aiming at synthetic aperture radar

Country Status (1)

Country Link
CN (1) CN113484829B (en)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN116068501A (en) * 2023-04-04 2023-05-05 烟台初心航空科技有限公司 Method for generating anti-interference radio altimeter modulation signal

Citations (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4045795A (en) * 1975-06-23 1977-08-30 Nasa Charge-coupled device data processor for an airborne imaging radar system
CN106772280A (en) * 2017-01-23 2017-05-31 深圳大学 A kind of SAR cheating interferences production method and system for being based on a bit sample
CN108508438A (en) * 2018-04-09 2018-09-07 深圳大学 A kind of a bit echo data acquisition method and system based on single-frequency time-varying threshold value
CN111077503A (en) * 2020-01-16 2020-04-28 深圳大学 Mixed interference signal generation method, device, equipment and medium
CN111077505A (en) * 2020-01-16 2020-04-28 深圳大学 Mixed interference signal generation method, device, equipment and medium
CN111077504A (en) * 2020-01-16 2020-04-28 深圳大学 Mixed interference signal generation method, device, equipment and medium
CN111896952A (en) * 2020-06-17 2020-11-06 深圳大学 Multi-target deception jamming method and device based on 1-bit quantization
CN112799023A (en) * 2020-12-25 2021-05-14 中国人民解放军63892部队 Multi-false-target interference method for fast forwarding

Patent Citations (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4045795A (en) * 1975-06-23 1977-08-30 Nasa Charge-coupled device data processor for an airborne imaging radar system
CN106772280A (en) * 2017-01-23 2017-05-31 深圳大学 A kind of SAR cheating interferences production method and system for being based on a bit sample
CN108508438A (en) * 2018-04-09 2018-09-07 深圳大学 A kind of a bit echo data acquisition method and system based on single-frequency time-varying threshold value
CN111077503A (en) * 2020-01-16 2020-04-28 深圳大学 Mixed interference signal generation method, device, equipment and medium
CN111077505A (en) * 2020-01-16 2020-04-28 深圳大学 Mixed interference signal generation method, device, equipment and medium
CN111077504A (en) * 2020-01-16 2020-04-28 深圳大学 Mixed interference signal generation method, device, equipment and medium
CN111896952A (en) * 2020-06-17 2020-11-06 深圳大学 Multi-target deception jamming method and device based on 1-bit quantization
CN112799023A (en) * 2020-12-25 2021-05-14 中国人民解放军63892部队 Multi-false-target interference method for fast forwarding

Non-Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
BO ZHAO等: "Deceptive SAR Jamming Based on 1-bit Sampling and Time-Varying Thresholds", 《IEEE JOURNAL OF SELECTED TOPICS IN APPLIED EARTH OBSERVATIONS AND REMOTE SENSING》, vol. 11, no. 3, pages 939 - 950, XP011678835, DOI: 10.1109/JSTARS.2018.2793247 *
BO ZHAO等: "One-Bit SAR Imaging Based on Single-Frequency Thresholds", 《IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON GEOSCIENCE AND REMOTE SENSING》, vol. 57, no. 9, pages 7017 - 7032, XP011742579, DOI: 10.1109/TGRS.2019.2910284 *

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN116068501A (en) * 2023-04-04 2023-05-05 烟台初心航空科技有限公司 Method for generating anti-interference radio altimeter modulation signal

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN113484829B (en) 2023-09-05

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN110412568B (en) Distance fuzzy clutter suppression method based on extended azimuth phase coding
CN110109117B (en) Satellite-borne synthetic aperture radar convolution modulation interference method based on frequency control array
CN108051812B (en) Satellite-borne SAR moving target detection method based on two-dimensional speed search
CN111142105A (en) ISAR imaging method for complex moving target
CN110632594B (en) Long-wavelength spaceborne SAR imaging method
Chang et al. An advanced scheme for range ambiguity suppression of spaceborne SAR based on blind source separation
CN111896952B (en) Multi-target deception jamming method and device based on 1-bit quantization
CN113093122B (en) Method for synthesizing fast scene deception jamming of aperture radar
CN113655478B (en) Imaging method and device
Savci et al. Trials of a noise-modulated radar demonstrator–first results in a marine environment
CN110879391B (en) Radar image data set manufacturing method based on electromagnetic simulation and missile-borne echo simulation
CN112285658A (en) Recursive computation based method for rapidly generating satellite-borne SAR deception jamming signal
Zhao et al. One-bit splitting deceptive jamming against SAR
CN113484829B (en) Method for generating 1-bit multi-decoy deception jamming aiming at synthetic aperture radar
CN115184877A (en) Multi-parameter optimization SAR anti-interference method based on RD imaging
CN108845318B (en) Satellite-borne high-resolution wide-range imaging method based on Relax algorithm
CN112255596B (en) Space-borne SAR deception jamming signal generation method based on spatial frequency interpolation
CN116520256B (en) Airborne early warning radar interference recognition method and device based on deep learning
CN115629360B (en) Linear frequency modulation short pulse sampling modulation forwarding interference signal generation method
CN106980110A (en) A kind of sidelobe cancellation method of adaptive confrontation active pressing jamming containing multipath
Xu et al. Backward projection imaging of through-wall radar based on airspace nonuniform sampling
Saeedi A new hybrid method for synthetic aperture radar deceptive jamming
Ji et al. A fast false large-scene images generation method against SAR based on two-dimension CZT and multi-transmitter cooperation
CN112835006A (en) Method and system for tracking radar small-target detection on sea based on interframe accumulation
CN104849713A (en) SLIM algorithm-based SAR imaging realization method

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PB01 Publication
PB01 Publication
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
GR01 Patent grant
GR01 Patent grant