CN110176970A - Signal quality evaluation method aiming at cryptographic chip bypass attack - Google Patents
Signal quality evaluation method aiming at cryptographic chip bypass attack Download PDFInfo
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- CN110176970A CN110176970A CN201910523740.6A CN201910523740A CN110176970A CN 110176970 A CN110176970 A CN 110176970A CN 201910523740 A CN201910523740 A CN 201910523740A CN 110176970 A CN110176970 A CN 110176970A
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 32
- 238000013441 quality evaluation Methods 0.000 title abstract description 4
- 239000011159 matrix material Substances 0.000 claims abstract description 24
- 238000005070 sampling Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 11
- 238000003780 insertion Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 5
- 230000037431 insertion Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 5
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000005855 radiation Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000005670 electromagnetic radiation Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005265 energy consumption Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012827 research and development Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000011664 signaling Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B17/00—Monitoring; Testing
- H04B17/30—Monitoring; Testing of propagation channels
- H04B17/309—Measuring or estimating channel quality parameters
- H04B17/336—Signal-to-interference ratio [SIR] or carrier-to-interference ratio [CIR]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Quality & Reliability (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Electromagnetism (AREA)
- Complex Calculations (AREA)
Abstract
The invention relates to a signal quality evaluation method aiming at bypass attack of a cryptographic chip, which comprises the following steps: inputting a random plaintext sequence into a password chip, and inserting a fixed plaintext sequence into the random plaintext sequence according to a certain mode; sampling the bypass signal of the cipher chip to obtain a bypass signal matrix W with m rows and n columns. Dividing a bypass signal matrix W into a fixed plaintext track and a random plaintext track according to the insertion rule of a fixed plaintext by using a behavior unit, storing the divided fixed plaintext track into a fixed plaintext group, and storing the divided random plaintext track into a random plaintext group; respectively calculating the variance of each column in the two signal groups, and calculating the corresponding signal-to-noise ratio value of each column of the bypass signal matrix W according to the obtained values; and judging the quality of the bypass signal according to the signal-to-noise ratio value corresponding to each column of the obtained bypass signal matrix W. The method and the device can accurately evaluate the quality of the bypass signal of the cipher chip to be attacked on the premise of unknown keys.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of by-passing signal method for evaluating quality, specifically a kind of to be directed to crypto chip bypass attack
Signal quality evaluating method.
Background technique
With the arrival of information age, the importance of information security becomes increasingly conspicuous.In order to protect information security, present information
System generallys use encryption method and handles secret information.By many years research and development, the mathematics safety of cryptographic algorithm
Abundant verifying has been obtained.However, cryptographic algorithm needs IC chip as realization carrier, including general micro process
The forms such as device, special encryption chip are referred to as " crypto chip ".In recent years, the safety of crypto chip receives bypass
Attack seriously threatens.The letter such as electric current can be consumed in integrated circuit operational process and generates electromagnetic radiation, heat radiation, light radiation
Number, i.e. by-passing signal (Side Channel Signal, also referred to as side channel signal).It is demonstrated experimentally that the variation of by-passing signal with
The compact internal structure of integrated circuit is related, has not only included operation correlation, but also include data dependence.Bypass attack method is just
It is that the data in crypto chip ciphering process are speculated using the data dependence of by-passing signal, thus breaking cryptographic keys,
A variety of cryptographic systems are successfully cracked.The implementation of bypass attack is highly dependent on the by-passing signal of crypto chip.By-passing signal matter
Amount is higher, and the sample size needed is fewer, and the success rate of attack is higher, and required attack time is shorter.Conversely, the sample then needed
Quantity is more, and attack is also more difficult to success.By-passing signal acquisition usually requires longer time with analysis.If by-passing signal
Sampling condition is excessively poor, and the sample size for needing to acquire will greatly increase, and the time for acquiring and analyzing, which will also greatly increase, (up to be counted
Hour or even a couple of days), in some instances it may even be possible to it can not success attack.Therefore, when acquiring by-passing signal, if it is possible to what is collected
By-passing signal quality is assessed, and adjustment acquisition system can be determined the need for according to assessment result, and can estimate attack institute
The sample size needed (according to the correlation between the related coefficient of the propositions such as Guilley and by-passing signal signal-to-noise ratio).But now
There are no by-passing signal of the relevant technology to crypto chip to carry out quality evaluation.
Summary of the invention
It is an object of the invention to provide a kind of signal quality evaluating methods for crypto chip bypass attack, to solve
The problem of method of quality evaluation is carried out to crypto chip by-passing signal currently not yet.
The present invention is implemented as follows: a kind of signal quality evaluating method for crypto chip bypass attack, including with
Lower step:
A. random plaintext sequence is inputted to crypto chip, and is inserted into fixation according to certain mode in random plaintext sequence
Plaintext sequence is with the length of machine plaintext sequence and fixed plaintext sequence is all n;
B. the by-passing signal of crypto chip is sampled, samples and obtains m by-passing signal track, in every bars track
Comprising n sample point, the by-passing signal matrix W of m row n column is thus obtained;
C. by by-passing signal matrix W with behavior unit according to the insertion rule of fixed plaintext divide into fixed plaintext track with
Random plaintext track, the fixation plaintext track separated is deposited into fixed plaintext group, and the random plaintext track separated is stored in
Into random plaintext group;
D. the variance respectively arranged in fixed plaintext group and random plaintext group is calculated, by-passing signal square is calculated according to obtained value
The corresponding snr value of each column of battle array W;
E. the quality of by-passing signal is judged according to the corresponding snr value of each column of obtained by-passing signal matrix W.
In step a, fixed plaintext sequence is inserted into using fixed intervals mode, if interval coefficient be k, every k-1 item with
Machine plaintext sequence is inserted into a fixed plaintext sequence.
The fixed plaintext sequence being inserted into step a is full 0 value sequence or complete 1 value sequence.
In step a, k value appropriate is chosen according to sampling total amount, makes the fixation plaintext sequence being inserted into random plaintext sequence
Number of columns is moderate, and general fixed plaintext sequence quantity is no less than 50.
In step d, the variance for organizing a certain column in plain text at random is signal entirety variance, the fixed side for organizing corresponding column in plain text
Difference is noise variance, and signal entirety variance is subtracted each other with noise variance, should divided by fixed group in plain text with the absolute value of obtained difference
The variance of column calculates in by-passing signal matrix W in this way to obtain the snr value of respective column in by-passing signal matrix W
The snr value of each column.
In step e, if the snr value of certain data column is significantly higher than other data column in by-passing signal matrix W,
Then show to reorganize in data column and significant data dependence occur, there is preferable signal quality;Otherwise, show to collect
By-passing signal is second-rate, needs to adjust sampling system or the more massive by-passing signal of acquisition.
The present invention devises the mode for fixing and intersecting with random plaintext send in plain text, corresponding by fixed encryption in plain text
The variance of noise is calculated in by-passing signal, is calculated by the corresponding by-passing signal of random encryption in plain text comprising data wave
Dynamic and noise aliquot signal entirety variance, is calculated the signal-to-noise ratio of each signaling point later.It as a result, can be in unknown key
Under the premise of the by-passing signal quality of encryption chip is assessed, and according to assessment result to by-passing signal acquisition system carry out
It improves, sample size needed for bypass attack is estimated, the conventional efficient of bypass attack is improved.It simultaneously can also be according to the present invention
Energy point associated with the data in crypto chip calculating process is determined, so that the implementation for subsequent bypass attack provides position and refers to
Draw.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is flow chart of the invention.
Fig. 2 is the signal-to-noise ratio variation diagram related coefficient corresponding with correct key is used being calculated using the method for the present invention
Situation of change.
Specific embodiment
As shown in Figure 1, the present invention the following steps are included:
A. random plaintext sequence is inputted to crypto chip, and is inserted into fixation according to certain mode in random plaintext sequence
The length of plaintext sequence, random plaintext sequence and fixed plaintext sequence is all n;
B. the by-passing signal of crypto chip is sampled, samples and obtains m by-passing signal track, in every bars track
Comprising n sample point, the by-passing signal matrix W of m row n column is thus obtained;
C. by by-passing signal matrix W with behavior unit according to the insertion rule of fixed plaintext divide into fixed plaintext sequence with
Random plaintext sequence, the fixation plaintext track separated is deposited into fixed plaintext group, and the random plaintext track separated is stored in
Into random plaintext group;
D. the variance respectively arranged in fixed plaintext group and random plaintext group is calculated, by-passing signal square is calculated according to obtained value
The corresponding snr value of each column of battle array W;
E. the quality of by-passing signal is judged according to the corresponding snr value of each column of obtained by-passing signal matrix W.
Wherein, in step a, fixed intervals mode can be used and be inserted into fixed plaintext sequence, can also be inserted using other
Enter mode and is inserted into fixed plaintext sequence.When being inserted into fixed plaintext sequence using fixed intervals mode, if interval coefficient is k, often
A fixed plaintext sequence is inserted into every the random plaintext sequence of k-1 item.Specifically use following process:
Total m item plaintext sequence is inputted to crypto chip in a manner mentioned above, and corresponding by-passing signal track is carried out
Acquisition.
In step a, need to be inserted into fixed plaintext sequence, and common classical fixed plaintext sequence includes full 0 value sequence
Or complete 1 value sequence etc..It simultaneously when being inserted into fixed plaintext sequence, needs to choose k value appropriate according to sampling total amount, make random bright
The moderate number for the fixation plaintext sequence being inserted into literary sequence, general fixed plaintext sequence quantity are no less than 50.Work as insert number
When measuring excessive, sampling efficiency can be reduced;When insertion quantity is too small, statistical result can be made to lose accuracy.
In step c, after obtaining by-passing signal matrix W (m row n column), it is grouped by following processes:
K value in this process is identical as the k value in step a, to distinguish the letter of bypass corresponding to fixed plaintext sequence
Number and random plaintext corresponding to by-passing signal, and the by-passing signal track distinguished is grouped deposits through the above steps
It puts, so as to the calculating of next step.
In step d, the variance for organizing a certain column in plain text at random is signal entirety variance, the fixed side for organizing corresponding column in plain text
Difference is noise variance, and signal entirety variance is subtracted each other with noise variance, should divided by fixed group in plain text with the absolute value of obtained difference
The variance of column calculates in by-passing signal matrix W in this way to obtain the snr value of respective column in by-passing signal matrix W
The snr value of each column.Its detailed process is as follows:
In step e, if the snr value of certain data column is significantly higher than other data column in by-passing signal matrix W,
Then show to reorganize in data column and significant data dependence occur, there is preferable signal quality;Otherwise, show to collect
By-passing signal is second-rate, needs to adjust sampling system or the more massive by-passing signal of acquisition.
Basic principle of the invention is as follows:
Start with first from the composition model of crypto chip by-passing signal:
wtotal=wop+wdata+wconst+wnoise
wtotalFor the gross energy for acquiring by-passing signal, whole Normal Distribution is denoted as wtotal:Its
It is made of multiple components: wopIt represents operation and relies on component, the control unit energy consumption in general corresponding circuits;wdataRepresent number
According to relying on component, energy consumed by data processor in corresponding circuits.Studies have shown that for the data changed at random and
Speech, the variable Normal Distribution might as well assume its obediencewconstRepresent the perseverance of holding circuit basic status
Determine component;wnoiseRepresent noise component(s) comprising a variety of components such as power supply noise, clocking noise, thermal noise, quantizing noise,
The whole normal distribution obeyed mean value and be 0, is denoted as
When acquiring by-passing signal, keep operation and data constant, then wop、wdataAnd wconstIt is constant.At this point, bypass letter
Variance in number is mainly reflected in noise variance, i.e.,Keep operation constant, when only changing data at random, then
wopAnd wconstIt remains unchanged, the variance in by-passing signal is made of data variance and noise variance two parts, simultaneously as making an uproar
Sound component component associated with the data is mutually indepedent, thenIn practical by-passing signal collection process,It is unknown.ButWithIt can be by the method for the invention to sampling condition and encrypting plaintext
It is controlled, to obtain the unbiased estimator of the two.δ in the present invention2Random isδ in the present invention2Const is
ForAnd δ2random-δ2Const can be obtainedIt obtainsSignal-to-noise ratio can be calculated.
As shown in Fig. 2, the figure is that the signal-to-noise ratio variation diagram that method according to the present invention is calculated and use are correctly close
The corresponding related coefficient variation diagram of key.By two figures of comparison it is found that the SNR value that is calculated by the method for the invention with just
True key is corresponding and related coefficient has preferable consistency, demonstrates the validity of the method for the present invention.
Claims (6)
1. a kind of signal quality evaluating method for crypto chip bypass attack, which comprises the following steps:
A. random plaintext sequence is inputted to crypto chip, and is inserted into fixed plaintext according to certain mode in random plaintext sequence
The length of sequence, random plaintext sequence and fixed plaintext sequence is all n;
B. the by-passing signal of crypto chip is sampled, sampling obtain m by-passing signal track, include in every bars track
Thus n sample point obtains the by-passing signal matrix W of m row n column;
C. by-passing signal matrix W is divided into fixed plaintext track and random according to the insertion rule of fixed plaintext with behavior unit
The fixation plaintext track separated is deposited into fixed plaintext group by plaintext track, by the random plaintext track separated be deposited into
In machine plaintext group;
D. the variance respectively arranged in fixed plaintext group and random plaintext group is calculated, by-passing signal matrix W is calculated according to obtained value
It is each to arrange corresponding snr value;
E. the quality of by-passing signal is judged according to the corresponding snr value of each column of obtained by-passing signal matrix W.
2. the signal quality evaluating method according to claim 1 for crypto chip bypass attack, which is characterized in that
In step a, fixed plaintext sequence is inserted into using fixed intervals mode, if interval coefficient is k, every the random plaintext sequence of k-1 item
It is inserted into a fixed plaintext sequence.
3. the signal quality evaluating method according to claim 1 for crypto chip bypass attack, which is characterized in that
The fixed plaintext sequence being inserted into step a is full 0 value sequence or complete 1 value sequence.
4. the signal quality evaluating method according to claim 2 for crypto chip bypass attack, which is characterized in that
In step a, k value appropriate is chosen according to sampling total amount, makes the fixation plaintext sequence moderate number being inserted into random plaintext sequence,
General fixed plaintext sequence quantity is no less than 50.
5. the signal quality evaluating method according to claim 1 for crypto chip bypass attack, which is characterized in that
In step d, the variance for organizing a certain column in plain text at random is signal entirety variance, and the fixed variance for organizing corresponding column in plain text is noise side
Difference, signal entirety variance are subtracted each other with noise variance, organize the variance of the column divided by fixed plaintext with the absolute value of obtained difference, from
And the snr value of respective column in by-passing signal matrix W is obtained, the noise of each column in by-passing signal matrix W is calculated in this way
Ratio.
6. the signal quality evaluating method according to claim 1 for crypto chip bypass attack, which is characterized in that
In step e, if the snr value of certain data column is significantly higher than other data column in by-passing signal matrix W, show to reorganize
There is significant data dependence in data column, there is preferable signal quality;Otherwise, show the by-passing signal matter collected
It measures poor, needs to adjust sampling system or the more massive by-passing signal of acquisition.
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